




# Der Krieg zur See 1914-1918

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# The war at sea 1914-1918

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The War in the North Sea Fifth Volume



With numerous cards and inserts

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Berlin 1925 / published by E. S. Mittler & Sons<sup>1</sup>

# The war in the North Sea

Edited by O. Groos  
Fregattenkapitän

Fifth Volume From January to June 1916



With 81 sketches, maps, tables and attachments

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Berlin 1925 / published by E. S. Mittler & Sons<sup>2</sup>



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## Preface.

The present V North Sea volume from the overall presentation “The War at Sea 1914 to 1918” covers the period from January to June 1916. In this section, the warfare in the North Sea underwent a fundamental change. After a year of extreme restraint in the activities of the High Seas Fleet, the situation urged a decision with all its might. On the German side, new men had taken over the command of the fleet, and from the beginning of 1916 onwards all operations of the German High Sea Forces were dominated by the unified idea of striving for battle with purpose. The assessment of the "strategic situation on land" also indicated that a "more stringent offensive at sea" would appear to be desirable. It was therefore not difficult to obtain the approval of His Majesty the Emperor for the new operational program of the German naval command. An advance of the entire High Sea Forces into the Hoofden at the beginning of March 1916 was followed by a bombardment of the English coast near Lowestoft in April. When immediately afterwards the submarines had to be withdrawn again due to a decision of the political leadership from the newly opened trade war, they too were incorporated into the operations of the high seas and found a purely military use before and during an advance of the same into the Skagerrak beginning at the end of May.

The lively activity of the German fleet that suddenly set in soon sparked counter movements in English. However, they did not get beyond the support of repeated aircraft attacks against the German airship hangars. After the bombardment of Lowestoft, the British fleet also pursued the goal more closely than before of engaging in major combat operations in the North Sea.<sup>4</sup>

Contributing to this was the fact that the Russian ally, under the pressure of a blockade, which he was no less exposed to than Germany, demanded that the British fleet be more forceful to relieve the pressure. At the end of May an undertaking very similar to that of the German was in preparation on the English side, and so the strategic development of its own accord now hastened to the climax of the North Sea warfare, which is marked by the battle of the Skagerrak. The previous history and the course of this battle therefore form the essential content of this volume.

Much has already been written about the sea battle off the Skagerrak, which, according to the number of forces deployed, must be described as the greatest of all time. The two fleet chiefs leading in the battle, Admiral Scheer in the book "Deutschlands Hochseeflotte im Weltkriege", Admiral Jellicoe in "The Grand Fleet 1914–1916", gave detailed descriptions. Personal experiences are provided by Korvettenkapitän v. Hase been recorded in the book "Die zwei weißen Völker" and by Lieutenant H. W. Fawcett and G. W. W. Hooper in the compilation "The Fighting at Jutland". Then followed in England that of Sir Julian Corbett in the III. Volume of "Naval Operations" given "semi-official" description under the title "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland" is the official description of the battle published directly by the British Admiralty. Both of these works have the disadvantage, however, that their editors, apart from the already published immediate report by Admiral Scheer, had no official German material available to them.

In contrast, the official English material was almost completely available when the present German presentation was being processed. As early as December 1920, I had forced the British Admiralty, giving in to the pressure of public opinion in England, to submit a blue book to Parliament under the title "Battle of Jutland, Official Despatches", in which there were copies of all war diaries, battle reports and reports Maps of the English ships and vehicles involved in the battle with apparently only very small expansions are included.<sup>5</sup>

Although this extensive work is incomprehensible to the layman with the abundance of disordered material, for the expert it offers a treasure trove of reliable information for assessing the events on the English side, all the more valuable because the reports were originally by no means intended for publication. But since the editor of the present volume was at the same time completely available the corresponding, no less detailed material of the German ships and units, I was given the opportunity here for the first time to give a presentation based on the official material on the pages. This distinguishes the present description from everything that has hitherto been written in German and English about the battle of the Skagerrak.

When depicting a sea battle, the processor has to go other ways than that of a land battle. In naval combat, on the one hand, the combat power is concentrated in a relatively small number of units, and, on the other hand, the effects of the individual heavy shells, torpedoes, and mines are of such importance that they must be investigated in every detail if at all possible. Furthermore, during the high speed of the ships, I play the battles in a confined space and with a high concentration of fire at such a speed that I am forced to fight in seconds and minutes in fighting and disagreements between the leaders, which is spread over hours and days in land wars. In view of the abundance of events and observations that overwhelm me, my memory would fail if it was not part of the special peculiarity of combat operations, at least in the larger ships, that everything relating to them, in particular navigation, the use of weapons and machines, evolved during the violent fighting is immediately recorded at different locations on the ship, and that activity is automatically resumed at other locations on the ship in the event of a breakdown in one recording station. So it happens that the battle records of both the German and the English ships that took part in the battle off the Skagerrak contain observations of the fighting, times, sketches and route maps in a quantity and accuracy that the layman can hardly believe.<sup>6</sup>

There is therefore only rarely a deficiency, but much more often it is precisely the overabundance of material from which the difficulties in processing arise. No observer was able to grasp more than partial sections of the whole from one location, especially with the many alternations and constantly changing visibility conditions of the battle, and in the various records I find a number of errors and contradictions, which vary with the duration of the fight and the number of missed skirmishes is increasing. This applies in particular to the route maps and battle sketches of the ships. As a result of inevitable errors in navigation, these often reveal differences in length and breadth in the location of the individual ships, which could only be eliminated by means of compensation. In the case of the small cruisers, airships, torpedo and submarines, this method also fails in some cases, so that it is not always possible to reliably indicate the location of small units for certain phases of the battle. Nonetheless, the cartographic picture of the battle as a whole comes so close to reality that it can lay claim to historical accuracy.

The artillery information is sufficient enough to accurately timed almost 65% of all heavy hits that occurred on the German and English sides and to present them in descriptions and maps.

Incidentally, it was necessary to write about 10,000 German and English radio messages and signals, about 300 extensive battle reports and war diaries, to break them down in time and, like parts of a mosaic, to fit them into the framework of the whole. Even though the representation in language, writing and map is only able to incompletely follow the breathtaking pace of the mighty events, in this way it was ultimately possible to give a picture of the battle, which comes pretty close to reality, admittedly a picture that none of the participants, especially those who were responsible for leading the whole thing, could not win at that time during the struggle.<sup>7</sup>

With such a reconstruction there is therefore the danger that the leaders of the battle will retrospectively assume a greater knowledge of the processes than they had at the time and which should have been decisive for their decisions. In this mistake, Admiral Jellicoe sees the main flaws in the official presentation of the British Admiralty. But even Sir Julian Corbett's work is not entirely free from allegations of motives that were subsequently established, which he ascribes in particular to the German naval commander, and "in some ways it would be different if he had witnessed the battle as an eyewitness. In contrast to this, the editor of the present volume, as must be shown in the interest of evaluating the work, participated in the battle as a navigational officer on S.M.S. "von der Tann".

On the basis of the material now available, there should hardly be any disagreement among experts about the actual course of the battle. Even today the fight over the pros and cons of the Commander's conclusions in battle rages all the more violently and does not stop at the two official or semi-official statements mentioned. For example, Sir Julian Corbett's work has a declaration by the Admiralty attached to it that some of the principles represented in the book, particularly the tendency to belittle the importance of slaughter and penetration to the point of a decision, are in direct contradiction with the ideas of the Lords of the Admiralty. But if the official presentation by the Admiralty does not enjoy general approval, it is, as can be seen from an appendix, described by Admiral Jellicoe as incorrect on several points and in many cases. On the other hand, it must be emphasized that the present German presentation, which was made available to all the leaders responsible in the battle, in particular by Admiral Scheer and Admiral Ritter v. Hipper has been completely approved. The result of this work is that the German claim to victory in the battle of the Skagerrak withstands even the most rigorous historical research. It must therefore fill the whole German people with proud satisfaction to have emerged from such a tremendous test of morality, character, intelligence and technical ability, as shown in this battle, in such glory.<sup>8</sup>



The example that those who stepped, suffered and sighed on German ships in front of the Skagerrak gave their people, to them a sacred and inalienable legacy! They acted according to the words of Frederick the Great: "It is not necessary that I live, but that I do my duty, that I fight to save the fatherland."<sup>9</sup>

March 1925.

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Drawn by the conductor Herzog.

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## Abbreviations and Explanations. [added from North Sea - Volume 1]

A.-Gr	=	Reconnaissance Group.	Nm.	=	Afternoon,
A.- L	=	Reconnaissance Line.	NE. [NO]	=	Northeast.
Armier.	=	Armament (e.g. 8 - 10.5 - 8 guns of 10.5 cm caliber).	north.	=	north
B. B.	=	port.	NW.	=	Northwest
	=	Bay.	E [O]	=	East.
B. d. A	=	Commander of the scout ships.	Ostl. Lg	=	Eastern length
Bnk.	=	Bank (shallow water, mostly dangerous for shipping).	Pzkrz	=	Armored cruiser
(Bk.).	=		S	=	South
cm	=	centimeter	S.K.	=	Rapid fire cannon.
Div	=	Division (association of several war vehicles).	Schlikrz	=	Battle cruiser.
Dpfr	=	steamer	Schw	=	headlights
dtsh	=	German	sm	=	nautical mile (1852 m).
engl	=	English	S. M. Krz.	=	His Majesty's cruiser.
E S	=	detection signal	S.M.S.	=	His Majesty's ship.
Fl. or.	=	Flotilla (in the German fleet, 11 to 14 smaller war vehicles, torpedo boats, submarines, etc.).			
Flott	=				
Fsch.	=	beacon of lightship	SE [SO]	=	Southeast
F.T.	=	Spark telegraphy, spark telegraphic	St. B	=	starboard
F.d.T	=	leader of the torpedo boats	SW	=	southwest
F. d.U	=	leader of the submarines	t	=	ton (1 t - 1000 kg weight).
G. or	=	Squadron (association of 6 to 8 large ships of the line or cruisers as a tactical unit of a fleet).	T flotilla.	=	Torpedo boat flotilla
Geschw.	=		Tpd	=	torpedo
Greenw.	=	Greenwich (longitude from Greenwich's prime meridian).	Tpdbl	=	torpedo boat.
gsch	=	protected (lightly armored).	Tpd.-N	=	Torpedo tube (permanently installed launching tube).
h.	=	Time (hour).	Treffen	=	formation of 2 ships
Hfl	=	Half-flotilla (torpedo boat a formation of 5 to 7 torpedo boats).	U-boat	=	submarine
Kbt.	=	Gunboat	U-hfl.	=	Submarine half-flotilla
Kl. or.	=	small cruiser.			
kl. Kl.	=				
Krz. .	=				
Km.	=	Kilometer	U-Flotilla	=	submarine flotilla
Krz	=	Cruiser	Vm	=	morning,
l. oder	=	light	Vpl.	=	Outpost line
lcht.	=				
Lft.-	=	Airship	W	=	West
Sch.	=				
Lin.-	=	Ship of the line. (battleship)	Wasserverdr	=	water displacement (the weight of the water displaced by the submerged hull is equal to the weight of the entire hull and is expressed in "t" at 1000 kA each),
Sch.	=				
M.	=	Noon	west	=	west
M. S.	=	Minesweeping Division.	Dest	=	destroyer (torpedo boat destroyer).
D..	=				
mtgs.	=	at noon.		=	
mtnchts	=	at midnight		=	
mw.	=	misleading.		=	
N	=	North.		=	
Not	=	night, at night.		=	



Remarks.

Times = Central European Time. Courses misleading. Declination = 13.25° West.

The square map (Map 5, Volume I) and the abbreviations and explanations see: “The War in the North Sea”, Volume I. Additional explanations of the maps see the map portfolio.<sup>20</sup>

### Translator’s Notes

#### Translator’s Notes (Ver 1.0)

Dear reader:

Please find my English language version of Book 5 in the North Sea series. Book 5 covers the German Navy’s activities leading up and the Battle of Jutland. I’m growing more confident with my translations, and hope my readers find the work interesting.

I have worked on most of the books of the German War at Sea 1914 – 1918 series, and published seven of them on my site on [archives.com](https://www.archives.com). Below I have included links to all the German language books available online.

I have also added from Book 1 of this series the list of abbreviations and the quadrant Map, and the German language chart of abbreviations. Also below is my rank conversion table for the officer grades.

Finally this work is likely not in its final form. I still lack any means to reproduce the maps enclosed with the book. My equipment can only render low resolution images which are next to useless, but as anyone who checks online, the maps there are mostly missing. As this is a historical research project without any compassion, we have to make due with the equipment on hand.

R. Denny


February 2022

(aka Bad Cat 433)

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# Square Map from Book #1



## Instructions for use:

1. The square maps should allow a short description of the approximate location at sea.

2. Each map - has up to 9 main squares, each of which is divided into 850 small squares. The main squares are numbered 1-9, these numbers are called additional numbers. For a more detailed description of a square, they must always be specified if they can be confused with squares of the same name that are in the area of another.
3. The identical additional numbers are spatially so far apart that confusion is usually ruled out. If, in exceptional cases, this error is possible, the name of the map must also be given, e.g. North Sea 126γ additional number 4.<sup>21</sup>

The Greek alphabet  
 α-alpha, β-beta, γ-gamma, δ-delta, ε-epsilon, ζ-zeta, η-eta,  
 Not used: θ ι κ λ μ ν ξ ο π ρ ς υ φ χ ψ ω

Officer rank equivalents (off the top of my head, so not gospel)

Germany	UK	USN	Germany	UK	USN
<i>Großadmiral</i>	Fleet Admiral	Fleet Admiral	<i>Fregattenkapitän</i>	Commander	Commander
<i>Generaladmiral</i>	Admiral	Admiral	<i>Korvettenkapitän</i>	Lt Comdr	Lt Comdr
<i>Admiral</i>	Vice Adm	Vice Adm	<i>Kapitänleutnant</i>	Lieutenant	Lieutenant
<i>Vizeadmiral</i>	Rear Adm	Rear Adm	<i>Oberleutnant zur See</i>	Sub Leut	Leut (jr)†
<i>Konteradmiral</i>	Comandore	Rear Adm (LH)*	<i>Leutnant zur See</i>	Midshipman	Ensign
<i>Kapitän zur See</i>	Captain	Captain	<i>Fähnrich zur See</i>	Sea cadet	Midshipman

\* Lower Half  
 † Junior Grade

I know what you are thinking, the *zur See* is unnecessary but it designates a line officer with the right to command a vessel, not a technical officer like a Doctor or Engineer.

<sup>21</sup> Gebrauchsanweisung:

1. Die Quadratkarten sollen eine kurze Bezeichnung des ungefähren Standortes auf See ermöglichen.  
 2. Jede Karte – hat bis zu 9 Hauptquadrate, von denen jedes in 850 kleine Quadrate geteilt ist. Die Hauptquadrate sind 1-9 nummeriert, diese Zahlen heißen Zusatzzahlen. Sie sind zur näheren Bezeichnung eines Quadrates stets dann mit anzugeben, wenn Verwechslungen mit gleichlautenden Quadraten, die im Gebiete einer anderen liegen, möglich sind.  
 3. Die gleichlautenden Zusatzzahlen liegen räumlich so weit voneinander entfernt, daß Verwechslungen in der Regel ausgeschlossen sind. Sollte dies ausnahmsweise doch möglich sein, so muß die Bezeichnung der Karte mit angegeben werden, z.B Nordsee 126γ \_Zusatzzahl 4 .



From Wikipedia

Official printed works

The War at Sea 1914–1918 published by the marine archive / edit. by Eberhard von Mantey; partly ed. by the Department of War Studies / edit. by Kurt Assmann; partly ed. in connection with the Federal Archives-Military Archive of the Working Group for Defense Research / edit. by Walther Hubatsch; partly edit. by the Military History Research Office / edit. by Gerhard P. Groß. Publisher E.S. Mittler, Berlin / Bonn / Hamburg.

**Part 1: *The war in the North Sea***

Bd. 1. [\*Von Kriegsbeginn bis Anf. Sept. 1914.\*](#) Bearb. von [Otto Groos](#): 1920. XV, 293 S. : Mit 60 Kt., Tab. + Anlagen.

Bd. 1. *Von Kriegsbeginn bis Anf. Sept. 1914. Bearb. von Otto Groos: 2. durchgesehene Auflage 1922.* XV, 293 S. : Mit 61 Kt., Tab + Anlagen  
(See my site for translation.)

Bd. 2. [\*Von Anf. Sept. bis Nov. 1914.\*](#) Bearb. von Otto Groos: 1922. XIV, 340, 1 S. : Mit 38 Skizzen, Kt., Tab. + Anlagen.  
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([For my translation, see my site.](#))

Bd. 4. [\*Von Anf. Febr. bis Ende Dez. 1915.\*](#) Bearb. von Otto Groos: 1924. XV, 442 S. : Mit 46 Skizzen, [farb.] Ktn, Tab. + Anl.  
(For my translation, see my site.)

Bd. 5. [\*Von Jan. bis Juni 1916.\*](#) Textband. Bearb. von Otto Groos: 1925. XX, 568 S. : Mit 81 Skizzen, Ktn, Tab. u. Anlagen.  
(translation forthcoming)  
<https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uva.x001131544>

Bd. 5a *Von Jan. bis Juni 1916.* Kartenband. Bearb. von Otto Groos: 1925. Mit 81 Skizzen, 43 Ktn, Tab. u. Anlagen.

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(translation forthcoming)

Bd. 7. [\*Vom Sommer 1917 bis zum Kriegsende 1918.\*](#) Bearb. von Walter Gladisch: 1965. XIV, 368 S. : Mit Ktn. u. 9 Tab.  
<https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015037031005>

Bd. 7. [\*Vom Sommer 1917 bis zum Kriegsende 1918.\*](#) Kritische Edition; Textband und Kartenschuber. im Auftr. des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes bearb. und neu hrsg. von Gerhard P. Groß : 2006. VI, 486 S. ; Mit 4 Kt.-Beil.  
<https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015037031005>  
(translation forthcoming)

## **Part 2: The war in the Baltic Sea**

- Bd. 1. [\*Von Kriegsbeginn bis Mitte März 1915\*](#). Bearb. von [Rudolph Firle](#): 1921. X, 290 S. : Mit 12 Kt. u. Tab.  
([For my translation, see my site.](#))
- Bd. 2. [\*Das Kriegsjahr 1915\*](#). Bearb. von Rudolph Firle: 1929. XVI, 385 S. + Mit 62 Anlagen, Kt., Skizzen u. Tab.  
(translation forthcoming)
- Bd. 3. [\*Von Anfang 1916 bis zum Kriegsende\*](#). Bearb. von [Ernst Freiherr von Gagern](#): 1964. XV, 462 S. : Mit 5 Ktn. u. 14 Beilagen.

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- Bd. 3. [\*Oktober 1915 bis Januar 1917\*](#). Bearb. von Arno Spindler: 1934. XII, 400 S. : Mit 16 mehrfarb. Steindr. Kt. u. 12 Textskizzen.
- Bd. 4. [\*Februar bis Dezember 1917\*](#). Bearb. von Arno Spindler. Nachdr. [d. Ausg.] 1941: 1964. VI, 559 S. : Mit 15 Kt., 7 Textskizzen u. 44 Minenskizzen.  
<https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015027341612>
- Bd. 5. [\*Januar bis November 1918\*](#). Bearb. von Arno Spindler: 1966. VIII, 447 S., 3 Ktn.-Beil. Mit 3 Ktn. u. zahlr. Tab.  
[https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.\\$b743794](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.$b743794)

## **Part 4: The Cruiser War in Foreign Waters**

- Bd. 1. [\*Das Kreuzergeschwader\*](#). Bearb. von [Erich Raeder](#): 1922. Mit zahlr. Kt., Tab. u. Anl.  
([For my translation, see my site.](#))
- Bd. 1. *Das Kreuzergeschwader*. Bearb. von Erich Raeder: 2. verb. Aufl. 1927. XVII, 459 S. : Mit Kt., Tab., Anl., Abb.
- Bd. 2. [\*Die Tätigkeit des Kleinen Kreuzers Emden. Königsberg u. Karlsruhe, Geyer\*](#). Bearb. von Erich Raeder: 1923. XVI, 374 S.
- Bd. 3. [\*Die deutschen Hilfskreuzer\*](#). Bearb. von Eberhard von Mantey: 1937. VI, 374 S. : Mit 51 Skizzen.

## **Part 5: The War in Turkish Waters (*Der Krieg in den türkischen Gewässern*)**

Bd. 1. [Die Mittelmeer-Division](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015030479011). Bearb. von [Hermann Lorey](#): 1928 [Ausg. 1927]. XVI, 430 S. : Mit Skizzen, Kt. u. Anlagen.

<https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015030479011>

(translation forthcoming)

Bd. 2. [Der Kampf um die Meerengen](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015030479029). Bearb. von Hermann Lorey: 1938. XI, 221 S. : Mit 16 Kt. u. 8 Skizzen.

<https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015030479029>

**Part 6: *Die Kämpfe der Kaiserlichen Marine in den deutschen Kolonien* {*The battles of the Imperial Navy in the German colonies*}. Tsingtau; Deutsch-Ostafrika. Bearb. von Kurt Aßmann: 1935. XVI, 330 S., Kt. + Register.**

**Part 7: *Die Überwasserstreitkräfte und ihre Technik*. {*The surface forces and their technology*}. Bearb. von Paul Köppen: 1930. XII, 314 S. + Anlagen.**

I have online links for all the volumes except the last two listed.



## **1. The strategic situation at the beginning of 1916.**

At the beginning of 1916 the situation of the Central Powers, viewed externally and within the framework of the overall strategic situation, was not unfavorable. In the western arena of war, the German troops had achieved great successes in defense and thus achieved a moral superiority over the English-French superiority strength, the value of which was not to be underestimated. In the east, the Russian threat could be considered eliminated for a considerable time. Romania was deterred from an attack for the time being, Bulgaria won as an ally, the Serbian army largely eliminated as a power factor, the dangerous crisis in the Dardanelles eliminated and Turkey relieved (1). And yet I did not let it be seen that peace as the goal of war was any closer. Everywhere, in the east, in the world and in the south, the front froze. The value of the allied Austrian-Hungarian army began to decline, the development of the economic situation in Germany became serious, the decline in mood was disastrous and the hopes of the political leadership for an understanding with England had not been confirmed by anything. Under these circumstances, I broke the ground with the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army that the only way to end the war could be through increased pressure against England, and at the beginning of 1916 I slowly began to loosen the resistance that I had always opposed to all attempts to more openly operate the Navy.

Therefore, on the German side, the naval war now moved more than before into the area of great strategic combinations, and under this influence the image on the northern naval war scene finally began to show more vivid colors, on which so far so powerful forces were seemingly uselessly concentrated.

The year 1916, the beginning of which marked the evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula as part of the larger operations at sea, opened for England on the northern European arena with a not inconsiderable loss.

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1) See Schwarte, "Der große Krieg" Volume II, page 35.<sup>22</sup>

On January 6th, the liner “King Edward VII” capsized in front of the west exit of the Scapa Flow base after an explosion which was due to a mine block set up by a German auxiliary cruiser.

On the basis of the positive experience that had been made during the two-time advance of the "Meteor" with the use of an inconspicuous and not even particularly fast cargo steamer of medium size as an auxiliary cruiser, the Imperial Shipyard Wilhelmshaven began on the orders of the Admiral's staff at the beginning of November 1915 to create a replacement for the lost “Meteor” by converting and arming the English steamer “Pungo”.. As an auxiliary cruiser "Möwe" (1), the ship left the Elbe under Korvettenkapitän Burggraf and Count zu Dohna-Schlodien on December 29th to, based on the experience of the auxiliary steamer "Berlin" and "Meteor" as well as submarine reconnaissance, to pollute the sea area between the end of the Pentland Firth and Cape Wrath (text sketch a and b) with mines. Instead of this task, or in connection with its implementation, the commander was also cleared to pollute North Minch, the sea area off Lough Swilly, Bantry Bay and the Loire and Gironde estuaries, following an operation ordered by the High Sea Forces Command. Then he should turn to the tasks of the trade war in the Atlantic Ocean, as ordered by the Admiralty, if by then he had not determined the return of the ship to be necessary.

The intentional securing of the advance with an airship had failed due to the weather conditions. On the other hand, a submarine, "U 68", captainleutnant Güntzel, cleared up in front of the "Möve". Leaving earlier than the latter, however, apart from an English auxiliary cruiser, which it drove from its outpost position about 60 nm west of Lindesnes during a western storm on the 28th by attempting an attack, it saw no enemy forces. When the "Möwe", disguised as a Swedish steamer, on December 30th, about 50 nm southwest of Bergen in the 60s. Having passed latitude, the submarine turned around, crossed the Skagerrak and Kattegat in the next few days and began the march back to Heligoland on January 5th

On the English side, there had been no lack of measures that could have endangered the advance of the “Möwe”, because since the successful operation of the “Meteor” against the Moray Firth, the British fleet management was always expecting a repetition of the mine contamination of the entrances to bases of the “Grand Fleet”.

---

1) Armament: four 15 cm SK. L/45, a 10.5 cm SK. L/55, two 50 cm torpedo tubes, 500 mines, speed 14 nm, coal supply 3500 t.<sup>23</sup>

Text sketch a.

[illegible]

**Path of the auxiliary cruiser “Möwe” (December 29, 1915 to January 10, 1916).<sup>24</sup>**


Whether a two-day advance of the III. Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth in a south-easterly direction on December 30th and 31st was due to similar considerations or even news of the departure of the German auxiliary cruiser, must remain an open question.

When these ran out, however, the "Möwe" was already high in the north (text sketch a). After an attempt to break through to the west between the Shetland Islands and the Faroe Islands at night, which failed due to bad weather, the auxiliary cruiser went north around the Faroe Islands on January 1 and headed for Sule Skerry west of the Orkney Islands the following day stood at 6 p.m. about 9 nm southwest of this beacon on the starting point of the barriers planned between Cape Wrath and the western exit of the Pentland Firth (text sketch b). Even while the mine was being thrown, the wind picked up considerably and was blowing at around 9:30 p.m. with hurricane force. The ship rolled to 20° on both sides; nevertheless, thanks to the excellent seafaring behavior of the crew, the task was carried out according to plan. Until 11:30 p.m. 11 partial barriers of different lengths with changing pitches were laid out, a total of 252 mines, with a setting of 4.5 to 7.5 m under average low spring water, taking into account the current and tidal range. But the current, sea and wind were so strong that the ship remained until 2 a.m. despite the highest engine output almost on the spot just below Cape Wrath. Only then did it become possible to get off the land with the NW course. Although some lights had been sighted under the coast, which must have come from vehicles, the presence of the auxiliary cruiser had apparently gone unnoticed. On January 3, however, as emerged from intercepted English radio messages, the entire west coast was alarmed apparently with consideration for reported German submarines. The auxiliary cruiser therefore swung out in a wide arc to the west, stood on January 8th between 10th and 5th degrees west longitude in front of the exit of the English Channel and put a mine lock of 238 mines off Bordeaux on the night of January 10th. Then the "Möwe", disguised as an English steamer, disappeared in the Atlantic Ocean in order to wage the same trade war, especially in the southern part, which kept it out of the domestic waters until March (1).

---

1) The trade war of the "Möwe" as well as the details of the mining operation off Bordeaux will be dealt with elsewhere in the entire work (Cruiser War, Volume III).<sup>25</sup>

On January 6th, the liner "Africa" from the III. Battle squadrons passed on the way from Belfast to Scapa lock of the "Möwe" without touching a mine. Almost at the same time, however, the flagship of the III. Battle squadron, "King Edward VII", on the march from Scapa to Belfast in order to repair there.<sup>26</sup>



Minefield of the Auxiliary Cruiser "Möwe" before Pentland Fifth (2. January 1916)



Here it got at 11:47 a.m. about 6 nm NW by N from Strathie Point to the eighth partial block of 57 mines. There was a violent explosion under the starboard engine room, the ship was immediately listed and both engine rooms were full of water. According to the first report that reached Scapa, the detonation appeared to be attributed to an enemy submarine. As a result, the flotilla leader "Kempenfelt" with 12 destroyers immediately pushed forward to the scene of the accident in order to prevent the alleged submarine from further attacks. There the cargo steamer "Melita" had tried to tow the liner, which was lying deep in the water, in spite of the heavy seas, but the towing line broke and at 5 p.m. it was decided to leave the ship for the night. Four destroyers went alongside and disembarked the crew, four hours later the ship capsized and sank. The area between Cape Wrath and the Pentland Firth was now closed to all shipping traffic; but only on the 14th was the last doubt about the cause of the sinking of the "King Edward VII" removed by the driving of a German mine onto the beach at Thurso. Minesweepers dispatched immediately after the accident could not start work on determining the extent of the mine contamination until January 21st and it took until January 28th before a path along the coast that could only be traversed by day and only by warships was created. The auxiliary cruisers were instructed to bypass the minefields to the north from Cape Wrath and to enter Scapa just below the west coast of the Orkney Islands. All other ships had to avoid the area entirely and use the route through the Fair Island Canal, so they were forced to make considerable detours due to the mines of the "Möwe".

At the time, the German side was very unclear about the whereabouts and intentions of the "Grand Fleet". Since the last attack on London (14. X. 15) no airship reconnaissance had been possible either. For all information about the enemy, one was therefore dependent on the rumors circulating in neutral countries and the generally unreliable reports from agents, often even distributed by the enemy. Through these channels it became known on January 5th that allegedly "an English fleet of great size" was being pulled together at Dover and that in the last few days there had been almost only talk of an English landing in the Scheldt in Holland. In this context, intercepted fragments from the English radio traffic, which in reality related to the dispatch of destroyers to the accident site of the "King Edward VII", misinterpreted by the German fleet management to mean that a destroyer advance against the German Bight was probably already intended, but had been canceled due to a western storm.<sup>27</sup>

In any case, all of these things indicated that he should be more vigilant. As a result, for the II., VI. and IX. Torpedo boat flotilla, the so-called attack flotilla, the previous three-hour standby extended to all night. Also, taking into account the most varied of situations, operational plans for advances were worked out so that one keyword was sufficient for the final arrangement. The westerly storm continued, however, in the following days, so that a reconnaissance advance ordered for the night of January 11th over Horn's Reef to the Kleiner Fischer-Bank had to be prematurely broken off by the flotillas because the use of weapons was questioned in the heavy seas.

Towards the middle of the month, rumors of hostile intentions to attack grew livelier. In particular, it was said that on January 16 the English fleet would definitely hit the German Bight. Even if this news was not given undue importance in itself, it led the fleet management to consider again what aims such an English enterprise might have and how it could best be countered.

Borkum and Helgoland were able to defend themselves as soon as the enemy came within the range of the guns on this island. Bombardment of these places from distances at which the German coastal guns could not return fire was possible, but only became effective if it lasted for a long time. Then it would have to be the task of the heavy German naval forces to intervene in good time. List, the northern part of the island of Sylt, was completely unprotected against a bombardment, and even if the material damage of such a bombardment could only be minor, it seemed necessary for moral reasons that in this case also naval forces appear in good time to protect the island. The sea area there did not offer any operations for submarines because the water depths were too shallow. It was more worrying that Norderney was not yet fortified either and therefore the airship hangar in Hage could be endangered by a bombardment across the island. If submarines were available, they could be used to counter the bombardment, otherwise the defense would fall to surface forces. With any such action on the English side, the presence of enemy submarines and mine barriers were to be expected between the enemy and their own exit routes. In the opinion of the fleet management, however, this had to be accepted under certain circumstances.<sup>28</sup>



Above all, however, it made a decision that represented considerable progress compared to the previous way of thinking, in that, in the event of timely news about an intended hostile undertaking, it wanted to be in the open water with the entire armed forces at dawn. This is the only way to intervene on the spot in good time, especially in the case of brief hostile undertakings.

Based on these guidelines, the fleet was supposed to cross the German Bight on January 15th, but it wasn't until the 16th that the weather improved so much that an enemy operation became more likely. In the afternoon, the airships, the hulls of which had already softened during the long stay in the halls, some of which were unheatable, rose to dry, and before dark the ocean forces gathered on Schillig Roadstead, while the only submarine available for defense, the "U 32" took a waiting position in the blocking gap near Norderney. On the following morning (17th I.) the Deep Seas Fleet went to sea for the first time under the flag of Vice Admiral Scheer and, while the cruisers of the II Reconnaissance Group secured in the gaps near Norderney and north of Helgoland, conducted exercises in maneuver in the battle line and in range finding. However, the weather situation was still not calm, so that the airships could not ascend and only a short long-range reconnaissance by airplanes took place. After the exercises, the III. Squadrons, as well as the ships of the line "Friedrich der Große" and "Thüringen", the IV Reconnaissance Group and the V Torpedo Boat Flotilla were sent to the Baltic Sea for urgent exercises, while the other High Seas Forces returned to their anchorages around noon. An intended advance of the attack flotilla to the west to the entrance of the Silver Pit after the exercise day against English armed forces crossing this sea area or approaching the German Bight from there had to be avoided due to the bad weather. The time during the absence of the III. Squadron was to be used, as soon as the weather permitted, to search the exit routes from the Helgoland Bay, west and east of the Amrum Bank to Horns Riff and to the west beyond Borkum for mines, as well as to clarify the more outlying mine-suspect areas by airships. Because of the storm and fog, this work was only progressing slowly.

In contrast to the prevailing ideas on the German side, at the beginning of 1916 the British were further removed than ever from any plans to attack the German Bight; it had become clearer in the meantime how much the Dardanelles operation was hindering any more offensive activity by the British fleet in northern waters.<sup>29</sup>

The most determined representative of the great offensive in the North and Baltic Seas, Lord Fisher, had already resigned from his position as First Sea Lord on May 22, 1915, and finally Admiral Jellicoe felt compelled to oppose a further reduction in the effectiveness of the "Great Fleet" through new deployments of armed forces to the Mediterranean, if otherwise the fleet should remain strong enough to counter the German opponent in the open sea with an offensive approach with a prospect of success. It is true that the increase in the British fleet in new ships of the greatest combat strength was so considerable at the time that it amply compensated for the detachments of older ships to the Mediterranean; But it was precisely through the commissioning of the new ships that the departure of tried and tested crews for the purposes of the Mediterranean warfare was felt twice as much. The five "Queen Elizabeth's", of which "Barham", "Warspite" and "Queen Elizabeth" had already joined the "Grand Fleet" in the autumn and winter of 1915, counted among the new ships. "Malaya" and "Valiant" were to follow in February 1916, and the new liner "Revenge" in March. In the opinion of the fleet chief, the crews for the latter ships could only be created by some of the older ones returning from the Mediterranean and relinquishing the necessary personnel. The previous system of withdrawing specialists for this purpose from the ships in service in the "Grand Fleet" must be broken. The Admiralty thereupon promised the fleet chief that no more rearrangements would take place until April, but the question of a reduction in the Mediterranean forces still had to be seriously considered. For Admiral Jellicoe, however, increasing the strength of the armed forces in the domestic waters seemed all the more necessary as he was of the opinion that on the German side, after the submarine trade war had been abandoned, attempts to weaken the "Grand Fleet" would again come to the fore in military activity. The activity of the latter was therefore mainly limited to preventing this through appropriate and frequently repeated advances and, if possible, to intercept the expected German mine-layers as they approached.<sup>30</sup>

The maintenance of the actual blockade in the shadow of the "Grand Fleet" (1), on the other hand, still fell to the X. Cruiser Squadron, Kontreadmiral DRS de Chair, which in the meantime had reached its planned strength with 24 auxiliary cruisers led by active commanders" (2).

After the government of the United States of America protested more sharply than before against the illegal extension of this blockade to legal neutral trade on November 5, 1915, France was also called upon to take this measure to a greater extent than before to relieve England of the political burden. Since this power itself had no suitable ships, the auxiliary cruisers "Digby" and "Oropesa" were made available to sail under the names "Artois" and "Champagne" with a French crew and under the French flag.

The sudden break in the submarine trade war made the work of the X. Cruiser Squadron much easier. Not only could the auxiliary cruisers now pass through the danger zone with fewer precautionary measures than before in order to approach their bases in the Clyde and Mersey, but also the arrest and investigation of neutral ships themselves was now less dangerous; also the neutrals were now more inclined to allow their ships to call at English ports without any special coercive measures and to subject them there to a detailed investigation. The activity of this squadron is given a special light when one learns that in 1915 it regularly patrolled an area of no less than 220,000 square nautical miles and that no fewer than 2,281 ships and 817 fish steamers were stopped and examined (3). 743 ships were brought into ports, and the blockade was so effective that during the last five months Norway and Denmark had received only 77 steamship loads, the character of which was not perfectly known on the English side. Only eight ships with important banned goods had managed to escape the English auxiliary cruisers, while the overseas trade of German ships, apart from the one in the Baltic Sea, had been brought to a complete standstill. On the other hand, none of these precautions had hitherto been able to prevent German auxiliary cruisers from breaking through the blockade line where and when they pleased, under determined leadership.

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1) Corbett: Naval Operations. Volume III, page 263.

2) "Alsatian" (flagship), "Alcantara", "Almanzora", "Andes", "Arlanza", "Cedric", "Changuinola", "Columbella", "Digby", "Ebro", "Hilary", "Hildebrand", "Mantua", "Motagua", "Orcoma", "Oropesa", "Orotava", "Otway", "Patia", "Patuca", "Teutonic", "Victorian", "Virginian". Two more, "Bayano" and "India", had been sunk by submarines, "Clan Macnaughton" and "Viknor" capsized in bad weather.

3) Corbett: Naval Operations. Volume III, page 265.<sup>31</sup>

The above-mentioned "Berlin", "Meteor" and "Möwe" undertakings clearly demonstrated this. What remained a mystery, however, was the silence that apparently had entered the German High Seas Fleet. While Admiral Jellicoe took this only for the calm before the storm, which would soon be followed by an all the more violent eruption, the British Admiralty took the opposite view. She believed that at the moment there was no intention on the German side to seek the decision in a sea battle, rather the enemy was probably making preparations for a future heavy use of mines and submarines, which would prevent an extensive attack on English trade in all Oceans will be accompanied. To her, the raid of the "Möwe" only seemed to be the prelude (1). The most effective countermeasure is a tight blockade of the German Bight, and the only way to achieve this is to gain a base for submarines and aircraft on one of the islands off the coast of Schleswig-Holstein. This had been one of the main points in Lord Fisher's great offensive plan, and though it had been rejected at the time, the prospect of the future seemed serious enough to revive. However, the conditions for the implementation had deteriorated considerably since then. The range and number of the heavy German coastal guns had meanwhile been increased so that all the islands that came into question were probably under the fire range of such guns set up on the mainland. But that would make each of these islands untenable as a naval base in English hands. Apart from that, great difficulties in the implementation of the plan were also to be expected for other reasons. The attack squadron, for which older ships of the line, monitors and cruisers were intended, would have required a large number of destroyers to protect against submarines, which could only be taken from the "Grand Fleet", since the Dardanelles enterprise had consumed every reserve of such vehicles. The "Grand Fleet" would therefore have to have undertaken cover for the operation without being accompanied by the flotillas usually assigned for this purpose; a disadvantage for which, in the opinion of the Admiralty, a remedy could hardly be found. After careful deliberations by the government, this plan was set aside and the offensive, apart from the constant raids on cruisers and destroyers against German shipping under the neutral coasts and in order to ward off the expected mine-layers, was literally in the air.

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1) Corbett: Naval Operations. Volume III, page 273.<sup>32</sup>

Since December 1915 a plan was in preparation, according to which Commodore Tyrwhitt had to bring the aircraft mother ship "Vindex" right up to the Ems with the core of the Harwich Forces and some submarines. Then planes, launched there, should reach the airship hangars suspected in Hage and Hoyer and destroy them. On January 18 the first attempt was made against Hage, but before the naval forces had reached the intended starting position, thick fog came up and prevented any further action. Approach and return march were completely unmolested from the German side; the only loss occurred because one of the submarines involved, namely "H6", ran aground off Ameland (1).

During this time, the news about the English fleet on the German side remained contradictory. Soon it was said that it was in the Irish Sea and should not return to the North Sea until January 22nd and 25th, then again that on the 15th several battleships, cruisers and torpedo boat flotillas had departed from the Firth of Forth for the Firth of Moray where the fleet would be concentrated. There were few warships and torpedo boats in the Humber, Tees, and Tyne. There was lively activity among the senior naval officers in England and, in connection with the offensive planned from Salonika, "something big was about to happen" in the North Sea as well. Nor did it seem impossible that the reported increased activity of the British fleet was connected with an expansion of the blockade announced by the press.

At the same time it was reported that the Dutch fleet was also hastily taking over coal and provisions and calling back the vacationers, which in semi-official circles in Holland was attributed to the attitude of England. It soon emerged, however, that at least on this point there was a different connection. It was learned that an English submarine, presumably "H 6", was stranded on January 18th in front of the Frisian Sea Gate, within Dutch territorial waters. As a result, a large number of English warships, a total of 20 units, including the light cruisers "Aurora" and "Arethusa", appeared off Ameland and tried to tow the submarine and rescue the crew under threat of force. It was only thanks to the decisive intervention of the Dutch fleet that Dutch neutrality had been preserved. The incident had aroused the mood in the Dutch Navy.

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1) See p. 49.<sup>33</sup>

Unfortunately, the German fleet management received this news too late to exploit the presence of enemy forces at Schiermonikoog for attacks. It was therefore compelled to take this opportunity to draw the admiral's staff's attention to the inadequacy of the entire intelligence service. "U 32" (Frhr. Von Spiegel) was dispatched to Schiermonikoog on January 23, but at the same time reconnaissance airships and aircraft were only able to detect Dutch warships at the stranding point, so that "U 32" returned to the Ems the following day.

Another submarine, "U 44", Kapitänleutnant Wagenführ, has been cruising off the east coast of England between the Tees and Tynes estuary since January 19, according to which intercepted English radio messages practice submarines and destroyers should sail out and in. Although there was a lot of ship traffic, which made the panoramic view quite difficult, the boat also made some unsuccessful attacks on enemy destroyers, but the submarine exercises seemed to have failed due to the stormy seas. "U 44" therefore took up position on the 22nd at Coquet Island in order, if possible, to intercept larger warships on their march along the coast. However, it only sighted destroyers there and, after an unsuccessful torpedo fired on one of the same, "Talisman", turned to the Scottish coast near Aberdeen in order to avoid the stronger counteraction to be expected at Coquet Island. According to English information, ten destroyers were immediately dispatched from Rosyth to the Blyth area with the flotilla leader "Botha", where they searched in vain for the submarine. On the other hand, the latter intercepted English radio messages on the 27th, according to which two destroyers had rammed each other during the submarine hunt and one of them had sunk. Even before Aberdeen, the weather prevented any attack activity. "U 44" was content to show itself there several times in order to divert the guard to the north and returned to Coquet Island after a brief reconnaissance attempt in the direction of St. Abbs Head. Although radio messages intercepted again showed that strong guarding was still to be expected from this island to the mouth of the Tees, the submarine steered further south on the 27th under water at a distance of 2 nm along the coast, in accordance with its operational orders a Number of P-mines (1) it had taken in the stern to throw in front of the Tyne. After several fishing vessels, an armed force and finally a line abreast of six destroyers, which drove north at intervals of 200 m, had happened, the commander decided, however, in order not to come into even stronger counteraction further south, to expel the mines already near Coquet Island.

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1) See Nordsee, Volume IV, p. 367.<sup>34</sup>

Given the nature of their attitude, which caused them to sink to the bottom with the tidal current heading north, it was to be assumed that they would also contaminate the area up to the mouth of the Tynes.

When the submarine sailed east after completing the task, the destroyers that had been observed earlier came into view again. In order not to get across the course of the same, as they were probably towing explosive devices behind them, "U 44" went on the opposite course at a depth of 30 m under them, appeared soon afterwards and only now began the return march, which it ended in the Ems on January 28th. After the observations in front of the Firth of Forth, the commander declared it possible to gradually feel more deeply into the Forth the next time following coastal steamers and thus perhaps to get closer to the berths of the warships with the P-mines.

In the meantime nothing had changed in the German Bight, as the weather conditions prevented any major venture on the German side. Also, the degree and extent of the mine contamination of the German Bight, as it could have occurred in the last few months of stormy weather and insufficient air reconnaissance, could not yet be sufficiently determined. The minesweepers only came to work on a few days, and the barrier breakers were only able to drive the way east of Amrum-Bank to about 20 nm west of Horns-Reef once, namely on the night of January 24th. Mines were not found here and reports from Dutch fishing vessels about sightings of mines at Horns-Reef and Terschelling did not seem credible or at best could be traced back to loose, floating mines. On January 28, the auxiliary minesweeping flotilla, secured by "L7", apparently came across the remains of an old, well-known English mine barrier about 23 nm west of Rote Kliff (1).

On the same day the British attempted a repetition of the previously unsuccessful air raid on Hage. At 6 a.m. (28, I.) the "Harwich Forces" were in position in front of the Ems area. But when the aircraft mother ship "Vindex" was about to launch its aircraft, two torpedo runways allegedly passed the stern of the "Arethusa", the flagship of the Commodore Tyrwhitt, in quick succession. But since it has been proven that there was no German submarine in this area on that day, it must have been a deception if the torpedoes were not fired from an English submarine otherwise.

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1) See Nordsee, Volume IV, p. 302.<sup>35</sup>



Either way, the incident seemed reason enough for the English leader to give up the venture that had just been initiated. No sooner had he started the retreat than thick fog enveloped his forces. The operation would therefore probably be ineffective in any case.

Although airships, minesweepers and airplanes had been on the way from the German side, apart from the usual outpost boats, the presence of enemy forces in the area west of the Ems remained hidden from them because of the foggy weather. The invisibility increased towards noon so that the minesweepers had to stop their work. On the other hand, the German attack flotillas, II. (Schoor), VI. (Max Schultz), IX. (Goehle), east of the Amrum bank to the north, in order to search the sea area between 4° and 5° 20' east longitude from the latitude of Horns-Riff to that of Terschelling, reaching from Horns-Reef to the west. This happened without the fleet command knowing the slightest thing about the second attempted attack by English airmen on Hage, but the news it had received in November and December almost regularly suggested hostile light forces in this area. When it got light, the flotillas should stand in front of the Ems and be picked up by the I and II Reconnaissance Groups, while the III. Squadron had to keep in intensified readiness from the departure of the cruiser on Schillig roadstead. As luck would have it, this venture took place only one night later than the English, otherwise, since the English had no support from heavy forces, the German cruisers and torpedo boats would probably have been a not insignificant success on the morning of January 29th. But as it was, the attack flotillas were nowhere near.

Already at 4.30 p.m. they were in thick fog. The use of weapons was ruled out for the next few hours. Since the commander, Korvettenkapitän Schoor, was doubtful "whether the fleet command was so concerned with carrying out the advance, that it wanted to put up with the endangerment of the boats during the fog voyage", he asked over the radio whether the advance should be continued anyway. In the opinion of the fleet management, only the assessment of the situation on the spot could be decisive for this decision. However, since the boats must have already covered half of the way when the radio message was received, the request was answered in the affirmative. At 8 p.m. the flotillas therefore headed south in seven groups at a distance of 3.5 nm and reached at 3.15 a.m., not without navigational difficulties caused by the fog the sea area northwest of Terschelling, where the visibility was seldom more than 1 nm.<sup>36</sup>

In the estuaries of the rivers the fog had become so thick that the cruisers could not leave when it was light. But even before this gave rise to concerns about the safety of the flotillas at sea, it was possible to determine by means of the F. T. bearing that they would be at 6 am. already existed before the mouth of the Ems. The advance had been unsuccessful; in particular, enemy forces had not been sighted anywhere, but this could also be attributed to the poor visibility. In contrast, enemy liners and cruisers in the Skagerrak were reported to the fleet management during the operation.

In fact, after no major movements of English armed forces had taken place in the North Sea since a brief advance of the battle cruiser fleet on January 5th, the 2nd battlecruiser squadron with the 1st light cruiser squadron and 11 destroyers were at sea on the 26th to search the Skagerrak for German armed forces (1). The ships then went north, joining on the 28th with the IV Light Cruiser Squadron and three destroyers coming from Scapa. All the ships then formed a reconnaissance line in the direction of the Utsire lighthouse at 210°, followed them again into the area as far as the Skagerrak and then returned to their bases. It seems that on the English side at the time they were expecting an operation by German light armed forces, only that they misjudged their aim and as such perhaps assumed a repetition of the December advance to the Skagerrak. Since experience has shown that the movement of parts of the English fleet of the type reported was mostly short-lived, it seemed too late after the news had been received by the German fleet management to start another operation against them.

On the day before the torpedo boat flotilla entered (31. I.) the weather allowed a new air raid against England for the first time after a long pause, the largest undertaking of its kind in terms of size and number of armed forces, Tondern and Hage raised no less than nine airships. All targets of central and southern England were free to them, but in particular they should try to reach the world and attack Liverpool. A thick blanket of fog lay over the entire southern North Sea from a height of about 50 to 400 m, so that for the most part only the not always reliable F. T. bearings of the directional stations came into question.

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1) Jellicoe: The Grand Fleet.<sup>37</sup>

In addition, when approaching the English coast, rain and snow clouds moved in, which the airships could no longer avoid. As a result, it quickly formed a sheet of ice on the wet hulls, which put a heavy load on the ships; the carrying capacity of the air was also impaired by an unexpectedly small decrease in temperature in height. The ships could therefore only be brought up to 2000 m, for which part of the gasoline or even bombs had to be dropped as ballast. In addition, there were engine accidents on three airships, "L 17", Kapitänleutnant Ehrlich, "L 20", Kapitänleutnant Stabbert, and "L 16", Oberleutnant zur See Peterson, through which they were forced to give up Liverpool as a target from the start and attacked to keep the east coast (Map A). "L 17" therefore launched an attack against the Humber. According to the calculation, the airship had at 8 pm. got the coast, but at that time only one headlight directed vertically upward, the cone of which was broken by the clouds, from an altitude of 2200m. Immediately afterwards, however, numerous powerful lamps and fireslights, as is usually assumed by blast furnaces, were thrown through the low-lying cloud cover, while the ship received fire from small-caliber guns. Apparently it found itself over Immingham. The burst of bombs silenced the defense battery. The searchlight went out, so that the industrial facilities that were suspected to be near the battery could now be covered with explosive and fire echoes. But when all the lights were extinguished after the second attack, every attempt to find new targets on changing courses was in vain.

At the same time, "L 16", Oberleutnant zur See Peterson, attacked some factory and industrial facilities near Warmouth with all of their ammunition, insofar as the navigation from 2100 m was made difficult by the visibility conditions. Even before that, when crossing the coast, the ship had received fire from some batteries with insufficient headlights. It repeated this process during the attack, then "L 16" left at 8:30 p.m. at the Winterton coast. At 8:50 p.m. "L 17" was already heading for Nordholz.

In the meantime "L 20", Kapitänleutnant Stabbert, had observed headlights in the Humber and further south in clearing weather at times, which was probably due to the attacks by "L 17" and "L 16". When the airship was then about 9 pm. in order to better orientate itself, it began to throw incendiary projectiles, it was suddenly lit and shot at, and six high-explosive bombs were thrown to defend against it.<sup>38</sup>

Immediately afterwards Sheffield appeared to be in sight, and from 9:30 p.m. to 10:15 p.m. two blast furnaces in the south and a third in the north of the city were bombed with 27 explosive bombs, the southernmost one apparently being largely destroyed. There was no evidence of any hostile counteraction. "L 20" left the English coast near Saltfleet at around 12 o'clock at night.

All the other airships pushed further inland. One of the first "L 13", Kapitänleutnant Mathy, had, not without being immediately echoed, as one of the first "L 13", Lieutenant Mathy, at around 6 pm. Reached the English east coast at 1200 m driving height around Winterton (map A). Far in the world, the setting sun showed a brighter shimmer, but the expectation of clearer weather there did not confirm me, rather the cities were only partially recognizable by the light under a nearly even, low-lying cloud cover. Only the glow from the numerous blast furnaces stood out more clearly. When the commander believed he had passed Nottingham according to his calculations, he set course for Manchester at 8:30 pm, but encountered impenetrable ground fog in the supposed area of this city. Only the firelight of a blast furnace gave enough reason to drop seven explosive bombs on it at least at 9.15 pm. Then the airship turned around because of the increasing cloudiness, felt it with light bombs and F. T. bearings from Bruges, as was assumed, to the Humber and measured through the cloud cover at 11.45 pm. a blast furnace and other extensive factories at Goole with the number of high explosive bombs and 60 incendiary bombs. It left the coast at 12:35 p.m. at Spurn Point, repeatedly hit by guns and rifles, but with no success.

On the other hand, "L 21", Lieutenant Commander of the Reserve Dietrich, who, according to the report, had already passed Manchester at 8 pm., apparently found better visibility conditions. Railways and factories were good targets, but the attack on the way back was postponed, so that the first surprise hit over Liverpool. When, according to the calculation, the coast had to be reached at 8:50 p.m., the fog had increased again, but the bright glow of two cities separated by a river could only be Liverpool and Birkenhead based on the presumed location of the ship, as well as on the appearance and location. Swinging out in a wide arc to the north across the sea, "L 21" therefore steered at around 9 pm. at an altitude of 2300 to 2800 m on a southeasterly course over both cities and dropped 35 high explosive and 20 incendiary bombs over the docks, port and factories with only weak counteraction by the coastal batteries, the effect of which was soon recognizable by the flaring up of fires.<sup>39</sup>

As on the return march at 9:10 pm. Manchester came back into view, the city was already largely covered by clouds of fog, but a blast furnace plant that betrayed it by the fire could still be bombed with nine incendiary bombs with good success. Already at midnight, even before "L 13", the airship passed the Humber again over a thick, opaque blanket of fog.

"L 15", Kapitänleutnant Breithaupt, also made the experience that it was clearer with the prevailing east wind on the other side of the English low mountain range. If the moment of crossing the coast could not be determined at 7 p.m. above the Wash because of a thick cloud cover, only an hour later isolated lights, then the reappearance of larger cities, became visible, so that at 8:30 p.m. one of them, probably Sheffield, dropped four 50 kg high explosive bombs on the brightly lit station and two hits could be observed. A large, bright green flame marked the location of the explosion. One hour later, half an hour after "L 21", this airship was also located on the cloud-covered weather forecast above a large urban complex with a wide N – S running waterway, which was referred to as Liverpool-Birkenhead. While the lights of the city gradually went out, "L 15" flew four times over the riverbank at an altitude of 2500 m and dropped 1400 kg of explosive bombs and 300 kg of incendiary bombs. When the four dropped 100 kg bombs exploded, the airship itself was violently shaken. The incendiary bombs had detonated with particularly good effect, as a tremendous bonfire could be seen over the city while it was still running. On the way back, it showed that the only compass on board was dragging up to eight lines, so that you had to steer by the stars and F. T. directional bearings. The bearings at the Bruges station turned out to be very inaccurate. If the sky was overcast, the failure of the compass could have been disastrous. According to his navigation, "L 15" stood over Norwich at 1:20 pm and left the coast shortly afterwards near Yarmouth.

Meanwhile, between 11 pm and 12 midnight, "L 14" (Böcker), "L 19" (Loewe) and "L 11" (v. Buttlar) had reached the west coast of England after their navigation. Here, "L 14", as far as it can be seen from its route map, took the route via Nottingham, where the airship at 9:30 pm. received heavy gunfire, sunk by temporarily cutting out the front engine from 2300 m to 1600 m and could only be caught by immediately dropping gasoline.<sup>40</sup>

On the further advance to Liverpool, however, even after passing Derby, a thick wall of clouds came up from the west coast, which made it impossible to see through. Although the airship then, after having arrived at the coast due to the calculations and F. T. bearings, steered up and down the supposed coast for a long time, orientation could not be gained anywhere in the thick fog.

"L 11" had the same experience around the same time on which it had embarked the commander of the naval airship division, Korvettenkapitän Strasser. As soon as the east coast was crossed, the airship found a layer of dark everywhere over the earth, even thick fog in places, which made orientation very useful and ultimately impossible. At 8:15 p.m., it came across larger city and was addressed as Lincoln. Then it appeared to be a large, brightly lit facility south of Sheffield, which, however, according to several indications, turned into a prison camp and was therefore not bombed. At 11 p.m. according to the calculation, the west coast had to be reached. It was not to be expected, however, that Liverpool would still be found in the fog. Therefore, in agreement with Korvettenkapitän Strasser, the commander turned roughly in the line Macclesfield-Hanley; but no targets were set on the return march, so that "L11" was the only ship to bring the full supply of bombs back home, a sign of great self-denial and a cool, sober assessment of the situation by the experienced commander. On the other hand, "L 14" succeeded in throwing explosive and incendiary bullets at large factories and blast furnaces at least on the return journey near Nottingham from 1:20 to 1:45 a.m. a defense battery, from which it was fired heavily but unsuccessfully, to be silenced with two high-explosive bombs. Around 2.30 a.m. "L 14" crossed the English east coast south of Boston to start the return march.

After a radio message at 5.37 a.m. the fleet chief received the last attack that night by "L 19". After the airship had looked in vain for attack on the west coast in impenetrable ground fog at midnight, it threw all the ammunition on several larger industrial plants near Sheffield with good success on its march back around 4 am. Although it was fired on many times on its way through England, it had apparently remained undamaged, like all other airships, according to his report.

Given the uncertainty surrounding the navigation of the airships that night, it is difficult, if not impossible, to get an idea of the routes they have actually taken and the degree of reliability that can be attributed to their reports.<sup>41</sup>

If the results are summarized by the latter, Sheffield was attacked no less than three times in a row on the night of February 1, 1915, at 8:30 p.m. from "L 15" at 9:30 pm. by "L 20" and around 4 am. from "L 19". Immingham and Marmouth were each once around 8 o'clock in the evening, namely from "L 17" and "L 16", Manchester at 9:30 pm from "L 21" and "L 13" simultaneously unloaded bombs, Liverpool shortly after each other at 9 o'clock and at 9:30 o'clock by "L 21" and "L 15", Goole at 11:45 o'clock from "L 13" and Nottingham at 1:20 am. from "L 14". Of nine ships, four, namely "L 14", "L 21", "L 15" and "L 19", reached the west coast, but only two of these, "L 15" and "L 21", dropped bombs there, and, as both commanders assumed with certainty, over the main target of Liverpool.

The English reports (1) also admit that four ships advanced more than 150 miles to the west and that more than 360 bombs fell, but if the material damage was extremely small, the loss of men and women amounted to 183 dead and wounded. But what is astonishing about this report, if one is to believe some of the information, is the statement that not one of the cities named by the airships was hit by bombs. Not Sheffield, but Burton on Trent, 35 nm SSW from this place, which has been haunted by three ships in a row. Not in Sheffield, as "L 15" reported, but in Derby the station facilities had been hit, and even those of such outstanding commanders as Mathy ("L 13") and Böcker ("L 14") did not achieve their actual goals. The former was the closest to Manchester and had bombed Stoke on Trent, then made a loop through the Pottery District, then drove down the Trent to Burton, from there turned sharply northwest. On this course he would have reached Manchester if he had not turned east via Buxton. Apparently he confused Burton with Manchester or the Trent with the Irwell, and finally not over the Humber, but left the coast near Inner Dowsing north of the Wash. (Map A.).

Böcker ("L 14") for his part did not cross the coast in the Wash near Boston, but further south, was to SW to Wisbech, then northwest towards Grantham, then steered directly to the west and stood just east of Shrewsbury at 11:05 p.m. (German time) stood east of Shrewsbury.

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1) See in particular "Times" of September 21, 1920: "The Air Raids on England".<sup>42</sup>



and got there at 11:05 pm (German time) just east of Shrewsbury. There he turned on an SE course, drove several loops over Wellington and Shifnal, and on the return march threw bombs not over Nottingham, but near Ashby and Derby. He had probably approached the Trent valley for that of the Mersey, confusing Derby with Someter and Nottingham with Sheffield. Incidentally - and this is what is disappointing about this report - "L 14" (Böcker) has reached the widespread point, because no German airship has ever come to Liverpool. If you consider that the quick location of Liverpool by means of "L 21" and "L 15" stood in striking contrast to the difficulties with which the airships, however, arriving on the west coast a few hours later, had to fight due to the lack of visibility, that "L 11" with the particularly experienced pilot of the airships even marched back without having dropped bombs over England at all, and that on "L 15" a dragging of the compass was found, errors by the commanders about the location of their ships that night seem very possible. Apparently all over England have been severely displaced to the south without the F. T. direction bearings having given them sufficient reference points for a more reliable determination and improvement of their location.

Nevertheless, considering the very meager English reports, one must not forget that both then and even now there was a great interest on the British side in reducing the effects of the German airship attacks as far as possible, precisely because this weapon dared to cast doubt on the invulnerability of the English mother country. The appearance of the German airships, even in such unfavorable weather, deep in the country and even over the area of the west coast, the fall of a rain of bombs in a foggy winter night simultaneously in the most varied of places, All this must have aroused fear and horror even in the cold-blooded population because of the novelty of the weaponry used. From a military point of view, however, it was even more significant that, after the experience of the attack, the remote areas had to be given extensive defensive systems, as a result of which important weapons and men were withdrawn from the main battlefield on the Mainland in France, to an extent many times that of the German side in the air war.

On January 26th, five heavy monitors had fired at the German batteries at Villa Scolaire in Flanders, but in the following days all monitors near the Thames estuary were withdrawn in order to take part in the protection of London during the new moon phase, which was favorable for airship attacks.<sup>43</sup>

On the night of the squadron attack, reports of the result of their attacks were soon received by the German fleet management from all airships.

The return march and landing, however, were severely hampered by fog. So "L 15" (Breithaupt), as he could no longer rely on a compass, rang out through the fog when it was light and headed for Borkum at 150 m driving height on a south-east course, as he said, when he suddenly received heavy rifle fire. A few bullets hit the gondolas and cells, and a gas tank was choked on before he could escape the unexpected attack by going straight up into the clouds. He found out that the airship, unable to determine its position correctly, had been over the Rottum Island and had been taken under fire there by a Dutch coast guard without any prior warning.

Until 2 p.m. but all airships were able to return to their halls in spite of the fog, only "L 19" (Loewe) had not yet arrived. This ship too had at 5.37 a.m. issued a battle report, but at the next signal, "Please urgent wind measurements for Nordholz and Bruges", as confirmed by F. T. bearing, it was still at 6:41 am on the English coast. Apparently the return march was delayed by an engine breakdown. There was no answer to another call in the course of the morning, apparently afterwards the F. T. facility had also become unusable. At 2 p.m. the II., VI. and IX. Torpedo boat flotilla and aircraft received orders to search for the airship that was suspected at the time between Borkum and List. At 4:05 p.m. reported "L 19" by F. T-Signal: "F. T. system was unusable, three motors at times unusable. Location around Borkum, wind is good, Tondern tonight. "However, a F. T. bearing while the radio call was being sent showed that "L 19" was found at Ameland, an observation that was immediately communicated to him. However, since the wind was favorable at the time and according to a report, "L 19" did not consider it necessary to call at the closer Hage as a port of refuge, there were no longer any concerns about a happy, albeit greatly delayed return of the airship. The flotillas were therefore recalled. Contrary to expectations, however, there was no further report. Four airships that were supposed to be deployed to search the next morning (February 2nd) could not sail because of strong south winds. The aircraft reconnaissance was also canceled. There was therefore no other choice than to let the three torpedo boat flotillas mentioned again advance westward from Borkum and List, while the II Reconnaissance Group and the battle cruisers "von der Tann" and "Derfflinger" crossed the inner German Bight as support.<sup>44</sup>

The latter measure seemed necessary because it had not been ruled out that English armed forces would also be on the lookout for "L19". This assumption was correct, for in fact the V Light Cruiser Squadron departed from Harwich at the same time as the German flotillas for the same purpose, but all the cruisers and torpedo boats that had left had to return without having achieved anything. Soon, however, the riddle was to be solved. As early as 10 am the German fleet management found out from news from Holland why no more reports had been received from "L 19" after his radio message the day before. Apparently in the fog the airship had tried to gain orientation over land and had flown over the Dutch islands of Texel, Vlieland, Terschelling and finally Ameland at a very low altitude. Although the Dutch newspaper reports on the islands gave the definite impression that the airship had lost its way in the fog and was in distress, the Dutch coast guards immediately took it out of rifles, from Ameland it was even heavily fired at with artillery and hit several times until it disappeared in a northerly direction. But since then it has been lost. With the onset of the snowstorm, the search for the German torpedo boat flotilla, temporarily interrupted by the hunt for enemy submarines near Norderney and Horns-Riff, was in vain. The only thing they found was a large petrol tank, apparently belonging to "L 19", 12 nm north of Borkum. Since it was undamaged, the airship had to be close to the water when it was dropped. Around midnight the flotillas and cruisers returned to Schillig-Reede. Given the low prospect of finding a trace of "L 19", initially only extensive aerial reconnaissance was ordered for February 3. The airships, however, were again unable to ascend because of the weather conditions, and of the aircraft that went back to Borkum for the missing "L 19", two returned, "488", Leutnant zur See Hansen, Matrose von Wisocky, and "490", Leutnant zur See Stenzel, Obermaat Voigt, also did not return and could not be found either, despite the fact that the outpost boats of the Ems and the 10th half-flotilla had searched for them until the following morning.

It was not until the evening of that day that a message from the army radio station in Lille brought further clarification about "L 19", namely that it had intercepted and deciphered an English radio message, according to which a fish steamer of the "Grimsby Patrol" reported the wreck of a zeppelin 110 nm east of Flamborough Head was reported.<sup>45</sup>

It could only be "L19", which stayed in the air longer than expected after the bombardment over Ameland, but was probably driven about 100 nm in the direction of England after all engines failed. Kapitänleutnant Loewe himself provides information about the further fate of the airship in a poignant report, which only drifted to the beach in a message in a bottle after months at Marstrand on the Norwegian coast. It read as follows:

“With 15 men on the platform of the" L 19 "at 3° east longitude. The balloon envelope floats without a gondola. I'm trying to send the last report. We had an engine breakdown three times. The strongest headwind on the way back delayed the journey and drove us in the fog towards Holland, where we were shot at with rifles. Three engines failed at the same time. The situation is getting more and more difficult. Now, around one in the afternoon, our last hour is approaching. Loewe."

In the meantime, as one learned from newspapers, the English fish steamer "King Stephen", probably in the service of the Admiralty, had appeared at the sinking airship, but had refused to admit the helpless shipwrecked people, supposedly for fear of being caught off guard, left them to death in the waves while he was returning to the harbor himself, an exceedingly cowardly and shameful behavior, which stands in pitiful contrast to the so often vaunted English humanity and chivalry. Through statements in a large part of the English press, especially by the Bishop of London, this act also found the express approval of the British nation, a sign of the moral low to which the unscrupulous whipping of all popular passions in this country had already reached " (1).

Even the bombardment of the defenseless airship by the Dutch coast guards was not a heroic act and caused an understandable excitement in Germany. The German government was unable to accept the position of the Dutch government that, in order to maintain its neutrality, it had the right to oppose the crossing of its borders by belligerents by airships without further ado, unless they indicated their intention to land by signs. The question of whether a violation of neutrality in the flight over neutral area by belligerents was not yet resolved at that time.

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1) An article in the "Frankfurter Zeitung" of February 9, 1916, which denounced this state of affairs, deserves to be passed down as a cultural document of history and is attached in Appendix 1.<sup>46</sup>

A right to fire at German airships without warning could not be derived from the prohibition of flying over the Dutch sovereign borders, which the German government had already granted at the beginning of the war to avoid disturbances in the friendly neighborly relations between the two countries. The Dutch government's investigations also revealed that "L 19" had drifted near the Dutch coast for more than four hours at low altitude without showing the slightest hostile intent, even tried to communicate with a Dutch warship by signal call. If the Dutch government criticized the fact that the airship had not given any signal to recognize that it was about to land, it had to be countered by the fact that an international signal for an airship to not land was not yet available. Also, an airship that was unable to maneuver was not in a position to manage the immediate landing without further ado to show that it was peaceful. However, a claim had to be made that an airship was granted at least the same right of asylum on a neutral coast as, for example, a warship in distress at sea. The German government could therefore not avoid to uphold their immediately asserted protest against the behavior of the Dutch naval forces in a concluding note dated July 25th. At the same time, however, she suggested entering into negotiations on how any incidents of such a serious nature could be prevented in the future, in particular by agreeing on certain signals by which the airships should indicate on the one hand when they were in distress, on the other hand, it would be made known to them from the country that they were over neutral territory. Orders were given that in future airships or airplanes which were in distress and indicated that they intended to land on Dutch territory could no longer simply be fired at.<sup>47</sup>

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## **2. The operational program of the new German fleet command.**

The last torpedo boat advance and airship attack were already part of an operational program with which a more powerful offensive of the High Seas Forces was to be initiated. On January 18, Vice Admiral Scheer had set his flag on S.M.S. "Frederick the Great". On the 24th he was finally entrusted with the command of the High Seas Forces by the Supreme Cabinet Order. Under him and the new men of the staff, Kapitänen zur See Adolf v. Trotha and v. Levetzow, immediately began a systematic work to convert the tasks of the fleet in the offensive direction. It was first reflected in the "Guiding principles for naval warfare in the North Sea", which were drawn up at the beginning of February and read as follows:

"A. Basic thought. The current balance of power initially forbids us to seek the decisive battle against the assembled English fleet. Our naval warfare must also prevent this decisive battle from being forced upon us by the enemy."

"B. Inferences. By systematic, constant action on the enemy, we must first force the enemy to advance certain armed forces against us from his now waiting position, which offer us favorable opportunities for attack; on the other hand, we must use them to prevent the enemy from developing such a feeling of superiority that he is no longer afraid to put us into battle according to his will.

The versatile surface attacks of our opponent offer us the advantage of always stepping forward as an attacker, even with our inferior strength."

"C. Passable ways. In a memorandum, the chief of the admiral's staff has described the ways that are open to us for this:

1. The submarine trade war.
2. The mine war.
3. The trade war in the north.
4. The air war.
5. The lively activity of the High Seas Forces in advances."<sup>48</sup>

“D. Execution. The submarine trade war and the aerial warfare have begun and will proceed as planned. The mine war, the trade war and the advances of the High Seas Forces are operationally related. The more closely they are linked to one another within the framework of an operational program, the more prospect they offer for success.”

»To the establishment of such an operational program, which, depending on the circumstances, provides for smaller or larger undertakings with individual parts or with the entire fleet, the operational work of the naval command will first have to concentrate on the material readiness of the means for this and finally - an important moment - on the attitude of the leaders and commanders to these tasks. ”

“A necessary precondition for such an approach in the North Sea is the keeping of the German Bight between Horns-Reef and Borkum against hostile encroachments (contamination, etc.) through constant, systematic security, through appropriate construction of our own barriers and through frequent night-time advances by our light forces in the border areas of this area.”

In drawing up the operational program itself, the head of the operations department was able to look back on a year and a half of war experience that was of considerable use. This program, in which in particular the planned cooperation of all weapons of naval warfare for a unified purpose, was intended from the outset for a continuous series of undertakings, which extended from the nocturnal advance of individual light armed forces into the border area of the German Bight to the advance of the entire fleet using airships, airplanes, submarines and mine layers as far as the Hoofden, the Dogger Bank and the Skagerrak.

The fleet management saw limited nightly advances by the light armed forces as the best means of defense against enemy interference in the area of the German Bight. Due to frequent advances, especially by torpedo boats, beyond the previous mine area, the area in front of the German Bight should first be monitored more closely than before, even at night and with no airship reconnaissance, in order to avoid new, overly extensive mine contamination in this area for the enemy make more difficult. As far as material, weather conditions and other dispositions allowed, these advances should therefore be carried out continuously in different variations, whereby the Osterems and the Lister Tief could serve as temporary bases because of their advanced position.<sup>49</sup>



The attacks of the airships against England should from now on be regularly accompanied by torpedo boat advances, which in turn benefit from the long-range reconnaissance of the airships ahead, but at the same time could serve the latter to provide assistance in the event of accidents. In order to be able to act quickly in the frequently and suddenly changing conditions of such undertakings, general guidelines have been drawn up by the fleet management, according to which the leaders of the advances were able to issue the execution orders with full appreciation of the peculiarity of the weapons they wielded on a given cue without wasting time. The time of the execution, however, reserved the fleet command in order to keep the provision of the armed forces necessary for the hold in hand. In special cases it was planned to continue the advances that had begun at night with greater expenditure of strength and stronger support into the following day and to advance across the German Bight into the Hoofden, to the Dogger Bank and the Skagerrak. If the circumstances made it desirable, the contamination of individual areas by mines should also be combined with the venture. It was also intended, if the weather permitted, to combine these extended undertakings with airship attacks against England in order to take advantage of the enemy situation created by such attacks, which under certain circumstances would have to induce the latter to advance armed forces on their part and to expose them to the attack from the German side. From now on, it was precisely in this point that one saw the meaning and purpose of every undertaking. Therefore, with the expressed intention of challenging the enemy, every opportunity to harm enemy trade should be seized. This was to be expected primarily in advances into the Skagerrak and Kattegat.

The sharpest form of the challenge, in connection with the laying of mines on the enemy coast, was intended to be the bombardment of English coastal areas, so that the majority and all otherwise available armed forces could be deployed against the advancing enemy. In such cases, extensive aerial reconnaissance had to be carried out to safeguard against surprises by the enemy. For operations of this kind, which had to be carried out under the uniform management of the fleet chief, appropriate operational orders of the fleet command were drafted and kept ready. A detailed discussion with the admirals and a general briefing of the commanders should in good time familiarize the subordinates with the aim and purpose of the intended operations.<sup>50</sup>

The admiralty staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the commanding admiral of the marine corps were also privy to the general guidelines of the new plans in order to be able to adjust their measures accordingly.

The operational program should not and could not contain any binding information about the point in time at which the individual undertakings and operations were to be initiated. It had to be influenced in this by the possibility of the highest possible material readiness of the armed forces, by the respective general war situation and finally, as experience has shown, to a considerable extent also by the weather. A list of the scheduled readiness of the armed forces, depending on the docking times and repairs, made it easier from the outset to choose the most favorable time periods for larger operations.

By deciding to act as the aggressor in the planned ventures, it was hoped at the same time to prevent the enemy from forcing the decisive battle in German waters on the High Seas Fleet, possibly at the most inopportune moment of readiness. Nevertheless, even this undesirable case had to be included in the circle of planned considerations in order to counter it in the best possible way. Not binding orders, but leaflets both for the possibility of an attack that was expected on the basis of certain signs or that suddenly began unexpectedly were therefore drafted in order to familiarize leaders and commanders with the general intentions contained therein in good time.

Only after this operational preparatory work did the new fleet command feel equipped to no longer live from hand to mouth as before, but rather operationally link planned attacks, taking into account news from the enemy, their own readiness, the weather, in short the respective situation and the resulting opportunities for success to approach his tasks with the conscious intention of getting to the enemy with certainty sooner or later.

On February 23, His Majesty the Kaiser visited the fleet in Wilhelmshaven and without further ado approved the operational program presented to him by Admiral Scheer Major Headquarters must have been greatly reduced.<sup>51</sup>

At a meeting of the admirals and the Kaiser emphasized commanders that he completely approved of the manner of action presented to him by the fleet chief, a declaration which was of great value to the latter, that in this way he was given a power of attorney in front of all subordinates, giving him freedom of action expressly admitted to the extent specified by himself (1).

But now the differences between military and political leadership on the question of the resumption of the unrestricted submarine trade war intensified all the more. As a result of these contradictions, the submarine trade war had led a sham existence that threatened the lives of the crews since June 5, 1915, and then came to a complete standstill on September 18. At the end of 1915, however, the chief of the admiralty's staff and the fleet management, supported by Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz, attempts have been made to revive this form of warfare. The first possibility for this was the declaration of the German government in January 1916 that armed merchant ships would be treated as warships in future, i.e. would be easily destroyed. This declaration was based on the finding that England increasingly armed its merchant ships, gave them gun crews of the Navy on board and, despite the insurance, that the ships were armed only for defense purposes, had given instructions to attack and destroy any submarine that came into sight. On the basis of this declaration, the fleet management was in a position to order the reopening of the submarine trade war on the west coast of England on February 23, at least with the restriction that, with the exception of passenger steamers, which were still flying an enemy flag and despite armament, should be spared, all enemy merchant ships in the restricted area are allowed to be attacked. The submarine commanders were forbidden to examine the steamers before they were destroyed because of the danger involved. Out of consideration for the neutrals, the order did not come into force until the 29th. Such a restricted form of the submarine trade war was only intended as a transition until the combined efforts of the admiralty and general staff of the field army succeeded in winning the Reich Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg to resume the unrestricted submarine trade war. However, in a meeting on March 4, 1916, the latter declared that the time had not yet come for this;

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1) Scheer, Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War, page 168.<sup>52</sup>

However, in a meeting on March 4, 1916, the latter declared that the time had not yet come for this; in particular the United States of North America, attempts are made to convince England of the hopelessness of further warfare through the measures taken so far and to use the submarine trade war only as a "last resort" in the event that all other possibilities to achieve peace would have failed. In vain did the chief of the admiralty's staff, Admiral v. Holtzendorff, pointed out that it could then be too late because of exhaustion of the will to fight on the German side; the final decision was postponed until April 1st.

In the meantime the conflict between the Chancellor and Grand Admiral von Tirpitz on these questions, which had never been completely balanced since September 1915, had erupted in full sharpness. The State Secretary was accused of unduly influencing the press and the Federal Council on the issue of the unrestricted submarine trade war, although the press censorship in naval matters, in accordance with the mobilization plan, had already been transferred from the Imperial Navy Office to the Admiral's staff at the outbreak of the war was handled by this (1). In addition, Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz was not called to the decisive meeting on March 4, although he was expressly promised anew on September 19, 1915, to take part in the deliberation of important marine policy issues, and although Grand Admiral Prince Heinrich v. Preußen in a letter of February 25th to the Kaiser, had advocated a better relationship between the Kaiser and the State Secretary in an extremely warm and comradely manner. Grand Admiral von Tirpitz believed, after he had to feel constantly and now all over again in the most important questions, to be no longer able to appear before the Reichstag as a "man pushed aside" and therefore took the last incidents as an opportunity to report to the Kaiser on March 8th that his state of health does not allow him to continue the business of the State Secretary of the Imperial Marine Office. In a letter dated March 10th, the Kaiser informed him that, painfully moved by the fact that he would have to forego the valuable services of the State Secretary in the future, he would look forward to the submission of his resignation, and appointed Admiral von Capelle as his successor and re-enlistment in the active naval officer corps. He had been the State Secretary's right-hand man in financial and parliamentary matters for many years in the Imperial Naval Office but had recently been put on hold for health reasons and therefore asked that he refrain from his appointment for this reason.

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1) In response to a complaint from the Grand Admiral, the Reich Chancellor had to expressly withdraw the accusation of undue influence on the Bundesrat.<sup>53</sup>

In the end, however, he declared himself ready to obey an order from His Majesty to assume the position of officer, and expressed the idea that he was on the special position, which the previous state secretary of the Imperial Naval Office had been granted due to his outstanding personality, could not make any claim, in particular, in his opinion, it was not up to a new state secretary to stand up for or against the submarine war.

On March 12, Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz submitted his resignation on the grounds that the grave concern, the life's work of His Majesty and the national future of Germany would collapse on the path taken by the Chancellor, made it clear to him that his services could no longer be of use to His Majesty's government (1).

From the escalation of the conflict between Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz and the Imperial Chancellor received the Crown Prince and Grand Admiral Prince Heinrich v. Preußen only became aware of it after it had been dealt with by the State Secretary's adoption on March 17th. In a letter to the Kaiser, the Crown Prince expressed the painful feeling of regret at the loss of a personality so important for the conduct of the war in the following words:

““I consider the departure from Tirpitz to be a national misfortune. If the Chancellor wants to be right in his assumption, otherwise it could turn into a major calculation error.”

In fact, the failure of this strong personality in hostile countries, and particularly in England, was seen as a battle won. Domestically, even the “Frankfurter Zeitung”, which was contrary to the power politics of the Grand Admiral, paid him the following “recognition” on March 15:

“The merit and fame of having been the founder of the German fleet in its current size with the enthusiastic Kaiser, follows him and remains him. He has, supported and sustained by the global political ideas of Wilhelm II, and the evident connected recognition of the necessity of a strong fleet to protect our trade and to assert our reputation abroad and, what must not be forgotten, to protect our home coast in the German people and its representation the conviction of the necessity of a corresponding fleet for the political and economically strengthened empire and beyond this realization, one may say it without exaggeration, able to arouse enthusiasm for the fleet and everything connected with it in the people. ”

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1) For the wording of the resignation request see Tirpitz, recollections, page 365. The imperial handwriting with which the request was approved is contained in Appendix 2.<sup>54</sup>

"In the art of dealing with parties and people and of building a staunch following not only in parliament but across the country, Mr. Tirpitz achieved quite unusual achievements, and he was constantly surrounded by a staff of employees and helpers who were unusually gifted for this advertising work and for gaining public opinion (1). "

"None of our statesmen, not even Bismarck at the height of his power, was able to exert such a prompt influence on public opinion at any time, far beyond the official apparatus, in the form of voluntary and enthusiastic helpers as this head of our naval administration. He has been a power in the state and empire far beyond this official position, and for many years the fact that, according to the Reich constitution, in his capacity as State Secretary of the Navy, he should be a subordinate to the Reich Chancellor, who is solely responsible for all affairs of the Reich under changing Chancellors no one thought any more. A political power was Mr. Tirpitz, and the influence of this power has, as is inevitable with the close connection between naval policy and foreign policy, also made itself felt in the areas of the latter. "

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1) Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz gave a farewell address on March 17th, which is included in Appendix 3.<sup>55</sup>

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### **3. Beginning of increased activity of the light naval forces.**

With the departure of Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz's rejection of the resumption of the unrestricted submarine trade war on the part of the political leadership was only the incentive for Admiral Scheer to tackle the increased activity of the High Seas Forces in the sense of the new, completely offensive program of operations all the more energetically. At first, however, he was faced with a tough test of patience due to the persistently unfavorable weather conditions. Since the end of January the weather had prevented any major venture, and when, on February 6th, the interaction of airships and torpedo boats was to be tested for the first time in a joint advance, they couldn't ascend, and even the flotillas had to break off the expedition at Langeoog because of heavy seas, which made any lookout impossible even at a short voyage. When the flotillas left again on February 10th, the waxing moon had already reached the first quarter, so that airships were no longer able to attack. They had to limit themselves to a brief early explanation. The II., VI. and IX. Flotilla about 10 nautical miles north of Ameland at nightfall in order to advance from there into the area between the Dogger Bank and Swarte Bank mine barriers (Map B). They had the task of attacking enemy forces in this area in order to make it more difficult for the enemy to monitor the border area of the German Bight and to contaminate it with mine barriers. It was in keeping with the character of the undertaking to forego support from heavy forces during the night. These would only have been endangered by their own torpedo boats and the latter would have hindered their freedom of movement. On the other hand, the flotillas were supposed to be picked up by the battle cruisers and the II Reconnaissance Group when it got light. The torpedo boats themselves were only accompanied by an escort cruiser, in this case S. M. S. "Pillau", on which the first leader of the torpedo boat forces, Commodore Hartog, embarked. At the same time, the II Reconnaissance Group with five torpedo boats ("G 11" and 9th Half-Flotilla) was relocated to the Osterems, while the battle cruisers and the outpost division of the ships of the line on the Jade were on standby from 10 o'clock in the evening.<sup>56</sup>



The other liners and cruisers on Wilhelmshaven roadstead and in the harbor opened up steam for half the journey.

On the British side, the day before, the Admiralty had warned both the Commander-in-Chief of the "Grand Fleet", Admiral Jellicoe, as well as the leader of the battlecruiser fleet in Rosyth, Admiral Beatty, that signs of new activity were becoming visible in the German armed forces. Both admirals were therefore ordered to advance south with their forces and to unite, while Commodore Tyrwhitt was to take a second waiting position near Texel. The forces were halted again a few hours later, but the signs that something was in the air remained. These condensed on February 10 to the point that apparently a considerable number of German light cruisers and destroyers had set off westward from the Jade. A new "raid" against the English east coast seemed to be the purpose of the advance. Admiral Beatty was therefore instructed to move south again to locate the German armed forces, and Commodore Tyrwhitt also went to sea again on the orders of the Admiralty. But these armed forces had hardly started the advance when the trick, as the German fleet command had actually planned it, had already fallen.

Without any suspicion on the German side of the countermeasures already taken, the three attack flotillas had entered a reconnaissance line about 25 nm wide on the evening of 10<sup>th</sup> at 8 p.m. in the evening north of Terschelling, in which they moved north-westerly and from 10:30 pm. advanced in a westerly direction, while "Pillau" with two boats of the III. Flotilla, "G 42" and "G 85", about 20 nm behind the middle of the line followed. In the moonlit night a slight south-west, later south-east; when the swell was generally light, there was a strong swell from the northwest. The visibility was about 2000 to 3000 m against the bright western horizon, but was too much less to the east. At midnight, they should have reached stand line III, about 90 nm north-west of Terschelling (map B). On the right wing the groups of the II Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Schuur, in the middle those of the VI., Korvettenkapitän Max Schultz, on the left wing those of the IX., Korvettenkapitän Goehle.<sup>57</sup>

The distribution of the boats to the individual groups was as follows from the left to the right wing:

P	F	P	P	F	P	F	P
Tilleßen	Goehle	Ehrhardt	Lahs	Schultz	Dithmar	Schuur	Boest
V 30 V 28		V 27 G37	G41		B 109 B 97		G 101
S 33	S 51	V 26 G 38	V 44	B 110 B 111	G 102		
S 34 S. 52		S 36 S 50	V 43	G 103 B 112	G 104		
				S 49			

Their destination was the Dogger Bank. According to the English representation (1) there was the newly formed "X. Sloop Flotilla" ("Buttercup", "Arabis", "Alyssum", "Poppy" and probably also "Opossum") was busy searching one of the many paths that had to be kept mine-free for the timely concentration of the British fleet. By the afternoon of February 10, they had been secured by four cruisers, but in accordance with the other measures of the Admiralty at 5 p.m. returned to Humber. Since, however, a general silence had been ordered in the meantime in order not to alert prematurely the High Seas Forces, which were believed to be involved in the expected German advance in their full strength, the "Sloop Flotilla" was not warned. Rather, it continued its work according to plan and marked the point up to which it had searched the area assigned to it by means of a light buoy when it was dark. One of the ships, "Arabis", was ordered to stay by the buoy, while three others stood in line and left.

So it happened that at 11:10 p.m. Lights were seen in the German reconnaissance line on the right wing group port ahead, led by Korvettenkapitän Boest, the chief of the 3rd Torpedo Boat Half Flotilla, which were soon to be seen as the brightly burning stern lights of two larger vehicles, which were otherwise dimmed. Behind them followed a third completely dimmed ship in keel line on about WNW course. Although the bright lanterns, which were never used by the Germans on such nights, puzzled the half-flotilla chief, he thought it possible, due to course differences and navigation errors, to have his own group of neighbors in front of him after a seven-hour journey. At 11:25 p.m., however, he spotted another dimmed vehicle on starboard ahead near a white light that was later identified as a light buoy, which was approaching the others across the course of its own group. Soon after this a fifth vessel (not mentioned in the English illustration) came into view, and at 11:30 p.m. it was possible to see that the three ships on port side were similar to the English cruiser of the "Arethusa" class.

1) Corbett: Naval Operations, Volume III, page 275.<sup>58</sup>

In terms of size, they did not seem to be inferior to the German cruisers of the "Regensburg" class. Thereupon Korvettenkapitän Boest immediately gave the agreed signal for the attack in the approach and from 11:30 p.m. to 11:42 p.m. two torpedo shots from "G 101", Kapitänleutnant Rudolf Schulte, and one shot from "G 102", Lieutenant Captain v. Varendorff. Then the guide boat swung to starboard, and immediately afterwards four torpedo shots were fired from the guide boat "G 101", one shot from "G 102" and two shots from "G 104", Kapitänleutnant v.

Bartenwerffer. As a result of the high swell, however, the majority of the torpedoes seemed to have passed under the targets. Only the last ship attacked remained immobile in a strikingly thick cloud of smoke. On the other hand, the other three vehicles had immediately turned away by ship and had gone on the opposite course. The Boest group follows them immediately and is back in attack position at 11.53 p.m. The shots were canceled, however, because the enemy formation was turning eight lines to starboard at this moment (Map B). Only "G 104" unleashed two torpedoes at 18 hm above sea level, but they missed the target due to the opponent's change of course. To follow the ships moving in the formation south and to draw the other groups towards them by optical signals, Korvettenkapitän Boest apparently considered less important than the safe destruction of the ship that had broken down near the light buoy, and therefore turned after the second unsuccessful attack back to NW. Also, although almost an hour had passed since the enemy was first sighted, observation, attack maneuvers and combat had so occupied him that only now did he send the first radio message about the sight of four dimmed vehicles, the location of which, however, was about 5 nautical miles was given too far to the east and there was no indication of the opponent's course.

Five minutes later, Boest spotted another dimmed ship two lines to port north of the light buoy. While three chimneys were clearly visible on the one previously attacked (as it later turned out, the bridge structure was confused with a chimney), only two could be made out on this one. "G 101" and "G 102" each fire a torpedo immediately, but the enemy maneuvers them again by turning. At the same time headlights light up on both sides, while the gunfire is opened and hit the fore and amidships of the enemy.<sup>59</sup>

Suddenly, however, salvos covering "G 101" and "G 102" are visible from the south and the previously attacked ships approaching at high speed are recognized as the originators. Still believing that he had cruisers of the "Arethusa" class in front of him, the Half-Flotilla chief swerved at high speed on an east course to shake off the enemy, and did not close again until he stopped firing at 12:20 am.

During this process, all the other groups, without knowing that the northern wing group had in the meantime encountered the enemy, continued their advance to Stand Line III and, having arrived there at 12 o'clock at night, turned back as planned. Only when the radio message from "G 101" had been deciphered at 12:12 a.m. that four dimmed vehicles had been seen in square 049  $\delta$  did the neighboring groups, primarily "B 97", "B 111" and "B 112", under the leadership of Korvettenkapitän Schuur, there together. Four minutes later the radio message came in that the Boest group were engaged in combat with four cruisers, and immediately afterwards the flash of gunfire could be seen on the flotilla group. Ten minutes later the group spotted three vessels on port side, apparently small cruisers of the "Arethusa" class, sailing high on a southerly course, followed by a fourth, similar-looking ship at a greater distance. As it turned out later, they were the ships that had already been attacked twice by the Boest group. Answering their identification signals with the same letters, the Schuur group turned towards the torpedo shot. "B 97", Kapitänleutnant Leo Riedel, fires two torpedoes at about 10 to 12 hm, but they remain ineffective. On the second and third boats, "B 111", Kapitänleutnant Schickhardt, and "B 112", Kapitänleutnant Claussen, the enemy ships are initially mistaken for destroyers. As a result, the range is overestimated and no torpedo is fired. Then this group also lets go of the enemy because as soon as they turn a line on the port side three more dimmed vehicles come into view, which, at high speed on an easterly course, are now mistaken for the cruisers reported by the Boest group. Korvettenkapitän Schuur, handing the first sighted vehicles to the VI Flotilla following him, was already preparing to attack the supposed cruisers when German identification signals flashed on them just in time. It is the Boest group that had lost touch with the enemy when the Schuur group intervened.

The groups Dithmar and Schultz (VI. Flotilla) had also observed the flash of gunfire at Group Boest at 12:18 a.m., but then they were misled by the incoming radio messages and held off too far to the east, although they had intended to line up west of the reported four enemy cruisers and thus cut off their retreat.<sup>60</sup>

The chief of the IX Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Goehle pursued a similar line of thought. In doing so, both of them met the plan of the first leader of the torpedo boat forces, Commodore Hartog. He and his flagship SMS "Pillau", Fregattenkapitän Mommsen, had meanwhile turned north about 20 nm east of the torpedo boat group in order to sit in front of the reported enemy cruisers, pull them in the direction of the Ems and the torpedo boats, if the enemy would have given up the pursuit of the fast German cruiser to allow the attack to come from the west. The attack was also supposed to be delayed in this way until after the moon set, since in the opinion of Commodore Hartog such an attack was previously hopeless. With even a little vigilance and training of the enemy for the night battle, it had to be easy for him to avoid torpedo shots in good time by countermaneuvers and to bring his artillery to full effect from a long distance with a visibility of about 3000 m. That had to change as soon as the moon had set. Commodore Hartog therefore gave the radio message at 12:40 a.m. to "join the attack after the moonset", although under the visibility conditions of the night it seemed harmless to him to use all three flotillas at the same time against the reported enemy. Apart from errors and mix-ups in the F. T. transmission of the square information, a particular difficulty arose from the differences in the calculation of the ship's location in the individual groups for the quick connection, whereby even the use or non-use of the presumably running current could lead to considerable differences in the cutlery. The signaling devices were also missing course information on several occasions.

At least the three groups of the II Flotilla managed to gather around 1 o'clock in the 080 δ square. But when Korvettenkapitän Schuur asked the Boest group about the position of the enemy, the leader of the latter did not really know how to explain the question. The flotilla group came from the west, so it must have just passed the enemy within a short distance. If she no longer had him in sight, as Korvettenkapitän Boest now assumed and at the same time reported by radio and flashing signal, the enemy could actually only be in the northwest. Thereupon, the II Flotilla advanced at 1.10 a.m. with a 25 nm speed in the reported direction, although the enemy actually standing in W to SW could hardly be encountered.<sup>61</sup>

When at 1:16 a.m. three lines dimmed to port came into view, they were mistaken for the enemy by the II Flotilla. While the moon was behind the clouds, she was already heading north to attack, when the Schultz group was recognized just in time. Thereupon the II Flotilla swiveled back to the northwest, while the Schultz group turned on a WNW course in order to look for the enemy in that direction. 15 nm south-east of her, "Pillau" advanced westwards, while all flotillas received another order from the first leader of the torpedo boats through F. T. Signal to re-establish contact with the enemy. In this endeavor, the groups further south, not yet mentioned, had in the meantime closed in to the north or northeast, so that finally around 2 a.m. all groups of the reconnaissance line were in sight of each other on approximately the same course between NW and WNW. At that moment volleys were heard ahead and large explosive clouds were observed. The II flotilla attacked again.

Already at 1:48 am, the chief of the same, Korvettenkapitän Schuur, had seen a bright white light on the port ahead of "B 97", as it later turned out, the light buoy that had already been detected by the Boest group at 11:25 pm, in the vicinity of which there was a larger, dimmed vehicle with two chimneys, which initially swiveled towards the Schuur group, but then turned on a SW course, but after a short time turned back and went on a NE course. By this time the moon had disappeared behind clouds. The flotilla boat "B 97", Kapitänleutnant Leo Riedel, started to attack with the bow torpedo because the other torpedoes had been fired, but when at 2:03 am should the torpedo shot be fired, the ignition screw failed. The torpedo stays in the barrel, "B 97" comes up to 4 hm to the enemy, turns and opens the gunfire, into which "B 111" and "B 112" immediately join in with the success that multiple hits with strong smoke and steam development on the navigating bridge and on deck of the enemy ship can be observed. This returns fire with four volleys, grenades go over the bridge and the guns of "B 97", but are far away. In the meantime, "B 111", Kapitänleutnant Schickhardt, who had followed the guide boat in starboard squadron, fires at 4 to 5 hm with a good cutting angle, depth setting 3 m, two torpedoes. Again one of them cannot come out of the barrel due to a failure of the ignition screw, but the other is observed as a hit amidships and immediately silences the enemy's guns. As a result, the "B 112" driving behind "B 111" no longer fires a torpedo, but is limited to the artillery fire (15 shells) that is on the target after the first volley.<sup>62</sup>

During the gunfire, the outlines of the enemy ship are clearly visible, estimated size about 2 to 3000 tons, length 120 m, two funnels, long forecastle with ram stems, gun caliber about 10.2 cm. After the torpedo hit, it leans over strongly, but then straightens up again and remains unable to maneuver. Shortly afterwards, the Boest and Lahs groups are in the immediate vicinity of the English ship. The last boat of the former group, "G104", Kapitänleutnant v. Bartenwerffer, observed that the enemy cruiser at 2:03 a.m. fired two more torpedoes, which "G104" could only avoid by "hard to starboard twice, extreme power ahead". One torpedo runway runs on the port side, the other past the stern. "G104", however, could not fire again in order not to endanger the boats of the II Flotilla standing on the other side of the cruiser.

While the flotilla group turns to port in the attack, the group behind it swings Boest to starboard and no longer attacks. In contrast, the third group, Korvettenkapitän Dithmar, initially turns after the flotilla group, but turns to port forward 20 hm to see a second dimmed ship near the light buoy, which is barely moving and so far has apparently been covered by the vehicle attacked by the flotilla group. At 2:06 am, the commander of the guide boat "B 109", Oberleutnant zur See Eßberger, fired while the Half-flotilla chief turned the boat to starboard, personally setting the port bow torpedo at 1.5 m, and after exactly reading the torpedo running time of two minutes three seconds, a detonation occurs in the direction of the shot, the effect of which, however, cannot be seen due to the heavy smoke development of the vehicle attacked by the flotilla group. The boats "B 110", Kapitänleutnant Vollheim, and "G 103", Kapitänleutnant Fritz Spieß, following behind the leader's boat, no longer get a shot during the sudden maneuver of the leader's boat. Reaching out to starboard in a large circle to avoid other boats in the flotilla, the group did not approach the enemy again until so late that only the bow of a sinking ship could be observed in the glow of a light grenade fired by the led boat. Since the ship attacked by the flotilla group was still swimming at the time, a mix-up with the latter seemed impossible.

In order to finally sink it, the Schuur group had started to attack again. "B97" and "B 112" each shoot a torpedo, but only when "B 112" calls for the third time on the orders of the flotilla chief, the enemy ship is at 2:21 am. sunk with two torpedoes that hit both.<sup>63</sup>



Immediately afterwards the supposed cruiser has completely disappeared. At the command of the flotilla chief "Save people", "G 103", "G 104" and "B 109" run to the sinking site and deploy lifeboats, while the other boats of the 2nd Flotilla and the 12th Half-Flotilla secure the stopped vessels on all sides.

At the same time, the groups Schultz and Ehrhardt, who could clearly observe the battle, advance with 15 nm to the west and south-west, respectively, in the hope that the place of destruction, brightly lit by headlights, would attract further enemy forces. Likewise, the Goehle (IX. Flotilla) and Tilleßen, after attacking the boats of the II. Flotilla that had left the attack almost as supposedly enemy cruisers, continued their advance over the sinking point. Finally, at high speed, their lookout obstructed several times by the strong swell, they pushed towards the northwest, as the flotilla chief believed the other enemy vehicles had escaped there. But all searches were in vain. The mistake made by the first group at the beginning of the battle of letting go of the strongest enemy, three ships sailing in formation, could not be made good, and soon after 3 a.m. all groups were called back.

In the meantime the three already mentioned boats of the 2nd Flotilla had managed to save at least some of the survivors of the English formation in about three quarters of an hour, made difficult by the swell. "G 104", from the Boest group, retrieved the commander, two officers, one deck officer and ten men, of whom one officer, the deck officer and one man died despite attempts to resuscitate for several hours. The leader boat of the Dithmar group, "B 109", also took part in the rescue after its attack and took over eight men, and during the attack by "B 109", "G 103" was also at high speed to the sinking site of the Schuur Group's scuttled ship to take prisoners. This boat also contained a deck officer and eight men, including three seriously wounded. Only when the entire area had been searched with the searchlight and the calls for help had ceased in the water, the rescue work was canceled. From the statements of the rescued crews it emerged that the sunken ship was not a cruiser, but a completely new, and indeed considerably smaller, type intended for mine-hunting and airship defense. The ship destroyed was the minesweeping gunboat "Arabis", which had only been put into service in mid-January 1916.<sup>64</sup>

Allegedly 30 ships of the same type were already finished, 120 (?) Under construction. Their silhouette resembled, in fact, the ships of the "Arethusa" class, especially if the construction of the navigating bridge was mistaken for a chimney, as it probably happened several times on the night of the battle. This mix-up may also partly explain the low hit results of the torpedo weapon; the vehicles, which were considerably shallower than cruisers, had probably been shot below several times. Nevertheless, the statement that the "Arabis", as the prisoners claimed, had a water displacement of only about 1200 tons, considering the number of officer (eight officers compared to a crew of 80 men), which was quite high for such a small vehicle, appeared to be little believable. The fact that the destruction of the "Arabis" had required two hits from the latest German torpedo, which was equipped with a particularly powerful explosive effect, also seemed to support the assumption of greater water displacement. On the other hand, however, there was also the possibility that the vehicles, according to their purpose for mine-hunting, had a particularly high reserve buoyancy.

In the vicinity of the sinking site of the "Arabis", "G 103" also picked up a lifebuoy with the inscription of a sister ship, H.M.S. "Poppy". Since it could not be determined whether all prisoners belonged to the crew of the "Arabis", Korvettenkapitän Dithmar's assumption that a second ship of this class had been sunk by his led boat "B 109" could not be dismissed. Given the difficulty of clarifying the details of a night battle in which such a large number of torpedo boats had been involved, this assumption remained as uncertain as the other that a third ship might have been hit by torpedoes.

At 2:5 a.m. "Pillau", who at the time had come up to a point about 15 nm SE from the place where the "Arabis" sank, went on an SE course so as not to get too close to its own torpedo boats. The enemy ships that had not yet been found could no longer be reached without standing too far away from their own receiving forces when it got light. At 3 a.m. Commodore Hartog therefore gave the order to the flotilla to turn around and enter at a high speed over a point 30 nm north of Terschelling and 10 nm north of Ameland. This order crossed with a corresponding signal from the commander of the reconnaissance forces, Kontreadmiral Hipper, who also expected no further use from a further continuation of the Torpedo boats advance.<sup>65</sup>

Admiral Hipper was already at 1:15 a.m. on the incoming radio messages departed with the battle cruisers from Schilling-Reede, 20 minutes later the outpost division, consisting of the 1st Division of the I Squadron, followed, and then the ships of the line "Westfalen", "Kaiser" and "König Albert" and "Margrave" lying in Wilhelmshaven-Roadstead also left, under the leadership of the 2nd Admiral of the III. Squadron, at sea, while the chief of the latter received orders to collect the ships of the line leaving the port and use them to seek connection with the others. The IV reconnaissance group in the harbor received the same order, while the II from Osterems at 2:30 a.m. went to sea. At 3:30 a.m. The fleet management ordered that the submarines "U 32" and "U 70" should also proceed immediately from the Ems to the sinking site of the "Arabis" in order to wait 48 hours for the appearance of further enemy forces. The departure of the submarines, however, was delayed until 10:30 a.m. as a result of the fog, so that they could not reach the waiting position ordered before dark. At the same time as the order was given, the airships "L 16", "L17" and "L20" had received instructions to stand in the outer German Bight as soon as it was light, to clear up to W, NW and N and, in particular, to carefully search the battlefield.

At 5:30 a.m. the outpost division of the ships of the line stood along the length of Norderney, the battle cruisers in front of Borkum, the II Reconnaissance Group in front of Schiermonikoog, while the attack flotillas were on their way back about 40 nm northwest of the latter. An hour later, the receiving forces turned around because they were still far enough forward to intervene in time if the torpedo boats were able to spot enemy forces. Unfortunately, however, the aerial reconnaissance had to be aborted due to the freshening southerly wind, so that "L 17" only reached 40 nm west of Heligoland, "L20" up to 60 nm north of Horns-Riff, whereupon both airships shortly after 8 am. turned back. "L 16", on the other hand, continued the reconnaissance in the sea area northwest of Terschelling up to about 50 nm northwest of Texel, before he also started the return march at 10:30. This ship had seen nothing of the enemy either. The assumption of the German fleet command that the latter would immediately dispatch armed forces towards the battlefield was nevertheless correct. Already at the first radio messages from the battle on the Dogger Bank, the battle cruiser fleet from Rosyth, the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron from Harwich, and the other parts of the "Grand Fleet" were heading for a meeting point at sea from their various bases.<sup>66</sup>

Only when further reports revealed that only torpedo boat flotillas were involved in the German advance and that they had meanwhile returned to the estuaries, the British forces were called back by the Admiralty, and at 11:30 p.m. the battle fleet turned about 65 NM east of Peterhead to return to Scapa Flow.

The destruction of the "Arabis" could be tolerated on the English side. A loss that occurred on the return march of the cruiser of Commodore Tyrwhitt to Harwich was felt all the more severely. When they ran through the Sledway Canal, which was constantly monitored and searched for mines, and had reached the North Cutler buoy, the flagship "Arethusa" suddenly heard a detonation. The cruiser's engines immediately came to a standstill, and attempts to tow by the destroyers "Lightfoot" and "Loyal" failed. The cables broke in the heavy seas, which ran against the tidal current, and ultimately doom took its course. The cruiser drifted out of maneuvering onto Cutler Reef, broke through, and had to be abandoned by Commodore Tyrwhitt and the crew. He was the victim of a mine lock, which was carried out by the Flanders submarine "UC 7", Oberleutnant zur See Haag, on the night of 9/10. February had been laid out directly in the approach to Harwich. All rescue attempts failed, so that in mid-August the wreck was left to its fate.

In the meantime, further operations on the German side had been seriously considered in response to the battle. On the assumption that the enemy must have been set in motion by the events of the previous night and might even allow himself to be misled into pushing stronger forces against the German Bight, it was decided to repeat the torpedo-boat advance immediately, and the flotillas should follow suit. Immediate fuel replenishment on the following day, which was the last possible time because of the waxing moon, in the direction of the Haaks lightship, in the vicinity of which English armored cruisers were allegedly sighted by Dutch fish steamers on February 9th. The other armed forces were held together on the inner roads in readiness for this venture. It was only when a meeting with the flotilla chiefs and torpedo boat commanders involved that the previous night would have been too light for pure torpedo boat operations and the planned advance was abandoned.<sup>67</sup>

As a result of the early retreat of the British armed forces, "U 32" and "U70" crossed on the battlefield in vain from the evening of February 11th. While "U70", Kapitänleutnant Wünsche, started the return march on the afternoon of February 12, due to a misunderstanding, "U 32", Oberleutnant zur See Grünert, remained in the area ordered until the evening of the following day. Only a corpse, a few pieces of uniform and drifting pieces of wood still testified of the battle that had taken place here. On the afternoon of the 12th, two fish steamers, evidently patrol vehicles, appeared on the battlefield, but when they saw the submarine they sped away and disappeared to the west. No other enemy forces were sighted. After "U 32" had destroyed a pole buoy with a lantern, probably the position buoy of the "Arabis", it started its march back on the 13th and returned to Emden on the 14th in the afternoon.

Simultaneously with the advance of the German submarines towards the Dogger Bank, the activity of the English submarines increased in front of the German estuaries. Both off the Ems and even off the Jade, these were reported on February 12 and hunted by outpost and torpedo boats until after dark, albeit without results.

Even if the material success of the battle at Dogger Bank was in itself small, even if one wanted to assume that a second, perhaps even a third ship, besides the "Arabis", would have been destroyed or shot, the fact was still valid, that, after a long break, the torpedo boats had been successfully brought to the enemy, insofar as the English were now likely to be forced to call in stronger and more valuable guard forces than before for mine sweeping, and these in turn could offer good targets for further advances.

The torpedo boats also met expectations in terms of driving training, maneuvering skills and tactical cooperation. In spite of the large number of groups grouping together in a confined space at the highest speed, the danger of collisions or mutual bombardment had been avoided in all cases. The gun leaders had also done an excellent job. On the other hand, the results of the torpedo weapon: 19 torpedoes, 3, at most 4 hits, had to disappoint. Korvettenkapitän Boest, the chief of III. Torpedoboots-Halbflottille, which alone had fired 13 torpedoes, attributed the poor results primarily to the poor ballistic properties of the exhaust tubes originally intended for 53 cm torpedoes and later changed for the 50 cm torpedoes of the II Flotilla, their replacement against 50 cm tubes therefore had to be tackled immediately.<sup>68</sup>

The Half-Flotilla chief cited the lack of practice on the part of the shooters as a further reason for the missed shots.

The fleet management took these circumstances into account. The new moon period, which was favorable for torpedo boat operations, was over anyway. As early as February 12th, therefore, the first leader of the torpedo boats with the VI. and IX. Flotilla detached to exercises in the Baltic Sea until February 23. After the small boiler cleaning was completed, the II Flotilla followed on the 14th, to be brought back to the level of training and to be used in the North Sea with all the more success in the next new moon period. Those of the II. Squadron were made available as target ships. The disadvantage that as long as only three torpedo-boat half-flotillas of old boats remained in the North Sea had to be accepted. In the meantime, they were responsible for the reconnaissance of the area in front of the German Bight, which was already explained in the operational program, in order to report hostile mine operations in good time and, if possible, to prevent them. To do this, they were supposed to advance westwards from Heligoland or Norderney to the north and south of the English mine barriers, patrol there and, when it got light, be back within their own barriers, an intention that was often thwarted by bad weather. For example, a patrol run by the 9th Torpedo Boat Half Flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Faulborn, had to be stopped after a short time on the night of the 15th from the lock gap near Norderney, the next, by the 10th Half Flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Friedrich Klein, on the night of 19. Carried out from Heligoland, without any particular results.

Also the intention of the airships to use the time until the attack opportunity against England resumes for extensive reconnaissance in the northern North Sea in order to receive information about the whereabouts of English naval forces and to determine whether and where, for example, guard lines between the north of Scotland and Norway or lay out in the Skagerrak, initially failed due to the weather conditions. When the opportunity arose on the 21st, it was waived because without the fast torpedo boat flotillas that were currently in the Baltic Sea, aid beyond the narrower German Bight seemed impossible and the opportunity to take action against any reported enemy armed forces did could not be exploited. On the other hand, on the 20th, for the first time in a long time, the airships took part in securing and supporting the mine sweeping work.<sup>69</sup>


The primary aim was to check whether the mine barriers reported by "L 7" in September and October 1915 about 70 nm north-west of Heligoland (in 089 β and 065 β 7) were actually in place. Furthermore, the area about 45 nm west of the Amrum Bank and another about 25 nm northwest of Heligoland (the squares 085 β, 099 β, 100 β and 130 ε) had to be searched, where during a fleet advance in September 1915 by SMS "München" and the torpedo boats "G 192" and "G 194" also anchored mines had been sighted and partly shot down. In addition, since the only mine-safe passage to the north east of the Amrum Bank could not be passed by the squadrons in bad weather, great importance was attached to the fact that a 12 nm wide and 60 nm long strip to the north (squares 131 β to 127 β and 134 β to 138 β) would be searched for mines. The latter task in particular seemed so important that it had to be promoted even when the weather conditions prevented the mine sweepers from being secured by airships. A comparison of the assessment of the mine situation from the German side at that time and the barriers actually laid out by the enemy up to that time is contained in sketch c.

The trips to discover mines, undertaken for the first time by several airships in the triangle north-west of Heligoland on February 20 and 21, failed due to the poor observation conditions when the sea was rough. In contrast, the 13th Half Flotilla, Kapitänleutnant v. Zitzewitz, during one of the usual patrol trips on the night of the 22nd, about 40 nm west of Heligoland, sighted two mines at a distance of 800 m, without her being able to tell whether they were drifting or anchored. Now that the British mine locks are now known, there is no doubt that the half-flotilla must have passed the northern edge of a lock of 850 mines that night. (Text sketch c.) In the meantime, the work of the minesweepers west of the Amrum Bank had been promoted to such an extent that the I. Minesweeping Division, Korvettenkapitän Bobsien, was able to report three of the squares to be searched, an area of about 100 square nautical miles, free of mines on the 22nd. Aircraft and airship reconnaissance in the border area of the German Bight revealed nothing unusual these days. Only it was established that on February 21st, on the western corner of Schiermonikoog, attempts were made to tow the English submarine "H6", which was stranded there at the time, but not, as initially suspected, by English, but had started from Dutch ships, which led to success the following day.<sup>70</sup>



On the 23rd, the first leader of the torpedo boats, Kommodore Hartog, returned with his flagship S. M.S. "Rostock" and the VI. and IX. Flotilla returned from the Baltic Sea, just in time to take part in the safety measures for the departure of two auxiliary cruisers equipped in the manner of the "Möwe".

Text sketch c.  
Textflage c.



**Die Minenlage in der Deutschen Bucht Anfang 1916.**

The mine situation in the German Bight in early 1916.

These, SMS "Greif", Korvettenkapitän Tietze, and SMS "Wolf", Kapitänleutnant Kurth Hermann, were to leave the German Bight from the Elbe via Horns-Riff on February 26th and 27th respectively, in order to break through the English blockade lines in the north to win the free sea to enter into the trade war. In the event that they were forced to march back on the first day by enemy forces, all cruisers, two torpedo boat flotillas and the squadron were provided by the outpost service to accommodate them.<sup>71</sup>

71

At first nothing was made known to the armed forces about the purpose of the readiness, and every other possible precaution had been taken to keep the departure a secret. As with the operations of the "Möwe" and the "Meteor", another submarine, "U70", Kapitänleutnant Wünsche, to which the exact course map of the auxiliary cruiser had been sent, should leave so early, that it would be standing in front of the Skagerrak on February 26, when it was light, in order to take over the reconnaissance in front of the auxiliary cruisers, without, however, drawing enemy forces near the courses controlled by the auxiliary cruisers.

The patrol run by a torpedo boat half-flotilla on the night of the 25th had to be broken off north of Langeoog due to bad weather. For the same reason, the departure of the submarine was delayed by a day; At noon on the 26th, however, it reached a point about 100 nm north-northwest of Horns-Riff, advanced from there to about 70 nm west of Lindesnes for reconnaissance, but had to turn around 40 nm from the intended end point of the reconnaissance at nightfall, because it could not run more than 10 nm with E.N.E. winds up to strength 8 to 9 and also had to stop several times to clear the F. T. rigging damaged by over washing seas. No ship traffic was detected anywhere, and when it got dark, "U 70" ran back about 50 nm on the previous course at a depth of 20 m in order to start reconnaissance for NNW again the following morning (February 27). There was no possibility of attack. On this day, too, the submarine suffered from heavy seas, so most of the F.T. signals could only be picked up mutilated. At 11 a.m. it sighted a steamer and at 1:20 a.m., about 60 nm west of Lindesnes, an enemy submarine, which was only recognizable by a staysail, which was immediately reported by radio message. At 6 p.m. "U 70" turned around 60 nm west of Egersund and ran back south again according to the plan (Map C). Due to the bad weather, during the night it went back to a depth of 20 m in part to protect the boat and engine. When on the morning of the 28<sup>th</sup> appeared about 50 nm southwest of Lindesnes, there was a snow storm, which made the view much more difficult. The starting position planned for this day could therefore no longer be reached, shipping traffic was not encountered and at 6 p.m. the submarine headed to the Danish coast near Lodbjerg.<sup>72</sup>

In the meantime the bad weather had become disastrous for S. M. S. "Wolf". Lying at anchor in the mouth of the Elbe in a stormy easterly wind, this auxiliary cruiser ran aground on the 26th and suffered such a severe boiler and machine breakdown, that his departure was no longer an option for the time being. The departure of the auxiliary cruiser "Greif" was also delayed by a day. It had not left the Elbe estuary on the 27th when it was at 1:25 p.m. the main deciphering office in Neumünster reported the following to the fleet management on the basis of the observation of the English radio traffic:

Incomplete message about the following content:

Well informed source reports that the German fleet has equipped three ships, one of which is said to have been in Kiel in mid-February, while No. 2 and 3 are apparently still being equipped. It is guaranteed that this message is correct. Addition: Message is addressed to five ships apparently lying in the guard line.

Another message describes a ship that is armed with two 10 cm guns in the foredeck, one 10 cm in the broadside and two 10 cm in the stern.

Complementally description: The reported ships fly the Danish flag and have Danish-speaking officers and men on board."

This news was apt to seriously question the conduct of the undertaking, even if it remained uncertain how far it had already led to actual countermeasures on the British side. One had to reckon with the premature announcement of the equipment of the auxiliary cruisers in England, the commander of the "Greif" also knew that. Bringing the message to him at the last moment before going away might only have made his mind uncertain without giving him the opportunity to change his plan. The location of his ship was also no longer known to the fleet management at the time. It was probably from land to anchor. The message should therefore have been transmitted to him by radio message, which, if the enemy could decipher it, would have been even more aware of the intended departure. The weather in the German Bight was hazy. According to reports from the Neumünster main decoding office, English radio messages revealed that there was snow and rain north of the Orkney Islands. No alarming reports were received from "U 70". In spite of all this, the situation seemed to the fleet chief to be quite favorable for the departure, even if on the 28th an airship reconnaissance was not to be expected. He therefore refrained from transmitting the message to the auxiliary cruiser and also asked the admiral staff not to let the former receive any more information about English armed forces that had been sighted in the North Sea a few days ago.<sup>73</sup>

At 5 p.m. Korvettenkapitän Tietze left the Elbe estuary with his ship as planned without knowledge of these events.

On the British side during these days - whether with or without connection with the above-mentioned news, it must remain an open question - there was an intention to act simultaneously against the German Bight by Scapa, Rosyth and Harwich. The British battle fleet with the II and VII Cruiser Squadrons, the IV Light Cruiser Squadron and the associated flotillas therefore left before dawn on the 26th, but had to give up the advance south due to bad weather. The squadrons, to which the battle cruiser fleet from Rosyth joined on the 27th, used the time for combat exercises and returned to their bases on the 28th. In the meantime, however, news had been received through neutral countries of the intended departure of German auxiliary cruisers, the equipment of which was already known, and at noon on February 28 the Admiralty warned the British fleet chief that such a ship was in the guise of a peaceful merchant ship, probably with one U-boat together, about to leave the Skagerrak. As usual, however, the news arrived so late that one could only try to obstruct his path high in the north. One had to keep in mind that the reported auxiliary cruiser was supposed to either lay mines in front of the bases of the fleet or break through to the Atlantic Ocean. As a countermeasure for the latter case, the usual guard line of ships of the Xth Cruiser Squadron southwest of the Faroe Islands was strengthened, the passage between the Shetland and Orkney Islands was occupied by the armored cruiser "Minotaur" and manned a destroyer and took special measures to protect the Pentland Firth from mine contamination. (See Map C.) Furthermore, the small cruiser "Blanche" was dispatched to a point 30 nm northeast of the Shetland Islands, while two light cruisers and four destroyers from Rosyth advanced in an easterly direction and two others, "Calliope" and "Comus" from the IV. Light Cruiser Squadron, was supposed to search the area off the Norwegian coast about 60 nm west of Utsire and 100 nm west of Obrestad. When the English FT directional stations detected a German ship close to Egersund soon after midnight, the auxiliary cruisers "Patia" and "Columbella" were also instructed by the Xth Cruiser Squadron to move from a point 60 nm north-north east of the Shetland Islands to the north-east and south-west Direction to cross. At the same time "Comus" and "Calliope" were withdrawn from the auxiliary cruisers in an 80 nm long outpost line about 60 nm south.<sup>74</sup>

Another auxiliary cruiser of the Xth Squadron, "Alcantara", which was already in the vicinity of this area, was to be relieved on that day by the auxiliary cruiser "Andes" in order to go to Liverpool for fuel replenishment. The separation should take place about 60 nm east of the north point of the Shetland Islands.

The F. T. traffic caused by these measures did not go unnoticed on the German side. The main deciphering office in Neumünster succeeded in determining from English radio messages on the 29th that from 3 pm. until dark two enemy warships (apparently "Patia" and "Columbella") were to patrol 45 sm NNE of the Shetland Islands; at that time, however, "Greif", if he had carried out his departure as planned, must have already passed this area. The message immediately transmitted to the auxiliary cruiser by the Norddeich station did not reach him, however, because in the morning he had already encountered the enemy immediately in front of the aforementioned outpost line.

Already at 9:45 a.m. the auxiliary cruiser "Alcantara", heading towards NNE on the outpost line, had sighted a column of smoke on the port side. Then the radio message "Enemy in sight, northeast 15 sm" came from the auxiliary cruiser "Andes". As a result, "Alcantara" immediately set off on a north-westerly course with extreme strength and almost immediately sighted a ship with the Norwegian flag, which surprisingly and contrary to a further report from the "Andes" had only one funnel instead of two. The doubt as to whether the reported and suspect ship was really in front of you was intensified when the auxiliary cruiser "Andes" came into view on starboard at high speed on a north-east course, apparently on the hunt for another ship. The commander of the "Alcantara", however, decided before he followed the "Andes" to stop the ship he had sighted himself. With two warning shots he brought it to a stop. At this point in time (10:20 a.m.) the other auxiliary cruiser reported that it was pursuing the ship it had signaled in a south-easterly direction. The steamer stopped by the "Alcantara" could therefore not be identical to the former. At the stern of the same now the name "Rena" could be read and the ship's knowledge matched the name. On the English auxiliary cruiser all information about the cargo and destination of the "Rena" was available. So a brief investigation had to reveal everything else. Stopping at a distance of 1000 m behind the stern of the same, the "Alcantara" launched a boat. At that moment the stopped steamer signaled to everyone's amazement: "This is the suspect ship." At the same time he pulled down the Norwegian flag, the German war flag rose from the mast, the gun fairings fell, cannons became visible, and immediately afterwards the "Alcantara" was in a violent and extremely effective fire at the short range.<sup>75</sup>

Before she could reply, the armored dinghy had been blown to pieces, the ship's rudder line was disabled and every connection between the navigating bridge and the guns had been destroyed. A fierce battle broke out, in which the "Andes" soon intervened at greater distances. At 11 a.m. A torpedo from the "Greif" hit the "Alcantara" between the boiler rooms, but five minutes later the German ship was also in flames and had to stop after several hits. Almost all the gun crews, including the chief officer, Kapitänleutnant Nebeski, had fallen. While the survivors struck the prepared explosive charges and then rescued themselves in boats or jumped overboard, the English auxiliary cruiser capsized, an event that was greeted with cheers by the German crews swimming in the water. Then the falling snowstorm claimed new victims.

In the meantime, the cruisers "Calliope", "Comus" and "Blanche" immediately followed the first signal from the "Andes" at full speed, but when "Comus" was the first to appear on the battlefield with the destroyer "Munster", the "Alcantara" already sinking. But the flag was still waving on the German auxiliary cruiser. As a result, "Comus" opened fire on this again, while the destroyer with the auxiliary cruiser "Andes" saved the survivors of the "Alcantara". Soon afterwards "Greif" went under, being fiercely bombarded by the English cruiser until the last moment. The people floating in boats and on rafts suffered further losses under the raging fire of the English. The commandant, Korvettenkapitän Tietze, was also killed in the process. Fear of the presence of German submarines had influenced the behavior of the English, although "U 70" was unfortunately already on the march back between Horns-Riff and Sylt during the battle. As a result, the rescue work was also started late. Of a crew of 306 men, 97 had since found death in battle and in the waves. At 2 p.m. the cruiser "Calliope" and the auxiliary cruiser "Magic" appeared, but found nothing more to do and immediately returned to their patrol areas. In order to better protect the English auxiliary cruisers from similar surprises in the future as in the case of the "Meteor" and "Greif", it was determined that with every further procedure the boat with the investigation team would be lowered into the water far away from the stopped ship and the latter then was to receive the instruction to steam towards the boat while the investigating auxiliary cruiser kept itself apart.<sup>76</sup>



In the meantime, measures had begun in the German Bight to match the newly formed "Marine Corps Half-Flotilla", Korvettenkapitän Paul Cleve, from the torpedo boats "V68", Kapitänleutnant Steiner, "V 67", Kapitänleutnant Waitz, and "V47", Kapitänleutnant Zander to be transferred to Flanders. The memory of the first, unfortunately unsuccessful attempt by the Thiele half-flotilla on October 17, 1914 (1), made it necessary to prepare particularly carefully and to keep the undertaking secret. Patrols of the 9th and 14th torpedo boat half-flotilla in the area in front of the German Bight in the night of February 29 and March 1 respectively went without incident, a submarine sighted 10 nm south of Heligoland on February 28 was hunted down sharply by minesweepers and the 5th torpedo boat flotilla and, if possible, kept under water. On the morning of the 29th, the II. Reconnaissance Group, as well as "Rostock", the flagship of the I. leader of the torpedo boats, and the VI. and IX. Flotilla relocated to the Osterems, and in the afternoon of the same day the Marine Corps half-flotilla entered the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal from Kiel. The airship attack against England planned for the following night, which was also to serve for long-range reconnaissance, unfortunately had to be canceled due to the weather. On March 1, the 1st Squadron, the 1st Reconnaissance Group and a flotilla of outposts in Schillig Roadstead went into intensified readiness. In the meantime, however, the march of the torpedo boats destined for Flanders down the Elbe through fog was considerably delayed. The half-flotilla did not arrive in Heligoland until the afternoon of the 2nd, but had to wait until the late afternoon of the following day in order to begin the final advance when the weather cleared. An escort for the half-flotilla was not planned so that any appearance of a major undertaking that could only have led to an alert to the English naval forces in the Hoofden was avoided. In the event that the boats were forced to turn around during the night, the armed forces on the Osterems and Schillig Roads, which were in heightened readiness, were to advance in good time to pick up the boats when it was light. Although the airship and aircraft reconnaissance failed on March 3, the crossing to Flanders went on the very dark night that followed without any particular incident.

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1) See Nordsee Volume II, page 192ff.<sup>77</sup>



From the lock gap near Norderney in a wide arc to the north in order to avoid the area off the Dutch islands, in which enemy forces were most likely crossing, the half-flotilla reached at 9.30 p.m. a point about 60 nm north of Vlieland, swiveled there on a south-south-westerly course and stood at 4 am. at Noord Hinder lightship. The original intention to advance from there immediately in the direction of the Thames estuary in order to attack guards suspected there had to be abandoned due to the delay that had already occurred on the march out. There was just enough time to reach Zeebrugge by daylight. Contrary to expectations, no hostile counteraction had been encountered anywhere.<sup>78</sup>

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#### **4. Initiation of the offensive of the High Sea Fleet.**

The request for the external fire from Zeebrugge by the Cleve Half-flotilla was the signal for the High Seas Forces to return to normal readiness. It was called gathering strength for the first major undertaking of the High Seas Forces under the new management, planned for the following night (March 3rd / 4th) as part of the operational program. For this purpose, at the same time as an airship attack on England, the I. and II. Reconnaissance Group with the VI. and IX. Torpedo boat flotilla advance westward in order to advance into the Hoofden at daybreak, while the majority took up a position at Terschelling-Bank. In this way it was hoped to attack light enemy forces repeatedly reported in the Hoofden, and perhaps also to lure and cut off others in pursuit of the attacking airships.

To support the enterprise, the Marine Corps also sent six UC boats to sea on March 3, namely "UC 6", "UC 7", "UC 4", "UC 10", "UC 5" and "UC 3", to take the Dover exit, the north exit of the Downs, the Edinburgh Channel and the Black Deep (Thames exits), as well as the south and north exit of Harwich, at the same time as the naval forces proceeded the next night (3-4 March) contaminate with mines. Although the boats suffered from heavy seas and blowing snow, they managed to throw all the locks on schedule, with the exception of those intended in the Downs. Only the boats sent to Harwich suffered delays in their advance and could not throw their barriers until the night of March 6th to 7th. In addition, on March 4, seven more submarines, namely "UB 18", "UB 17", "UB 2", "UB 6", "UB 13", "UB 10" and "UB 16", were deployed the height of Smiths Knoll, Great Yarmouth, Thornton Bank, Orfordness, north of Harwich, and in front of the North and South Falls.

But when the High Seas Forces were supposed to leave on the 3rd, thick fog lay over the German estuaries of the North Sea. The planned operation therefore had to be postponed and the II reconnaissance group as well as the S.M.S. "Rostock" and the VI flotilla returned from the Osterems to Wilhelmshaven in the course of the day to replenish fuel.<sup>79</sup>

All preparations for carrying out the undertaking were already made the next day, when around 9 p.m. Suddenly the auxiliary cruiser "Möwe" reported its arrival in the local waters by radio message, asked to be admitted to Horns-Riff the next morning and thereby set all oceanic forces in motion in a completely different direction than the planned one.

After an extremely successful voyage through the North and South Atlantic Oceans (1), the commander of this auxiliary cruiser, Korvettenkapitän Graf zu Dohna, decided to break through between Iceland and the Faroe Islands on the march back home at the end of February. Although several clouds of smoke at regular intervals seemed to indicate the presence of enemy guard vehicles in this line, the breakthrough was achieved on the 29th, the same day on which the auxiliary cruiser "Greif" ran into the arms of the enemy blockade forces northeast of the Shetland Islands. Under these circumstances it had been a particularly fortunate decision of Count Dohna to take his ship that far north. That the guard between the Faroe Islands and the Shetland Islands had meanwhile been intensified, he learned from observing the English radio traffic only after the breakthrough had already been made further north. The further voyage to the Norwegian coast also went without any incident. On March 2, the latter came in sight towards evening at the 61st parallel near Utvär in front of the Sogne Fjord, the next morning the ship was already at Utsire. Around 4 p.m. but several clouds of smoke were sighted, apparently belonging to a formation of six large ships and three cruisers or destroyers. Several suspicious clouds of smoke were also seen in the further course of the afternoon. Although it was possible to evade in good time every time, towards evening the commander thought it advisable to radio the fleet management to ask that his ship would be picked up on March 4, when it was light, 20 nm southwest of Horns-Riff. The radio message came as a complete surprise. However, the outpost forces, consisting of the II Division of the I Squadron, the battle cruiser "von der Tann", the IV reconnaissance group and the V torpedo boat flotilla, succeeded. to start marching so accelerated that they could reach the pick-up position indicated by the auxiliary cruiser just in time. As soon as their state of readiness permitted, they were followed by the 2nd Flotilla, the battle cruisers "Seydlitz", "Moltke" and "Derfflinger" as well as the 1st Division of the 1st Squadron, while the rest of the High Seas Forces were on standby as quickly as possible collected the outer roads.

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1) The trade war of the "Möwe" will be dealt with in Kreuzerkrieg, Volume III.<sup>80</sup>

Only the II Reconnaissance Group with the VI. and IX. Torpedo boat flotilla remained in port in order to continue the fuel replenishment in the interests of the intended fleet operation in the Hoofden. The majority of the fleet was also only supposed to leave if, contrary to expectations, stronger enemy forces were reported in the course of the night or the next morning. This could not be assumed without further ado, since "Möwe" had apparently not yet been noticed by the enemy. In this case, however, the following morning at Horns-Riff, little other than light armed forces, which were accidentally advanced, were to be expected, which the units dispatched to take up must be able to cope with.

The night passed with a certain tension. The greetings were all the happier when S.M.S. "Möwe" the next morning at 6 am. reported their location about 10 nm south of Horns-Riff by radio message, an area which at the time had also been reached by parts of the receiving forces. At 6:23 am, the chief of the 1st Squadron, Vice Admiral Ehrhardt Schmidt, who was in charge of the host forces, ordered that all ships and units should return to their anchorages. But the auxiliary cruiser itself had not yet been sighted, as thick fog had descended in stretches as soon as it was light. Only around 7 am he was found by S. M. S. "von der Tann", but soon lost again in the fog that lasted until 10 am. Then, one after the other, the ships of the 1st Squadron and the 1st and 4th Reconnaissance Group with the assigned flotillas came into view, whose crews greeted the returning "Möwe" with cheers. At 7:35 a.m. the commandant received the following radio message:

"The fleet welcomes you with pride and joy. High Seas Chief. "

At 5 p.m. After more than two months of absence from home, the ship entered the locks of Wilhelmshaven, sinking 15 ships with a total of 57,835 Br.R.T., with valuable raw materials and 34 million marks of unminted gold on board.

Originally the fleet management had intended to take advantage of the favorable weather for the planned advance into the Hoofden that same evening, but had to postpone it for another day because the torpedo boat flotillas, some of which had already been on the second night, had to add fuel. As a result, the B-boats of the U-Flotilla Flanders were called back on the evening of March 4th, but went back to sea on the 5th except for "UB 18" with the same order, so that on the 6th in the morning from dawn to dusk the already mentioned positions were occupied again by submarines.<sup>81</sup>

The operation of the fleet was initiated by the airships "L 11", "L 13" and "L 14", which rose from the German Bight on the 5th around noon in order for the march of the High Sea Forces intended for the following night in the direction of to clear up the northern bases of the English fleet and, if possible, to attack the naval installations in the Firth of Forth, Tyne and Tees. Even after passing Heligoland, however, the north-northwest freshened up strongly, so that the airships only made slow progress under heavy gusts of snow and hail. At 4:20 p.m. therefore "L 11", Korvettenkapitän Victor Schütze, gave up the intended attack on Rosyth and headed from the south-west flat of the Dogger Bank in Middlesborough to attack the ammunition factories there. At 6 o'clock, "L 14", Lieutenant Commander of the Böcker Reserve, set course for the mouth of the Tyne from the middle of the Dogger Bank, because with the strong headwind he would not have reached the Firth of Forth until 3 am. Only "L 13", Kapitänleutnant Mathy, held since 4:20 pm. an engine had already failed due to shaft damage, continued on the previous course until 8 o'clock in the evening, but then had to turn off in the direction of the Tyne as well. Enemy forces had not been sighted by any of the airships until then.

In the meantime, while the minesweeping divisions searched the Heligoland Bay for enemy submarines, the High Seas Forces had again gathered on the outer roads and were at 7:25 p.m. from departed to the west as planned. Shortly before midnight, the last ships left the Jade. 20 capital ships (1), 11 small cruisers (2), 50 torpedo boats (3) were thus at sea. Only the 2nd Squadron remained on the Elbe to take over the security of the German Bight and, if necessary, to leave the following morning with a minesweeping division to cover the return march of the other armed forces. For the same purpose, the submarines "U 68" and "U 69" as well as S. M. S. "Arcona", the latter loaded with 100 mines, were on the Ems in intensified readiness. The Marine Corps supported the enterprise by air reconnaissance in the Hoofden and by the already described submarine operations against the hostile ports of call on the south-east coast of England.

1) "Rheinland", which was in the shipyard until mid-April, was missing, "Bayern", which was not put into service until March 17, and "Lützow", which was only ready for front in mid-April.

2) "Stralsund" was still in the shipyard in Kiel for the rearming from 10.5 to 15 cm, which had already been carried out on all other cruisers of the II reconnaissance group. "Munich", which was under repair, was not ready again until March 7th.

3) The 1st and 8th flotillas were on the Baltic Sea war scene.<sup>82</sup>

While the High Sea Forces headed west off the West Frisian Islands, the first airship "L 11" (Schütze) had p at 10:45 pm. reached the English coast, contrary to expectations, however, considerably further south than expected, namely between Flamborough Head and Spurn Point, after it had reached 10 p.m. was unsuccessfully shot at by naval forces when dumping 380 kg of gasoline as ballast. The commander reported on the further course of his journey as follows:

"The ship was now heading north over the clearly visible, snow-covered coast. As long as the landscape was not covered by thick snow clouds, visibility was good; the upper cloud limit was 2–3000 m, above it was a clear starry sky. In the meantime, violent hailstorms set in again, the ship iced up heavily and arrived despite all of the ballast water having been released and the air temperature being 16°, not above 2000 m altitude. In the gusts of snow and hail, the antennas and the tips of the metal struts in the gondolas and walkway shone in bright Elmsfeuer, the gondolas and the platform were heavily snow-covered. When it was 1 a.m. cleared up, it turned out that the ship had previously stepped on the spot and that with a wind speed of 24 m/sec. further steering to the north was pointless."

Now, however, the Humber Run clearly emerged from the snow-covered landscape in the south, then the bomb impacts of another, already attacking airship made the city of Hull, which was actually well shaded, visible.

The airship that "L 11" saw was "L 14" (Böcker). At 12:40 a.m. this had crossed the coast near Scarborough, but with a headwind of 24 m/sec could no longer reach the targets at Tyne and Tees. It had therefore gone before the wind and steered south, where the Humber stood out clearly as a dark streak in the snowy landscape, and came at about 1 a.m. with 1,300 kg high explosive and incendiary bombs from a height of 2,300 m for the attack on the docks and port facilities of Hull. It was brightly lit by the numerous searchlights set up west of Hull and on the south bank of the Humber, and the batteries fired at it very violently with incendiary grenades and shrapnel. However, the only direct hit, in the ship's heel, did no significant damage. On the other hand, the effects of their own bombs were extraordinarily great.<sup>83</sup>

Several hits were flawlessly observed on the quays of the western docks, but in particular it was recognized how entire blocks of houses collapsed in a north-south street, which later stood out as a large black spot in the snow-covered landscape. Driving over the port facilities a second time after the first attack, however, proved impossible in the stormy north wind. An attack on Grimsby was thwarted by the fact that shortly before a thick wall of cloud pushed over the city and blocked any view. "L 14" therefore left the coast at Saltfleet at 1.45 am and started the march back.

Immediately after the attack by "L 14", new snow clouds obscured the view, so that "L 11", who had observed the attack, had to stand still for an hour until the clouds cleared again and this airship could approach. But it soon turned out that the commandant would not have been able to reach the city a second time with the strong headwind. He therefore initially only threw a few high-explosive bombs and incendiary bombs in order to induce the defense batteries and searchlights to fire and shine and thus better overlook the situation. However, this challenge was unsuccessful. In the city everything remained dark and quiet as before. At that moment, however, the clouds parted and, according to the commandant's report, the following picture emerged:

"The city and its surroundings were freshly covered in snow. With the star-clear sky, very well shaded, the city was still sharp, like a drawing with streets, blocks of flats, quays and docks under the ship. Some lights wandered around in the streets. With a north course and all engines, the ship was laid over the targets with extreme power ahead and was almost on the spot. For 20 minutes, the officer on watch, Leutnant zur See Mieth, and the Austro-Hungarian Hauptmann [Captain] Macher, as instructed by the commanding officer, placed explosive and incendiary bombs on docks and docks and carefully observed the effect of each individual bomb. The first high-explosive bomb hit the quay, a large part of which flew off, another hit in the middle of the lock gate of a harbor basin. The detonation point was so precisely on the gate that it could have been mistaken for a gun fired there. Buildings collapsed like houses of cards. One hit was particularly powerful; more and more new buildings collapsed from the point of detonation, finally forming a huge black hole in the snow-covered harbor area. A similar, large, dark spot in the neighborhood appeared to have been caused by the attack by the "L 14".<sup>84</sup>



A bomb caused further detonations below. With the double glass you could see people running to and fro in the glow of the fires. Shipping traffic developed in the port, whose locks were hit."

Apparently the English were not prepared for the second attack, because in contrast to "L 14", "L 11" found only slight counteraction from single fire and a few weak searchlights that did not find the ship. In the meantime, when the bombs were dropped, "L 11" had risen to 2,700 m and was heading for Immingham in order to occupy the fortifications there with the last five high-explosive bombs. Four strong searchlights lit up immediately, but they searched in vain for the ship behind a cloud cover just passing by and went out again when the first high-explosive bomb hit. Meanwhile, however, south of the searchlights set up on the bank, a battery with large amounts of ammunition had opened a brisk fire. 40 to 50 fiery incendiary or flare projectiles, the height of which was estimated at 3000 m and more, flashed very close to the ship. In addition, two observers believed they had also seen fliers behind the airship. However, the commander considered this to be a deception, as an aircraft attack during the defensive fire of the batteries seemed unlikely to him. Towards the end of the attack on Hull, the oil and cooling water pipes of the front engine were frozen at 19° C; the aft engine also failed over Immingham. Right now, however, particularly heavy snow and hailstones with electrical phenomena reappeared and hit the airship sharply. Within 3 minutes it was torn by a gust from 2400 to 3000 m, 250 m above the last impact height. When it came down shortly afterwards, the elevator jammed in the up position. The ship was trimmed with people as best as possible until the rudder could be put back, but it was inevitable that it rose to 3200 m. Despite these incidents, however, it remained uninjured and left the coast at 2.40 a.m..

Apparently there were severe atmospheric disturbances that night, and these almost became fatal for the third airship "L 13" (Mathy). Since turning from Dogger Bank to Tyne, "L 13" hadn't seen anything in the snowstorm. It was at 11 p.m. through a hole in the cloud, light from houses was seen for a short time, a sign that one must have already crossed the coast, but even thrown light bombs gave no indication of objects to be attacked or the location of the ship. Only when Carlisle on the north-west coast of England had to be reached after the navigation had been cast did it become clearer and almost windless in places. But to the north and west lay low clouds.<sup>85</sup>

At 12:15 a.m. the commanding officer therefore set a course for the Humber, presumably via Preston, in the hope of finding a cloud-free area there. In the next two hours, however, the ship came into a heavy vortex with gale-force winds. As a result of the snow load and then as a result of the failure of an engine, it fell through several times so badly that it had to drop 30 incendiary bombs and 750 kg high explosive bombs as ballast. Soon after 2 a.m. however, the weather became clearer again and a river estuary was recognizable, from which "L 13" was immediately illuminated and very violently bombarded by numerous warships. As it was only now realizing, it was not over the Humber but over the Thames. In the short time from searching to recognizing the terrain, the ship was driven from the north to the south bank. The commander then tried to attack three times in a row, approaching the wind, but had to do so at a wind speed of 20 m/sec. give up from the north at 3:30 a.m.

An attack on Dover, which was clearly recognizable in itself, had to be refrained from because the loss of windward position that would have been caused by it could not have been justified. Likewise, the risk of flying in the morning hours should not be underestimated. Only after overcoming the heaviest gusts did the commander finally manage to capture the Flemish coast near Ostend at 5.15 am and set course for Namur, where an airship hangar was available.

Even if the airships had not succeeded in reaching their original goals, the northern bases of the "Grand Fleet", the alerting of the enemy coast that they called out was in line with the task and strengthened the hope that English light forces would be deployed advance in pursuit of the airships and thereby expose themselves to attacks by the German ships. In addition, the airships "L 11" and "L 14" supplemented the reconnaissance north of the route of the High Seas Forces on the march back in the desired manner, so that the danger of being suddenly cut off from the German Bight by superior formations of the enemy seemed to be significantly reduced. When soon after 2 a.m. the first F. T reports from the airships were received by Vice Admiral Hipper with the battle cruisers "Seydlitz", "Moltke", "Derfflinger" and "von der Tann" among the Kapitänen zur See v. . Egidy, v. Karpf, Heinrich und Zenker however only reached the area in front of the Westerems. From there they steered further west on a course W by N, 15 nm. (Map D.)<sup>86</sup>

Vanguard and side cover formed the 5 small cruisers of the II Reconnaissance Group, Kontreadmiral Boedicker, and S. M. S. "Rostock", the flagship of the I. leader of the torpedo boats, Kommodore Hartog, with the torpedo boats of the VI. Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Max Schultz. Eight boats of the IX Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Goehle followed behind the battle cruisers. Soon after 3 a.m. also reached the I. and III. Squadron, Vizeadmiral Schmidt and Kontreadmiral Behncke, with the IV. Reconnaissance Group, Kommodore v. Reuter, SMS "Hamburg", the flagship of the leader of the submarines, Fregattenkapitän Bauer, the II. Leader of the torpedo boats, Kommodore Köthner on "Regensburg", and the rest of the torpedo boat flotilla the area in front of the Ems estuary, swiveled there under the leadership of the fleet chief on WNW and advanced at a speed of 14 nm towards a point about 40 nm north of Vlieland. The small cruisers of the IV Reconnaissance Group and "Hamburg" formed march protection around the main body at a distance of 6 nm, while "Regensburg" marched with the II. Flotilla 3 nm in front of the head of the I. Squadron.

Between 12 and 4 a.m. the airships intended for closer reconnaissance in the fleet, "L 6", Hauptmann Stelling, "L 7", Kapitänleutnant Sommerfeldt, and "L 9", Kapitänleutnant of the Prölß reserve, rose from Fuhlsbüttel, Tondern and Hage in weak south-easterly to south-westerly winds. Of these, "L 9" should stand by the battlecruisers when it gets light, "L 7" in the N to NW sector, "L 6" in the NW to W sector up to a distance of 150 to 200 nm from Heligoland to clear up the approach of especially heavy enemy forces, which were expected to be reported in good time, primarily from the Firth of Moray, Firth of Forth and the Humber. However, the weather deteriorated noticeably towards morning. Heavy gusts of rain and hail fell several times. When strength 8 to 9 southwest was determined on "L 7", the northernmost airship, the commander of the airships, Korvettenkapitän Strasser, ordered the airships not to advance beyond the longitude of Terschelling at about 5 a.m., and they soon had to call back on it completely. "L 6" started the return march at Borkum-Riff, "L 9" north of Ameland and "L 7" just west of Lister Tief. As a result, the fleet initially relied solely on the airships returning from England for long-range reconnaissance. Of these, "L 13", Kapitänleutnant Mathy, according to F. T. bearing around 4 am. about 20 nautical miles northeast of Calais and reported by radio to the fleet management and the marine corps that he was going to Namur after an engine failed. At 5:15 am, "L 13" stood over Ostend, and soon after that another engine failed due to a broken shaft; nevertheless, the airship landed at the reported location at 8:50 a.m.<sup>87</sup>

Against this, at around 6 am. "L 11" (Schütze), whose return march was also delayed by the freezing of engines, about 90 nm east of the Humber, "L 14" (Böcker) about 50 nm north-west of Terschelling. Around 7 a.m. came "L 11" in sight of the fleet; However, a call from the fleet flagship with headlights could not be answered because the headlight dynamo was also not working due to the failure of the front engine. In contrast, "L 14" reported at 7.30 am by the headlight signal that he had only seen fishing vessels on the way from the Wash to Terschelling. In order to reinforce the reconnaissance in the probable approaching direction of heavy enemy armed forces, the fleet chief had the II. Torpedo boat leader, Kommodore Köthner, through the II. Torpedo boat flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Schuur, and S.M.S. "Regensburg", Fregattenkapitän Heuberer, 60 nm NW of Terschelling, laying out a 28 nm wide outpost line, while the majority took a course in the Hoofden at 7.15 am to follow Admiral Hipper's armed forces. (Map D.)

An hour earlier he had swiveled the battle cruisers about 30 nm north-west of Vlieland on a south-westerly course in order to now, with the small cruisers advancing in two groups starboard and port 10 to 15 nm, distributing the torpedo boats around the ships to secure the submarines to search the Hoofden for enemy forces. First of all, the educational work was made more difficult by fresh winds from the west and high swells from the north by gusts of snow; but soon the wind subsided and there was clear, sunny weather with great visibility. But apart from a few fish steamers, which were unsuccessfully examined for support of the enemy contrary to neutrality, no ships or enemy armed forces were sighted anywhere. At 8.30 a.m. therefore had Admiral Hipper swivel to SSW in order to get into the steamboat route from IJmuiden, where enemy surveillance forces had often been reported; but nothing was seen in this area either. An explanation for this seemed to have been found when two English radio messages were intercepted at 9:30 a.m., according to which Sheerness and Harwich had called back their destroyers, minesweepers and drifters, as well as all other auxiliary vehicles. Apparently the enemy had again, perhaps through the at 6 am. sighted fish steamer, knowledge of the German advance received. When the battle cruiser at 10 a.m. when they reached the IJmuiden – Lowestoft connection and were thus only 70 nm away from Zeebrugge, the commander of the reconnaissance forces turned around in accordance with the operational order and set out on a north-east course.<sup>88</sup>

After the turn, the group “Rostock”, “Frankfurt”, “Wiesbaden” marched 10 to 15 nm starboard ahead, the group “Graudenz”, “Pillau”, “Strasbourg” just as far aft of the battlecruisers to port. In the westerly winds, ships and boats were now very favorable in the sea, but the hope of attacking enemy forces by approaching the Dutch coast and especially in the area of Haak's lightship turned out to be hopeless.

In the meantime, neither in the outpost line of the II. Flotilla nor with the main body, enemy forces had been sighted. In order to reduce the distance from the battle cruisers, it had continued its advance into the Hoofden until 10:30 a.m., but then also swung on the opposite course and was back at Terschelling lightship at 11:30 a.m. It was still too early to march back because the fleet chief did not want to enter the German Bight before dark because of the danger of submarines. He therefore swung 30 nm north from Terschelling-Bank before leaving at 1:30 p.m. Set course for the mouth of the river Ems.

Meanwhile, "L 7" (Sommerfeldt) and "L 9" (Prölß) had risen again soon after landing in order to make a new reconnaissance attempt despite the still gusty southeast wind. But while "L 7", advancing from Tondern in a west-northwest direction, soon again at south-southeast, strength 8 to 10, had to struggle with heavy snow gusts and had to turn around 100 nm west of List at 12 o'clock, "L 9" flew over the Fleet flagship at this time and received a visual order to continue scouting to the north-northwest. However, due to the weather, this airship was also unable to advance beyond the outpost line of the II Flotilla. Enemy forces were nowhere detected by either airship.

Nothing unusual happened in the naval forces either. Even the Flanders submarines saw no stronger enemy forces from their waiting positions. Only "UB 13", Oberleutnant zur See Neumann, encountered two destroyers with eight old torpedo boats around noon between the Noord Hinder lightship and the Outer Gabbard, which were about 3 pm. an English submarine with three destroyers (Lennox type, 3 funnels) followed. After a miss shot at the foremost destroyer, which can be explained by the high swell, further attempts at attack were unsuccessful. In the meantime "UB 6", Oberleutnant zur See Haeker, and "UB 16", Oberleutnant zur See Hans Valentiner, had to endure a few firefights with enemy fishing cutters, which in each case had opened hostilities on their part without showing the flag of war.<sup>89</sup>

At 4 p.m. the high seas forces gathered about 40 nm north of Vlieland. Then, while the battleship squadrons with the IV. Reconnaissance Group continued the march back, the II., VI. and IX. Flotilla as well as three boats of the 6th half-flotilla with the second leader of the torpedo boats, Commodore Köthner, in order to advance against the Firth of Forth for the night after an order given by the fleet management around noon. This direction was given preference, because despite the fruitlessness of the previous venture, the advance of heavy English forces could still be expected from there, while only light enemy forces were to be expected from the Hoofden.

Positioned by Admiral Hipper at 5 pm about 60 nm north of Vlieland in the direction ordered and still secured by the II reconnaissance group with the 10th half flotilla until dark, the 29 torpedo boats of the attack flotilla, divided into eight groups, reached the II flotilla on the northern wing, the IX on the southern wing, in between the VI flotilla and the 6th half -flotilla, still at dusk at 7 pm. the stationary line I, about 70 nm north of Texel, and from there headed for the stationary line II between the mine barriers of the Dogger Bank and Swarte Bank at 17 nm. 25 nm behind the reconnaissance line followed, accompanied by two torpedo boats, the second leader of the torpedo boats on "Regensburg". (Map D.)

On the English side, the German advance had remained unknown until the morning of March 6th. The British movements on the 5th had therefore limited themselves to the fact that a submarine, "D 7", had been sent to the Kattegat to monitor German merchant shipping and the III. Rosyth Battle Squadron went to sea to take up "an observing position in the central North Sea". In the early morning hours of the following day (March 6), however, "it was discovered that the German fleet was standing near Terschelling (1). As a result, all squadrons of the "Grand Fleet" had set sail and had united at the "Long Forties", about 60 nm east of Aberdeen, in order to advance south from there. At the same time, Commodore Tyrwhitt had been sent to the Noord Hinder lightship for reconnaissance with the "Harwich Armed Forces" and a group of submarines that were supposed to work with the former, but had received orders from superior forces in the direction of Dover-Calais to go back.

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1) Corbett: Naval Operations, Volume III, page 289.<sup>90</sup>

However, the advance of the fleet suffered from bad weather from the start, so that the destroyers could not maintain their speed. Around noon it was determined by listening to and deciphering German radio messages that the High Sea Fleet was still at Terschelling, was heading north and intended to return to the port towards evening. Commodore Tyrwhitt was then called back towards evening, while the "Grand Fleet" continued to steer south until 12 o'clock. Then he also turned around, and so the advance of the German attack flotillas, which had been initiated under the right conditions, was hopeless from the start. Despite the clear night, nothing suspicious of the torpedo boats was seen. But since they had orders to stand in front of the Ems again when it was light, they had at 10 pm turn around in the stand line II and stood at 1 am. again in the stand line I. From there on the way to stand line III along the length of Ameland they already had to fight hard against the steadily increasing easterly wind and swell. Under gusts of snow and strongly changing visibility, the "G42" of the 6th Half Flotilla sank astern, on "V 48" the mast went overboard and so did those of the other boats of the VI. Flotilla and the 6th half-flotilla reported sea damage, so that the voyage first had to be reduced to 15 and then to 12 nautical miles. As a result of an unusual current displacement of almost 20 nm, the boats finally got into dangerous proximity to the English mine barriers north of Borkum, but, warned by bearings from the F. T. direction stations, still quite early to the south and collected between 8 and 9 o'clock in front of the mouth of the Ems.

During the night the battle cruisers and small cruisers remained at sea for pickup. The latter had crossed between the Ems and Norderney, the former between Norderney and Helgoland, since the intended entry into the Osterems proved to be impracticable due to the bad weather, in order, if the flotillas had not clashed with the enemy by 4 am, to run into the jade. But when it emerged from the F. T. reports during the night that the flotillas would arrive in front of the Ems considerably later than intended, the commander of the reconnaissance forces received a F. T. signal from the fleet management, to advance again to the west with the 1st and 2nd reconnaissance groups and take up the flotillas when it was light. This happened and only after the II reconnaissance group had made contact with "Regensburg" did the battle cruisers march back to the Jade from the mouth of the Ems. Shortly after 9 a.m. a submarine was spotted in front of the Osterems 500 m port abeam of "Seydlitz", which was apparently pushed above water by the heavy swell.<sup>91</sup>



While a boat of the 9th half-flotilla threw depth charges at the dive site, the battle cruisers turned and avoided the vicinity of the dive site. At 11.30 am, the same submarine was apparently reported again from "Regensburg" a few nautical miles further east. The incident proved that enemy submarines could still be expected in the German Bight. The fact that no submarine had been sighted the day before, given the much better weather, the extensive reconnaissance by airplanes and the careful search of the area by the minesweeping divisions, showed that these measures had been effective insofar as they held submarines under the water and made it impossible for them to orient themselves so that they could attack the returning forces in time. During the afternoon (March 7th) the cruisers and flotillas arrived after the battleship squadrons with the IV Reconnaissance Group and the torpedo boats assigned to them had already reached the Jade the evening before. On the same day (7th III.) The "Grand Fleet" returned to their bases.

During the next two weeks, operations on the German side came to a certain standstill. The battle cruiser "von der Tann" had to begin the scheduled repairs, "Rheinland" was not yet ready for war again and "Lützow" was still busy with individual training. Furthermore, the II. Flotilla went to the Wilhelmshaven shipyard immediately after the operation to install 10.5 cm guns in place of the previous 8.8 cm guns, and storm damage had to be repaired and other minor repairs carried out on the other attack flotillas. Therefore, the period of the approaching full moon was used for exercises. After the ships of the II. Squadron, SMS "Regensburg" and the V. Torpedo Boat Flotilla had already gone to Kiel on March 8th, "Seydlitz", "Moltke" and "Derfflinger" followed on March 16th, and "Kaiser", "König Albert", "Stuttgart", "Berlin" and "Frauenlob" went there for the same purpose, while "Strasbourg" joined the Baltic Sea forces from this point on.

The commander of the reconnaissance ships, Vice Admiral Hipper, had also left the North Sea with the battle cruisers. During his absence, the leader of the II Reconnaissance Group, Kontreadmiral Boedicker, took over the management of securing the German Bight. A patrol run by the 11th torpedo boat half-flotilla planned for the night of March 15 had to be canceled due to fog, but one of the tried and tested II barrier breaker group, Kapitänleutnant of the Seewehr Simonsen, led to the discovery of a hitherto unknown British mine barrier on the Borkum reef the following night.<sup>92</sup>

Around 10 p.m. there was a detonation at the barrier breaker "Ottensen", Kapitänleutnant of the Reserve Boehner, which was followed by a second 10 minutes later. The barrier breaker "Niederwald", which was sailing in front of this ship, turned, but could not find the "Ottensen" in the fog that was falling almost at the same time. Suddenly, however, the severely damaged ship emerged from the darkness close to the "Niederwald", so that a collision could no longer be avoided. But no sooner were the ships free from each other than they lost each other out of sight again in the fog. Apparently the detonations were caused by mines, as an attack by an enemy submarine in the fog seemed very unlikely. As a result, the commander of the "Niederwald" believed he could anchor safely to launch lifeboats. Even before they were launched, however, the first boats of the "Ottensen" came into view. The crew had to leave the rapidly sinking ship after the collision and were rescued except for two men. But even for "Niederwald" all danger was by no means eliminated, because every movement in the mine-contaminated area during fog and darkness could cause it the same fate. Only when outpost boats appeared the next morning and deployed their minesweepers did the steamer anchor and head for the Ems behind them with a broken stem.

The sinking of the barrier breaker had saved the fleet from worse. The scene of the accident was directly in front of the western entrance to the German Bight. It was therefore all about finding out as quickly as possible whether it was actually a new enemy mine block, as assumed, or whether it was only caused by floating mines. As a result, the leader of the II Reconnaissance Group received orders to immediately call in all minesweeping divisions for this work and to have them searched for speeding up even on days when security by airships would not be possible. For the rapid restoration of the freedom of movement of the High Seas Forces, losses would ultimately have to be accepted. In order to provide the search boats with some security against surprising attacks, the outpost group of the small cruisers with the IX. Torpedo boat flotilla relocated to the Osterems until further notice. Until the 23rd, however, either fog or stormy weather prevented all work.<sup>93</sup>

On this and the following day, however, the combined efforts of the I. and III. Minesweeping division and the 2nd half flotilla of the auxiliary minesweeping flotilla of the North Sea, led by Korvettenkapitän Bobsien, Walter Krah and Kapitänleutnant Wolfram, near the sinking point of the "Ottensen", an apparently 10 nautical miles long, approximately north-south, near the sinking point of the "Ottensen" to determine the running barrier and to designate the wings of the same by buoys. (See map E.) (1) In the meantime, enemy submarines had been sighted several times again at Horns-Riff and off the Ems, but always hunted in vain from boats of the IX. Torpedo boat flotilla and a special group of armed fishing steamer under Oberleutnant zur See Schlieder.

The fight against enemy submarines, as well as the determination of enemy mine barriers in the German Bight area, was particularly important at the time, because on March 20 the initiation of a new undertaking by the entire High Seas forces had begun. This should be directed against the hostile forces suspected in the central North Sea. It was planned to advance to the Farn Island – Skagerrak line on the evening of 26th with the High Seas Forces, on the following day the cruisers and torpedo boats advance further into the trade war and on the night of March 28th with the III., VI. and IX. Flotilla to search the area west of the Dogger Bank Lock to the south. On the 28th, all armed forces were to gather in the area of Terschelling and then, depending on the events, begin the march back. At the same time, "U 74", one of the large submarine mine layers that had just been completed, was supposed to be on the night of 27./28. March, contaminated the Firth of Forth with mines, while the Marine Corps was ready to support the action of the fleet again by flight reconnaissance and deployment of submarines against the hostile ports of call on the south-east coast of England. - While the preparations for this venture were still in progress, it took place on March 25th at 9:45 a.m. following a report from the F. T. Station List: "Vamdrup attacked with bombs early in the morning by enemy aircraft. Plane is drifting south of Hörnum." "At the same time, the outpost steamer "Braunschweig" reported from the northern group crossing in front of List: "Enemy torpedo boats in sight".

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1) From English post-war information it emerges that 180 mines were in this barrier.<sup>94</sup>

At 9:58 a.m. these were also signaled by the signal station Westellenbogen (List) on a southerly course. Soon afterwards the intelligence department of the North Sea station announced that enemy destroyers had also been sighted off the Ems. It was not yet possible to overlook what the enemy intended and what kind of armed forces, other than those previously reported, would be involved in the attack. But you hardly went wrong if you expected another attempt by the enemy to target the German airship hangars.

As a result of a chain of unfavorable circumstances and misunderstandings, however, the receipt of the first reports by the fleet management had been so delayed that precious hours had already been lost for the defense. But one had expected the appearance of enemy planes all the less on this day, because the own flight reconnaissance had to be stopped after the first attempts due to snow gusts, fog and low cloud cover. The airship reconnaissance was also canceled due to unfavorable weather conditions and heavy snowfall had started at 7:15 a.m. A request received by the List flight station at 7:40 a.m. as to whether an aircraft sighted in Tønder belonged to the station was therefore all the more surprising. 20 minutes later, the flight information service of the IX. Army Corps for information as to whether anything was known about two aircraft that were sighted at 6:55 a.m. by the army air stations on the island of Röm and Scherrebeck. The latter could, however, have been the planes that List took off at the same time to attempt a reconnaissance, so that the airport manager, Oberleutnant zur See Faber, replied in this way. It did not help to clarify the situation quickly, either, that the reports from the army air stations had only made the detour via the army headquarters in Hamburg, especially since the Tondern air traffic control service failed completely. It was only when the island guards on Sylt reported at 9:10 that an enemy aircraft was drifting south from Hörnum to the island of Föhr that the List air station had been attacked and the first aircraft began immediately to start defense.

The attack found the High Seas Forces in the following readiness: The 12th torpedo boat half-flotilla was on outposts in Heligoland, the 1st squadron, the IV Reconnaissance Group and the 11th torpedo boat half-flotilla on the outer jade, while the III. Squadron, the II. Reconnaissance Group, the flagship of the I. Leader of the Torpedo Boat Force and the IX. Torpedo boat flotilla was on standby for three hours, partly in Wilhelmshaven roadstead, partly inside the locks.<sup>95</sup>

In addition, the I. Reconnaissance Group, the flagship of the II. Leader of the Torpedo Boat Armed Forces and the VI. and VII. torpedo boat flotilla arrived on the Jade and partly busy with preparations for fuel replenishment. The same applied to the ships of the line "Kaiser" and "König Albert", which were still in Brunsbüttel roadstead, as well as to the I. torpedo boat flotilla that had just entered Cuxhaven. As a result of the fortunate coincidence that in this way the armed forces coming from the Baltic Sea were able to clear their machines again in a very short time, Admiral Scheer was able to throw quite considerable armed forces against the enemy from the outset. The first to receive the outposts, which the battle cruiser "Derfflinger" and the VII. Torpedo Boat Flotilla could join immediately, were ordered to sail under the command of the chief of the 1st squadron, Vice Admiral Ehrhardt Schmidt, while all other High Seas Forces should follow as quickly as possible.

The attack by the British had indeed what the naval command assumed. After the last two German airship attacks had shown that repelling them with advanced cruisers was unsuccessful, the British Admiralty had decided to carry out a plan by Commodore Tyrwhitt and the airship hangars themselves, first of all the one at Hoyer behind Sylt island suspected to be attacked by airplanes. In carrying out this plan, Commodore Tyrwhitt set sail from Harwich on March 24th, advanced south of the Dogger Bank barriers and on 25th had already reached the intended starting position within the Vyl lightship at 5.30am. His forces consisted of the cruisers "Cleopatra" (flagship), "Penelope" and "Conquest" from the 5th light cruiser squadron, the two flotilla cruisers "Aurora" and "Undaunted", the aircraft carrier "Vindex" with five seaplanes and three land planes, the flotilla leader ships "Nimrod" and "Lightfoot", as well as two divisions of the IX. and X. Flotilla (1). Of the rest of the British forces, only the battle cruiser fleet under Admiral Beatty took part in the undertaking and was assigned a position at Horns-Riff. Although the weather on the 25th, when it was very cold due to frequent snow gusts, greatly reduced the aviators' prospects from the outset, the aircraft carrier "Vindex" received an order at 5:30 am to proceed to the Graa Dyb lightship. No sooner had he parted with the rest of the armed forces with his destroyer escorts than a torpedo passed by the cruiser "Cleopatra".

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1) From the IX. Flotilla: "Laforey", "Liberty", "Llewellyn", "Laurel", "Laertes", "Lassoo", "Laverrock" and "Linnet"; from the X. Flotilla: "Meteor", "Mastiff", "Minos", "Manly", "Medusa", "Murray", "Mansfield" and "Morris".<sup>96</sup>

Aircraft carrier "Vindex" was ordered to proceed to the Graa Dyb lightship at 5:30 am. No sooner had he parted with the rest of the armed forces with his destroyer escorts than a torpedo passed by the cruiser "Cleopatra". If there was no deception at all, this shot must be traced back to the English submarine "H 7", which set sail from Yarmouth to the waters there on March 19, since there was currently no German submarine there and apparently had received no news of the action of the English forces. Without further incident, the five seaplanes took off from 6:30 a.m., three two-seaters and two single-seaters, each equipped with a machine gun and three to five bombs, a modest undertaking compared to the power of the British navy every success should also be denied. Soon after departure, the weather turned noticeably worse; one gust of snow chased the other and at 8 o'clock the first two machines returned without having achieved anything. They had reached Hoyer, but, contrary to expectations, could not find any airship hangars there. Thereupon only one of the planes had flown further inland and had found the hangar it was looking for near Tondern; however, at the moment of the attack, the release mechanism for the bombs failed, so that they were all brought back again. As from the other planes until 8:45 a.m. not a single one came in sight, the commodore ordered the two flotilla leader ships "Lightfoot" and "Nimrod" to scout with 11 destroyers in a south-easterly direction, while he himself searched the Graa Dyb.

Already at 9:38 a.m. the destroyers were sighted by the Westellenbogen naval intelligence center in List, senior signal mate Schrader, high speed, on a south course and reported by radio message from the signal station. Although the chief of the North Sea Upstate Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Max Forstmann, immediately allowed the boats of the List Group and North Group to return from their positions, the order came for two of them, the outpost steamers "Braunschweig" and "Otto Rudolf", which were Located about 13 to 15 nm west of the signal station, too late. As could be observed from this, they were attacked by 10 destroyers and sunk after brave resistance, not without first having reported the enemy. Most of the crews were rescued by the destroyers.

During this battle, the planes "505" (FT), "541" and "291" rose to attack, and the former, under Leutnant zur See Blessinger, was able to fly through and over the clouds soon after 10 am. to get over the enemy at a height of 1200 m, about 15 nm abeam of Rote Kliff.<sup>97</sup>

Dropping to 800 m, it sighted three larger ships, as the observer believed, small cruisers of the "Chatham" class, in reality probably the already mentioned flotilla leader ships, and seven torpedo boats of various sizes on constantly changing courses. With the sun and wind behind it, the aircraft seemed to be a poor target for the enemy, so that, at 10:20 a.m., it attacked one of the larger destroyers with three bombs, not even remotely reached by its shrapnel. (Map E.) It appeared that one of these was a hit. Thereupon it started a second attempt against wind and sun, dropping three more bombs on one of the larger ships before it had to turn off because of the now much stronger counteraction. Though clouds of smoke could be observed on the destroyer that was hit first, which were attributed to the hit that had already been identified. 20 to 30 minutes later, the planes "541" and "291", Leutnants zur See Klocke and Lemmen, were also approaching the enemy and dropped their bombs from a height of 800 to 1000 m, themselves heavily fired at. The floats and the carrying deck were hit on "291", but the bombs did not seem to have missed their target either, because from these aircraft it was also observed that two destroyers had to stop while the others continued to move in a north-westerly direction.

According to the English official sources (1) the temporary stopping of the two destroyers was only due to the attack of the aircraft, as the destroyers "Medusa" and "Laverock" rammed each other while avoiding the dropped bombs, whereby the former was reduced to a speed of 6 nm. At 11 a.m. it was therefore possible to observe from the Westellenbogen intelligence center that an apparently badly damaged destroyer of the "Acorn" type with a heavy list, stern under water, anchored in a west-north-westerly direction, while a second went alongside and five others to the north and two to the south of crossed him. At 11:35 a.m. the destroyers came out of sight in gusts of snow in WNW to NW, only the damaged one remained, surrounded by four others, lying in the old place. It was not towed north until 11:55 a.m. and, while up to 13 other destroyers were observed on different courses, came in sight at 12:31 p.m. in NW by N. At 12:50 p.m. the last destroyers had also disappeared, on the other hand an enemy submarine was now reported by an outpost boat at the approach buoy of the Lister Deep.

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1) Corbett: Naval Operations. Volume III, page 292.<sup>98</sup>



Meanwhile, "508", Leutnant zur See Ratazzi, and: "533", Leutnant zur See of the Reserve Schürer, landed at 10:20 a.m. on the enemy aircraft south of Hörnum, while it landed on the beach from a boat of the Army Coast Guard was towed. From the statements of the three occupants it was learned that the aircraft brought in (No. 8040) rose from the aircraft mother ship "Vindex" at 6:30 a.m. about 30 nm west of the island of Röm, but after initially clear weather had got into a snowstorm at around 6:00 a.m. which had made orientation extremely difficult. As a result, since he could not find an airship hangar in Hoyer, the pilot had returned to the Wadden Sea after a short loop over the mainland and then, when he saw one of the single-seaters floating helplessly in the water with him, went down right in front of Hoyer. The occupant reported that he had also been caught by the snowstorm over the mainland, rolled over and then, in order to lighten the plane, dropped the bombs without a target. Finally he had to land at 7:45 a.m. because of an engine failure. In order to save their comrades, the occupants of "8040" threw machine guns and bombs overboard on their aircraft, took the former after his aircraft was sunk and, ascending again, tried to reach the island of Sylt, from which strong counteraction was expected from anti-aircraft cannons was to bypass on SW course; however, soon afterwards they had to land again as a result of similar damage to the single seater (breakage of the interrupter [Distributor ?]) and were thus captured. According to their statements, 18 destroyers, 6 light cruisers, but only one aircraft carrier were involved in the advance, and battleships were also at sea to cover them.

While this aircraft was being recovered, Baaken Detachment Kongsmark reported on Röm at 10:37 that another enemy aircraft had anchored on the Jord Sand south of the island. Thereupon the island commander, Colonel Müller, immediately dispatched an armed boat to haul it, while the aircraft "105", Leutnant zur See Löwe, and "426", Lieutenant zur See Rogge, rose from the List air station for the same purpose. As it turned out, the enemy aircraft had meanwhile dried up with the water running out. "105" therefore rolled as close as possible to the enemy aircraft, the machine gun aimed at the enemy aircraft. The latter were captured and, after their weapons had been surrendered, brought to the station on aircraft "105".<sup>99</sup>

Here the climbing ability of the same with four men on board (Rumpler, 150 hp Benz) aroused the amazement of the English. The interrogation revealed that the British aircraft "8083", which was stranded on Jord Sand, equipped with three bombs of 64 pounds each, had arrived at 7 am. left the mother ship, flew over the Danish island of Manö and then steered south along the coast. After it had searched via Hoyer for the airship hangar that was suspected there, just as in vain as the others, and only dropped its bombs for its own relief, the same engine defect as the other two caused it to land on Jord Sand on its march back. Before the two occupants were taken prisoner, they had thrown the machine gun overboard and tried to make the engine unusable with three or four revolver shots.

During these operations north and south of Sylt, around 11 am, with a gusty west-southwest, force 6, which prevented the airships in Hage, Nordholz and Tondern from ascending, there were also two aircraft from the Helgoland air station, namely "483" and "431" under the Leutnants zur See Lech and Quaßnigk with one observer each, started to search for enemy forces first in a northerly and then in a north-westerly direction. (Map E.) Around 12 o'clock they sighted clouds of smoke about 25 nm west of the island of Röm, flew towards them and, as they almost certainly assumed, placed four battlecruisers of the "Lion" -Class approaching them at a height of just 500 m at 1.5 nm ", which were accompanied as side cover by three destroyers each with four funnels and a mast. This important, but, as can be seen from the later context, erroneous statement was apparently based on a confusion with the ships of the 5th light cruiser squadron. The enemy cruisers initially ran at high speed to the south, but swiveled when sighting the aircraft on WNW, while behind them in the north two large cargo steamers, apparently aircraft mother ships, with black hulls and yellow funnels, secured by two small cruisers of the "Chatham" class, became visible. At 12.20 p.m. the leading aircraft "483" turned away from the enemy to report the presence of heavy enemy forces to List, sighting at an angle behind the supposed enemy battlecruisers while the enemy forces opened relatively well-positioned shrapnel from all sides the sail of a submarine that immediately reappeared. While "483" flew to List, "431" stayed with the enemy and tried to attack the steamers, but this was thwarted each time by the other armed forces, who skillfully made every movement of the aircraft.<sup>100</sup>

With the strong headwind at the height of the aircraft, the ships ran considerably more than the latter. At 1:15 a.m. the enemy turned to WNW and soon came out of sight. "431" maintained a course to the north, cleared up to Graa Dyb, but no longer sighted enemy forces and finally had to stop at 2 p.m. due to lack of petrol and land in front of Westerland.

About half an hour after the planes got on in Heligoland, List had also started another fleet of planes, namely "532" and "505", Leutnants zur See Martinengo and Blessinger with one observer each (11:30 a.m.). They were supposed to visit the enemy destroyers south of Graa Dyb, then scout out further enemy forces as far as Horns-Riff, report them by radio message and attack forces seen on the return flight. At 11:55 a.m., the planes were caught under fire about 20 nm west of the island of Röm by five cruisers or flotilla ships and eleven destroyers, but they soon turned on their west course. On the other hand, on the further reconnaissance flight to Horns Reef, no further armed forces were sighted, despite a visibility range of 25 nm. The aircraft therefore turned around and on their march back at 1:30 p.m. attacked the cruisers and destroyers that had already been sighted and that were now about 10 nm south of the Vyl lightship from a height of 2000 m. According to his observation, "532" scored a hit with five bombs in two attempts on one of the destroyers, which was clearly recognizable by an immediately rising cloud of smoke, while a second destroyer walked alongside the one that was hit. Apparently the enemy vessels had not noticed the attack, as they did not change the formation during it and only began to fire with shrapnel afterwards. At around 2 p.m., "505", which had temporarily lost the flight leader in the emerging haze, attacked the same armed forces. (Map E.) With the strong headwind at an altitude of 2000 m, the aircraft was at times almost on the spot, so that the enemy shot at him very quickly and well. Nevertheless, he succeeded in two attempts to drop first four, then six bombs, two of which apparently hit the quarterdeck of the fourth cruiser in the keel line.

Further flight reconnaissance was made more difficult by the increasing deterioration of the weather. The aircraft "541", Leutnant zur See of the Reserve Schürer, detected many destroyers and two larger ships on a north-westerly course 15 nm south-west of the Vyl lightship at 2:30 p.m., but was pursued by a headwind of around 15 m/sec prevented and had to at 3 p.m. turn around at Horns-Riff lightship because of fog. This put an end to the reconnaissance and attack work carried out by the German aviators for that day with excellent cutting edge.<sup>101</sup>

The radio messages from the List air station and Westellenbogen news center, which were received in rapid succession by the fleet management, soon revealed that an air raid against the airship hangar in Tondern or against the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal was in progress, and that the attack by small cruisers, numerous destroyers and submarines and apparently also by battle cruisers was covered. What was behind this, in particular whether a simultaneous attack from the west on the halls in Hage or extensive movements of the enemy against the German armed forces, which had meanwhile been deployed to the north, could not be determined initially due to the lack of reconnaissance by airships. The decision of the chief of the 1st Squadron to develop the outpost forces initially in a northerly direction, reported at 11:21 a.m. and IX. Flotilla with backing on III. Squadrons that could be dispatched. However, no more reports had been received from Borkum so far. Two planes that had risen there around noon to scout to the NW had to land again immediately because of the fog. But even if the II Reconnaissance Group did not detect any enemy armed forces in the west, the flotillas assigned to it could in turn be used again for a bypass movement, whereby, in the opinion of the fleet management they had a particularly good chance of catching the English cruisers returning from List from the flank during the night. The task of the armed forces sent to the north, however, had to be to advance as quickly as possible, to chase the destroyers out of the German Bight, then to get in touch with the heavy enemy forces and to bring the flotillas attached to them to approach from there for the following night.

Correspondingly, at 1:45 p.m., the following command was given by radio message: "Chief of the I. Squadron with I. Squadron, I. and IV. Reconnaissance Group, II. Leader of the Torpedo Boat Forces and I., V., VI. and VII. torpedo boat flotilla advance to the north for defense; II. Reconnaissance Group, I. Leader of the Torpedo Boat Forces and III. and IX. Torpedo boat flotilla advance westward for defense, III. Squadrons provide support for this. It is intended to use the torpedo boats for the night in the north and west after the situation has been clarified."

However, it was shown again that even with the most favorable readiness conditions, a surprise attack in the German Bight could hardly be countered in time if the armed forces first had to develop from the estuaries of the Elbe and Jade, which are far back.<sup>102</sup>

When the clear sea order was received, "Thuringia" and "Oldenburg" were still busy taking over coal at Wilhelmshaven roadstead, but the other five ships of the line of the 1st Squadron, which "Derfflinger" followed at a greater distance, had torpedo boat flotilla together with the VII at 1.45 p.m. only reached a point 10 nm northeast of Heligoland. "Seydlitz", "Moltke" and "Lützow" with the V Flotilla was just passing the Outer Jade lightship, and the armed forces involved in the advance to the west were not even able to leave the Jade before 3.40 p.m. Even the II. Leader of the torpedo boats, Kommodore Köthner, stood with the cruisers "Regensburg", "Stuttgart", "Berlin" and the VI. Torpedo boat flotilla at this time hardly any further north than the I Squadron, as he had taken the detour via the Eider lightship in order to obtain a safe outlet set in the decreasing visibility weather. Only if he had not rallied the 12th torpedo boat Half-flotilla, which had immediately advanced from Heligoland upon the first reports of sighting of enemy forces, would not have rallied on his flagship, but had immediately advanced north if contact with the enemy had perhaps been more quickly established by the naval forces. At the beginning, Kommodore Köthner allowed himself to be restrained in the use of the higher speed of his flagship by the two cruisers of the IV Reconnaissance Group, whose highest continuous voyage was only 20 nm. It was not until 1:15 pm that he decided to leave them behind in order to advance alone with "Regensburg" and the VI Flotilla and, if at all possible, to attack the armed forces reported to the wrecked English destroyer. On the other hand, with the exception of two boats on the two cruisers of the IV Reconnaissance Group, he left the I. Torpedo Boat Flotilla, which was just now coming towards him from the Elbe, as submarine security. At the time, he had not yet been able to get a precise picture of the behavior of the enemy armed forces, since the reports from List arrived with a considerable delay in some cases during the very extensive F.T. traffic. In addition, the range of vision had decreased significantly in the meantime and changed between 2 and 5 nm. As a result, in the opinion of the Kommodore, neither the flotilla was allowed to vent too far from the Leader's cruiser, nor too far from the following outpost forces, although at least until after they had passed the Amrum Bank passage, the minefields to the west of the latter had sufficient cover to prevent them from being bypassed from the west would have offered.<sup>103</sup>

Later the cruisers of the IV reconnaissance group took up position with the I torpedo boat flotilla north of the English minefields in order to secure "Regensburg" and the VI flotilla during the further advance to the west. As Kommodore Köthner with his armed forces at 3 p.m. passed the Amrum Bank passage, the battle cruiser "Derfflinger" had already overtaken the 1st Squadron and was only 18 nm behind "Regensburg". According to reports from Westellenbogen, the commodore assumed around this time that the damaged English destroyer was only a few nautical miles west of the Lister Deep and was only a maximum of 15 nm away from the location of the "Regensburg". One hour later the VI. Flotilla in front of the Lister Deep spotted two masts of a wreck sticking out of the water close together, which at first could be doubtful whether they belonged to the destroyer, which may have sunk in the meantime, or to one of the sunk outpost boats.

However, the fate of the English destroyer was different from what this suspected. Just when Commodore Tyrwhitt had finally given up hope of finding the missing aircraft and had already given orders that the aircraft carrier "Vindex" should return to Harwich with a destroyer escort, he received reports of the German air raids and the mishap of the "Medusa". This was meanwhile taken in tow by the destroyer "Lightfoot", while "Laertes" and "Lassoo" secured the tow. He then called all destroyers still available, including those from the escort of the "Vindex", and pushed forward against the Lister Deep in order to cover for the tug himself. By noon, however, the British cruiser commander became fully aware of the whole difficulty of the situation. When he took into account how long the German side had to know of his presence, the onset of stronger counteraction could not be long in coming. On the other hand, he could not let the tugboat down, even though a radio message from the Admiralty was just now being received, according to which it had meanwhile been established through observation of the German radio traffic that parts of the High Seas Fleet had been set in motion, and although with this radio message he was expressly ordered to withdraw immediately. However, the British battlecruisers couldn't be far away either. He therefore ordered the cruiser "Aurora" and the destroyers, insofar as they were still at his disposal in a closed formation, to secure the towing train on all sides and also stayed in the vicinity with the other armed forces.<sup>104</sup>

Even when he was warned soon after by a second radio message from the Admiralty of German torpedo boat attacks likely to take place the next night, he could not make up his mind to leave the tug to its own devices, especially since the difficulties with the increasingly bad weather were increasing, but rather also called four other destroyers from the escort of the "Vindex" to be as strong as possible in the event of enemy counteraction.

Admiral Beatty, who at 12 noon with the battle cruisers was only 20 nm west of the Horns-Riff lightship, saw himself when he was at 1:30 pm. became aware of the radio messages sent to Commodore Tyrwhitt, was unable to comply with the warnings issued in these, but remained in place despite the danger that the torpedo boat attacks predicted for the night meant for the battlecruisers. The situation was very reminiscent of the events of August 28, 1914 (1). As then, the leader of the British battlecruisers, responsible for the safety of the advanced light forces, finally considered it his duty to exceed the instructions given to him by calling at 3 p.m. advanced south from his waiting position at Horns-Riff. But instead of meeting the forces of Commodore Tyrwhitt directly, as intended, the battlecruisers ran at 5 p.m. passed a few miles west of these. Although the obscurity had increased in the meantime, Admiral Beatty continued his advance to the breadth of Hoyer in order to secure the light forces more effectively. A new warning from the Admiralty to Commodore Tyrwhitt that strong enemy forces were advancing from the Jade to the west and north-west reached him at 6:30 p.m. Even the leader of the battlecruisers could no longer ignore this warning. He swiveled back north and was near the "Harwich" forces again shortly before dark.

On the German side, was at 4 p.m. with the increasing deterioration in visibility, neither from List nor Helgoland or Borkum received any further news from the enemy. The II. Reconnaissance group was at the time with the III. and IX. Torpedo boat flotilla on the advance to the west, the armed forces dispatched to the north west of Sylt. (Map E.) In the opinion of the fleet management they hardly had any prospect of catching the retreating enemy during the day, all the more they had to be careful to make contact with the tug and the armed forces assigned to cover it for the night attack.

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1) North Sea, Volume I, p. 200ff.<sup>105</sup>



The advance to the north accordingly amounted to a pure torpedo boat night attack. On the other hand, it was to be expected that the enemy would in turn use destroyers against the armed forces that pushed in. As a result, Admiral Scheer had at 2.15 p.m. the following radio message addressed to the High Seas Forces: "I. Squadrons enter estuaries in the dark. III. Squadron remains in intensified readiness on Schillig roadstead. Cruisers in the north and cruisers in the west are supposed to deploy the torpedo boat flotilla in the evening under the leadership of the escort cruiser for a night attack on enemy forces. During the night, flotillas in the west remain south of the Heligoland line in east to south, while flotillas in the north remain north of this line. Torpedo boats are back inside the Borkum-Vyl lightship when it gets light. Cruisers pick up torpedo boats in the north and west when it is light."

When this radio message was sent to the chief of the 1st Squadron, Vizeadmiral Ehrhardt Schmidt, at 2:41 p.m. reached, the latter did not consider the situation to be resolved with the congestion of the F.T. traffic, which had already resulted in long delays, some of the most important signals. In view of the increasing lack of visibility, surprises from enemy forces, which had presumably taken over the security of the damaged destroyer, had to be expected at any time. Of the battle cruisers, it was only "Derfflinger", Kapitän zur See, Heinrich, who had gained so much travel that he was able to take over the immediate cover of the "Regensburg" and the torpedo boats standing by it. Nevertheless, the chief of the 1st Squadron believed that it would be 4 p.m. at the latest. To have to turn around if he wanted to comply with the order to stand at the mouth of the river at dusk. This was at 4 pm. however, the decision reported at the same time as being carried out by radio did not meet with the undivided approval of the fleet chief; rather, a further advance by the 1st Squadron would have been more welcome to him at the time, in an analogous interpretation of the previously given order; however, Admiral Scheer did not intervene because, in his opinion, the situation could only be properly assessed on the spot. Apparently, however, the command from the fleet command that the 1st Squadron should enter the estuaries at nightfall gave the leaders of the advancing armed forces the impression that the fleet command itself wanted to hold back. The opposite was the case, but the early turning of the 1st Squadron ruined the fleet chief's intention to get in touch with the enemy by all means before dark.<sup>106</sup>

If the flotillas encountered the enemy before dark, even the battlecruisers, with the exception of the “Derfflinger”, could not be there for support in time, even if they followed them at full speed. As a result, Admiral Hipper, to whom the command of the advancing armed forces had passed when the I. Squadron turned around, ordered the II. Leader of the torpedo boats with the I. and VI. Flotilla should not cross the Horns-Riff – Borkum line before dark. He also gave orders to “Derfflinger”, who was alone as an outpost battle cruiser, pushed far forward and followed “Regensburg”, until 6 pm. to gather on the I. Reconnaissance Group. Without these precautionary measures, the torpedo boat flotillas would likely, like the cruisers on August 28, 1914, be in danger of being cut off before dark by the British battlecruisers advancing south at the time. On the other hand, one would still after 4 pm if visibility was poor, the forces of Admiral Beatty might have found themselves in a very difficult position. Logically, however, the restraint exercised by the 1st Squadron was not only carried over to the decisions of Admiral Hipper, but also to those of the 2nd Leader of the Torpedo Boat Force.

He had received the attack order for the night at 4 pm. To get in touch during the day by pushing up on the VI Flotilla, which was initially only available and only consisted of 10 boats, seemed to him little prospect given the insufficient support of heavy armed forces with regard to the number of enemy ships reported, since the flotilla with the prevailing lack of visibility and the narrow search width of their reconnaissance line could easily be cut off from the west. He therefore decided to keep the flotilla with him for the time being and to follow up with all the flotillas assigned to him only when it was dark. He therefore turned at 4:36 p.m. to first take up the other flotillas assigned to him for the night advance. Given the considerable prospect of restoring the lost contact with the enemy during the night, he reckoned that in addition to the 1st, the 5th and 7th flotilla would be made available to him for the advance. It was only at 4:45 p.m. that Admiral Hipper sent him a radio message that, in addition to the VI. only the 1st flotilla, at the time still with the 4th Reconnaissance Group, would be assigned. But at 5:30 p.m. he stood with both flotillas gathered about 17 nautical miles WNW from Lister Deep. Contrary to the fact that the enemy battlecruisers had meanwhile steered south from Horns-Riff and had reached the latitude of Hoyer at 6:30 p.m. and were therefore very close, Kommodore Köthner assumed after radio messages from the List flight station had been received in the meantime that the enemy was about to withdraw in the direction of the Firth of Forth.<sup>107</sup>

As a result, he laid the advance direction of the flotillas on this course. Since the approach of the 1st Flotilla was still delayed, the advance of the two flotillas, divided into five groups, could not advance until 8:15 p.m. start from a 20 nm long reconnaissance line west of Horns-Reef-Lightship. (Map E.) At least it seemed possible that, at a speed of 20 nm, they would reach the tow train, which may travel at 10 nm, and the armed forces assigned to cover it at 11 o'clock at night. The guide followed "Regensburg" with two boats 25 miles behind the reconnaissance line. The IV. Reconnaissance Group "(1), Kommodore v. Reuter, with the 10th half-flotilla between the Lister Deep and Horns reef, while the battle cruisers returned to the area south of the Amrum Bank with the 9th half-flotilla in consideration of possible enemy destroyer attacks, to 45 nm again at dawn (5:30 a.m.) WNW from Lister low to stand. In order to receive them and give them strong support, the fleet chief ordered that the III. Squadron until 6:30 a.m. should have reached the area north of the Amrum-Bank passage again, whereby the danger from submarines that was certainly to be expected there had to be accepted. At the same time, the naval airship division received orders to stand with three airships in the German Bight when it got light, if the weather allowed, while the planes at all stations were supposed to search them for submarines in particular. At 7 p.m. "U 69", Kapitänleutnant Wilhelms, had also reached a point about 40 nm north of Terschelling from the Ems in order, according to the order, to advance from there up to 70 nm west of Horns-Riff; however, it already made at 11 pm. 30 nm south of the end point indicated to him because the commander, anticipating the development, believed on the basis of the received radio messages that the enemy would already be at 2 pm. reported on the march back that at the time he would have to be about 100 nm north of him. If he proceeded further, it also seemed likely that he would encounter his own armed forces, about whose task he was not exactly informed. With this decision he missed the opportunity to attack the following morning from the start, although it would have been doubtful whether the torpedoes would have reached their destination in the heavy seas of that day.

1) "Munich", "Frauenlob", "Berlin", "Stuttgart", "Hamburg" (assigned), "Stettin" not sent out.<sup>108</sup>

An immediate launch of the submarine in the direction of the Firth of Forth, which it would have reached on the 26th at its best cruising speed, was out of the question, as the boat could only be spared for a short time due to its tasks in the trade war.

In the meantime the armed forces dispatched to the west, the cruisers "Graudenz", "Pillau", "Wiesbaden" and the 17th torpedo boat half-flotilla under Kontreadmiral Boedicker, to whom the first leader of the torpedo boat forces, Commodore Hartog, were at "Rostock" at a distance of 10 nm "With five boats of the III., VII. and IX. Flotilla followed, reaching the area in front of the Westerems. In the event that the armed forces reported south of Horns-Riff in the course of the day returned to the Hoofden during the night, they could, as Kontreadmiral Boedicker assumed, at 9 pm. stand about 10 to 20 nm north or northwest of Terschelling. In his opinion, it was therefore important to use the torpedo boats south of this line of retreat to gain an attack position and then to move towards the direction of the enemy. In the event that new enemy forces were to advance out of the Hoofden in the course of the night, such an approach of the torpedo boats seemed to him the most advantageous. For his part, at Horns-Riff and Terschelling, the fleet chief would have preferred to see an advance in the presumed line of retreat of the enemy forces to the nearest English port, the Humber. In order to avoid confusion, however, he refrained from subsequently changing the orders of the subordinate officers by means of a radio message, which the preceding armed forces would probably have reached too late. Flight reconnaissance, which had started in the afternoon despite gusty winds and hazy weather from Borkum, did not provide any new clues about the position of the enemy armed forces. When the F. T. aircraft "548", Lieutenant of the Reserve Susebach, reported that there were many suspicious light armed forces that were there at 6:36 p.m. 10 nm north of Schiermonikoog on a westerly course, there was obviously a mix-up with the armed forces of Kontreadmiral Boedicker. On his orders at 7.40 pm, Commodore Hartog encountered "Rostock" from a point about 13 nm north of Ameland with the boats "S 18" and "S22", north of him the 17th half flotilla, south of him "V 29", "G 42" and "G 85", facing west. Since there were only nine boats available in all, he had placed himself with his flagship in the reconnaissance line, while the II Reconnaissance Group had to do without torpedo boats. Around 10 p.m. the latter should reach an approximately 15 nm long baseline north of Terschelling and proceed from this into the area northwest of Texel. (Map E.)<sup>109</sup>

But at 9:30 p.m. the 17th Half-Flotilla had to report to Kapitänleutnant Ehrhardt that the boats could only hold the sea with difficulty in a strong freshening wind from the south-westerly direction. Even before the voyage went down, two detonations occurred in quick succession in the torpedo boat "S 22", which was in the starboard squadron, only 100 m away from the "Rostock", about 35 nm west of the Borkum-Riff-Lightship. As from "S 18", Kapitänleutnant Haushalter, who could be observed from, immediately after the first, but with a noticeable interval of about a second, shot up from the bow of the struck boat a high column of flame, which was probably due to an ignition of the fuel oil. The forecastle of "S 22" tore off to the fore edge of the navigating bridge and drifted astern, sinking. You heard the commands "Bulkhead tight" and "Clear with life jackets", saw the survivors rushing to the stern and heard through the roar of the storm how the commandant, Kapitänleutnant Karl Galster, gave three cheers to his boat, in which his people enthusiastically agreed. "S 18" tried in vain to get to the stern of "S 22" turning into the wind. Suddenly it sank sharply at the front, stood upright five minutes after the detonation with a jerk, protruded about 20 m out of the water for a moment and then shot into the depths. In the meantime the other boats had set sail for 12 nautical miles on the orders of Kommodore Hartog. Getting closer to the scene of the accident with the cruiser was impossible because of the feared mine hazard. In contrast, "S 18" succeeded in one hour of laborious work, 10 NCOs and 6 men from a crew of 93, with whom it began the march back to Wilhelmshaven, while Kommodore Hartog continued the advance with the other boats after a short stay. But it soon turned out that in the rough seas of the use of weapons on the torpedo boats was out of the question. No doubt any oncoming cruiser would have seen the boats first. At 11 p.m. the advance was therefore abandoned. On the march back, the mine barrier to the south which was presumed to be around 20 nm north of Terschelling after the accident of "S 22" was bypassed. However, as emerged from a map of the English minefields that became known after the end of the war, at that time the barrier that was pushed furthest west was only about 25 nm west of the Borkum-Riff-Lightship, so that "S 22" can only have been lost through accidental contact with floating mines. On the east course, Kommodore Hartog soon had the speed increased again, as the events that had meanwhile been reported west of Horns-Riff could make his intervention elsewhere desirable.<sup>110</sup>

There the advance of the I. and VI. Flotilla just started when Commodore Tyrwhitt freed himself from the obstruction of the wrecked destroyer "Medusa". When the towline broke at the onset of darkness and increasing swell, he gave the order to leave the destroyer; but not until around 10 p.m. the rescue of the crew by the destroyer "Lassoo", supported by the small cruiser "Aurora", was successful. However, contrary to the instructions to sink the wreck of the "Medusa", it was anchored because it was assumed on "Lassoo" and "Aurora" that a new rescue attempt should be made the next morning. For the choice of course on the retreat, which was now continuing at greater acceleration, the signals transmitted by the Admiralty in the meantime on the basis of deciphered German radio messages offered reliable clues. According to these, there was a particularly high probability of German torpedo boat attacks in two directions: once in the area along the Frisian coast, but then also north of a line leading from Sylt to the northwest. Admiral Beatty, who had already received a radio message from the Admiralty at dusk to remain at sea and cover the retreat of the light forces until the next morning, had just passed the latter to take up his reception position north of Horns-Reef. He was therefore already in the danger zone with the battlecruisers, while Commodore Tyrwhitt and his armed forces were still just south of them. But instead of turning to the west, the latter steered - for which reason is not evident from the English reports - N by W, a course which, as it was soon to show, brought him into the very danger of which the Admiralty had wanted to warn him.

Since 8:15 p.m. namely, from a standpoint west and south-west of Horns-Riff, the forces of Commodore Köthner were approaching in the following formation:

NW.				
↑				
P	F	P	F	P
Kptlt. Kolbe (2nd half-flot.)	Kpt. Tegtmeier (1st half-flot.)	K. Kptlt. Lahs (12th half-flot.)	K.Kpt. Schultz (VI. Flot.)	Kptlt. Rümnn (11th half-flot)
G 192	G 38	V 69	G 41	V 44
G 196	V 190	V 46	G 87	V 43
G 193	G 197	V 45	G 86	S 49
G 194	G 40			
	Kptlt.			
	Albrecht P			
	(1st half-flot.) <sup>111</sup>			

25 nm behind the middle of the line followed with the "G 195" and "G37" the flagship, S. M. S. "Regensburg", Fregattenkapitän Heuberer. The boats fought hard against the swell and the sea, and soon the overflowing torrential waves made the use of double glasses on the navigating bridge impossible. The torpedo tubes had to be swiveled in, the people at the tubes and guns had to seek shelter below deck. Ready ammunition went overboard, boiler rooms were flooded with water, and, since the boats from 11 a.m. had run for almost 20 nautical miles and more, heavy smoke and sparks poured out of the chimneys, without being able to remedy this by cleaning the fire. There was therefore the danger that enemy ships would sight and overrun the boats earlier than they had their weapons ready to fire. On the other hand, it was just as possible that the boats passed enemy ships without even noticing them. The senior flotilla commander, Korvettenkapitän Max Schultz, had orders to report when the boats could no longer maintain the advance speed of 20 nm. But he wanted to use the rarely available opportunity to get to the enemy to the extreme limit of possibility and therefore hesitated until 9.22 p.m. before giving the signal that the boats could only continue the advance with 15 nm. The traffic above deck was life-threatening, the operation of the weapons was no longer guaranteed, spark rods broke and the F. T. traffic, which was already overloaded, could only be carried out with the greatest difficulty due to the violent movements of the boats. Under these circumstances, Kommodore Köthner was forced to apply as early as 10:10 p.m. to finally abandon the advance, to set the reconnaissance line on the opposite course by radio message and to go 12 nm. However, luck would have it that just at this time the left wing group, Kapitänleutnant Kolbe, swiveled to port for a more precise determination of several fish steamers, whereby the squad "G 193", "G 194" lost the connection, because she had to go down for a while in order to lash any rope that had been torn loose. During the turning of the "G 192" and "G 196" to port, the FT command to turn the reconnaissance line about the "G 193" was received, so that the leader of the second squad, Kapitänleutnant Paul, assumed that he also had Kapitänleutnant Kolbe, according to this command, already swiveled on an SE course. So he turned around and tried to catch up with the leader boat on the new course at increased speed. During the advance, a boiler room on "G 193" was flooded by water, the fires in the coal boilers were heavily slagged, a lively shower of sparks from the chimneys had to make the boat visible from a greater distance, and the entire electrical system of the fore ship was through overcoming waves get short-circuited, so that the bridge compass, engine telegraph lighting and signal lamps had failed.<sup>112</sup>



In this condition, "G 193" saw at 11.20 p.m. about 40 nm WNW from Horns Reef - lightship at the closest distance 4 lines starboard ahead three dimmed, completely smokeless ships in keel line on a northerly course, which were approaching very quickly. Was it one of the other groups, was it "Regensburg" with its two boats, was it the enemy who might have gone unnoticed on the advance? The next decisions were made in seconds. A use of the torpedo weapon to attack was impossible in the bad weather and late sightings of the enemy. Perseverance would have necessarily led to a collision, turning to starboard and steaming against the heavy seas would have exposed the boat to the most effective gunfire of the ships moving ahead of the wind. Captain Paul therefore commanded "Hard port side, extreme strength ahead", and only barely succeeded in getting 5 to 10 m clear of the bow of an enemy cruiser, which shone relatively late with its headlights and fired a few volleys without hitting, and just two minutes after the first sighting it disappeared in the black oil smoke and artificial fog of "G 193". "G 194", Kapitänleutnant Arnold, but was missed from that moment on.

Just as the German line of reconnaissance had turned back to the Kolbe gang, Commodore Tyrwhitt had entered the area to the east of the southern wing of the former. At the time his armed forces marched in three groups, in the middle the cruisers "Cleopatra", "Undaunted", "Penelope" and "Conquest", ahead of them but out of sight, "Nimrod" with the mass of destroyers, astern, at an even greater distance, the cruiser "Aurora" with the destroyers "Lighfoot" and "Lassoo". On "Cleopatra" gang Paul was recognized by the flames that came out of the chimneys. The British top cruiser immediately scrapped the line, missed "G 193", but rammed the "G 194" and cut it in two, which quickly sank. Two detonations took place during the ram impact, one of which was attributed to a boiler explosion, the other to a mine, depth charge or a torpedo on board the rammed boat and which significantly damaged the stern of the British cruiser. As a result of the sudden change of course of the top ship and the later events, the squadron, although lights were immediately set, in disarray. "Cleopatra" struck across, the line was compressed, and in order not to be rammed by "Penelope", "Undaunted" had to precede and, in turn, rammed the flagship.<sup>113</sup>

The latter suffered only slight damage, but on "Undaunted" the forecastle was completely pushed in so that she was only allowed to travel 6 nm if the collision bulkhead was to withstand the pressure. All at once the British leader found himself in an even more difficult position than before the abandonment of the "Medusa". In the confusion that followed, the formation of the squadron and flotilla fell apart completely. Neither knew of the other's movements "(1), while the battlecruisers were still steaming northwards 50 nm away at the time.

Even "G 193" had by no means escaped any danger after the enemy cruiser had passed, because now two English destroyers had attached themselves to the German torpedo boat, the position of which was clearly betrayed by the black oil smoke visible above the artificial fog. The former fired a few shots from the bow guns at 3 to 6 hm in vain, none of them hit; however, they pushed the boat further and further away from their own armed forces on a NE course, until "G 193" suddenly reduced the speed so much that it was possible to drive almost smoke-free and at the same time turned five lines to starboard. This measure had the desired success, because at midnight the destroyers came out of sight. Although "G 193" was already at 11:40 pm. Having reported the location and encounter with the enemy cruisers and then continuously reporting everything else by radio, the Kolbe squad ("G 192", "G 196") did not learn the slightest about this encounter with the enemy. She hadn't picked up these radio messages any more than the order to turn around. Therefore, when she continued the advance in a north-westerly direction, alone from all boats, soon after the fish steamer starboard aft, about 3000 m down, she saw two dark shadows and sparks that had accompanied her for a long time, she took them to be "G 193" and "G 194 ". It wasn't until 12.40 a.m. another location report from "G 193" came in, she recognized that it was not the two rear boats of her own squad but English destroyers who had followed her to the northwest. Also the Schultz group, who after failure of the F. T. device on "G 41" only at 10:26 pm. had turned on an SE course, had to avoid vehicles several times until midnight, which could not be made out exactly, but were held for the neighboring groups.

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1) Corbett: Naval Operations. Volume III, page 294.<sup>114</sup>

For his part, Commodore Köthner did not think it appropriate to have the other boats collected for the reported enemy forces at the first radio message from "G 193", since in his opinion a single cruiser would have been enough to shoot down the completely defenseless boats one after the other in the bad weather. However, he ordered the I. and VI. Flotilla to the last location indicated by "G 193" (049  $\alpha$ ) to bring help to this boat. When the radio message from "G 193" was sent, the neighboring group, Korvettenkapitän Tegtmeier, was about 25 nm away from the square indicated. At 12:10 a.m. he went on course NW, but immediately had to reduce his speed from 15 to 12 nm. When "V 190" and "G 197" reported that the front boiler rooms were full of water, the half-flotilla chief was forced to give up the advance by notifying the commodore accordingly. The Lahs group had not received the order at all and stayed on the previous course, especially since both turbines had to be stopped at 11:45 on "V 46" due to the failure of the return pump for the Föttinger transformer. Accompanied by "V 45" and "V 69", the boat drifted incapable of maneuvering in the heavy seas for about 30 minutes, until the engines got going again. Although "G 193" must have passed in close proximity, neither this boat nor the enemy destroyers were sighted. The Rümnn group, too, at 12.40 a.m. reached the specified square, could not get in touch with "G 193" and therefore went on the course reported by this. The Schultz group, however, which had received the order to collect on "G 193" again incompletely and late, did not set off on the WNW course until 12.55 am. Soon afterwards, however, "G 193" reported, in response to a request from Kommodore Köthner, that it was out of danger. At the same time, on request, the Kolbe crew reported their location about 100 nm NW of Horns-Riff, heading SE. So she was the only one who carried the advance through to the end, but without result.

In the meantime the Neumünster main deciphering office had succeeded in observing the English radio messages to determine that at 8:30 p.m. a wrecked destroyer at 55° 8' N, 6° 5' East (about 70 nm west of Lister Deep) and was abandoned after the failure of the towing maneuver by a warship with destroyers, which was heading north from there at 15 nm, but would return to him at dawn. The decryption of these radio messages, however, took several hours, since the Germans were not lucky enough to have the enemy encryption method like the British from the start, so that Kommodore Köthner did not wait until 1.20 a.m. Became aware of this important news.<sup>115</sup>

A request from Admiral Hipper as to what the Commodore intended to do with regard to this news could only be answered by the latter because of the south-westerly storm, which was now in full force, that he must hold on to the decision he had already made and slowly go back with the flotillas in the direction of the Lister Deep. Only then did "G 193" report at around 2 am that the meeting with the cruisers "G 194" had come from view. The incident was now 2½ hours ago. A report that "G 194" had been in action had not been received. There was no answer to F. T. calls with the highest intensity. It was possible that only the F. T. facility on the boat was unclear, but the destruction that had taken place in the meantime had to be expected. The commodore did not consider it right to reverse the flotillas or "Regensburg" immediately, as the probability of finding "G 194" before light was very low, while the prospect of losing other boats was very high. The only hope remained that "G 194", like "G 193", might have escaped its persecutors and would join their own armed forces at the latest after it became clear.

The III. Squadron, Kontreadmiral Behncke, had just lifted anchor with the VII torpedo boat flotilla at Schillig-Roadstead, in order to pick up the cruisers in the north at Hellwill, in accordance with the orders of the fleet chief, when the fleet management received the aforementioned report from the Neumünster main deciphering office. This opened the prospect of still encountering and intercepting parts of the enemy armed forces at least at dawn. It seemed unlikely that the enemy would appear in superior strength, since an earlier report from Neumünster revealed that the English battleships or battlecruisers involved in the advance had already marched back to Rosyth that evening and apparently only left lighter forces at sea. Therefore, for the I. and IV. Reconnaissance group as well as the III. Squadron ordered to intercept the forces expected about 70 nm west of Lister Tief at daybreak. Admiral Hipper, who anchored with the battle cruisers during the night in front of Schmal Tief, but immediately had nets recovered at 1:15 a.m. had advanced north again, thereupon ordered that the IV. Reconnaissance Group and "Regensburg" at 4:30 am. 25 nm W by N from Lister Tief (141 β) should be collected in order to proceed against the reported berth of the abandoned English destroyer, supported by the battle cruisers. (Map E.)<sup>116</sup>

An earlier procedure during the night had to be avoided because of the danger of colliding with the returning torpedo boats. However, this measure had the consequence that Admiral Scheer was now also at 2:45 a.m. anchored at Schillig-Roadstead to advance north with the 1st Squadron and Fleet Flagship. Soon afterwards, the II Squadron, Kontreadmiral Mauve, which had meanwhile passed the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, reported that it would be at 5 a.m. would be ready for use in the North Sea, and received orders to follow north when requested. On the other hand, the II Reconnaissance Group was again set up to secure to the west. With that, all the armed forces at sea were in search of the enemy at sea. If the English returned to the berth of the abandoned destroyer, major fighting was to be expected on the morning of the 26th.

On the English side, the leader of the "Harwich" armed forces after the clash of the "Cleopatra" and "Undaunted" was unable to get the former firmly under control again due to the difficulty of transmitting orders and navigating. To his relief, however, he learned at midnight from a radio message from the Admiralty that the German torpedo boats had turned. By the same radio message, however, he was warned that as soon as it got dark, German cruisers would advance again and take up the chase. As a result, he ordered his widely dispersed destroyers to take a single course for Harwich, while he himself wanted to take the cruisers on a NW course north around the Dogger Bank lock. Neither the Admiralty nor the leader of the British battlecruisers knew about the accident on the "Undaunted" at the time. As a result, Admiral Beatty had asked the Admiralty shortly before the radio message was received to allow the "Harwich" forces to advance south from the Dogger Bank Lock. However, this proposal had been rejected by the Admiralty in view of the anticipated action by the German armed forces. When this at 2 am. learned about the failure of the "Undaunted" from the signal traffic between Commodore Tyrwhitt and Admiral Beatty, she considered the security of the advanced armed forces to be so jeopardized that she ordered Admiral Jellicoe to leave immediately with the battle fleet and initially to the east of the "Long Forties" (east of Peterhead).<sup>117</sup>

For little reason a great action now seemed to be developing.

Soon, in the further course of the stormy night, by observing the German F. T. traffic, the intentions of the High Seas Fleet became even clearer. Apparently this had succeeded in determining the location of the abandoned "Medusa", because all the indications indicated that the German battle cruisers and light naval forces would gather in front of Lister Tief when it was light and then, probably supported by the battle squadrons, advance to the west. Immediately recognizing the renewed danger for the "Harwich" forces and especially for the wrecked "Undaunted", Admiral Beatty came across at 5:30 am on course SE directly towards the northeast exit of the Amrum-Bank-Durchfahrt, from which the German armed forces had to advance. Half an hour later, which was enough to establish that the German fleet had indeed left, Commodore Tyrwhitt received an order from the Admiralty to join Admiral Beatty. As a result, at 7 a.m., all light cruisers, with the exception of the "Undaunted", on eastern courses in order to unite with the battle cruisers. A clash between the German and British forces seemed imminent.

While the south-westerly storm was racing with undiminished violence, the British battlecruisers made their way north of Horns-Reef-Lightship through huge torrential seas to the wreck of the "Medusa". The German squadrons steamed towards this from the Amrum Bank. But already at 5 a.m. Admiral Hipper had had to send the 5th torpedo boat flotilla back because the boats could no longer use their weapons in the heavy seas; soon afterwards he was forced to dismiss the IV Reconnaissance Group and "Regensburg" for the same reason for the most part. Around 7 a.m. the middle artillery was no longer usable even on the battle cruisers and a fight was only possible from the windward position, as the waves went over the ships. In addition, it was hazy to the west, so that the visibility was at times only 6000 m. At this time the III Squadron following the battle cruisers at a distance of about 45 nm had to send the VII torpedo boat flotilla assigned to it back to the Amrum Bank passage. Therefore, when the battlecruisers were only a few miles from where the abandoned destroyer was supposed to be located, Admiral Hipper gave Without even the slightest sign of the approach of enemy forces, the advance at 8 am was declared useless.<sup>118</sup>

At 8:50 a.m. swing the III. Squadron on the opposite course after the fleet chief had given the order to enter at 8.30 am. No sooner had this order been issued than the main deciphering office in Neumünster reported that, according to their observations at 6:15 a.m., an English warship (call D.N.) was about 150 nm WNW from Horns-Riff-Lightship, course 50°, travel 20 nm. An hour later came the report that enemy battleship or battlecruiser squadrons (or fleet) were also 6 am. would have been determined at 4° 50 east, latitude uncertain, probably 57°, heading SE, speed 16.5 nm. However, after the very dubious form in which Admiral Scheer received the news, it was difficult for him to judge whether the enemy had meanwhile continued the advance against the German Bight. Airship or aircraft reconnaissance was not available, so that he no longer expected any success from another advance by the German armed forces. Under these circumstances to seek a battle against the British mainstream would have been wrong in his opinion.

On the march back, individual battlecruisers had to turn for a long time in order to catch parts of the torpedo protection nets that had been knocked loose from the sea and to lash them seaworthy. Without being secured by torpedo boats, the ships were in serious danger of being attacked by enemy submarines. It is true that "Seydlitz", when at 9:15 am such a tower came out of the water about 25 nm southwest of Horns-Riff Lightship 800 m to port and thereby betrayed the need to dodge in time, shortly after 5 pm. but a submarine torpedo was fired from the west between Helgoland and the Eider lightship on "Lützow", which, at times visible on the surface, passed only 50–100 m behind the stern of the battle cruiser. Soon after dark, however, all forces were back at anchor on the Jade without incident. In addition to the two torpedo boats, an aircraft ("419", Leutnant zur See Bohle, Aviator Senior Seaman Gurke) was lost, which had started the previous afternoon from Borkum for reconnaissance and never returned. All sacrifices and efforts made by the armed forces to get to the enemy were destroyed by the sudden onset of the storm.

For his part, Admiral Beatty was already at 10 a.m. was informed by the excellently working deciphering service of the British Admiralty that the search for the damaged destroyer had been given up on the German side. However, he still had to cross at Horns-Riff-Lightship until around noon before all of the Commodore Tyrwhitt's ships, with the exception of the damaged "Undaunted", had reached the connection to the battle cruiser fleet and the return march could begin.<sup>119</sup>



At 10.30 a.m. the British battle cruiser fleet was still 60 nm away from Horns Reef. Although it is not known in which direction to the lightship it was at the time, it must be doubted that that morning, even if the German armed forces had not turned, there would still have been prospects of a battle. Given the precise knowledge of the German movements on the English side, it cannot be assumed that the battle was expressly sought on the English side. The concentration of all available German capital ships between the Lister Tief and Horns Reef would have secured them absolute superiority over the armed forces of Admiral Beatty and Commodore Tyrwhitt. Admiral Jellicoe, however, would be with the British battle squadrons, which at 5 a.m. had only reached the meeting point east of Peterhead, did not show up at the battlefield in time. In the meantime three of the light cruisers had received orders to accompany the wrecked "Undaunted" on the way to the Tyne, but were only able to find this ship after a long time due to the great differences in cutlery that had emerged during the night. Only in the early afternoon did Admiral Jellicoe receive a message that "Undaunted" had stopped for the time being to wait for better weather. At the same time he learned from radio messages from Admiral Beatty and Commodore Tyrwhitt that all other advanced forces were out of danger. Since the destroyers in the battle fleet could no longer hold the sea anyway, he went back to the bases with the latter. Only the 5th battle squadron was sent south to cover the return march of the "Undaunted" without escorting destroyers. This did not head for the Tyne, as initially ordered, but for the Firth of Forth, which she did not reach until the next morning. On the same day (March 27th) the 5th Battle Squadron returned to Scapa while the battle cruisers arrived in Rosyth. The wreck of the "Medusa" is said to have been brought to Holland later by fish steamers.

The plan of the German fleet management to set sail with the high seas forces on the evening of March 26 to the Farn-Iceland-Skagerrak line had been thwarted by the British air raid; but also the intention to carry out the advance on the 28th had to be given up after the western entrance of the German Bight had proven to be mine-contaminated, as the accident of "S 22" seemed to show. Before the extent of the contamination could be determined, a naval operation was out of the question.<sup>120</sup>

As a result, the ships "Seydlitz", "Markgraf" and "Stuttgart", which were due to be repaired, immediately entered the shipyard. At the same time, Admiral Hipper, the commander of the reconnaissance forces, was instructed to use all mine search units as well as the 10th torpedo boat half-flotilla in order to have the area in question in the west searched quickly under aerial reconnaissance and cruiser security, but to be careful with patrols in the area to keep the north entrance open between Amrum Bank and Horns-Riff. But before this work could be tackled, the guide boat "Volksdorf" of the 2nd half flotilla of the auxiliary minesweeping flotilla hit mines immediately in front of the Elbe estuary and sank. The fact that a torpedo runaway and then an enemy submarine had been sighted shortly after the boat sank, as well as the novel, cylindrical shape of the anchored mines, left no doubt as to the origin of the barrier. The laying of mines by submarines close to the enemy bases was therefore no longer the exclusive domain of German warfare. The remainder of the submarine mine barrier was cleared on the 30th, but there could be no doubt that the increasing activity of enemy submarine miners would result in new and difficult tasks. Constant searching of certain routes in the inner German Bight could then become more necessary than the precise determination of the location of enemy barriers further outside. But it was already being overlooked that the available means would no longer be sufficient for clearing away the outer barriers on a large scale. As the Admiral's staff announced on March 30th, however, an increase in mine search information for the North Sea was not currently feasible in terms of personnel or material, and it was also impossible to fall back on minesweeping units of the Baltic Sea Forces.

While an English submarine put the barrier in front of the Elbe estuary, a German, "U 74", Kapitänleutnant Weißbach, had been approaching the Firth of Forth since the 26th, as was originally planned in connection with the intended fleet operation to throw between Bass Rock and St. Abbs Head, the likely starting point of the English naval forces, when they left the same mines. Despite the fact that the boat had to suffer from machine accidents of all kinds and even when approaching the area to be contaminated only one machine side was operational, the lock was thrown on the night of March 31st to April 1st as planned.<sup>121</sup>


In the meantime the airships, the attack flotillas and the outpost forces of the fleet had developed brisk activity from the German Bight. When it emerged from a report from an Ijmuiden fisherman on March 30th that the English destroyer "Medusa", abandoned by the crew and badly damaged, but with the flag waving, still anchored about 70 nm WSW of Horns-Reef on the 27th, seemed it is possible that the enemy might still send forces to salvage the ship. As a result, the III., VI. and IX. Flotilla under the leadership of Kommodore Hartog was sent there after an airship, "L 17", which was sent for reconnaissance, had to turn back prematurely due to strong southerly winds. When it got dark in the area between Horns Reef and the English mine barriers, the flotillas advanced from a 30 nm wide line in seven groups with 21 boats 90 nm to the west, but without encountering enemy forces or the wreck of the "Medusa". So they turned around at 12:30 at night and were taken by the II Reconnaissance Group, the battle cruisers "Lützow" and "von der Tann" and the III. Squadron to take in.

At the same time as this undertaking an attack by seven airships against southern England was in progress, which had already ascended by noon on March 31st. Two of these, "L 9", Hauptmann Stelling, and "L 11", Korvettenkapitän Victor Schütze, had to turn northwest of Terschelling between 6:30 and 8 o'clock in the evening due to accidents, but the others had from 9 pm. crossed the coast between Cromer and Southwold at an average altitude of 1600 m. The load-bearing capacity of the air, the temperature of which was still + 2 ° C even at an altitude of 2500 m, was not sufficient, however, given the large amount of ammunition carried (on average around 2040 kg high explosive and 2388 kg incendiary bombs), in order at once to reach a height sufficient for the main objective of the attack, London; rather, in order to be able to drop ammunition, secondary targets first had to be attacked. As such, "L 13", Kapitänleutnant Mathy, had chosen a powder factory near Stowmarket northwest of Ipswich. When the airship was for this purpose at 10 p.m. throwing a light bomb south-east of this city, it was caught by searchlights and heavily fired at, dropped 12 bombs against the batteries in two attempts, partially covered by low clouds, but could not find the powder factory and therefore went on a westward course to continue the enterprise (text sketch d). It soon became apparent, however, that "L 13" did not remain unharmed in the battle with the batteries and that half of one cell had leaked as a result of a hit.<sup>122</sup>

## 4. Initiation of the offensive of the Deep Seas Fleet.

Text sketch d.

Textskizze d.



Siebenter Geschwaderangriff der Luftschiffe (31. März bis 1. April 1916).

Seventh squadron attack by the airships (March 31 to April 1, 1916).<sup>123</sup>

Lieutenant Mathy therefore had to decide to march back at 10.15 a.m., but was able to fly 60 nm ahead of the wind at 11 p.m. drop the rest of the ammunition on Lowestoft.

Around the same time, "L 15", Kapitänleutnant Breithaupt, was already attacking the northern suburbs of London. But the airship was immediately caught in such violent counteraction by guns that it had to turn off immediately after the attack, badly damaged but surprisingly not caught on fire. According to English reports, "L 15" was hit by a battery in Purfleet and was attacked by an aircraft 20 minutes later, but was able to shake it off and headed for Ostend. As a result of the great loss of gas, however, it fell from 3000 m to 800 m over the Thames estuary, then it broke at 1 a.m. suddenly collapsed in the middle, fell vertically and fell into the sea, with the crew, except for one man, rescuing themselves on the ridge of the ship. In response to wireless calls for help, which had already been made at 11:28 p.m. and 11:44 p.m., the torpedo boats in Flanders received orders to leave immediately, but had to turn back just outside Zeebrugge due to the thick fog. "L 13" had meanwhile also reported by radio that he had been hit, but at 4 am. hope to land in Hage. The care for the reception of "L 15" had to be left to the naval forces of the Marine Corps, on the other hand Admiral Scheer now considered it necessary to take measures of his own accord for the reception of the "L 13" and, if necessary, other airships damaged during the attack. As a result, the forward post forces that had just left the Jade to take up the attack flotilla at Horns-Riff, the small cruisers "Frankfurt" and "Wiesbaden", as well as the 1st torpedo boat half-flotilla were dispatched to the west entrance of the German Bight. But they could not intervene, because "L 13" landed at 3 am. in Hage, and soon the other airships reported the results of their attacks without further losses or accidents.

The artillery and searchlights that "L 15" were pernicious, showed "L 16", Oberleutnant zur See Peterson, the way. This airship, approaching via Winterton, Norwich and Cambridge, had reached the area south of Hertford at 11:30 p.m. and while searching for a suspected ammunition factory there, large, dimly lit facilities, which were referred to as such, were loaded with around 700 kg of bombs, and on a similar facility in Enfield dropped five more high-explosive bombs. Then numerous searchlights shone ahead over London, gunfire and bomb explosions showed that one or more other airships "L 16" had already got ahead of them in the attack on the main target.<sup>124</sup>

Swinging in a wide arc to the west, the latter now also attacked and threw, fired heavily at an altitude of 2700 m, but apparently better protected by ground fog than "L 15", from 12:50 a.m. to 1 a.m. its ammunition at Hornsey in the north-northwest part of London.

Five quarters of an hour later, the third attack on the English capital took place that night, by "L 14", Kapitänleutnant of Reserve Böcker. The airship, on which the commander of the naval airship division, Korvettenkapitän Strasser, was also on board, had received very violent fire at 12:30 a.m. over Cambridge from six guns set up around the city, the batteries were silenced with 8 high-explosive bombs and afterwards several extensive factories in the otherwise completely blacked-out city were hit with 15 explosives and 6 incendiary bombs, which resulted in several violent explosions. At 2:15 a.m. the airship flew over London at a height of 2,800 m from the west, with the Thames and several illuminated guns and searchlights providing good clues for navigation. Until 2:40 a.m. it therefore covered the city near the Tower Bridge and the dock facilities with 21 high-explosive and incendiary bombs. While houses collapsed and fires flared up, "L 14" was lit from all sides by numerous searchlights, against which a layer of haze over the city only offered protection in places, and was shot at extremely violently with shrapnel and incendiary rockets. A dropped bomb was successful and at least for a while distracted the extremely violent fire from the ship, which, contrary to expectations, remained undamaged.

At the same time "L 22", Kapitänleutnant Dietrich, attacked on the east coast. As a result of a four-hour engine breakdown, the airship had at 10 p.m. still stood 40 nm west of Texel and therefore had to give up the advance against London in consideration of the air raids to be expected after lightning. On course after the Wash, in order to attack the Humber area from the west, a dense cloud cover, which only rarely allowed a view, made orientation so difficult that one did not arrive until 2:10 a.m. the beginning, violent bombardment from heavy caliber and with incendiary grenades indicated that the coast had to be crossed. One of the firing batteries was silenced with a volley of five bombs, then port facilities, probably from Grimsby, were sighted for a short time and bombed with explosive and incendiary bombs, and finally two more batteries of larger and smaller caliber, probably at Spurn Point, with the rest of the high explosive bombs.<sup>125</sup>



Soon after 3 a.m. "L 22" left the coast, half an hour later "L 14" received another violent fire on its march back from London west of Harwich and landed as the last airship at 9 am. in Nordholz.

In the meantime, the efforts of the Marine Corps to bring help to the "L 15" which had fallen into the sea had been thwarted by the unsightly weather. The flight reconnaissance, which started immediately after light, was initially unsuccessful because of the fog. At 10 a.m. (1. IV.) reported that around 6 am. the aircraft "472" took off that the "L 15" was lying in the water at Kentish Knock with the hull folded several times and the aft section completely shot, while English destroyers and other vehicles tried to drag in the wreck. According to the commandant's later report, around 3 am several English fish steamers appeared and fired heavily at the airship. It was only thanks to the fact that in the meantime the gas cells had been cut and the gas valves pulled to ensure the sinking of the "L 15" that the airship had not gone up in flames. Only when the destroyer "Vulture" appeared did the fish steamers stop their shooting at the defenseless airship, whose crew was now recovered, but not treated as was usual in the German Navy against defenseless and brave opponents. Evidently British chivalry had been put to the test by the damage and excitement caused by the airship attacks.

The official historical account from the English side (1) is content with the laconic statement that bombs fell in Cleethorpes (just east of Grimsby) and Bury St. Edmunds, a few miles northwest of Stowmarket, and killed and wounded a number of soldiers but the fact that three airships alone had reached and attacked London is ignored. At that time, too, the English press was only allowed to provide general information under the strictest censorship, from which it emerged, however, that the effects of the attack eclipsed all previous ones. Although the docks and arsenals were immediately closed so that no one could see the consequences, and foreigners were not allowed to leave the British Isles for eight days, important details were soon learned from agents. In Grimsby, besides the post office and many other houses, a warship lying in the roadstead would have been badly damaged by a bomb and should have been beached.

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1) Corbett: Naval Operations. Volume III, page 296.<sup>126</sup>



An aircraft shed was destroyed in Kensington, a transport ship damaged at Tower Bridge, a factory destroyed in Great Tower Street, and north of the Tower in George Street a bomb fell just 100 meters from two anti-aircraft guns. A large fire broke out in the West India Docks and an ammunition ship was blown up in the Tilbury Docks (400 dead). Particularly serious explosions had occurred in the Surrey Commercial Docks and a factory near Lower Road where projectiles were filled with explosives. A train already loaded with such was completely destroyed. In addition, it emerged from all reports of the airship commanders that the artillery defense in England was evidently being expanded more and more, which in the course of time had to result in a substantial relief of the German land front in France. In London the number of guns was already so high that counting from above was no longer possible. The existing overarming, however, makes a well-directed shooting impossible after observation; Nevertheless, the hail of bullets had great prospects of hitting, so that it was advisable to only attack London from a great height.

However, the loss of the "L 15" could not prevent Korvettenkapitän Strasser from taking advantage of the favorable weather outlook for the next few days in ongoing attacks. He even applied for "L 20" and "L 27", which had been given to the Baltic Sea Warfare for a larger undertaking, to be used for this purpose; however, this request was rejected by the Admiralty. On April 1, around noon, only two airships, "L 11" and "L 17", rose to attack London again if possible, with the ocean forces ready to take them. However, when the wind turned NW during the advance of the airships and even an easterly wind direction was discernible in the south, they received a F. T. order from the Naval Airship Department at Terschelling to proceed against the central or northern group of England, depending on the wind conditions. From 7 to 9 o'clock, therefore, "L 17", Kapitänleutnant Ehrlich, crossed, as dusk came very slowly, at Flamborough Head, only to attack the industrial center of Westriding or the benzene plants of Middlesbrough after dark, but shortly before crossing it the coast broke at 10:30 p.m. the propeller shaft of the aft motor. There was a risk that the loose propeller would be thrown into the ship by the current and break through at least one cell.<sup>127</sup>

The ship was therefore brought to a standstill at an altitude of 2300 m and the propeller set firmly. For this maneuver, however, all the ammunition had to be discarded as ballast - according to English information it fell into the sea 12 nm north of the Humber near Tunstall - so that the attack had to be abandoned.

An hour earlier, "L 11", Korvettenkapitän Victor Schütze, had received a fire from the naval forces over the Dogger Bank and could only evade it by surrendering the entire water ballast and 360 kg of gasoline. At 10:20 pm the mouth of the Tyne came into view, but there too, "L 11" was received by heavy gunfire. Since this gradually extended over the entire coastline north and south of the river, a swing to gain the windward position required for the attack, but with the prevailing wind (WNW) would have taken several hours, for which the gasoline was scarce, the commander took off Fly over the batteries distance. Instead, he attacked the extensive docks and blast furnaces of Sunderland from 12 to 12:20 a.m. according to his report, "entire blocks and rows of streets" collapsed, some large fires broke out and, according to the English account, considerable damage was done. The ship itself was for a time caught by a powerful searchlight and unsuccessfully taken under fire with shrapnel and incendiary projectiles. The last high-explosive bombs were thrown with weak counteraction between 1:05 a.m. and 1:25 a.m. on two blast furnace works that became visible near Middlesborough. Then "L 11" started the march back and landed at 10 a.m. in Nordholz, where "L 17" already at 6 a.m. had arrived.

In the same night the 9th torpedo boat half flotilla and after dawn also planes and outpost boats in the German Bight up to Horns-Riff chased enemy submarines that had been in vain there, then rose again around noon of the following day (2.IV) four airships to attack England and this time headed for the Firth of Forth. However, after "L 13", Kapitänleutnant Mathy, had to turn southwest of Horns-Riff because of an engine failure, the others soon discovered that the southeast wind was picking up considerably. Bruges also reported a sharp fall in the barometer and, as the distance between the airships increased, was soon no longer able to align them, which made it very uncertain for the latter to determine the location of the ship. Already at 6:45 p.m. therefore "L 22", Kapitänleutnant Dietrich, turned towards Newcastle, but noticed, flying over a thick layer of cloud, that he was crossing the coast only when he reached at 9:30 pm. received strong fire from astern at an altitude of 2500m.<sup>128</sup>

Between the few lights that were visible under the airship at the time, only a single larger factory stood out, probably in Newcastle, which has now been very successfully filled with 19 high-explosive and 19 incendiary bombs. Even a violently firing battery could be silenced by a volley of five bombs, but no further targets could be seen. On the way to Middlesborough, the airship was apparently pursued by motor guns and heavily fired at, but could not find any further targets under the thick cloud cover. Parachute bombs dropped only had the effect of illuminating the airship itself as bright as day. As a result, "L 22" soon left the coast without dropping any further ammunition.

In the meantime, after dark, the III., VI. and IX. Torpedo boat flotilla under the leadership of Kommodore Hartog again made an advance from the area between Horns-Riff and the English mine barriers west of the Amrum Bank, which this time led to the northern tip of the Dogger Bank, but was just as unsuccessful as the previous one. Apart from an enemy submarine that immediately dived, nothing was sighted.

At 11:20 o'clock in the evening "L 16", Oberleutnant zur See Peterson, when a strong freshening of the wind from SSW to SW was observed under the English coast at dusk, also intended to reach the Firth of Forth, gave up, so as not to go too far north in view of the newly overhauled engines, and reached the coast only at 12:20 p.m. north of Shields, advancing slowly to attack the Tyne area.

Only "L 14", Kapitänleutnant of the Böcker Reserve, had stayed on course from the start in order, if possible, to attack the great railway bridge over the Firth of Forth and the naval port of Rosyth. Already at 9:30 p.m. the airship was pursued and shot at by destroyers 60 nm south-east of St. Abbs Head and, Flying at an altitude of 2,400 m, tried in vain to reach the entrance to the Firth of Forth by several searchlights and unsuccessfully taken under fire by some batteries. The wind had gone around to the SW and was now increasing rapidly, so that "L 14" was only advancing very slowly. A thick layer of haze lay over the water and land. A few lights in Leith and Edinburgh, however, provided an opportunity to pinpoint the exact location of the ship around midnight; But when the railway bridge was about to be headed for, all the lights of the two cities gradually went out in response to a star signal, while the airship was searched for and shot at by many anchored ships with searchlights. Neither the railway bridge nor the apparently completely masked Rosyth could be found in the haze that lay over the inner bay.<sup>129</sup>

Kapitänleutnant Böcker therefore had to give up the attack on these targets and instead, at 12.45 a.m., pelted the docks and port facilities of Leith and Edinburgh with 1900 kg high explosive and incendiary bombs from a height of 2500 m. Collapses and violent explosions were the result, and fires that flared up in the docks lit the whole area for a long time afterwards.

Almost at the same time, "L 16", only moderately shot at, dropped its bombs south of Shields on a number of blast furnaces and factories, which were visible in ground fog and haze in the light of a few searchlights. Running down the wind, "L 16" already passed at 1 a.m., "L 14" only at around 3 a.m. the coast and landed in front of their halls until about noon. Even if "L 14" had not achieved its actual goal, the performance of the airship in the strong southerly winds was particularly noteworthy.

In the course of the morning (3rd April) the flotilla torpedo boats and the outpost forces, which had picked up the former north of the Amrum Bank when it was light, came in again, but in the evening they were again in increased readiness, since around 3 p.m. "L 11" and "L 17" rose to attack South England with the main target London. Light easterly winds were blowing in the German Bight, so that the airships initially made relatively rapid progress. At 8:30 p.m. but on "L 17", Kapitänleutnant Ehrlich, the starboard engine failed, and when the airship was at 9 p.m. went to attack height, it was determined by a drift bearing that the wind had meanwhile turned to SW and was blowing with considerable strength (about 14 m/sec). At 10.30 p.m. was the first sign that the ship was approaching shore, a searchlight ahead. In the meantime, however, the headwind had become so strong that "L 17", although three engines were running at full power, hardly moved any closer to the headlight in the next 1½ hours and finally, just off the coast, as the bearings of the FT directional systems showed, it was close Haisborough, the venture had to abandon.

According to the last bearings from the direction stations, "L 11", Kapitänleutnant Victor Schütze, had to reach the coast almost simultaneously with "L 17" in the Sheringham area, but although the airship, assuming that the wind might have turned further south in the meantime gradually swiveled on a south-westerly course and threw one incendiary bomb and flare after another, none of them fell on land.<sup>130</sup>

Finally, from a F. T. bearing obtained at 1.10 a.m., the surprising fact emerged that the WSW, which had been blowing weakly up until then, had suddenly refreshed to 16-20 m/sec. Not until 2:45 a.m. "L 11" came over land at an altitude of 2500 m, but now it was too late for the further march on London. Even the mouth of the Humber could hardly be reached, considering the wind direction and strength. The commander therefore turned west to attack Norwich, Yarmouth or Lowestoft, but none of these cities could be seen under the apparently thick layer of haze that lay over the country. Even dropping incendiary bombs at regular intervals, perhaps to tempt enemy searchlights and batteries to open fire, did not lead to anything. Everything remained quiet, and only when "L 11" at about 4 a.m. when he left the coast again at Marmouth, a lively muzzle flash was suddenly visible astern in a thick haze. "L 11" immediately turned around and covered the place from which the fire came with three well-positioned volleys and a total of 13 high-explosive bombs. It was forbidden to linger longer above the coast, as it was already dawn at the height at which the airship was standing. When it got light it became clear that the haze over England reached up to 3000 m in height and that there were thick storm clouds over the country. As expected, the return trip was favored by the fresh westerly wind, so that "L 11" was already at 9:50 a.m. landed in Nordholz.

On the same night the 9th torpedo boat half-flotilla tried to surprise a submarine at Horns-Reef, which had been reported several times on April 3, but had to abandon the hunt due to fog. After it became clear, the same submarine was apparently reported repeatedly from outposts and aircraft and also thrown bombs from the latter.

For the following night (4<sup>th</sup>/5<sup>th</sup> IV) five airships were already on their way to attack central England, which was to be linked again with an advance of the III, VI and IX torpedo boat flotilla from Horns Reef to the north-west; but already at 5:30 p.m. all airships had to be called back because of the strong freshening wind and the torpedo boat advance also had to be abandoned. The airship attack was carried out the following night (5th/6th April) by "L 11" and "L 16". On "L 13", Kapitänleutnant Mathy, who had also climbed up, the engines failed again, so that the airship had to break off the operation in the course of the afternoon over Borkum-Riff.<sup>131</sup>

"L 11", Korvettenkapitän Victor Schütze, had set himself the goal, like "L 14", to reach the Firth of Forth on the night of April 3, since the weather conditions initially seemed favorable for this. Gradually, however, the clear sky covered with a thick layer of clouds, rain squalls set in and the north wind increased from 4:30 p.m. so much that the airship turned on Newcastle, but soon after had to stop further south on Flamborough Head, as the cloud cover seemed to be loosening in that direction and better weather was reported in the south. There it spotted "L 16" at 9:30 p.m., who had initially headed for the wash to attack the industrial area near Leeds, but then drove north along the coast because of the increasing north wind to gain windward and only steered inland after the moonset. At 9:45 p.m. "L 11" was standing 2300 m above the coast and had just headed for Sheffield when at 10:10 p.m. four very powerful searchlights suddenly caught the ship north of Hull and apparently newly installed batteries opened an unusually heavy fire. The airship was violently shaken by the shrapnel creaking in the immediate vicinity, but surprisingly remained unharmed. It was possible to silence the nearest battery with explosive bombs, but it did not seem advisable to force the airship, standing only 2300 m high, through the fire of the other batteries in the clear air, especially in the moonlight. "L 11" therefore turned to sea in order to steer south along the coast and only repeat the breakthrough from a greater height after the moonset. The aft engine failed while it was still running, so that Hartlepool was chosen as the target in order to win windward. On the way there, when the weather was clear, the outlines of the coast and the course of the river could be followed like on a map.

"L 16", on which the bombardment of the other airship over Hull had been clearly observed, also did not cross the coast north of Scarborough until 12:10, was searched in vain by two searchlights at an altitude of 2,700 m and was only lightly fired at, and reached around 1 am Leeds. Although line fog made orientation difficult at times, extensive, illuminated factories, as well as railway junctions and stations between Leeds and Work could now be bombed in the northeastern part of the city. At the same time, the forward engine on "L 11" just before Hartlepool failed, so that the airship now had to give up this goal as well. On the march back, however, it sighted near Whitby at 3:30 a.m. an extensive ironworks with many brightly lit smelters and numerous buildings, in front of which steamers took and unloaded cargo, crossed over these facilities for a long time and was able to throw all the ammunition at them with careful aiming.<sup>132</sup>

The clearly recognizable effect was not only the destruction of the smelting plants and buildings by explosions and fires, but also in the darker parts of the plant some serious explosions took place, which indicated the complete destruction of the entire plant. When it was running off the coast, fliers had apparently been directed at the airship by searchlights both off Hartlepool and near Hull, but they did not attack; on the other hand, the headlights proved to be a good guide for navigating the airship.

On the march back, "L 16" got caught in an air vortex with a strong right-hand wind, so that, as the bearings of the F. T. directional systems showed, it stood still for a long time and concerns about the return of the airship arose. However, when it went into deeper layers after light, the wind conditions there were more favorable and landed at 10 a.m. in Hage, while the return of "L 11" is due to thick fog was delayed until about 3 p.m..<sup>133</sup>

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## **5. Continuation of the offensive of the High Seas Fleet.**

The longest and most effective series of airship attacks to date during the new moon periods has now come to an end. If these were successful in most cases, the night advances of the attack flotillas, which were often associated with them, had repeatedly proven in vain in the likely approach of enemy forces. Neither the recovery of the wreck of the “Medusa” nor the pursuit of the airships on their return march was apparently enough incentive for the enemy to advance against the German Bight again. As a result, Admiral Scheer decided to go back to the offensive with the whole fleet and for this purpose selected from the operational program an undertaking that had already been postponed several times, but its goal was now considerably expanded. On the evening of April 8, the High Seas Fleet was supposed to stand in the Farn Island – Skagerrak line to enable the cruisers and torpedo boats to be 30 nm ahead of the main body on the following day, for example in the area of the Big Fisherman's Bank, against the English and banned goods to proceed with neutral trade to and from the Baltic Sea and thereby induce British naval forces to depart. The attack flotillas were then to advance westward and the remaining armed forces eastward of the Dogger Bank barrier southward, in order to attack parts of the enemy fleet which had in the meantime perhaps run out. If this did not succeed either, a further advance to the Haaks lightship – Smiths Knoll line was planned when it got light on April 10th in order to destroy at least the enemy guard forces standing there, but to draw stronger forces on the main body operating in the closest tactical connection with the light armed forces. By deploying numerous submarines of the Marine Corps in front of the ports of call on the south-east coast of England, laying out submarines of the fleet between Terschelling Bank and the Haaks lightship, as well as extensive aerial reconnaissance from Flanders and the German Bight, it was hoped that the conditions for a meeting would be met to make the enemy even more favorable. But, as is so often the case, one waited in vain for good weather to take place and when the time of the new moon was finally too far past to be able to expect any success for the intended night advance of the torpedo boats west of the Dogger Bank, the undertaking had to be postponed until the next dark period of night.<sup>134</sup>

In their place, however, another one immediately stepped up, which took into account the bright nights with the waxing moon and was also supposed to lead the fleet into the Skagerrak. In this case it was decided to consciously strive for battle in close tactical cooperation between the advanced cruisers and the main body. Before the completion of the repairs of "Markgraf" and "Seydlitz", scheduled for April 13th, one should wait.

In the meantime, the British had contented themselves with maintaining the usual blockade lines by the X. Cruiser Squadron and an advance of the armored cruiser "Devonshire" with two destroyers from Rosyth to the Norwegian coast. Only the attack of the "L 14" on Leith and Edinburgh on April 2nd was followed by a short but futile advance by the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron to intercept the airship. Much strain on personnel and material, especially the torpedo boat flotilla on the German side, could have been spared if the intelligence service of the Admiralty's staff could have obtained more reliable information about the movements and intentions of the enemy fleet. It was only when the auxiliary cruiser "Campania" returned to Scapa from a lengthy layover time on April 12 that a new British attack was initiated. At the request of Admiral Jellicoe in Liverpool, the ship had been given a departure deck for its seaplanes, so that they did not have to be lowered into the water as before, and in this way were made more independent of wind and sea conditions. So far they had only been able to rise from the water when the sea was fairly smooth. The last step on the new path still remained to be done: the transition from the seaplane, which was more cumbersome due to its swimmers, to the land plane, which climbed better, was faster and had a greater range, for which, however, the greater dependency on the mother ship on it had to go down after the flight, too. A request from the British fleet chief was already moving in this direction. In this way one was feverishly endeavored to create the weapons of war, in order to proceed again as soon as possible and with better success than hitherto against the German airship hangars and thus to get to the root of an evil that can hardly be mastered in any other way could be hoped for. The first attempt in this direction should apply again to the halls in Tondern after the arrival of the "Campania". The mere fact that the major efforts of the "Grand Fleet", even at the expense of major entanglements and losses, were directed again and again towards this goal, is proof enough that the airship attacks must have had greater effects than then or later was inclined to admit.<sup>135</sup>

However, there were other operational problems preoccupying the British fleet at the time. On the one hand, a large mining operation had to be covered against the Flemish coast, but on the other hand the Russians, in any case disappointed at the little relief they had received from the British fleet, demanded that the latter should demonstrate in the North Sea in order to hold back the High Seas Forces there and in this way to prevent the German enemy from strengthening his Baltic forces in the near future. This support was important for the Russians because after the ice had risen they had to supplement their minefields off the Gulf of Finland and in the eastern Baltic Sea with new barriers and thereby wanted to reduce the counteraction as far as possible.

As a result, sources on the German side that were considered reliable, but were probably under the influence of the British Admiralty, very soon received reports that the English fleet, "reinforced by French units", was planning larger undertakings in the near future and, more generally, more lively activity will develop. Since this appeared to be well-founded in the political situation, the reports could not be denied a certain degree of probability. However, opinions differed as to the possible goals of such ventures. Landings on the Flemish, Dutch or Schleswig coasts, of which so much had been mentioned earlier, could be ruled out from the outset as unlikely, given England's lack of available troops and the threat to its rear connections from the undefeated German fleet. On the other hand, it seemed possible that the pressure on German maritime traffic could be increased and that a complete cut-off of Germany from maritime traffic was planned, particularly through ventures into the Baltic Sea, perhaps in cooperation with the Russian fleet. Until the situation was cleared up, it was in any case necessary to keep the German fleet and its aids at the highest possible level of material readiness for the near future, putting repairs and exercises aside. In the event that, based on reliable indications, an imminent attack by the enemy was to be expected, all armed forces still available to the Commander-in-Chief in the Baltic Sea should be recalled immediately and the ships and torpedo boats still under repair should be made ready for action at an accelerated rate and three cruisers, loaded with mines, ready to leave immediately on the Ems and Elbe.<sup>136</sup>

In the German Bight, an intensified hunt against enemy submarines had to be started immediately, while the own usable submarines had to be put in waiting positions, the airships had to be advanced up to 150 nm from Heligoland for increased long-range reconnaissance. Then the High Seas Forces themselves should go to sea, even before their exit routes would be blocked by enemy submarines and mines, in order to put the enemy into battle in the border area of the German Bight, if possible during his deployment. This countermovement should be accompanied at the same time by torpedo boat advances in the likely direction of approach of the enemy.

If, however, the attack took place completely surprisingly without any prior signs, based on previous experience it hardly seemed possible to counter it in full on the same day with all ocean-going forces from the usual readiness. The gathering of the naval forces to proceed as one would have resulted in a loss of time that would have been tantamount to renouncing defense. In this case, therefore, one had to limit oneself to falling into the reins of the enemy with the outpost forces alone, in order to disrupt and confuse his plan of attack. If the enemy withdrew, the outpost forces had to do their utmost to maintain contact, at least the following night, in order to attack the torpedo boats with any prospect of success at least the following night. Such a surprising appearance of the enemy, however, could in all probability only have a coup-like character (bombardment of Hage, Borkum, List or air raids), so that the outpost forces in their current strength and composition (1) were probably sufficient for the first defense. These considerations had already been put down in special leaflets so that the subordinates were prepared from the outset for all possibilities and, familiar with the intentions of the management, could act independently if necessary.

As of these measures on April 15 von Admiral Scheer also with the chief of the admiral staff, Admiral v. Holtzendorff, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Sea Forces, Grand Admiral Prince Heinrich of Prussia, were discussed on the naval flagship, the intentions of the British navy had been condensed to the point that attack movements of the same could be expected as early as April 15-20.

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1) A battleship squadron, two battle cruisers, an attack flotilla on the Jade, a reconnaissance group of small cruisers on the Jade or Weser, a torpedo boat flotilla in Heligoland, half of the ships of the 2nd squadron in Altenbruch roadstead, a torpedo boat half flotilla on the Ems or in the Lister Tief.<sup>137</sup>

On the same day, therefore, brilliantly prepared and much more aggressively directed than ever before, the High Seas Fleets deployed. No ship remained in the port, with the exception of the small cruiser "Hamburg", the flagship of the commander of the submarines, which had to maintain its telegraphic and telephone connections until the end due to the tasks of the submarine trade war. The outpost forces had been reinforced by a third and fourth torpedo boat flotilla, one of which was particularly fast in List, the other in Heligoland, and the other two in Schillig Roads. The ships that were not on outposts were also from 4 a.m. to 12 p.m. in one hour, otherwise in three hours of readiness. For the advance through the mine-contaminated area, searched and constantly controlled paths were available west and east of the Amrum Bank, another in a west-north-west direction through the barriers, after which one could turn to the north or west, depending on the situation. A fourth path led directly to the west under the East Frisian Islands. In the event of an attack, it was considered unlikely that the enemy would penetrate the German Bight, because the English minefields in front of it had to considerably restrict the freedom of movement of the enemy squadrons. Rather, the attack could actually only take place in such a way that fast, combat-strong formations appeared in the German Bight from the north and west or from both sides at the same time and to bombard certain coastal facilities or to dispatch planes against the German airship hangars, the port and shipyards and passed over the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, while the bulk of them would stand ready seaward to receive the advanced forces and to battle in the open sea. After the enemy had contaminated the western entrance of the German Bight and the central sea area between Amrum-Bank and Borkum with mine barriers, it was to be assumed that the attack would probably come from the north. If the enemy nevertheless attacked from both directions at the same time, this division, if one was careful not to split up, could only bring advantages. In addition, the fortifications of Borkum, albeit weak, enabled the western flank to defend itself with stationary means, especially when these were reinforced by submarines. In any case, the advance to the north, because shorter, as well as the possibility of developing a battle, in the sea area south and west of Horns-Reef was considered more favorable compared to a development to the west.<sup>138</sup>

According to the issued orders, on the 15th the planes from List, Helgoland and Borkum were already in the border area of their area of activity by light of day, but neither these nor the submarines "U 45" and "U 46" located north of Ameland and west of Horns-Riff "Reported something extraordinary. Unfortunately, however, the intended reconnaissance by airships had to be canceled due to the uncertain weather situation, and for the same reason the planned patrols of the torpedo boats from List and Helgoland 50 nm in a north-west to west-north-west direction could not take place, so that the planned recording of the same on the next morning by the I and II Reconnaissance Groups south of the Amrum-Bank passage became obsolete. Only on the following night (April 15th / 16th) did the flotillas and cruisers advance, but just as little as the four airships that had ascended shortly after midnight were able to report the approach of enemy forces despite the support of extensive flight reconnaissance. This was repeated the next night, but on the 17th the airships had to leave at 6 a.m. due to strong freshening southerly winds. In the further flight reconnaissance, the aircraft "505", Leutnant zur See Blessinger, was lost from the Heligoland station about 40 nm north of Ameland. Neither the submarines on display nor the VI. Flotilla, II reconnaissance group, and the battle cruisers "Lützow" and "Derfflinger" could locate it. After the visibility decreased to 1 nm in the afternoon, the surface forces began the march back to the Jade. When it was seen on the 18th that the weather outlook would not improve for the near future either, Admiral Scheer canceled the previous readiness order and also called in the two "UB" boats that had meanwhile taken waiting positions in the Horns-Riff area. In the course of the day back so that they could equip for a planned operation of the High Seas Forces on the 23rd or 24th. In addition, in close connection with the planned venture, the two large submarine miners "U 71", Kapitänleutnant Schmidt, and "U 72", Kapitänleutnant Krafft, set sail on April 12 and 14 to move to the Moray Firth and / or the Moray Firth Lay out Firth of Forth mine barriers. Both boats were also in their area of operations on the 18th, but found strong counteraction from the enemy guard, were attacked with depth charges or got aground, so that the oil bunkers became leaky and the boats were betrayed by wide traces of oil on the surface.<sup>139</sup>

As a result, they both had to terminate the venture in the end with no result.

After the increased state of readiness of the last few days had unfortunately not come to fruition, Admiral Scheer allowed all ships of the line and battlecruisers that did not belong to the scheduled outpost forces to enter the port on April 19 in order to refuel for the intended fleet operation. Apparently, however, the F. T command "normal readiness" was bugged by the English without being heard of; for it had hardly come into force when British cruisers set sail from the northern bases to wage a trade war in the Kattegat, to be seen and reported from the coast and in this way to attract German forces from the North Sea ports and to run into the arms of the British fleet. At the same time, three English submarines took up position in front of the northern exits of the Sound, the Little Belt and the Great Belt, in order to attack German forces advancing from there. However, other motives also influenced this advance of the British cruisers and submarines. After rumors of intended German troop landings in Ireland in support of an uprising planned there had become known in England at the beginning of March, the British government received, as later claimed by the editor of the "Gaelic American", John Devoy, and in the English parliament by Lansdown and Peel was confirmed on April 17th an official announcement from the United States government that a weapons landing from Germany on the west coast of Ireland was planned with the assistance of submarines. This warning was likely based on the close monitoring and probably also deciphering of the lively cable traffic which had in fact been involved in such an enterprise between the leaders of the Irish freedom movement in the United States and Germany since the beginning of March. On the basis of the agreements made in this way and after lengthy negotiations with Sir Roger Casement, the leader of this movement in Germany, the General Staff of the Field Army decided in mid-March, to give some help to the movement at the request of the Irish by means of a shipment of weapons limited to 20,000 Russian rifles and 10 German machine guns with the associated ammunition, the transfer of which was the responsibility of the Navy. At the same time, the Irish had suggested that the uprising planned for Easter Sunday should be supported by a strong demonstration by German armed forces and airships on the east coast of England.<sup>140</sup>



Although it was clear from the outset on the German side that the English would probably succeed in suppressing the uprising over time and, above all, through the strictest censorship, prevent it from becoming known in its entirety in the world, calculations were still made as later proved to be true, with a great moral impact. The mere fact that a major insurrection was possible in Ireland in the middle of the war, the fact that the German navy, despite the blockade, was able to bring means for this purpose ashore in Ireland, must have made the allies of England particularly uneasy. A not inconsiderable relief of the western front was to be expected if the English were forced to throw large numbers of troops into Ireland. It was therefore decided to comply with the request of the Irish and at the same time land the requested weapons in Ireland with a bombardment of Lowestoft by the High Seas Forces.

The English steamer "Castro" from the Wilson Line was chosen as a suitable vehicle for the transfer of weapons. The commander and crew were taken from the North Sea Outpost Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Forstmann, which had already provided excellent personnel for the "Möwe". The steamer, which was given the name "Libau" and was equipped with papers from the similar-looking Norwegian steamer "Aud" from Bergen, was ordered to leave the Baltic Sea in good time for the ship to arrive on April 20 at the earliest and on April 23 at the latest in Tralee Bay, south of the Shannon River, in Fenit Harbor. According to an appointment with the Irish, a vehicle with which special identifying marks had been agreed should be ready for piloting at the entrance to the bay near the island of Inishtooskert. At the same time Sir Roger Casement was to be landed with two other Irishmen by submarine in Tralee Bay. For this purpose, "U 20", Kapitänleutnant Schwieger, who had already set sail for a long-distance operation, was called back by radio on April 8 from a distance of 315 nm. It left again on the 12th with the Irish on board, but had to turn around the following day due to an accident in the forward elevator and was replaced on April 15th in Heligoland by "U 19", Kapitänleutnant Weisbach.


In the meantime, the steamer "Libau" had already left Warnemünde on April 10th, had passed an enemy auxiliary cruiser between Scotland and Norway on the 12th in the guise of the Norwegian steamer "Aud", and then passed a small cruiser east of the Shetland Islands safely successfully bypassed the guard line north of the Shetland Islands and headed for the intersection of 65° latitude and 0° longitude in order to attempt the breakthrough in the Iceland-Faroe Islands line from there.<sup>141</sup>

There he met an enemy auxiliary cruiser again on the 16th at 7:15 p.m. This drove for a while at 200-300 m next to the ship, but did not stop it and soon afterwards disappeared again into the fog. Also other auxiliary cruisers, which the ship in the night of 17./18. April 180 nm southwest of the Faroe Islands and sighted on the following two days, behaved like the one mentioned above. Apparently they had orders to report the ship only in order to lure it all the more safely into the set trap. For the German commandant, her entire behavior remained a mystery at first. On April 18, in a hurricane north-west storm, the steamer was in danger of failing on the Rockall cliffs, which had to be approached in order to obtain a precise point of departure for the entry into Tralee Bay. He only narrowly escaped this. But then the weather improved, so that the steamer after passing a signal station and battery at Loop Head at the mouth of the Shannon River on April 20 at 5 pm. reached the agreed meeting point on schedule. But the pilot vehicle that had been promised was not shown, nor were the agreed signals recognizable from land, and the submarine that Sir Roger Casement was supposed to bring was nowhere seen. Already around 6 p.m. Leutnant zur See Spindler drove slowly into the bay after the dummy cargo of pit timber had been thrown overboard and everything had been cleared for the discharge of the weapons (see sketch e). The English war flag was flying on the jetty at Fenit, however, and after dark, fires flared up on various mountain tops, which, in conjunction with the strange behavior of the auxiliary cruisers and the absence of the agreed signals, could only be taken as a warning. In spite of all possible precautionary measures, as Lieutenant Spindler now had to assume, the enterprise had already been betrayed, so that on land the state of siege had meanwhile begun with special defensive measures. Without any connection with the rebels being made to go to the Fenit pier, the ship would presumably have immediately taken into enemy hands. Lieutenant Spindler turned around again and decided to wait in the shelter of the island of Inishtooskert, perhaps so that the pilot steamer or the submarine would appear at the meeting point after dark.<sup>142</sup>

When this did not happen, he steamed again at 9 o'clock in the evening, dimmed, into the inner bay and at times approached the Fenit pier to within a quarter of a nautical mile. Even now, however, his signals went unanswered.<sup>143</sup>

Text sketch e.

Textskizze e.



Unternehmung des Dampfers „Libau“ (10. bis 22. April 1916).

Operation of the steamer "Libau" (April 10-22, 1916).

While the steamer "Libau" was still in the inner Tralee Bay, "U19" Kapitänleutnant Weisbach arrived, who had orders to stand near Inishtooskert at midnight on the 20th, after a stormy crossing where a gun platform was knocked off and the FT masts were thrown from their bearings at 10:30 p.m. also the mouth of the Shannon River, looked in vain for the pilot vehicle and the steamer "Libau" and finally steered north of Tralee into Ballyheige Bay after the moon rose, in which the steamer "Libau" was at 6 pm. The submarine went under the coast to the limit of its diving depth and at 2.15 am, when the sea was flat as a mirror, put the Irish ashore in the particularly battered dinghy, in order to then in accordance with his orders to leave the coast at once and to go south for a trade war when it got light. On the morning of the 21st it intercepted an English radio message warning of a submarine on the south-west corner of Ireland, and reported on the 23rd by radio message from a point 120 nm west of Ouessant at a distance of 645 nm that it had completed its special task.

In the meantime the steamer "Libau" had anchored again at the meeting point at 1 am (April 21, Good Friday), where he could not be observed from the coastal signal stations under the protection of the island, but unfortunately remained invisible to the submarine. A motor vehicle that the insurgents sent during the night to pick up Sir Roger Casement and his two companions had crashed into a river, killing the two occupants. Casement therefore had to temporarily hide in an old fort near Tralee.

At 5 a.m. approached from Kerry Head from the steamer "Libau" an armed fish steamer, which had set the English war flag and came alongside. Soon afterwards he was in command, a deck officer, with six men on board. Now, however, cold-bloodedness and familiarity with the character of the English seafarers were shown in a brilliant light among the leaders and crews of the German steamer, all of whom came from the merchant navy. It was possible to keep the English from examining the steamer, despite the hatches being open. By ample supply of Whisky these were made so safe in the belief that they were dealing with a harmless Norwegian cargo steamer in distress that the leader of the British outpost boat finally confided to the commander that he had been expecting a German steamer for several days with ammunition for the Irish who was supposed to unload the load in Tralee. The coast guard has therefore been strengthened everywhere, especially on the west coast.<sup>144</sup>

He himself had come from Aberdeen with his vehicle "Shatter II" especially for this purpose and was stationed in the bay. The Englishman even promised to use as a safeguard against submarines while the cargo allegedly had gone into the sea and undertook a machine repair, as the crew of the German ship expressed fear of such. Thereupon Lieutenant zur See Spindler decided to approach the pier again with his ship after dark and, if the signals were now answered, to enter. In the meantime, however, the boat that had brought the three Irish ashore had been found on the coast, as well as three Mauser pistols with ammunition on the beach. Footprints in the sand indicated that three men must have gone ashore there. A police patrol immediately searched the entire area, and in the early afternoon Sir Roger Casement was located in the fort and arrested. A ticket from Berlin to Wilhelmshaven was found in his coat pocket. One of his companions, Irish Sergeant Bailly, had become a traitor to the enterprise. The signal station on Loop Head had apparently drawn suspicion and reported the steamer "Libau" as suspicious, because around noon a fast patrol boat equipped with F. T. came down the Shannon River at high speed, and only with extreme distress and extreme strain of engine power did the German ship escape the chase under the cannons of a coastal battery, which was misled by the still friendly behavior of the "Shatter II". At 7:15 p.m. but the steamer was intercepted at sea by the auxiliary cruiser "Bluebell" after the ship, as it turned out later, had been chased by seven auxiliary cruisers and a destroyer flotilla. Although the English, for fear of being attacked by German submarines or being shot at with torpedoes from the disguised auxiliary cruiser, did not dare to investigate the steamer at sea, they forced it to follow to Queenstown. To the boundless disappointment of the brave German occupation, their undertaking had finally failed. The crew of the "Libau" continued to show that they were worthy of the best traditions of the German war and merchant navy. After an unsuccessful attempt to ram an English cargo steamer in the entrance to Queenstown and at least in this way to damage the enemy, the explosive cartridges mounted everywhere in the ship were struck. At the same time the war flag and pennant rose on the mast, and four minutes later the steamer had sunk while the crew, in German naval uniforms, rowed to the English auxiliary cruiser in the lifeboats that had been brought into the water during the demolition.<sup>145</sup>

Before they were allowed to come on board, the latter took them under gunfire, and the bitter opponent on the aft deck of the "Bluebell" even threatened the commander with immediate shooting as a pirate. Only through the manly reference to the illegal international law of this procedure, the warning not to tarnish the British flag of war again with a second "Baralong" crime, and the threat that the same thing would happen to three captured English officers for every German man shot dead. The English naval officer in charge of the execution finally dissuaded himself from carrying out the shameful intention. Only in the port on the cruiser "Adventure" were the prisoners treated more dignified; but even during the following court martial investigation the bitterness of the enemy over the German enterprise was expressed in further threats with immediate execution and inhumane treatment, but without being able to shake the German commander and his crew in the steadfast refusal to give any statement about the cargo and purpose of the sunk ship.

The English bitterness clearly showed that the effect of the undertaking, in spite of its failure, was very badly hit. In connection with the uprising of the Irish that broke out at the same time, which saw around 12,000 volunteers under arms, it shook the internal situation and the reputation of England considerably. After the defeat in Antwerp, the subsequent shortage of ammunition, the coal strike and the failure in front of the Dardanelles, this uprising was only too likely to shake confidence in the government in England in the deepest possible way, especially since at the same time the news of the surrender of the English troops in Mesopotamia near Kut el Amara arrived. It was a biting irony, which was also reflected in the statements of the neutral press of those days, that England, in its urge to liberate allegedly oppressed peoples from foreign rule, had to experience, as was shown to the world by the Irish uprising, that the vaunted British art of colonization and pacification had completely failed, at least in Ireland. At the moment when the flag of the struggle for freedom was unfurled, the United States of North America, too, had to be careful not to appear as allies and comrades-in-arms of England, in view of the large proportion of the Irish in the American population. Even the attempt to present the aid which Germany had given the Irish as contrary to international law failed in view of the many similar attempts made by the French in earlier times to exercise military action on Ireland.<sup>146</sup>

Germany only followed many similar examples from the history of the Anglo-French wars. It was nothing but his good martial law, the badly tried Irish people, moreover at their express request to come to their aid. The fate of the leaders after the suppression of the uprising was therefore nowhere more deeply regretted than in Germany, especially since the latter was carried out with inhuman severity and cruelty against the whole Irish people. For the failure, of course, the main culprit was those who had started too early. The impression made by the British public was made even worse by the fact that the British navy proved incapable of repelling in good time the ocean forces undertaking launched at the same time as the uprising in Dublin, or at least to intercept the attacker on the march back for battle.

This venture will not be discussed until later, however, as it was initially thwarted by the aforementioned advance of the British fleet to the Skagerrak. In the German Bight, the aircraft reconnaissance had no result on the morning of April 20. Around noon, the Baltrum island guard only sighted an enemy submarine and hunted it down by the 1st torpedo boat half-flotilla, the outpost boats of the auxiliary minesweeping flotilla and aircraft from all stations, as well as the IX. Torpedo boat flotilla dispatched to advance from List in a northwesterly direction. When it got light, two battle cruisers with the IV Reconnaissance Group were waiting south of the Amrum Bank, but neither the torpedo boats nor the planes and airships reported enemy forces. In the afternoon, "U 71" and "U72" returned from their journey to the Firth of Forth. At 4 p.m. (April 21), however, English radio messages were received from the Neumünster main deciphering office, from which it emerged that enemy formations, ships of the line and cruisers had left the Firth of Forth and passed May Island on the ESE course the previous night. The expected attack seemed to be imminent, especially since the weather had improved so much that the use of airplanes to attack the German airship hangars seemed possible. Admiral Scheer was determined to oppose this immediately with all armed forces south of Horns-Riff, ordered heightened readiness on the outer roads and had the I and II Reconnaissance Groups with two fast flotillas clear up immediately in the direction of Horns-Riff, while he himself with the Main Body followed around 11 p.m..<sup>147</sup>



Although the preparations had been made for a long time, the departure unfortunately required a whole series of radio messages, which the British Admiralty did not go unnoticed. He learned that the High Seas Fleet, which, as he knew, had been in heightened readiness for the last week in anticipation of an attack, would go to sea towards evening, but without being able to form an idea of the purpose of these movements. The original plan for the advance of the English light forces into the Kattegat and their absorption by heavy forces, for example in the area of the Lesser or Greater Fischer-Bank, was then dropped and it was ordered, that in execution of the usual deployment to repel German attacks the British main body should stand 100 nm east of Aberdeen the next morning (April 22nd), the battle cruiser fleet advanced 40 nm, while the III. Battle Squadron and III. Cruiser squadrons had to take a rear position in order to be used depending on the development of the situation.

Meanwhile, the advance of the German armed forces to the north had not taken place without incident. At around midnight, "Graudenz", the flagship of the deputy leader of the II Reconnaissance Group, Captain zur See v. Reuter, about 15 nm southwest of the Amrum Bank lightship, hit a mine. The rearmost division was full of water and the ship had to be sent back while the leader transferred on to the "Pillau". The I and II Reconnaissance Groups turned around and then continued their advance east of the Amrum Bank, while at 3:30 a.m. "L 20", "L 21" and "L 9" from Tondern, Nordholz and Hage climbed up to provide information when it got light in the border area of the German Bight. At 5:25 am, in the II Reconnaissance Group saw the small cruiser "Elbing" about 7 nm southwest of the Vyl lightship spotted the periscope of an enemy submarine. On the other hand, no hostile forces were found anywhere from the airships standing in the Terschelling – Bovbjerg line at the time. Another advance, which would have exposed the ships to unnecessary submarine attacks, seemed pointless. As a result, the order was already given at 5:40 a.m. to call in all units, as well as two submarines, "U 20" and "U 32", which had left the Ems to take waiting positions in front of the western entrance to the German Bight, they were recalled so that their dispatch to the trade war would not be delayed any longer.<sup>148</sup>

If, contrary to expectations, the airships did encounter enemy forces, the fleet could still intervene in good time, at least within the time in which an enemy attack was still to be expected. On the march back, the small cruiser "Frankfurt" was attacked again by a submarine southwest of the Vyl lightship, but unfortunately the airships had to be recalled at the same time due to unsafe weather conditions.

Again, no ships of the line entered the port, as the fleet management on the one hand wanted to remain prepared for enemy attacks and on the other hand wanted to make the marching out of the High Seas Forces for the planned advance into the Hoofden less conspicuous.

While the German fleet was marching back, Admiral Jellicoe was told whether it had to be left unanswered as a result of reports from the English submarines to the Vyl lightship or as a result of eavesdropping on German radio messages. a message from the Admiralty that the German battlecruisers had advanced to the south of Horns-Riff, the German Main Body as far as Lister Tief. But then all the armed forces would have turned around. There therefore seemed no longer any reservations about giving up the defensive position previously taken in anticipation of a German attack. As a result, while the German High Seas Forces were replenishing fuel, the British continued their intended advance into the Skagerrak. When it got light on April 23, the British IV. Light cruiser squadron with destroyers was supposed to be standing at Skagen to cross west from there for the trade war. The battle fleet was also heading east while Admiral Beatty marched SE and at 7 p.m. (April 22nd) reached the area 75 nm northwest of Horns-Riff. There, if possible outside the normal range of German torpedo boat advances, he was to remain standing during the night in order to approach the Horns-Riff area only when it was light on April 23 to intercept any advancing German armed forces. However, it turned out differently. On the evening of the 22nd, thick fog fell, in which the battle cruisers "Australia" and "New Zealand" rammed each other and, badly damaged, had to be sent back to Rosyth. At 11 p.m. the battle fleet, which had also set course for Horns Reef when it was dark, in order to join the battlecruiser fleet when it was light, was also shrouded in thick fog, which made the advance considerably more difficult. Shortly after midnight there was a collision between the destroyers "Garland", "Ambuscade" and "Ardent", the latter being so badly damaged that it had to be towed over the stern post to a shipyard. Soon after, the battleship "Neptune" was rammed by a neutral steamer and severely damaged.<sup>149</sup>

Under these circumstances, the British fleet chief did not believe that he could justify a further approach to the Danish coast with such a large number of ships. After the return march of the wrecked destroyers was sufficiently secured, the battle fleet swiveled at 5:30 a.m. (April 23, Easter Sunday) west of the Kleiner Fischer-Bank to the north, the rearmost squadrons first, in order to reduce the risk of further clashes. When it got light, the weather cleared up a bit, but was still unsuitable for the continuation of the venture, so that Admiral Jellicoe decided to march back, especially since everything remained calm in the German Bight, according to the Admiralty. The destroyers' radius of action was insufficient to remain at sea for a further 24 hours and to repeat the advance against Horn's reef the following day, much as this was in the interests of the British operation against the Flemish coast and the Russian operations in the Baltic Sea would have been.

The back and forth of the last few days had already delayed the planned bombardment of Lowestoft by the German fleet, which was originally supposed to take place on the 24th at lightning, and it almost seemed as if the intention was to set sail for this on the 24th, should again be thwarted by hostile action. At 4:38 a.m. List reported that, following a message from Tondern, an aircraft of unknown nationality had landed at Hoyer Schleuse, but that one from List air station was out of the question. The weather was indeed not bad for an air raid. The enemy F. T. traffic on the 23rd, during which some of the stations observed on March 25th had again been heard, seemed to speak in favor of a hostile undertaking. On the other hand, it was noticeable that no reports of enemy aircraft had been received from any other place, in particular the F. T. flight, which cleared up from List to Horns-Riff, had not reported anything of an approaching enemy. At 6:15 a.m. the army headquarters in Hamburg reported that, contrary to the first report, only propeller noises and detonations would have been heard in Hoyer Schleuse in foggy weather. In order to be prepared in any event, the fleet chief ordered the outpost forces to advance again east of the Amrum Bank to the north, and that the remaining armed forces should be in intensified readiness on the outer roads.<sup>150</sup>

However, after the news department of the North Sea Station had announced at 7.40 am that after considering all the circumstances and reports, a "blind alarm" was to be assumed, the outpost forces were called back and, as the weather forecast appeared favorable, preparations for the advance against Lowestoft were continued. At the same time, the commander of the naval airship division, Korvettenkapitän Strasser, announced that he intended to attack England, especially London, with seven to eight airships in the coming night, a decision which was all the more welcome to the fleet management as the combination of this attack with the naval enterprise the latter not only helped to provide an excellent explanation, but was also able to considerably intensify its effect.

The cruisers of the I and II Reconnaissance Groups had just left the Jade with their flotillas in order to advance to the west and to appear at Lowestoft the next morning when it was light off the English coast, when at 11.35 a.m. Admiral v. Schröder, the commanding admiral of the Marine Corps, reported that since 6 am. a large number of English light forces stood off the Flemish coast and the mouth of the Scheldt, the intent of which was not yet clearly discernible. This report was all the more significant as Admiral v. Schröder had promised to support the operation against Lowestoft by the Marine Corps, namely seven "UC" boats were supposed to lay mines in front of Harwich and the exits of the Thames estuary, four "UB" boats a 17 nm on the night before the march of the German high seas occupy a long outpost line southeast of Southwold and two more "UB" boats south of the mine barrier laid out on November 3, 1914 during the bombardment of Marmouth, navigationally manning certain points as precisely as possible in order to make it easier for the approaching cruisers to approach this difficult area.

However, only "UB 6", Oberleutnant zur See Voigt, was already in his position on the 24th, as it had not learned anything about the postponement of the operation by one day, and waited in vain for the coastal bombardment. In contrast, the other submarines planned for the outpost line at Southwold and the positions east of Lowestoft, "UB 10", "UB 12", "UB 13", "UB 18" and "UB 29" did not leave until the 23rd. while enemy forces were already on the march against the Flemish coast. When the "UC" boats left the port of Zeebrugge at dawn (April 24th), they very soon got into full enemy counteraction.

"UC 7", Oberleutnant zur See Haag, who was already at 4 am. ran out, immediately turned around, alerted the coast and then tried, like the other UC boats, to break through to sea through the enemy forces. This attempt was only successful, however, "UC 6", Oberleutnant zur See Graf v. Schmettow, on that day, so that, after passing about 20 destroyers, it was able to lay its mines as planned between Orfordness and Shipwash in front of the northern exit from Harwich around midnight.<sup>151</sup>

On the other hand, "UC 7" had to get to the bottom after several unsuccessful attempts to break through in front of Zeebrugge and was only able to continue after dark, while "UC 5", Oberleutnant zur See Mohrbutter, was forced to go after the battery had run almost empty to return to Zeebrugge. "UC 1", Oberleutnant zur See Ramien, had to run in again after it was repeated several times, but to no avail, being caught by the search equipment of the patrolling English fish steamers and finally sailing under water into the nets laid out by the English in the meantime, from which it was only able to free itself again by several violent detonations of the braided mines. "UC 10", Oberleutnant zur See Nitzsche, had to go through even worse. This boat was at 1:20 p.m. at Thornton-Bank also got into the network blocking and sank to the bottom under heavy detonations all around at a depth of 27 m. The detonations continued during the afternoon, with the boat listing up to 15° in places. It was only when the noise of the screws from the enemy guard vehicles disappeared that the submarine was able to at 9:35 p.m. surfaced, but at 11:30 hrs 5 nm north of the Wandelaar lightship, this time sailing above water, it got back into a net before it started its march back to Zeebrugge.

In the meantime, there had been lively air fighting off the Flemish coast, which had been alerted by "UC 7". Already around 5 a.m. an enemy plane had unsuccessfully dropped two bombs on the Zeebrugge lock; then two monitors, many destroyers and fish steamers appeared off the coast, and from the planes "472", "537", "487", "547", "457" and "521", Oberleutnant zur See Faber, Leutnant zur See Rolshoven, Lieutenant in the reserve Christiansen, Leutnant zur See Schüler and flight chief mate Meyer, was bombed extensively and apparently with good success. The German seaplanes, some of which were unarmed except for bombs, had a difficult time with the enemy land biplane equipped with machine guns and were often only able to avoid them by diving. Finally, around noon, the aircraft "503", piloted by Riedel, also aimed a remote control boat against one of the enemy monitors (1).<sup>152</sup>

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1) Unmanned motorboat with a large explosive charge, that is controlled from the coast or from an airplane by FT.

Even after having covered a distance of 22.5 km it came within 4 nm of the enemy, but then the engine failed, so that the boat had to be blown up in order not to fall into the hands of the enemy. At the same time, the aircraft "472", Oberleutnant zur See Faber, Leutnant zur See Exner, 8 miles north of Zeebrugge at an altitude of 800 m, got into a fight with a Nieuport land biplane, before other aircraft could get in between, despite a steep dive, the 150 km fast and very maneuverable Nieuport aircraft circled several times in all directions and shot down at a height of 600 m.

According to the airport manager, Oberleutnant zur See v. Tschirschky said that at that time the Zeebrugge air station was far from having the means at hand to cope with its most important tasks in such a combat situation, namely shooting in artillery, setting up remote control boats, and reconnaissance behind the enemy line. As a result, he soon had to give up long-range reconnaissance and was pushed into the defense. So it was impossible to prevent the enemy from carrying out his task with weapons from the coast alone. This time this did not consist of a bombardment, as had been expected, even less in a landing there or in Dutch territory, as various agent reports had pointed out recently, but only in the execution of what had already been envisaged several times, but repeatedly postponed plan of the Commander-in-Chief in Dover, Admirals Bacon, to block the passage between the Thornton Ridge-Bank and the Belgian coast and thus the exit from Zeebrugge through a double row of deep mines, which should be reinforced by nets there and at Noord-Hinder. Six divisions of fish steamers to lay out the nets, four large and six small mine-layers, the monitors "Prince Eugene" and "General Wolfe", an M-class destroyer division from Harwich and the "Flanders Patrol" from Dunkirk were used for this purpose and had at 5 a.m. (April 24th) reached the commanded starting positions. By 8:30 a.m., a 15 nm long, two-row mine barrier and a 13 nm long net barrier were in place, in which mines were woven that were supposed to explode if the net were touched by submarines. The mine-layers then returned to the port from Harwich with the destroyers of the II Division of the L-Class who were in charge of them, while the fishing boats that laid the nets remained behind with the monitors used to hold them back to monitor the same.<sup>153</sup>

Around noon, the three large torpedo boats of the former Cleve half-flotilla, now the Z-Flotilla Flanders, "V67", "V 68" and "V47" received orders to scout north and disrupt the English vessels, but not far from the coast to cut off and avoid full commitment. At 4 p.m. came the three torpedo boats, led by the Kapitänleutnants Waitz, Steiner and Zander, in a lively battle with the destroyers "Medea", "Murray", "Melpomene" and "Milne", who had immediately moved to cover the fish steamers leaving to the north. When one of the monitors intervened, the boats finally had to retreat under the protection of the coastal batteries. The latter opened fire and immediately scored hits on all destroyers. One of these, "Melpomene", was immobilized and was towed by "Milne" and "Medea". Thereupon the Z-Flotilla pushed forward again, but the monitors covered the retreat of the destroyers so effectively that the German boats could not reach the torpedo fire range. After the latter had added ammunition in Zeebrugge - "V67" had fired 124 rounds in the course of the day alone - they patrolled the coast the following night, but found the area cleared of all enemy ships and vehicles. On the following day (April 25) the boats of the Flanders torpedo boat flotilla (1), Kapitänleutnant Assmann, which had set sail for the precise determination and evacuation of the English barriers, did not encounter any significant counteraction, so that, with the help of a few steamers, they were able to immediately create a larger gap and destroy large parts of the network barrier. Only "A 12", Oberleutnant zur See Weishaupt, got into a brief skirmish with six fish steamers from the Dunkirk minesweeping flotilla, which was also attacked by an enemy submarine. The last steamer was brought to a stop by hits, the flag was stricken and was sunk after the English crew had been captured. Even in the next few days, apart from air raids, the work went undisturbed. Once again it turned out that a barrier that was not constantly monitored and defended was not worth the effort it had cost. The enemy had originally intended to leave armed forces at the barrier, but abandoned these and perhaps even larger plans against the Flemish coast when the first signs of the advance of the High Seas Forces against the English coast became apparent.

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1) "A 4", "A 5", "A 8", "A 10", "A 12", "A 13", "A 14", "A 16" and "A 19".<sup>154</sup>



On April 24th, the battle of the Z-Flotilla was still going on off the Flemish coast, when in the German Bight, following the cruisers, from 3 p.m. had also left the Jade and Elbe battleship squadrons, so that now all High Seas Forces, namely 22 capital ships, 5 older ships of the line, 12 small cruisers and 48 torpedo boats were advancing westward (1). Meanwhile, the advanced reconnaissance forces had at 2 p.m. swung sharply to starboard in the locking gap of Norderney and had, secured by "L7" and some aircraft, walked 40 nautical miles to the north between the German and English barriers, secured by "L7" and some aircraft, so that they were not seen from the Dutch islands would betray prematurely. When they were about to turn back on WNW course, occurred around 4 p.m. on the flagship "Seydlitz", Kapitän zur See v. Egidy, a detonation that tore a 90 square meter hole in the ship's side at the height of the torpedo wide space, which, according to metal parts found, could only be traced back to a mine hit. The other battle cruisers turned around immediately, according to the order previously issued for this case, while "Seydlitz", standing beyond the presumed barrier, first swept west in order to then follow the other battle cruisers. Now, however, submarines and torpedo runways were reported one after the other, first on "Seydlitz" and then on "Lützow", so that crossing the submarine-endangered area through the damaged and therefore very slow flagship did not seem advisable. Kontreadmiral Boedicker, who was in charge of the battlecruisers on behalf of the sick Vizeadmirals Hipper, decided to go with "Seydlitz" alone, but secured by "L7" and the II Reconnaissance Group, which had already passed the lock without being damaged, to walk north of the same to the west, then stop in the area in front of the Ems and passed by the "Lützow". Since he did not know the location and extent of the barrier, he had, as can be determined after the hit, once more to the south and once to the north without detonating any further mines. (Map F.)

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1) The following were missing: "Bayern", in service since March 18, but not yet ready at the front, "Pommern", shipyard lay time, "Prussia", given for guarding the Sound, "Graudenz", mine hit, "Stralsund", to install 15 cm guns at the shipyard. The torpedo boats were missing: the II. Flotilla due to arming with 10.5 cm guns, the V. Flotilla due to scheduled repair work and finally half of the newly put into service and not yet ready-to-go boats of the III. Flotilla.<sup>155</sup>

When the battleship squadrons approached the Norderney lock gap around 5 p.m. from the east, the battle cruisers, under the leadership of "Derfflinger", Captain Hartog, came into view from the north. Admiral Scheer concluded from this that the commander of the reconnaissance forces considered it impractical to continue the march on the northern route, so he had his squadron take a reverse course to make way for the battlecruisers and then continued the advance under the East Frisian coast. In doing so he had to consciously accept the risk that the fleet would now be observed from Rottum and Schiermonikoog in the extremely clear weather and would probably be reported to the enemy, which would increase the prospect of carrying out the attack on Lowestoft and Great Parmouth by surprise, significantly decreased. The further development could, however, be awaited with confidence in the airship reconnaissance.

Admiral Boedicker, informed of the decision of the fleet chief by radio message, left with his staff at 7 p.m. about 45 nautical miles north of Ameland on the torpedo boat "V28" his flagship and at 8:30 p.m. he set his flag on "Lützow", which in the meantime had reached a point about 35 nautical miles north of Terschelling with the other battle cruisers on the orders of the Admiral from the mouth of the Ems, while "Seydlitz", led by two torpedo boats, returned to the mouth of the Ems and from there to the Jade with 1400 t of water in the ship and a loss of eleven men. At 10 p.m. "Lützow" went with the I Reconnaissance Group about 50 nm north of Texel on a south-westerly course, to sail the small cruisers of the II Reconnaissance Group in three meetings to two ships, each with four torpedo boats as vanguard and side cover, in the Hoofden to advance. At 1 o'clock in the morning the main Body followed on the same course in order, secured by the IV. Reconnaissance Group and the associated flotillas, to navigate 14 nm to a point 20 nm west of Haak's lightship, which at 6 a.m. should be achieved.

The previous evening, from the lively radio traffic from the British, it was clear that the approach was not going unnoticed. This was traced back to reports from the enemy submarines allegedly sighted by the battlecruisers in the afternoon, although this was not the case according to English information. According to a message that arrived at 9:30 p.m. on S.M.S. "Frederick the Great", all patrol vehicles were called back to the port, as emerged from an intercepted English radio message.<sup>156</sup>

A report from Norway that on the morning of the 23rd enemy squadrons 40 nm SW of Lindesnes had been sighted, combined with the fact that other apparently strong English formations had been off the Flemish coast since the early morning, seemed to confirm the previous view, that the enemy forces operated separately, partly from the northern North Sea, partly from the Hoofden and the ports of the south-east coast of England. So there was an opportunity - and that was the stated purpose of the undertaking - to push yourself between these parts of the fleet and attack the part that would face first with at least the same strength. It was also to be hoped that the opponent would not be able to evade the challenge this time, as was the case during the advance on 5./6. March had been the case, since he was to be influenced by the disproportionately stronger pressure of a bombardment of fortified coastal areas on the south-east coast of England, which had not been repeated since 1914. The places in prospect for this purpose, Lowestoft and Yarmouth, were both militarily important bases, the former for mine-layers and minesweepers, the latter for all submarine operations against the German Bight. The destruction of the port and other militarily important facilities at both coastal locations, such as air stations, gas stations, factories, train stations, as well as the destruction of the ships and vehicles lying in the port was thus already of high military value in itself, quite apart from the aim of the bombardment of challenging the enemy. If he answered the challenge, then, in the opinion of the German naval command, he would have to advance in the direction of Terschelling in order to locate the German armed forces after the attack. These waters off the Dutch islands, favorable for the acceptance of a battle, then became the focus of events. Perhaps it was possible to seize the units advancing from the Hoofden, which were by no means confined to light forces alone, from two sides, namely from the south with the battlecruisers, from the north with the main body.

On the English side, a German undertaking had been expected from the outset, for which, given the general situation, there seemed to be a lot to be said, and only the necessity of fuel supplementation had forced the "Grand Fleet" to wait between Horns-Reef and to give up the large and small fisherman bank prematurely. On the 24th, however, Admiral Jellicoe received at 5 p.m. from Whitehall news of grave concern.<sup>157</sup>

In Ireland there had been an open uprising of the oppressed, Sinn Fein was in possession of Dublin, and it seemed as if this movement was to be supported by a demonstration against the English east coast of the German High Seas Forces, whose increased readiness was known. As a result, the necessary measures, always prepared for such cases, were taken immediately. Commodore Tyrwhitt, who was at sea on exercises with the "Harwich" forces, was hastened to call back to replenish fuel, and all forces of the "Grand Fleet" were instructed to be ready when the coal was finished could go to sea within two hours of receiving the order. Admiral Beatty, who had already entered Rosyth with the battle cruiser the evening before, reported at 6 p.m. clear to sea. The battle squadrons in Scapa, however, which had only reached the port between 7 and 8 am, could not be ready before 9 pm. In addition, further delays were to be expected on the advance to the south due to violent headwinds, which barely allowed the destroyers and small cruisers to use higher speed levels. In this state of readiness, Admiral Jellicoe received at 7 p.m. the first report of the departure of the German High Seas Forces. The hit of the mine on "Seydlitz" and the orders that had become necessary as a result to reduce the advance course had resulted in some radio messages which, as the British Admiralty, as they could decipher them, gave a greater insight into the German intentions than was possible at the time on the German Side could accept. In this way the British commander-in-chief learned that the German battlecruisers would be leaving at 4 p.m. 40 nm west of Heligoland, on a north-westerly course, while the battleship squadrons seemed to follow them into a pick-up position. He thereupon ordered all armed forces to "open up steam in all boilers" and instructed Admiral Beatty to immediately advance south on the mine-free route west of the German Dogger Bank barrier. The 5th Battle Squadron ("Queen Elizabeths") will follow him as soon as possible to make up for the loss of the "Australia" and "New Zealand", which had rammed on the 22nd (1). However, he should only get involved in a fight with a superior enemy when the main body are up to support. At the same time, the "reserve forces", the III. Battle Squadron (older ships of the line, "King Edwards") and the III. Cruiser Squadron under orders to stand at Farn Island to cover the Tyne area. The actual battle fleet could not leave until later.

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1) See page 128.<sup>158</sup>

In the meantime the coast has been put into a state of defense. All outpost boats and minesweepers were called back and the torpedo boat flotillas and submarines of the coastal defense were pushed forward in their place. When it got light, planes should scout and attack any enemy forces that were sighted. Shortly after 9 p.m. received further clarification about the movements and intentions of the German fleet. Admiral Jellicoe learned that "Seydlitz", the flagship of the German battlecruiser formation, 40 nm north of Borkum, had apparently come to the aid of 850 mines laid by "Princess Margaret" and "Angora" in November, but the other battlecruisers from one Operated at 50 nm from Borkum. The most powerful German association, the III. Battle squadron, steer along the Frisian coast to a point 35 nm north of Terschelling, where it will go on a SW course. Apparently the other two battleship squadrons would also be at sea for the same purpose. Simultaneously with this "news from the enemy" the Admiralty informed the commander in chief that the weather in the south was considerably better and ordered him to face the enemy with the assembled fleet. A much more important undertaking seemed to be developing from the expected German demonstration, so that the situation was viewed as extremely serious. Not only the bases in Warmouth or Lowestoft or those in the mouth of the Thames were considered threatened, rather, despite the minefields off Dover, it was thought quite possible that strong German forces under the protection of the deep-sea fleet would advance into and across the canal leading rear connections of the British Army could interfere. According to the English view, a further point of attack offered the mass of ships which accumulated every night in the Downs, so that a squadron advancing there and ruthlessly using its guns could destroy hundreds of merchant ships in a few hours. The consequences for the British supply of food, raw materials and war material of all kinds are unpredictable. But that's not all. The enemy might intend to block the ports on the French coast, which are important for the supply of the army, with block ships, and finally the old fear arose that the German naval advance might be made to cover a landing operation set up between Nieuport and Dunkirk that the sea flank of the Allies should fall in the rear. This idea was by no means considered fantastic, but was taken very seriously by the British Army Command in view of the large number of lighters in the Flemish bases, even if the British Admiralty had always assured that it would prevent any such attempt from the outset.<sup>159</sup>

Every German advance in the direction of the English Channel made the disadvantages of the distant position of the "Grand Fleet" felt again and again. The crux of all defense plans had therefore always been based on setting up the destroyer flotillas and submarines in the Hoofden in such a way that they could attack one or more German capital ships. If it was even possible to torpedo one or the other ship and thus reduce the marching speed of the entire German force sufficiently, it would have to be easy for the British fleet to get close in time despite the great distance or to get between the former and their lines of retreat to push. In the course of the evening of the 24th the commander of the submarines stationed in Yarmouth therefore received orders to have six of them deployed with a destroyer approximately in the middle of the Southwold – Hoek van Holland line. At the same time, Commodore Tyrwhitt was instructed to use the light cruisers of the "Harwich" forces to occupy a point 20 nm north-northeast of the submarines in order to lure them into the trap set by the submarines in the event of German capital ships approaching. All destroyers from Harwich and from the Nore were supposed to stand near the submarines when it was light and wait there for further orders from the commodore. The actual target of the German battlecruisers had not yet become apparent from the enemy's radio messages, but the British Admiralty, probably in memory of the events of November 3, 1914, came very close in its assumptions to reality when it ordered that six more submarines were to line up on the probable bombing positions of an attacker in front of Yarmouth.

At 1:40 a.m., the Admiralty learned from further observation of the German radio traffic that the German battle cruisers, which the battleship squadrons were following at a distance of 50 nm, would be at the eastern border of the mine-prone area in about two hours, which lies to the east in front of Southwold Direction extended to then advance through this against Yarmouth. Thereupon Admiral Bacon received orders to immediately stop all operations in progress in Flanders, to gather the Dover forces to protect the English coast and to position the aircraft mother ship "Vindex" in such a way that the seaplanes could attack when the enemy appeared. In addition, the destroyer "Melampus", which had left Harwich about an hour earlier with 5 submarines and had just passed the Orfordness-Shipwash line, was instructed to instead of the first commanded position in the middle of the Southwold-Hoek of Holland line, if still possible, position 33 nm further south.<sup>160</sup>

Since the armed forces of the "Grand Fleet" had only just left the Scottish ports at the time, the defense of the attack that was expected when the light came on was the sole responsibility of the local coastal fortifications and the armed forces stationed in the south from the outset, although the details were disproportionately early had received knowledge of the imminent.

The fighting began with the appearance of the German airships over the coast. This was from 11:10 p.m. until 1:20 a.m. successively exceeded by "L 16", "L 17", "L 20", "L 21", "L 23", "L 13" and "L 11" between Wash and Mersey. (Map F.) Here the whole stretch of coast south of the Wash turned out to be richly occupied with defense batteries and searchlights, which first allowed the ships to come very close before they illuminated them through gaps in the cloud cover and fired them violently with incendiary grenades and shrapnel. But only "L 13" was hit by some explosives on the front gondola near Theberton. Very soon it was also found that a stiff south-westerly wind was blowing overland, so that the airships made only slow progress and had to give up the attack on London. But also finding other targets was made so difficult by fog, rain and again and again completely collapsing cloud cover that the majority of the airships, among them also "L 21" with the commander, Korvettenkapitän Strasser, on board, sometimes after hours of searching, had to leave the coast without dropping any of their ammunition. Only "L 13", Kapitänleutnant of the reserve Prölß, and "L 16", Oberleutnant zur See Peterson, found worthwhile targets, some bombs on Norwich and covered a battery near Winterton at 1:35 am with 20 explosive and incendiary bombs, while "L 16" at 2 am caused great house collapses by bombing Cambridge and dumped the rest of its ammunition in Norwich half an hour later. Afterwards, "L 16" was once again heavily lit and fired at on the march back at 2:50 for ten minutes in clear weather. The first airships landed between 6 and 7 a.m. in their ports. On the other hand, "L 17", Kapitänleutnant Ehrlich, after an initial failure, went at 2 a.m. again over the English coast, at 2:25 a.m. spotted lights and railway systems for a short time in a cloud gap and dropped a few more bombs on them.<sup>161</sup>



Also "L 21", Kapitänleutnant of the Reserve Dietrich, turned again on the command of the commander when the German battlecruisers were sighted, in order to secure them in a northerly direction during the bombardment. Later "L21" also passed the Main Body and landed around 11 am in Nordholz.

All that was later learned about the effect of these attacks was that in Lincoln, probably by "L 17", the Great Northern Station and the "Globe Works" had been badly damaged. The attacks by the airships did not have the expected influence on the movements of the English naval forces, since it seemed more important to them to thwart the imminent attack of the German I and II Reconnaissance Groups than to chase after the uncertain possibilities of chasing the airships. Moreover, only some of the destroyers were ready to sail at midnight. Two "L" -class divisions, which had previously operated off the Belgian coast, had just returned to the Nore and were only able to leave the port two hours later after adding fuel. As a result, the flotilla leader ships "Lightfoot" and "Nimrod" were initially only followed by seven and nine destroyers, respectively, when they left Harwich behind the V Light Cruiser squadron. At 2:30 a.m. Commodore Tyrwhitt stood with these forces at Sunk-Lightship. The order to take up positions outside the mine area that stretched before Lowestoft and north of the British submarine line between Southwold and Hook of Holland seemed out of date after the latest news about the enemy. The submarines, however, could hardly prevent the enemy from advancing even from their new starting positions, as the enemy now unexpectedly seemed to be running across the suspected mine area towards the coast. Contrary to the order, Commodore Tyrwhitt therefore decided on his own responsibility to stay on the west side of the mine area and to run north at a distance of about 10 nm from the coast. Although the enemy approaching was likely to be far superior to his three cruisers "Conquest", "Cleopatra" and "Penelope", the commodore could hardly hope to bring his destroyers to attack in time and surprisingly, since by 3 a.m. it was full of moonlight and an hour later it was dawn. Perhaps his approach was at least successful in pulling the enemy off the coast and thus weakening or possibly preventing the bombardment, the moral effect of which was greatly feared.

During these measures on the British side, the advance of the German naval forces had proceeded according to plan.<sup>162</sup>

Since midnight the two submarines set up south of the "Stralsund" mine barrier, "UB 18", Oberleutnant zur See Otto Steinbrinck, and "UB 29", Oberleutnant zur See Pustkuchen, in the expected direction of approach of the German battle cruisers a red or a green light, and at 4.15 a.m. "UB 18" saw clouds of smoke in a northeastern direction, ran closer, and soon afterwards the German attack forces passed the submarine. At the same time, a German airship ("L21") moved in a northerly direction in bright moonlight to the east, while to the south-east of the battlecruisers the group "Rostock" and "Elbing", Fregattenkapitäne Feldmann and Madlung, led by the first leader of the torpedo boat forces, Kommodores Michelsen, to secure the advance of the battlecruisers south. At 5 a.m. this group sighted ships and torpedo boats about 6 lines to port. At first they were thought to be the "Frankfurt" and "Wiesbaden" groups, but soon realized that they were enemy forces that apparently wanted to enter Lowestoft. They were reported to the commander of the reconnaissance forces by headlights and radio messages. Around this time the battlecruisers sighted the Corton lightship and brought it south to start the bombardment of Lowestoft on a north course. Believing that this move was being made to attack the reported enemy forces, the "Rostock" group now turned north to clear the field of fire, but once again made contact when the real purpose of the battlecruiser's movement was recognized on the enemy, while the other cruiser groups and torpedo boats followed the movement of the battlecruisers in order to secure them during the bombardment to the east and northeast. The Commodore Tyrwhitt's attempt had failed. His three cruisers had proven to be too little of a lure to distract the German battlecruisers from their main task. Kontreadmiral Boedicker had decided to attack the reported naval forces only after the coastal bombardment and with better lighting. However, if the battle cruisers ran up to Yarmouth, the English cruiser commander could hope that they would encounter the six English submarines there, which were supposed to be positioned within firing range in front of the city. In reality, however, only one of them, "H 5", was in position near the Cross Sand lightship, while the rest of them had misunderstood the Admiralty's orders that they should use the approach that led north of the mine area along the Sands to Yarmouth, should occupy. As a result, "H 10" and "H 7" were in front of and in the Haisborough Gat and "V 1" at the Smiths Knoll buoy. "E 53" and "E 37" were still on the march from Harwich.<sup>163</sup>

On the German side, the group "Frankfurt" and "Wiesbaden", Kapitän zur See Thilo v. Trotha and Fregattenkapitän Reiss, already at 5 a.m. two fish steamers, one of which was flying the flag of war, passed, but not fired at, so as not to betray the approach to the coast prematurely. Soon afterwards she came across numerous guard vehicles northeast of the Corton lightship, of which she took three under fire and sank one. Some of the masts of wrecks protruding from the water initially gave the impression of submarine periscopes and were also shot at with several grenades.

In the meantime the battle cruisers "Lützow", Kapitän zur See Harder, "Derfflinger", Kapitän zur See Hartog, "Moltke", Kapitän zur See v. Karpf, and "von der Tann", Kapitän zur See, Zenker, along a row of red buoys, which were displayed at a distance of about 5 km from Cortonnach Cross sand lightship, apparently to indicate a mine-free route. Then they opened between 5:11 a.m. and 5:14 a.m. the fire against the military targets specified in Lowestoft. No one was surprised when this was immediately replied by two batteries south of the harbor entrance and some 15 cm shells struck near the ships, only one had expected considerably stronger counteraction, assuming that the enemy had in the meantime expanded their coastal defense. In reality, a few salvos from the heavy ship guns were enough to silence the shore batteries. As for the rest, the conditions for the bombardment, similar to November 1914, were again very unfavorable. A thick haze lay over the coast; In addition, the chimney and powder smoke from the ships drifted towards land, so that only a few larger buildings, such as the Empire Hotel and St. John's Church, stood out more clearly. However, they provided sufficient clues to use them to set fire to the targets actually to be bombarded, the port facilities, in particular the swing bridge, the ships in the port, the gas works and the train station. The first volleys of the heavy artillery, fired with a small combat load at 70–90 km, were short, and the shells only hit land when the attachment was set at 100 to 130 km, so that the middle artillery could now also fall into the fire and at one Score of 130 km hits. Overall, "Lützow" fired 18 = 30.5 cm and about 45 = 15 cm, from "Derfflinger" 16 = 30.5 cm and 32 = 15 cm grenades against Lowestoft, the ammunition consumption on "Moltke" and "von der Tann" was similar, and soon blazing fires and strong detonations at the entrance and the swing bridge had the effect.<sup>164</sup>

As the English admitted, about 200 houses were shot down; however, the loss of people was fortunately small. Between 5:17 a.m. and 5:20 a.m., the ships ceased fire in order to now turn to the bombardment of Yarmouth. In this city, however, individual targets were even less visible than in Lowestoft, especially since the battlecruisers had meanwhile had to turn farther away from the coast because of the offshore sands. Only the Nelson column and the lighthouse could temporarily be used as reference points for the bombardment. When "Lützow" opened fire at 5:24 am, the targets were only reached by the medium artillery, a volley of the heavy artillery, which fired again with a small combat charge, was still short at 100 m. As a result, "Lützow" stopped firing the heavy artillery after the first volley, and "Moltke" also broke off the bombardment after the first volley, as direct shooting was impossible with the smoke obstruction by the other ships and the poor shallowness, but indirect shooting promised too little success. For the same reasons, "von der Tann" also saved his ammunition and did not fire at the land targets, especially since the armed forces reported in the south soon promised more valuable targets, and only "Derfflinger" fired at distances between 110-130 hm according to navigational direction and distance determination 14 = 30.5 cm and 12 = 15 cm grenades against the city and did not cease fire until at 5:28 a.m. the ammunition selected for the heavy artillery had fired. The effect of the shooting remained small under these circumstances. Four minutes later, "Lützow" fired a 15 cm salvo on an armed outpost steamer northeast of the Corton lightship, which had already been in combat with "Frankfurt", while protecting the crew who were already fleeing into the boats, whereupon it went up in flames. At the same time, an enemy aircraft was shot at and apparently damaged by the battle cruisers. Soon afterwards they were attacked by a second and third airman, who, despite the excellent opportunity to drop bombs, immediately turned away after the first shots and glided steeply to land. Even during these skirmishes, Kontreadmiral Boedicker had the battlecruiser swivel on the opposite course between the Cross Sand lightship and the Middle Cross Sand buoy in order to repeat the bombardment of Yarmouth with a large combat load and then to proceed against the armed forces reported in the south. This turn must have seriously disappointed the English submarines deployed from Yarmouth in the direction of Smiths Knoll.<sup>165</sup>

When "H 5" watched the battlecruisers approach north from Lowestoft, it immediately dived to attack, but before it was within range, the battlecruisers were heading south again. "H 10" and "V 1" had also tried to get closer despite the greater distance, but were hindered by their own airmen, who knew nothing about the deployment of the submarines and therefore believed them to be hostile and attacked with bombs. At 5:42 a.m. "Lützow" opened fire again in the direction of the Great Yarmouth lighthouse, which was now apparently returned by a battery, and fired eight rounds of the heavy artillery, the impacts of which this time were all on land at distances between 140 and 128 hm. Black explosive clouds and blazing fires marked the impacts. Before the rest of the ships fell into the fire, more valuable targets drew the attention of the battlecruisers in the south.

There, at 5:30 a.m., the group "Rostock" and "Elbing" had been taken under fire by the forces of Commodore Tyrwhitt, which had now been identified as three cruisers of the "Arethusa" class with 18 destroyers. However, the shots were consistently short and could not be returned from the German cruisers, especially from the 10.5 cm of the "Rostock", given the great distance. The latter then tried to pull the enemy forces on an NNE course behind them in order to enable the battlecruisers to cut them off from the coast. The enemy also followed, but turned away when all cruisers of the II Reconnaissance Group, Kommodore v. Reuter, and under the leadership of the "Regensburg" began an ongoing battle on a southern course. However, the enemy evaded all attempts to get within effective firing range by moving closer because of his superior speed, so that "Rostock" had to break off fire after one volley, "Frankfurt" after three salvos, since the greatest range of their guns was only 131 hm was, while "Pillau", Fregattenkapitän Mommsen, and "Wiesbaden", Fregattenkapitän Reiss, did not get a shot at 169 and 144 hm respectively. Also "Regensburg", Fregattenkapitän Heuberer, could only take one destroyer under fire at 160-180 m with uncertain success with 15 rounds, and "Elbing" alone maintained a longer fire against two destroyers from 5:48 a.m. to 6:01 a.m. 39 HE shells were fired. However, in this case, too, no effect on the target could be seen. However, given the very favorable observation conditions, this could have been increased significantly if the planned enlargement of the gun elevation and equipment with new, more ballistically more favorable ammunition had already been carried out, especially since the small cruisers were almost entirely equipped with directional systems, which enabled them to stay on target even with the large number of hostile forces that were constantly in disarray.<sup>166</sup>

But even the enemy, who had actually fired at greater distances, had not scored any hits when the fire was fairly irregular; rather, their impacts had consistently been short.

Meanwhile, at 5:43 a.m., Kontreadmiral Boedicker had stopped the coastal bombardment and allowed it to pivot to port in order to also attack the enemy forces that were now coming into the fire area of the battlecruisers. At 5:47 am the signal "distribute fire from the left" blew, and from 5:49 am to 5:56 am "Lützow" and "Derfflinger" fired their heavy artillery at 126 to 140 hm at the enemy cruisers, while the medium artillery fired at 90 to 120 hm took the destroyer under fire and soon scored full salvos. On the other hand, "Moltke" could no longer achieve these goals at a distance of 150 hm with the 15 cm guns and also stopped the fire of the heavy artillery against one of the enemy cruisers after the first salvo, in view of the experiences of November 3rd 1914 not to hinder the fire of "Lützow" and "Derfflinger". In the course of the battle they fired 33 and 27 = 30.5 cm grenades at the cruisers and observed a hit on two of them at 5:49 a.m. and 5:52 a.m., each recognizable by a strong detonation and a high column of fire, whereupon the enemy destroyers took cover for the cruisers seemed to proceed to the attack and were now taken from the battle cruiser "von der Tann" at 120 to 146 hm with heavy artillery under several, soon covering salvos. The mast on one of the destroyers fell and a little later it seemed to be sinking, wrapped in a high black cloud of detonation. While the other battle cruisers, after the flagship arrived at 5:55 a.m. had swiveled on an easterly course, soon afterwards ceased fire, the tailship "von der Tann" fired 17 rounds at 140–158 hm just before swiveling at the most northerly of the enemy cruisers and believed that they had also hit this badly.

According to English reports, hits were only made on one cruiser and one destroyer. At 5:50 a.m., the flagship of the Commodore Tyrwhitt, which was furthest north after turning south, hit a volley of heavy shells, tore the superstructure of the quarterdeck away and killed and wounded 40 men, including officers. Nevertheless, the cruiser, traveling at 20 nm, was able to evade enemy fire behind the smoke curtain of the destroyer.<sup>167</sup>

In addition to the flagship, only the destroyer "Laertes" was hit during the 7-minute battle, with five men wounded and one boiler being put out of action. In the course of the run, the battlecruisers were attacked again by two airmen, who, however, quickly moved away after a short bombardment. The total ammunition consumption of the battle cruisers during the coastal bombardment and the later engagement with naval forces was as follows:

	Number	Caliber cm	bullet type	cartridge charge
"Lützow". . .	41	30.5	HE shells	large combat charge
	20	30.5	"	small combat charge
	168	15	"	-
	9	8.8	"	-
"Derfflinger".	62	30.5	"	large combat charge
	89	15	"	-
	9	8.8	"	-
"Moltke". . .	24	28	High explosive AP shells	large combat charge
	35	15	HE shells	-
	16	8.8	"	-
von der Tann"	51	28	high-explosive AP shells	large combat charge
	18	15	high-explosive shells	-
	3	8.8	"	-

In spite of an extraordinarily large accumulation of German and English submarines in this area, any effect of these had so far barely made itself felt. Of the four German submarines that were supposed to line up southeast of Southwold, however, "UB 12", Oberleutnant zur See Kiel, which had mistakenly headed for Lowestoft rather than Southwold, got in the middle of the bombardment and was seriously endangered by impacting grenades. However, it could not follow the further course of the battle to the south quickly enough, especially since it was attacked several times by airmen with bombs and pushed under water. In contrast, "UB 6", Oberleutnant zur See Voigt, and "UB 10", Oberleutnant zur See Saltzwedel, Although it was planned to stand in the commanded line before light, only "UB 10" had observed the approach of the enemy forces to the north at 4:33 .am. and the battle between them and the II Reconnaissance Group at around 6 am. It appeared at 6:22 am and contacted "UB 12", which was coming from the north, but had to go under water again 10 minutes later in front of enemy planes who bombed it, so that in spite of his excellent position he completely escaped the turning of Commodore Tyrwhitt to the east behind the German armed forces (1).

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1) See page 49.<sup>168</sup>



Nothing was known about the position and observations of "UB 13", Oberleutnant zur See Metz, who did not return from this venture, perhaps it was already lost on the approach to one of the net and mine barriers that the British had just laid out in front of Zeebrugge. With the other three submarines it was shown again how difficult it was for them, given their poor overview, to adapt quickly to changing tactical situations from the waiting position without the help of a special guide ship.

At 5:55 a.m., since the hunt for the light enemy forces proved to be hopeless at the superior speed of the latter, but on the other hand, several submarines and torpedo runways had been reported, the top ship turned east with the top ship to the south of the "Stralsund"-Barrier, marked by buoys and apparently not yet cleared, to gain the connection with the own main body. This stood, as Kontreadmiral Boedicker, soon after 6 a.m. reported the completion of the coastal bombardment, about 70 nm away from the battle cruisers. In order to reinforce the reconnaissance, Admiral Scheer had ordered that when it got light, an airship should be parked over the Dogger Bank, a second at the Main Body, and a third over the Hoofden; however, the ascent of the second airship, "L7", Kapitänleutnant Hempel, which after securing the "Seydlitz" at about 1 a.m. landed in Haage and therefore only at 3:30 a.m. was ready to go again, so delayed that it was only over the Ems when it got light. "L 6", Kapitänleutnant Kraushaar, who had received the order to occupy a stand line between the German barriers on the Dogger Bank and east of the Humber, was stronger than calculated, driven north and steered at 4:20 am first from Dogger Bank to the south to reach the starting point of the commanded baseline, 100 nm north-west of Terschelling. In the meantime, "L 9", Hauptmann Stelling, cleared up between the main body and the battlecruisers and was surprised by two enemy seaplanes at an altitude of 5:38 a.m., about 40 nm east of Lowestoft, at an altitude of 800 m. With the speed with which they came, it was no longer possible to reach greater heights in time, so the airship zigzagged straight ahead of the wind to the northeast. Thereupon the first enemy plane turned away, but the second came, the first repelled by machine gun fire from the upper platform of the airship, on the second attempt directly over the latter, but luckily the five bombs he dropped all missed the target.<sup>169</sup>

In the course of this battle the enemy aircraft had advanced as far as the march security of the German main body, so that it was now to be assumed that the enemy would no longer remain unknown to the enemy when it was approaching. The cruisers and torpedo boats returning from the coast did not appear to be in any danger, however, and the enemy forces reported by the latter had evidently - at least it seemed - withdrawn. After the distance between the ships of Kontreadmiral Boedicker and the Main Body had decreased to 50 nm, had Admiral Scheer turn around at 6.20 am and head for the intended waiting position at Terschelling-Bank at 15 nm while the, while the IV Reconnaissance Group under the direction of the II leader of the torpedo boat forces, Commodores Heinrich, cleared up in a north-westerly direction. "L 9" was also instructed by a headlight signal to advance in this direction, but could no longer comply with the order, since all airships had meanwhile had to be called back by Korvettenkapitän Strasser due to increasing south-easterly winds.

Only "L 6", Kapitänleutnant Kraushaar, secured at least until 8:20 am the fleet insofar as the airship took the march back over Horns-Riff and only around 11 am. went overland near Sylt to return to Fuhlsbüttel. Had "L 9" continued their reconnaissance in the Hoofden, the fleet command would probably not have escaped the fact that the enemy forces, chased off by battlecruisers off Lowestoft, had not stopped trying to keep in touch as soon as assumed.

Rather, Commodore Tyrwhitt had only waited for the most basic repairs to be completed on his flagship, at 6:40 a.m. to follow the withdrawing armed forces of the Admiral Boedicker in a wide reconnaissance line with a 22 nm journey through the "K" Canal, which opened a mine-free route towards Terschelling through the middle of the suspected mine area east of Southwold. At the same time, the destroyer division led by "Laforey" ran south around the mine zone and beyond it at 9:30 am to unite with the forces of Commodore Tyrwhitt. In the meantime, the submarines "E 55", "E 29", "E 22" and "D 4", led by the destroyer "Melampus", to relocate the withdrawing enemy in front of the eastern exit of the "K" canal.<sup>170</sup>

They were just about to take their positions when the order came from "Lurcher" to advance the positions of the submarines beyond the latitude of Haak's lightship to the north. Since, on the other hand, the report had just been received that the German ships were only 25 nm further west and were approaching at high speed, Lieutenant Hewett, the leader of the submarines on "Melampus", stayed with the first intention. But before the submarines were in position, came in at 7 p.m. the German armed forces were in sight at a great distance in the north, so that even the most northerly boat, the "E 55", could only come within 4 nm before they disappeared in the NE. Even Commodore Tyrwhitt saw only clouds of smoke from the German cruisers at 9:45 p.m. he would have continued the hunt so that the destroyers would later deploy the night attack if the Admiralty hadn't called him back 10 minutes later. His advance had not been without its dangers, for it was clear that the enemy was also covering his retreat with submarines. An enemy submarine had already been sighted by "Conquest" at 7:40 pm and by "Cleopatra" at 8:15 pm. No sooner had the English cruiser turned around than, despite all caution, "Penelope" was hit by a submarine. The torpedo, however, had apparently been shot at a very great distance and already at the end of its orbit, because it ran close to the surface and therefore had only a relatively small effect when detonated. Although he tore away the rudder of the cruiser and damaged the steering system, "Penelope" was still able to follow the other ships at 20 nm and at 4 pm. the commodore was back in Harwich with all his forces.

The shot against "Penelope" had been fired by "UB 29", Oberleutnant zur See Pustkuchen. Like "UB 18", Oberleutnant zur See Steinbrinck, according to the order, soon after 5 am. left his waiting position 20 nm east of Marmouth in order to depart from the coast in an east-south-east direction. As a result, both submarines came into the line of retreat of the German and the advance line of the English armed forces and thus also into the waiting positions of the enemy submarines set up by the destroyer "Melampus". At 7 a.m. "UB 29" had been passed by the side cover of the returning German battlecruisers after it had previously had to dive in front of airmen and dived an hour later in front of an enemy submarine, while three English cruisers of the "Arethusa" class were sighted in SW, who followed the German armed forces at high speed in a broad reconnaissance line. It was already too late to attack.<sup>171</sup>

The submarine therefore ran after the cruisers, had to go to 9.25 a.m. diving again in front of eight "L" -class destroyers, which were also heading NE at maximum speed; but soon these, and then the cruisers, came into view again on the opposite course. The middle one stayed too far from "UB 29", but the attack on the northernmost one succeeded. 85 seconds after it was fired, the torpedo detonated at 10:25 a.m., but impacting shells prevented the submarine from determining the effect, and soon afterwards the enemy forces in the southwest came out of sight.

At 6.45 a.m. "UB 18", Oberleutnant zur See Steinbrinck, had also been passed by two German small cruisers with torpedo boats, shortly afterwards it sighted the destroyer "Melampus" and to the north of this two enemy submarines of the "E" class with erected FT masts. "UB 18" dived immediately, got about ten times up to 300m to the submarines, even had to dive under one of them once, but did not get a shot because they always turned off just in time. At 9 a.m. nine "L" -class destroyers appeared from the south at high speed on a northerly course, immediately afterwards "Melampus" again from the north, on which initially three, then two "E" -class submarines assembled. The destroyer ran south from sight, but reappeared for a short time around 11 a.m. when the vehicles on a south-westerly course passed the submarines. Around noon, "UB 18" was sighted during further attack attempts by "E 26" because, as could clearly be observed, the officer on watch on the tower of the English submarine suddenly grabbed the rudder and turned towards "UB 18" to ram. This dived immediately to a greater depth, but was still touched by the net deflector. Even so, the enemy submarines remained afloat, and soon afterwards the German submarine commander's tenacious efforts would be rewarded. At 12:40 p.m. he came to the second submarine "E 22" from a distance of 350 m to fire, and immediately after the detonation of the torpedo it disappeared. Only two men reappeared, so that it was to be assumed that "E 26", about 3 nm away, would come to the rescue and perhaps also be torpedoed. "E 26" dived immediately after the detonation, and despite the risk of being attacked by it, the German submarine commander risked the lives of his crew and his boat to save the two Englishmen. This succeeded. "E 26" was no longer sighted and, after "UB 18" had sunk an English fishing cutter, the crew of which had been handed over to the Noord-Hinder lightship, it began its march back.<sup>172</sup>

At the same time as "E 22" was torpedoed, "UB 29" on "E 55" also attacked; but nevertheless the attempts last two hours and finally after the addition of two more English submarines until 4 a.m. continued, there was no longer any chance of firing in the oil-smooth sea.

The submarine battles remained the only fighting that followed the bombardment of the coast and the short cruiser engagement during the day. When the I. and II. Reconnaissance group with the VI. and IX. Flotilla had turned to the east and crossed the Hoofden over to Terschelling, the small cruisers and torpedo boats of the march security at 6.10 a.m. and 7.15 a.m. only a few enemy submarines were sighted, which tried to follow the German armed forces at a long distance with high speed to the east. In contrast, other enemy forces were no longer sighted. At 7 a.m. but made "G 41", the guide boat of the VI. Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Max Schultz, another good catch. When it examined a small steamer under the English trade flag about 40 nm east of Marmouth, it found a gun hidden at the stern of the same under a cover that was painted like a boat, which, according to the 13-man crew, served to combat submarines. It was the steamer "King Stephen", which had already made an inglorious name for itself through its behavior when the "L 19" sank. It was sunk, and the crew, who denied having been on board at the time, were taken prisoner to be subjected to a detailed martial law investigation in Germany. In the same area "V44", Kapitänleutnant v. Holleufer, sunk a Swedish barque that had wood on board for England. In addition, the Norwegian steamer "Nordam" and the Swedish steamer "James Dickson" were occupied by prize teams and brought to Cuxhaven because of suspicion of espionage, and the Dutch steamer "Griberg" and "Albatroß" were taken to Cuxhaven.

At 7.30 a.m. the fleet management received a report from the commanding admiral of the marine corps, which was of corresponding influence for the further decisions of Admiral Scheer. As emerged from enemy radio messages deciphered in Bruges, all English ships had in the meantime received orders to return from the Belgian coast. The destroyers were supposed to replenish coal and then meet west of Dunkirk. In addition, since Commodore Tyrwhitt's armed forces had not shown up after the cruiser battle either, the German naval command believed, admittedly, as it later emerged, a little prematurely, that they should conclude from this that the enemy was all too surprising and would no longer be of any value on that day keep in touch, but rather intend a counter-attack only the following morning at best.<sup>173</sup>

A further lingering of the fleet at Terschelling Bank, let alone an initially intended deployment of torpedo boat flotillas in the likely direction of approach of the enemy, is therefore pointless, it would be more correct to come in immediately to have the cruisers and torpedo boats replenished with fuel as quickly as possible. The premature failure of the airship reconnaissance was to a considerable extent also decisive for this decision, and with the later knowledge of things there is no doubt at all that that this had to be broken off at the point in time when it could have become of decisive importance for the realization of the intention of the naval advance. If "L6", Kapitänleutnant Kraushaar, had not been prevented by the weather situation and the order of the naval airship department from crossing on the ordered line southwest of the Dogger Bank barrier, so the airship and thus also the fleet management would probably not have escaped the fact that the entire British battle cruiser fleet passed this stand line soon after 11 am in order to head for the area at high speed, in which the German fleet, according to the original plan of operations, had anticipated the enemy counter-attack and wanted to accept the battle. Perhaps the German fleet chief would even have been informed by "L 6" that the enemy battlecruiser fleet was far from being followed by any other English armed forces, so that the opportunity aimed at with the coastal bombardment arose. to cut off some of the enemy forces before most of them could come in for support Unfortunately, at that time, the German fleet commander still lacked the opportunity to obtain the basis for assessing the enemy's movements from observing the enemy radio traffic. which he had at his disposal with the help of a better developed decoding system in such a rich, but never exploited measure to a resounding success. Even so, there was almost no contact between the German and English battlecruisers; because when the German majority believed they were attacked several times by enemy submarines from 9 a.m. off Vlieland, Terschelling and Ameland, Kontreadmiral Boedicker called in order to evade this, with his own armed forces almost on the same route as on the exit in a wide arc to the north. Without his knowing it, it was precisely this movement that brought him very close to the English battlecruiser fleet approaching from the northwest.<sup>174</sup>

When the German cruisers headed east at 12:45 pm, about 40 nm north of Terschelling, Admiral Beatty and his ships were within 45 nm. The German bulk was 45 nm southeast of the armed forces of Kontreadmiral Boedicker in front of the mouth of the Ems. In contrast, at the time, even the 5th British Battle Squadron was still 100 nm west-northwest of the British battlecruisers, the battle fleet under Admiral Jellicoe was only 100 nm east of the Firth of Forth. Under these circumstances, having Admiral Beatty accept the fight at Terschelling or in front of the mouth of the Ems was irresponsible given the clear overview that the British Admiralty had at its disposal through continued deciphering of German radio communications. He therefore called the battlecruisers back at 1.30am. Soon afterwards, the rest of the armed forces of the "Grand Fleet" swiveled north to return to their bases.

This decision cannot have been an easy one for the British Admiralty; because, as before with every bombardment of the English coast by German naval forces, they again had to accept the reproach of public opinion, that it had neither succeeded in preventing the attack on the coast nor in at least making the attacker march back to battle. On the German side they were disappointed that the hoped-for encounter with strong enemy forces had not come about; however, despite the expediency of the undertaking, the hope of achieving this had been given up too early. It was believed, however, that the advance had given the enemy the lesson that in future they would have to cover an attack on the Flemish coast with strong armed forces to the north, and it was hoped to be able to take action against them at the next opportunity. The advance had undoubtedly contributed to the relief of the Flemish coast; for it could not be assumed that for the enemy the laying down of net and mine barriers, which could quickly be cleared again without a defense, was an end in itself. On the contrary, it was more likely that this measure only meant the initiation of a major undertaking against the Flemish coast, which, however, had been ruined by the attack of the German high seas against the south-east coast of England.

After all, laying out the net and mine barriers had the effect that of the UC boats leaving Zeebrugge on the 24th only "UC 6", Oberleutnant zur See Graf v. Schmettow, as planned, was able to lay out his mines before the bombardment of Lowestoft.<sup>175</sup>



"UC 7", Oberleutnant zur See Haag, had continued the advance at least after dark, but the other boats had been forced to postpone the march to the 25th (1). On this day too, "UC 5", Oberleutnant zur See Mohrbutter, forced to dive by four English torpedo boats and later surprised by French pilots, had to give up the attempt to create a gap in the network lock with explosive cartridges and return to Zeebrugge; on the other hand, "UC 1", Oberleutnant zur See Ramien, managed to finally pass the network lock with extreme force over water despite strong aviation counteraction and at 8:20 pm. to put the ordered barrier of 12 mines at the Kentish Knock Lightship. On the way back it drove along the network barrier until it had found a gap created by the German side and ran through it. Around 11 p.m. "UC 7" (Hague) at Shipwash had also just started mine laying when it ran aground. All attempts to get free were initially in vain. The boat was already in danger of being caught by two destroyers at dawn on the 26th when it broke free at the last moment, lay on the bottom and finally, despite extremely difficult navigation on the night of 27 between Shipwash and Whiting Sand, was able to open the ordered barrier. Around the same time, however, "UC 5" (Mohrbutter) got stuck at Shipwash after it had happily passed the grid lock on the morning of the 26th, drifted higher and higher on the sand with the tidal current as the water fell and was at 3 o'clock. (April 27th) almost dry. At 6 a.m. the submarine came free, but, being chased by numerous guard vehicles, it got back on the sands four hours later and had to be blown up when enemy destroyers approached. The crew was rescued by the destroyer "Firedrake" and brought to Harwich. In contrast, "UB 10" (Nitzsche), after it had expired again on the 28th, was able to put a lock at Southwold on the night of the 30th. It is not known whether the mine barriers of the "UC" boats, which were laid out with much sacrifice and dangers, still harmed enemy cruisers, destroyers or submarines.

The boats "UB 27", Kapitänleutnant Dieckmann, and "UB 21", Oberleutnant zur See Hashagen, which were supposed to hold waiting positions in front of the Firth of Forth during the fleet operation to attack warships there, were no longer successful. As a result of some machine malfunctions, they had only started the advance on the 23rd or 24th, so that "UB 27" was only 180 nm east of the Firth of Forth on the 25th at noon, but only 90 nm east of the "Grand Fleet".

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1) See page 131.<sup>176</sup>

Without knowing the latter, the commandant nevertheless hoped, in the event that the attack on Lowestoft had taken place in the meantime, that when he reached the Firth of Forth he would at least attack returning enemy forces. However, this hope did not materialize. The submarine therefore soon went south from its waiting position in order to wage a trade war with great success along the English east coast. In contrast, "UB 21" (Hashagen), which only arrived on the 27th in its waiting position, stayed in its operational area for seven days, but only saw the usual large number of guard vehicles and isolated destroyers, although it penetrated so far into the bay at times, that it could overlook them as far as Inchkeith Island. Only then did it also return home.

It almost seemed as if the anticipated, but so far failed, British counter-attack was to take place the day after the return of the German fleet from their expedition against Lowestoft. On April 26, around noon, an outpost boat cruising on the Red Cliff Bank reported enemy torpedo boats and a large warship with two or three funnels on a south-westerly course. Although the time of day was not exactly the right time for an attack, it seemed possible that the enemy did not want to waste time in surprising the German fleet while the fuel was being replenished. With extensive aircraft reconnaissance, therefore, five German torpedo boat half-flotillas immediately pushed north, while the airships "L 20" and "L 23" rose from Tondern. One of two flights seen directly in front of the Elbe, submerged submarine was chased by outpost and torpedo boats. However, after three F. T. aircraft that cleared von List had not found enemy forces anywhere with a visibility of 20 to 30 nm, all measures were revoked around 2 pm. If there were enemy forces in the north and they were continuing their march to the south-west, there was still a chance that at least one special group of three fish steamers, equipped with torpedo tubes, was about 60 nm northwest of Terschelling at the time, and immediately Had received knowledge of everything reported so far, would still come to the attack. The actual purpose of this group, which consists of the fishing steamer "Bismarck", Oberleutnant zur See Schlieder, "Dithmarschen", Lieutenant zur See Woldag, and "Kehdingen", Steuermann d. S. I. Eugen Schmidt, consisted, had originally been the fight against enemy submarines off the Ems; In the course of time, however, it had extended its advances further and further to sea and on the 25th had been given permission to advance to the Dogger Bank if the weather was favorable, where, following the German naval operation against Lowestoft, there might still be an opportunity to attack enemy forces that followed suit.<sup>177</sup>

The advance by day was unsuccessful, but the following night (April 26th / 27th) the fish steamer "Horus" from Grimsby was captured on the south-west flat of the Dogger Bank. While "Kehdingen" stayed behind with the prize, Oberleutnant zur See Schlieder continued the patrol with the other two steamers and sighted at 2 am. a patrol boat about 120 m long, armed with two guns, built very low, with a flat stern, and immediately afterwards a second guard ship. When he immediately pushed himself with his group between the enemy vehicles in order, if possible, to torpedo both at the same time from the pipes extended to port and starboard, the steamer "Bismarck", when it came within 500 m, which, however, remained without consequences because the English torpedo did not detonate. But the torpedoes that were immediately released by "Bismarck" at 150–200m did not explode, but ran under the apparently very flat-moving vehicles, whereupon one of the latter moved on at high speed after firing a 10.5 cm cannon. Evaded attacks. But now the steamer "Dithmarschen", Leutnant zur See Woldag, managed to get the second enemy ship into the finish line and hit it amidships at a distance of 300m at the height of the very long funnel. Pieces of bronze and wood flew over the deck and, when the smoke had cleared, the enemy ship lay heavily listed, while fire and embers in a coal bunker could be seen from the torn side wall. One minute after the detonation, all lights went out on the enemy ship and, before "Dithmarschen" could launch a second attack, it sank after the crew had apparently saved themselves in a boat. According to the captain of the steamer "Horus", it was probably a paddle steamer with a speed of 18 nm, which had carried out passenger voyages on the Thames and from Hull to Holland in peace and had meanwhile been used as a watch ship. Unfortunately, the German steamers only had 3.7 cm revolver cannons for artillery combat, otherwise the other ship would probably not have escaped them either. When Oberleutnant zur See Schlieder reported the course of the battle the following morning (April 27th), the outpost battle cruisers "Moltke" and "Derfflinger" with the IV reconnaissance group and the III and VI torpedo boat flotilla left and took up the special group at 4.30 pm.<sup>178</sup>

But since it could be assumed that the enemy would advance forces on the news of the loss of the guard ship and search for the destroyed vehicle or pursue the prize, the first leader of the torpedo boat forces, Kommodore Michelsen, received orders, now to prepare the III. and VI. Flotilla for the night advance, while the battle cruiser in Hubert Gat, the IV Reconnaissance Group anchored on the Osterems. At 9:15 p.m. the two flotillas with the small cruiser "Rostock", Fregattenkapitän Otto Feldmann, advanced from a stand line south of the Dogger Bank barrier about 40 nm towards the south-west flat, but without sighting enemy armed forces, and were when it was light (28th IV.) From the outpost associations mentioned, which from the Jade from the III. Squadron under Kontreadmiral Behncke was followed.

Immediately after the advance against Lowestoft, in addition to "Seydlitz", the ships of the line "Friedrich der Große", "Ostfriesland" and "Nassau" entered the shipyard to start scheduled repair work, as well as various ships of the III. Squadrons had to do minor machine repairs. Therefore the fleet management had to refrain from major undertakings in the near future. In order not to let this break in the operations pass unused, the chief of the III. Squadron with "König", "Kronprinz", "Kaiser" and "Kaiserin", as well as the IV. Reconnaissance Group, the VI. Torpedo boat flotilla and 9th half flotilla sent to Kiel to practice in the western Baltic Sea together with the II. Flotilla, which was ready for use again after the 10.5 cm guns had been installed. On May 6th, however, all armed forces in the North Sea should be back, as Admiral Scheer then intended a larger undertaking in the Skagerrak.<sup>179</sup>

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## 6. Increased activity in the British fleet.

During the dismantling of the readiness on the German side, the British were busy with a new plan of attack in retaliation for the bombardment of Lowestoft, namely the unsuccessful flight operation against the airship hangar in Tondern was to be repeated on a larger scale and combined with a mine operation. For this purpose one wanted in the night of 3./4. May occupy the area at Terschelling and Horns-Riff with three or six submarines respectively and at the same time the mine-free routes of the German fleet to the west and north through the mine layers "Princess Margaret" and "Abdiel" northwest of Borkum and lock again south of the Vyl lightship. Then the next morning the I. Light Cruiser Squadron, 16 destroyers of the J. Flotilla and the aircraft carriers "Vindex" and "Engadine" were to appear off Sylt and from there, nine seaplanes should approach the airship hangars in Tondern. In contrast to the operation on March 25, this time the attack by the aircraft was not intended to be an end in itself, but rather to lure the ocean-going forces, which had previously left immediately after every attack, over the mine barriers and submarine lines after the aircraft had returned. To complete the trap, Admiral Jellicoe and Beatty had to line up with the battle cruiser and battlecruiser fleet about 60 nm west of the Jutian coast between Lyngvig and Blaavands Huk.

Even before this plan was implemented, a new, large-scale German airship attack took place the night before the British naval forces left. The order for the airships was as follows: "England North, main destination Edinburgh (English fleet, Forth Bridge). "L 11", "L 13", "L 14", "L 16", "L 17", "L 20", "L 21" and "L 23" have the same command North of England with north-westerly winds. However, the commanders had instructions to choose closer targets in central England if, contrary to expectations, southerly winds came through, which was not ruled out with the general tendency of thunderstorms.<sup>180</sup>


The closed approach of the airships against the Firth of Forth was first favored by steady ENE and later by SE winds so that they made an average of 50 nautical miles per hour. On the northwest corner of the Dogger Bank, some of them sighted many unflagged fish steamers, which, as the airships approached, after one of the vehicles had fired two rockets in quick succession, collected at full speed and headed south. When the airships, however, between 6 and 7 p.m. reached the area 70-100 nm east or southeast of the Firth of Forth and rose to greater heights, the wind was, as was confirmed by measurements in Bruges and on the North Sea coast, already gone south, a sign that a low was approaching from England. "L 14" and "L 20" could not be dissuaded from the main target of attack by this either, but all other airships now turned, according to the instructions given previously, one after the other on west and south-west courses in order to look for targets in central England. Of these, "L 11", Korvettenkapitän Victor Schütze, reached at 9:15 p.m. at Blyth the hostile coast. At an altitude of 2200 m it was still so bright at the time that the airship had to avoid the effective fire of some guard vehicles to the south. "L 23", Kapitänleutnant v. Schubert, across the coast. Although the previously brightly lit cities of Newcastle and Shields were dimmed at this moment, a blast furnace near Shields remained so clearly recognizable by the fire and smoke that it could be filled with all the ammunition from 10:35 p.m. to 11:08 p.m. from a height of 2,700 m. Several explosions and two large fires marked the effect of the bombs, while "L 23" was fired at by land batteries violently but unsuccessfully. Even during this attack, "L 11" (Schütze) was approaching from the north. After a F. T. bearing at 10:45 p.m., the airship had to stand near Newcastle, but soon found itself in a thick sea of clouds in heavy snow, so that even after dropping a few incendiary bombs no targets could be found. There were no further F. T. bearings because the airships began to hinder each other in requesting such, and at 2 am. "L 11" had to march back without having dropped his ammunition. (Text sketch f.)

While these two airships were still over the Tyne area, "L 17", "L 21" and "L 16" had headed for the area between the Tees River and Whitby, "L 13" even held up to Flamborough Head because of the southerly wind only there, depending on the weather, to decide whether to attack north or south of this point.<sup>181</sup>

Of this group, "L 17", Kapitänleutnant Ehrlich, crossed the coast at Saltburn in high cloud cover, which later gave way to clear weather. Numerous blast furnaces and brightly lit industrial plants were seen from afar, while in the northwest, close to a large city, another airship ("L 23") could be seen fighting with a coastal battery.

Text sketch f.<sup>182</sup>

Textflotte f.





At 11 p.m. "L 17" was also written above a particularly extensive industrial plant and, while efforts were being made in the plant to extinguish lights and fire, in several attempts so extensively with explosive and incendiary bombs that part of the blast furnaces seemed to have been destroyed. At 11:50 p.m. a town on the coast, probably Saltburn, was pelted with the rest of the ammunition from a height of 2,800 m. Only after the attack did a particularly powerful searchlight seize the ship and illuminate it as bright as day, while a battery, which, however, seemed to have been severely damaged by the attack of another airship, fired shrapnel at longer intervals.

"L 21", Kapitänleutnant of the reserves Max Dietrich, also made at 10:35 p.m. the coast south at the Tees River was crossed, the experience that the cities there only dimmed shortly before the attack. Even after that, however, it remained bright enough to be able to drop 17 high-explosive bombs and 20 incendiary bombs in the industrial area of Middlesbrough and Stockton with good effect from 11:30 p.m. to 12 midnight. Immediately after the attack, however, heavy snowstorms set in, so that a blast furnace east of the former town, which was to be supplied with the rest of the ammunition, was no longer found.

Then "L 21" left at 12:30 a.m. the coast. For "L 16", Oberleutnant zur See Peterson, the approach had already led at times through strong gusts of snow and eddies. At about 10:30 p.m. the thick veil of clouds lifted and at 11:15 p.m. the coast north of Whitby was crossed, while Tees Bay could be seen in the northwest up to Hartlepool. Just when a searchlight flashed there to look for an airship, and "L 16" was about to attack the brightly lit industrial works near Stockton, it was observed that "L21" achieved good results against them in two attempts. Using the blazing fires as a guide, "L 16" then covered the same facilities with 1,500 kg of ammunition at 11:50 pm and wreaked havoc on buildings and railroad tracks. During the attack, "L 16" was only weakly fired at from automatic cannons and left at 12:15 a.m. the coast, while a further attacking airship could be made out both in the north and over the Humber.

The latter was "L 13", Lieutenant Commander of the Reserve Prölß. When this airship crossed the coast at an altitude of 2,600 m at midnight, any orientation was already impossible due to the heavy snow drift.<sup>183</sup>

The original intention of reaching Leeds was therefore soon to be abandoned. On the other hand, when at 1:30 a.m. for a moment the lights of another city, probably Hartlepool, shimmered upwards, and seventeen explosive and incendiary bombs were thrown at it.

In the meantime, the onset of worsening weather had become particularly noticeable for the two airships, which were the only ones continuing the advance against the Firth of Forth, especially since they were not allowed to attack before midnight because of the brightness at high altitudes and the strong counteraction to be expected. They had therefore both gone on the opposite course for an hour before they started again, "L 14" at 8 o'clock, "L 20" at 8:20 pm, the advance against their targets. Here "L 20", Kapitänleutnant Stabbert, stopped a little further north in order to head for the Forth Bridge from Dundee and to attack it and the enemy forces suspected in the vicinity.

At 12 o'clock at night, "L 14" (Böcker) sighted the northern edge of the Firth of Forth; but before the airship could penetrate further into the bay, with the temperature rising rapidly from  $-8^{\circ}$  to  $-3^{\circ}$ , it got into a violent snowstorm and fell from 2700 to 1800 m due to the snow load and warming of the air. But just at this moment the snow drift subsided. At 12:30 a.m. came two apparently larger enemy warships in sight and tried in vain to catch the airship with searchlights. Five explosive bombs were thrown at them, the headlights went out, "L 14" rose to 2500 m altitude and, before the more precise effects of the bombs could be determined, the ships had disappeared from the view of the airship. According to the position, "L 14" had to be at 1:15 a.m. standing over Edinburgh. In the meantime, however, the blizzard had increased again with the west-north-westerly winds that the airship was almost on the spot and could no longer advance against the wind. So it finally had to turn around without seeing any other targets.

If "L 14" was able to make out at least the north edge of the Firth of Forth, "L 20" (Stabbert) had already been in since 10.45 p.m. over a completely closed cloud cover. After a light tip dropped at 7 p.m. and swept in the water, as well as after the smoke from the chimney and the flags of passing steamers, the commander had expected an easterly wind and no significant shift to the north at the time. However, after comparing the last F. T. bearing received at 10:20 pm with one determined about two hours earlier, it emerged that in the meantime northwest winds of 7–8 m/sec must have started. At 11:20 pm, "L 20" got into strong rain and snow gusts at an altitude of 2100 m, and at 12 o'clock at night in thick fog.<sup>184</sup>

At 11:20 pm, "L 20" got into strong rain and snow gusts at an altitude of 2100 m, and at 12 o'clock at night in thick fog. Although the ship had to be on land at the time according to the calculation, the commander steered further west because he believed he had made considerably less voyage than before due to the heavy ice load and the gusts that had just passed through. At the same time he requested several urgent F. T. bearings, but apparently no longer got through to home with the F. T. signals. At 1 a.m. but land was sighted and, in order not to get too far to the west, at 1.30 a.m. gone south. When it cleared up for a few moments, the Scottish high mountains could be seen under the airship. At 2:25 a.m. "L 20" went to SE, at 2:55 o'clock on east course, in order to reach the east coast again at least when it was light. Not until 3 a.m. A brightly lit mine, immediately afterwards a railway system was sighted and a total of 17 high-explosive and incendiary bombs were thrown at it. At last, around 4 a.m., the airship was again above sea, as the commander assumed, at the level of the Firth of Forth. However, confirmation from F. T. bearings, which were repeatedly requested, could not be obtained. When the airship went on an SE course at 5 a.m., 500 m above sea level, there was only nine hours of gasoline on board for all four engines, while the strong headwind gradually increased to 16-18 m/sec, and as "L 20" finally at 7 am. received a position from the fish steamer "Holland", it turned out that the airship was at 58° latitude and 3° longitude, thus about 135 nm west of Lindesnes.

But the situation for the other airships had already become more difficult during the night. Covered in ice and snow, they had to drive through thunderstorms several times, St. Elmsfeuer sprayed from all the tips, and on "L 17" a particularly strong electrical discharge ran in a flash from the front gondola to the upper platform. Pieces of ice that had attached to all struts and tension were knocked loose from the propellers and chased through the cells behind the motors. As a result, without this danger being recognized immediately, the latter were so heavily perforated that a considerable loss of gas occurred and one or two cells gradually leaked on "L 11", "L14" and "L21". Even after all unnecessary weights and trimmings of bombs, reserve parts and crews had been surrendered to the forecastle, it remained questionable whether these ships could be kept in the air by the power of the engines alone until they reached the German coast. In response to corresponding reports, Korvettenkapitän Strasser ordered the airships concerned to take a course for Hage during the night and at the same time asked the fleet management to advance naval forces to the west for pickup.<sup>185</sup>

Admittedly, after the locations of the airships "L 16", "L 17", "L 13" and "L 23", these could soon be viewed as secure, and "L 21" also seemed to be making good progress, although two cells had leaked, on the other hand, "L 11", "L 14" and "L 20" were still far behind in the early morning hours.

The day before, the outpost forces had been reinforced by a torpedo boat flotilla in view of the air attack, and the forces not on outposts had also received orders from 1 a.m. to lie in readiness for an hour. At 3:20 a.m. therefore the chief of the 1st Squadron, Vizeadmiral Ehrhardt Schmidt, received orders to send reception forces to the lock gap of Norderney and dispatched the small cruisers "Regensburg", "Pillau" and "Elbing" with the 1st torpedo boat flotilla and 10th and 17th half flotilla in this direction. At 5:25 a.m. "L21", which at that time was still 70 nm north-west of Terschelling, requested immediate help from torpedo boats. Thereupon the leader of the II Reconnaissance Group, Kontreadmiral Boedicker, let the flotillas with him advance there at full speed. This, in turn, was the reason why the 1st Squadron left the Jade in order to be able to intervene in time if the light armed forces were surprisingly attacked by enemy capital ships despite the reconnaissance by the numerous airships standing over the North Sea. However, since the greater part of the III. Squadron was in the Baltic Sea at the time, we should prevent this advance from developing into a major action. The outpost forces therefore received orders from the fleet chief to keep open the retreat behind the mine barriers. But just in case, the chief of the 1st Squadron was also given the battle cruisers "Moltke" and "Derfflinger", the small cruisers "Wiesbaden", "Frankfurt", "Rostock" and the III. Torpedo boat flotilla that were just being released. On the other hand, the four ships of the II. Squadron and three ships of the III. Squadron also had to sortie, since the armed forces now subordinate to Admiral Schmidt had to be fully sufficient for the task, which was limited by the circumstances.

At 7.40 a.m. "L 20" also reported that the airship needed immediate help because a German port could no longer be reached. Attempts are made to head for Hanstholm and from there to walk south along the Danish coast. After the last, albeit imprecise, bearing, "L20" at 5:50 a.m. stood about 150 nm WSW from Lindesnes.<sup>186</sup>

It was not clear from the report whether the accident or lack of fuel had prompted the call for help. "L 11" was also after an 8 a.m. received the F. T. bearing was moved about 130 nm to the NE and, contrary to his assumption, was not at Whitby at the time, but 165 nm west of Bovbjerg. However, it was out of the question to send the armed forces advanced to the west and to the north, since the airships in the west were not yet secured either. On the other hand, the cruisers and torpedo boats running down the Jade immediately went north and received orders to advance to Horns-Riff to pick up "L 11" and "L20", while two submarines, "UB 22" and "U 51", already waiting there, were pushed forward. When then until 10 a.m. "L 13", "L 16", "L 17" and "L 21" had landed and it could be foreseen that "L 23" would also reach his hall around noon, the chief of the 1st squadron sent the Armed forces to the west turn around to send a flotilla of faster boats into the Skagerrak. Since 10 a.m. however, every F. T. connection with "L 20" was broken. This airship had probably been driven further north by now and only had the option of landing in Norway. As a result, the advance intended to commence it was now abandoned as pointless, and at 2:30 p.m. all naval forces received orders to return. In doing so, they had to avoid an enemy submarine in the inner German Bight.

The assumption made by the fleet management turned out to be correct. Already at 9 a.m. "L 20" had sighted the Norwegian coast. The fuel supply lasted only four hours; Strong headwinds were also encountered at higher altitudes. The attempt to head for Hanstholm therefore had to be given up, especially since, according to the commander's calculations, the naval forces expected to be picked up could not arrive there before 5 pm. Going down on the sea was not possible because of the bad weather. Kapitänleutnant Stabbert therefore decided to land in Norway to rescue the crew, had all secret items, the rest of the explosive and incendiary bombs and the more important F. T. facilities thrown overboard and at 11 a.m. passed south of Stavanger the coast. However, due to the strong gusts of fall from the mountains, damage to the numerous houses and endangerment of the population could not have been avoided if the land had landed on the mainland. The ship was therefore finally brought into the water in Gande Fjord, drifted, after it had already been abandoned by part of the crew, at a low altitude over a headland and finally went down with the stern shattered in Hafs Fjord, where it was detonated with gunfire by its people.<sup>187</sup>

The crew was interned. The decision of the commander, carried by a lively aggressive spirit, to move further than 400 nm from the nearest home port the previous evening, despite the lack of orientation, had become fatal for the airship. In contrast, "L 11" could at 2:50 p.m. land in Tondern.

On the same night in which the airship attack took place (2nd/3rd V.), the British naval forces had left the Firth of Forth and Scapa. A German submarine, "UB 21", Kapitänleutnant Hashagen, was still standing in front of the Firth of Forth from the naval operation against Lowestoft, but although it broke through the outer guard line that night and on May 3rd at 3:00 am. until immediately before May Island it had only noticed a noticeably increased guard, but had noticed nothing of the departure of British naval forces. Also the fear of the English that with the large number of after Airships returning across the North Sea at dawn the approach would be reported ahead of time was not confirmed. "L 20", the airship farthest to the north, did not sight English armed forces, nor could the IV Light Cruiser Squadron, which is part of the British battle fleet, which was detached for a while to hunt an airship reported by the English F. T. directional stations in the middle of the North Sea, find this. But also the fact that the enemy would probably now proceed with strong armed forces in order to secure the reception of the airships could take away the moment of surprise from the British attack and put the light armed forces to be advanced prematurely in danger. The uncertainty in this direction, however, was not a sufficient reason to cancel or change the previous orders, especially since there was still a need to divert the German naval forces from the Russian sea front through the planned advance, and so all British squadrons sought to do so on May 3rd ordered positions on the Danish coast and in the border area of the German Bight. (Map G.) In the late afternoon, however, Admiral Jellicoe received the very reassuring news from the Admiralty that, after the intercepted German radio messages, a light German squadron and also the battlecruisers had been at sea to pick up the airships, but had meanwhile returned to the port. In response to this news, the next stage of the British venture developed entirely according to plan.<sup>188</sup>

At 2:30 a.m. (4th V.) the mine-laying by "Princess Margaret" and "Abdiel" had already ended without any counteraction, and when it got light the "Grand Fleet" was within the area of the planned waiting position (1).

Shortly after 4 a.m. also reached the 1st light cruiser squadron under Commodore Alexander Sinclair the position from which the planes should take off. When these were launched, however, it turned out that, in spite of the relatively shallow swell, only two of nine machines got loose from the water, while the others had to be put back into operation with damaged propellers. But also of the two aircraft that managed to climb, only one was able to advance against Tondern, while the other flew against one of the destroyers of the submarine security, "Goshawk", when wreckage fell into the water and it with its occupants were lost. Already at 6:30 a.m. the only aircraft that had attacked returned, and two hours later Commodore Sinclair and his forces were already back on the battlecruisers. In the meantime, two of the three English submarines set up at Horns-Riff had rammed themselves under water, one of which was slightly damaged.

If the air raid were to pose a challenge to the German fleet, this should have been made clearer by the British. The only thing that the Germans learned about the undertaking at first was that an unknown aircraft, coming from the west, had passed Toftlund at a great height and had flown on to Tondern. When this news reached the naval airship troop in Tondern via the army news center in Hamburg, were there at 5:30 a.m. the land planes available for defense mounted, but had seen nothing. It was only at 7:15 a.m. that the List sea air station, Oberleutnant zur See Faber, learned that at 5:30 a.m. near Reisby, close to the Danish border, behind the island of Röm, a presumably enemy aircraft had come out of sight after dropping a bomb on Danish territory in a north-westerly direction. At the same time an instruction was received from the commander of the reconnaissance forces to clear up immediately between List and Horns-Reef; but although already at 8:30 a.m. an aircraft troop under Leutnant zur See Rössing reached the area near Horn's reef lightship, could not find anything suspicious despite a visibility range of 5–10 nm.

1) The battleships "Ajax" and "Dreadnought", the battle cruisers "New Zealand", "Australia" and "Invincible", the armored cruisers "Black Prince", "Warrior" and "Donegal", the light cruisers "Southampton", "Gloucester", "Blonde", 3 destroyers from the I., 6 from the II. and 3 from the XI. Flotilla, characteristic of how much the nominal strength of the British fleet, too, was impaired at the given moment by the need for repairs and detachments for other tasks.<sup>189</sup>



In the meantime, "L 7" from Tondern and "L 9" from Hage had ascended north and west respectively for reconnaissance, and at 10 am. the latter airship stood under Hauptmann Stelling 60 nm north of Schiermonikoog in order to search from there in the direction of Horns-Reef for enemy forces, until it finally turned 60 nm southwest of this point without having seen anything of the enemy. At 1:10 p.m. it landed in Hage.

The last bearing of "L 7", Kapitänleutnant Hempel, showed that this airship had stood about 25 nm southwest of the Vyl lightship at 10:39 in order to advance from there to Horns-Riff. A weather report that the airship was supposed to make from there had not arrived, however, perhaps "L 7" had F. T. fault, and it was expected that the airship would leave at 2 pm after completing its task, land in Tondern. As was not found out until later, "L 7" had in the meantime, probably flying at low altitude, surprisingly encountered the enemy near the Vyl lightship. At 10:30 a.m. the airship was chased by the small cruisers "Galatea" and "Phaeton", which were on the western wing of the reconnaissance line of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, and shot at for a short time. While the cruisers were taking up their position in the reconnaissance line again, they saw how "L 7" suddenly stood almost vertically and then, bursting into flames, fell into the water. Apparently a gasoline tank caught fire by chance. However, because of the submarine danger, the cruisers did not dare to approach the scene of the accident; in their place, however, the English submarine "E 31" steered there and was able to save seven survivors. The whole thing happened so quickly that "L 7" couldn't even get around to reporting the encounter with the enemy. Not until 12:16 p.m. the fleet management learned, neither from airships nor from airplanes, but from a submarine, that enemy naval forces were near the German Bight.

Already on May 3rd the submarines "U 24", Kapitänleutnant Schneider, and "U 70", Kapitänleutnant Wünsche, had left the Ems in order to take action against enemy guard forces operating in the lines Peterhead-Egerö and Fair Island-Marsten suspected, and so it happened that "U 24", running under the Danish coast to the north, already at 10:30 a.m. (4th V.) sighted two enemy armored cruisers, apparently of the "Minotaur" class, with a destroyer about 100 nm west of Bovbjerg. At 11:10 a.m. the ships could be seen about 120-150 m above the horizon, so that the submarine went under water and started to attack.<sup>190</sup>

At that moment, however, two couplings began to burn, the boat was filled with acrid smoke, the engines had to be turned off and the attack abandoned. At 11:40 a.m. the armored cruisers turned around and headed south at high speed. A quarter of an hour later, "U 24" appeared and issued a radio message about the sighting of the enemy armed forces, which reached the fleet chief at 12:16 pm. "U 70", Kapitänleutnant Wünsche, which at the time was about 90 nm northwest of "U 24", also picked up the radio message, but it continued the advance towards the Orkney Islands without being stopped by this message because the distance from the enemy armed forces was already too great to be able to maneuver onto them with any chance of success.

Even when "U 24" was reported, the German fleet management in no way suspected a tactical connection between the sighted armed forces and the enemy aircraft allegedly sighted near Tønder that morning. In connection with the more frequent and credible sounding agent reports that had been received in the last few days, she considered a larger operation by the British fleet against the German Bight to be entirely possible, but by no means believed that it had already started, but rather through the report from the submarine would only be announced. Unfortunately, an airship reconnaissance was not possible as far north as the strong south-westerly wind was blowing and there was also a risk of thunderstorms. Primarily, the submarines "UB 27", "UB 21", "UB 22", "U 51" and "U 70" received orders to take action against the reported armed forces. Also the ships of the III. Squadron and the IV. Reconnaissance Group, as well as the VI. Torpedo boat flotilla and 9th half flotilla recalled immediately, while all other armed forces went to Schillig roadstead in intensified readiness. As I said, the enemy attack was not expected until the next morning. If this was the case, then an advance by torpedo boats the night before, set in the likely direction of advance of the enemy, must have had a particular chance of success. As a result, the first leader of the torpedo boat forces, Kommodore Michelsen, received orders to set sail immediately north with the outpost flotillas, in order to proceed against the enemy from Horns Reef during the following night. When it got light, however, he was supposed to stand south of the lightship again in order to be picked up there by the I and II Reconnaissance Groups, while the Main Body intended to stand south of the Amrum Bank at the time.<sup>191</sup>

As long as the III. Squadron was not fully present, should be avoided. The cruisers and torpedo boats to be pushed forward were therefore instructed to withdraw immediately in front of superior forces. The High Seas Forces in the Baltic Sea, including four ships of III. Squadron, immediately stopped their exercises at the recall order and ran from 6 a.m. on into the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, however, due to their draft, the ships of the line could not enter the Oste Bank before 2 a.m. Pass down the Elbe on the 5th.

In the meantime, "U 24" (Schneider) had to start the return march due to the damage to the couplings, but when it stopped for a while to look again, it saw at 1:40 p.m. about 60 nm west of Bovbjerg even stronger enemy forces. At a very great distance, thick warship masts came into view of about ten ships, which migrated south and soon disappeared again. At 2:10 p.m. these forces were reported by radio message.

When the III. Torpedo boat flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Hollmann, at 3:48 p.m. from Helgoland and Kommodore Michelsen on "Rostock" left the Jade with five boats of the 2nd Flotilla and the 1st Half-Flotilla, Admiral Jellicoe had already ordered all units to march back after waiting in vain until 3 p.m. for news of the departure of German forces. Although the battle cruiser fleet under Admiral Beatty had approached the German Bight up to 35 nm west of Horns-Reef at the time, this had escaped German aircraft reconnaissance completely. Although an aircraft raid from List had cleared up in this area in the morning, it was already at 9:20 a.m. landed, and the next plane under Leutnant zur See Löwe did not reach until 3:28 p.m. this area again. Also "L14", Lieutenant Commander of Reserve Böcker, who ascended at 4.20 a.m., mainly to look for "L 7", and stood at the Horns-Reef lightship at 7.23 a.m. encountered no enemy armed forces there with visibility of 3 nm and hazy weather. Continuing the march in a north-westerly direction, the airship reached at 8:20 p.m. the area 30 nm south of the Little Fischer Bank, but saw nothing there either, since the British battle fleet had already set course for the Pentland Firth from this area at 3 pm. Therefore List's flight reconnaissance, which started at 5 p.m. and had started again lively to determine the whereabouts of "L 7", no longer report anything from the enemy. All the planes sighted was an enemy submarine, which about 6 p.m. between Horns-Riff and Vyl Lightship was bombed by the F. T. airplane "560" under Lieutenant zur See Lemmen.<sup>192</sup>

In the meantime the wind had turned south and refreshed, so that "L 14" could no longer reach Nordholz and had to go to Tondern, where the airship did not arrive until 5:20 a.m. (5th V.) landed.

The hope that one of the submarines in the sea would reach the enemy was also not realized. "UB 27", Kapitänleutnant Dieckmann, who had just returned from a long and successful commercial war undertaking (1) and entered List, had no more torpedoes on board, and the attempt to have them accelerated from Heligoland by a torpedo boat was not successful. The submarines "U 51", Kapitänleutnant Walther Rumpel, and "UB 22", Oberleutnant zur See Putzier, which had been lying southwest of Horns-Riff since May 2nd, had already left their waiting position on the 3rd and had advanced to Hanstholm, to come to the aid of "L 20". When they received the order on May 4, "U 51" at 12.30 pm, "UB 22" at 4.36 pm, to take action against the armed forces reported by "U 24", they were therefore only on the march back to Horns-Riff. Although they immediately maneuvered on the enemy, with "U 51" at 6:20 p.m. met "U 24" and received more precise information from them, they came too late when the enemy withdrew early. (Map G.)

For all these reasons, Kommodore Michelsen was only dependent on the reports from "U 24" for the use of the torpedo boats. It was not to be assumed that the enemy would head for Horns-Reef that night, after "L 14" had also not seen any more enemy forces; it was just as unlikely that the enemy had stopped in the area of the Little Fischer-Bank, where he had first been seen. In view of the elapsed time and the short night, an advance in this direction could not be carried forward far enough. Kommodore Michelsen therefore decided, taking into account the southern course of the enemy forces reported by "U 24", to deploy his flotillas across the latter. At 7 p.m. went on his instructions the most advanced III. Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Hollmann, from a point 25 nm south of Horns-Riff in the direction of the middle of the Dogger Bank locks, while the 2nd Flotilla, Fregattenkapitän Schuur, and the 1st Half Flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Conrad Albrecht, at 9 p.m. advanced from a point about 15 nm south of Horn's Reef towards the northeast corner of Dogger Bank.

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1) See page 156.<sup>193</sup>

On the same course, Commodore Michelsen followed "Rostock" with "V 190" between the two reconnaissance lines. At 11:30 p.m. made the southern one, at 12:30 a.m. the northern group also turned back without having seen anything of the enemy. But when the cruiser "Rostock", Fregattenkapitän Otto Feldmann, also turned on the opposite course, a submarine was sighted at 12:50 a.m. on the 3rd line to port about 300 m from which, approaching over the water for the attack, apparently just turned to the stern shot. However, an immediate ramming attempt was no longer successful, as the submarine was already within the turning circle. Turning hard on the starboard rudder, the cruiser came up to about 10 m away from the submarine, so that the English war flag and the designation "E 31" painted in large black letters on the tower could be clearly recognized in the headlights. No sooner was the submarine free than the rear guns of the latter opened fire and hit the turret of the submarine with a third or fourth shot. Since the incident occurred in the waiting area of "UB 22", it was doubtful whether it was a German or an enemy submarine until the designation "E 31" was recognized. On the basis of all the testimony of witnesses, the Germans certainly believed at the time that the submarine had sunk. This was not confirmed, however, as it soon became known that "E 31" had reached the home port with survivors of the "L 7". A shell hit the tower of the submarine, but it did not explode.

Otherwise the night had passed without further events, although the III. Flotilla must have passed the mine barriers just laid out by "Abdiel". At 4 a.m. the boats were picked up by the 2nd Reconnaissance Group with the 18th half-flotilla 15 nm west of the Rote Kliff Bank, only a few nautical miles east of the newly laid out minefield, which at the time was still unknown on the German side. The battle cruisers with the 10th half flotilla turned west of the Lister Tief, the bulk, consisting of the I Squadron, the II Squadron, three ships of the III Squadron and the VII torpedo boat flotilla, south of the Amrum Bank and came in, while the four remaining ships of the III squadron were still turning in part in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal and arrived back in Kiel on the afternoon of May 5th to resume the aborted exercises.

Only "U 70", Kapitänleutnant Wünsche, had during the night of 4/5. May almost on the same course as the British battle fleet headed for the Orkney Islands, but no enemy forces were sighted either. (Map G.)<sup>194</sup>

It was not until May 5, when it was light, that four destroyers were encountered. In the meantime a German submarine had been reported off the Moray Firth, so that Admiral Jellicoe called the armed forces assigned there to Scapa. At 1 p.m. "U 70" stood 45 nm east of the Orkney Islands, steered into the Fair Island – Marsten line according to the order and remained stopped there during the following night. On the 6th it continued its eastward advance, passing on the 7th at around 5 p.m. Utsire and then returned to the Ems via Horns-Reef. Also "UB 21", Kapitänleutnant Ernst Hashagen, on his return from the Firth of Forth via the north-east corner of the Dogger Bank to Horns-Riff must have been at times very close to the returning English armed forces, namely the battle cruiser fleet, but learned only on May 5th from the captain of a neutral sailing ship that on May 4th there were very many large and small English warships, about 200 vessels in all, on the Big Fisherman's Bank. However, this important report could not be submitted because the F. T. facility on the boat was not working until shortly before the arrival.<sup>195</sup>

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## **7. The development of the strategic position up to the battle of the Skagerrak.**

In the meantime, the auxiliary minesweeping flotilla of the North Sea, Korvettenkapitän Walter Krah, had succeeded in determining the approximate location of the English mine barrier in the German Bight, which “Seydlitz” had come across when sailing out to undertake the operation against Lowestoft. The barrier was located north of Borkum-Riff-Grund, contained two different types of mine and extended about 15 nm in a west-east direction. Almost simultaneously on May 8th, the III. Minesweeping Division, Kapitänleutnant Eberhard Wolfram, discovered a mine barrier laid by an enemy submarine in front of the mouth of the Elbe, which, if not discovered in time, could have been particularly dangerous because of its location on the way from the Elbe to the Jade. The fleet management decided to have the “Seydlitz” barrier cleared as soon as possible in order to create a mine-free route out of the middle of the German Bight, which was absolutely necessary for the fleet to run out unnoticed. The quick completion of this work was all the more important as from May 17th onwards all ocean-going forces were fully operational and this period of relative strength was to be used for new offensive operations, especially since at that time a particularly large number of submarines were working together for tactical purposes was available with the High Seas Fleet.

When Admiral Scheer returned with the High Seas Fleet on April 24th from the operation against Lowestoft, he had received a telegram from the Admiral's staff while at sea that the submarines had been violated the instructions that had been given the month before to resume the submarine War until further orders were only allowed to wage a trade war according to the prize order. The reason for this order was the objection of the United States of America after the sinking of the French passenger liner "Sussex" in the English Channel. The submarine commander had mistaken the steamer for a mine-layer, i.e. a warship, due to the conspicuous superstructure and gray paintwork, and therefore attacked with torpedoes without further ado.<sup>196</sup>



The new instruction meant, however, that the submarines had to appear before the sinking of an enemy or neutral ship carrying banned goods, a use which, in the opinion of the fleet chief, contradicted the character of the weapon and which left the boats defenseless in any insidious attack that great losses were definitely to be foreseen without corresponding successes. This view was undoubtedly confirmed by the last expeditions to the west coast, in which the leader of the submarines, Fregattenkapitän Hermann Bauer, had personally participated on "U 69". With the progressive arming of enemy and neutral steamers and the increasingly common misuse of neutral badges and flags, Admiral Scheer could not be responsible for the conduct of the trade war by submarines according to the prize order. On the same day that the telegram from the Admiralty's staff reached him, he called back all submarines from the west coast by radio and reported to the chief of the Admiralty's staff and the General Headquarters that the submarine trade war was over, so he must very much regret the associated discontinuation of the most effective form of economic war against England, the effect of which might have been decisive for the outcome of the war.

As early as May 4th, however, the fleet management proposed a new kind of procedure to the Admiral's staff, which should make it possible, while avoiding new political entanglements, to at least not leave the submarines lying idle in the trade war until the overall situation was clarified, but this was still the case. Forced to withdraw this proposal the same day after the reply from the German Government to the United States of North America became known. Without having heard naval experts during the drafting of the same, it was stated in this note that the German naval forces had received instructions, observing the general principles of international law on the arrest, search and destruction of merchant ships, even within the restricted area, merchant ships not without warning and saving human lives to sink unless they flee or resist. The demand of the political leadership to avoid new conflicts with the neutrals at all costs could no longer be guaranteed militarily, so that the submarine trade war, barely started, had to be sacrificed again to the opposition of the political leadership.

Under these circumstances, the efforts of the naval command to deploy the High Seas Forces more sharply than before became more important, and this was due to the fact that the submarines were now in greater numbers than before for purely military use against the enemy warships and bases could be used, even a certain advantage.<sup>197</sup>

Considerations of the form in which the submarines could be most appropriately exploited in operational and tactical connection with the operations of the fleet led to this, apart from the already described sending of such to the blockade lines Fair Island-Marsten and Peterhead-Egerö, for the 15 May to have as many torpedo submarines as possible ready for dispatch to the east coast of England in order to use them to occupy the entrances of the most important British war ports and then to lure enemy forces out of the ports and draw towards the submarines by an advance of the fleet.

But on the English side, too, the motives for a stricter approach had increased. The fact that the German enemy had been able, after a long period of great reluctance, to attack the English coast again with impunity, had extremely aroused public opinion in England. If, according to the English account (1), this excitement did not exactly degenerate into a panic, the Admiralty considered it necessary to strengthen the reduced confidence in the British fleet. Mr. Balfour, 1<sup>st</sup> Lord of the Admiralty after Churchill's departure, therefore wrote to the Mayors of Lowestoft and Yarmouth, in which he emphasized that the naval forces in the domestic waters should now be regrouped so that a repetition of the coastal bombardment for the attacker would be associated with greater dangers than with the operation of April 24th. So far it has been necessary to keep the main part of the fleet high in the north. In this way, it would have been able to successfully counter a larger and longer-lasting operation of the enemy, such as an invasion, for example, but it would not always have been able to stop raids in good time. Now, however, after a large number of newbuildings had been made ready at the front, the strength ratio had improved in favor of the British, not only would more effective means for coastal defense be available, but it would also be possible to bring more substantial parts of the "Grand Fleet" into the more southern waters without endangering the British dominance in any other place. Such regrouping had in fact been considered frequently since the beginning of 1916, but was repeatedly postponed until the old difficulty of creating adequate and above all submarine-safe bases for these armed forces had been resolved.

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1) Corbett: Naval operations, Volume III, page 313.<sup>198</sup>

There were other influences, however, which increasingly urged the British navy to become more active. The then Russian Captain at sea, later a Finnish Commodore v. Schoultz, as a liaison officer in the "Grand Fleet". The latter viewed the success of the "wait and see" strategy as doubtful from the start (1).

Quite apart from the fact that he considered the previously chosen method of the hunger blockade, while sparing the British naval forces, to be contrary to international law, from a military point of view a strategy which was aimed at exhausting the enemy through the blockade was flawed.

In his opinion, this type of blockade, especially as far as neutral states were included, was not only disastrous for these countries, but also for some of the allies themselves. This was especially true for Russia, which was almost as completely as the central powers of all connections with was cut off from the industrialized countries of the west. Before the expansion of the blockade, Russia received various industrial products from Scandinavia, such as agricultural and other machinery, locomotives and railroad tracks, clothing and others. However, this stopped after the blockade was extended, and the only remaining route, if the extraordinarily long, expensive Siberian railway, which was overloaded with Russian goods, was disregarded, was via the Northern Arctic Ocean. Anyone who carefully followed the development of the situation could, in the opinion of the Russian Captain, observe that the remote blockade directed against the Central Powers was at the same time draining Russia's strength, since this country was already suffering from a great shortage of the most important industrial products at the beginning of the war.

Under these circumstances it was to be feared that the disintegration in which the Russian armies in Galicia had found themselves in 1915, mainly due to a lack of artillery and war material, could easily be repeated in the next spring and summer in the north, where the German fleet covered the left wing of the army. Captain v. Schoultz therefore considered it his duty to explain the shortcomings of the passive long-range blockade of both the English admiralty and the general staff of the Russian fleet, and to demand a consolidation of the Allied sea front in such a way that the English fleet or part of it could extend its area of activity into the Baltic Sea.

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1) See. "Mit der Grand Fleet im Weltkriege", Verlag K. F. Köhler.<sup>199</sup>

While the Russian Captain was drafting a memorandum to this effect, he was repeatedly given access to the leading personalities of the Admiralty, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Jackson, and the Chief of Staff, Kontreadmiral Oliver.

The latter pointed out the difficulty in carrying out military operations in the Baltic Sea, citing the unsuccessful Dardanelles operation as an example and asserting that if the English fleet attempted to penetrate the Baltic Sea, an occupation of the Danish islands by Germany would be the next consequence and thereby the British fleet will very soon be cut off from their bases.

Captain v. Schoultz did not consider serious ventures into the Baltic Sea to be feasible until the German fleet had been decisively defeated in the North Sea. A victory in this theater of war would, however, give the British fleet a free hand and thereby have a noticeable influence on the further course of the war. A continuation of the war ad infinitum threatens to drop the economically weaker states from the common front of the Allies and thereby weaken England's position itself. In his opinion, it was therefore necessary to give the strategy at sea an active direction, to force the German fleet into a battle and at the same time to prepare the consolidation of the sea front in the north, if the events of the coming spring and summer do not come as an unpleasant surprise to the Allies.

By consolidating the sea front, he understood closer strategic and, in certain cases, tactical cooperation between the Allied fleets, which included serious demonstrations in the North Sea, the Skagerrak and Kattegat, as well as the detachment of small cruisers, destroyers and submarines should find expression in still further expansion in these areas and finally in a purposeful cooperation of the allied fleets in the Baltic Sea. In mid-December 1915 he had already submitted a memorandum to this effect to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Balfour, and the First Lord of the Sea, Admiral Jackson, and at the beginning of 1916 some articles appeared in some of the English newspapers, which were published in similarly advocated a shift in the Allied naval strategy in a more active direction. One such article by Mr. David Hannay in the Morning Post concluded by saying:

“The Baltic Sea is the only naval theater of war where the English fleet has not yet fulfilled its task of gaining control of the sea. Only the obvious inability to fulfill their mission there would justify them to refrain from attempting in this direction.”<sup>200</sup>

This new trend in English public opinion was in line with the position of the Russian liaison officer and gave him great satisfaction.

On January 24, 1916, Captain v. Schoultz via London to Petersburg in order to further discuss the questions of the interaction of the British and Russian navy in the sense suggested by him. Before he left, he had a discussion with Balfour, in which he said that the British Admiralty could not change its strategy before a decisive defeat of the German fleet. When this is to be expected is difficult to predict for the time being. The "Grand Fleet" was always quick-witted, but did not wish to fall into an ambush on the German coast.

On February 17th, in part due to the memorandum of the Russian liaison officer and the pressure of public opinion, at a meeting of the *War Committee*, which was also attended by Admiral Jellicoe, the general strategic situation was discussed in detail from this point of view and in the first place Line examined in depth the possibility of a major offensive based on Lord Fisher's still pending plan. Even if this plan had never taken shape by working out the details, it was clear that the main idea of it rested on at the given moment to bring the German plans to failure by forcing the enemy to split up his armed forces in defense of the German coastal front in the North and Baltic Seas. The possibilities for this were either to seize one of the German North Sea islands as an aircraft and submarine base or to try to block the German estuaries with block ships and mines. In the meantime, however, the difficulties involved in carrying out such an undertaking had increased considerably. As a result of the increasing range and penetration of the heavy artillery of the field armies, an island could not be held for long if it was under fire from the mainland. There was also a lack of troops for the landing. Furthermore, with the increasing effectiveness of mines and submarines, quite apart from the resistance that was to be expected from the German high seas, securing supplies for a fleet that was supposed to operate in the Baltic Sea was more difficult than ever before. For these and other reasons it was finally decided that a sea offensive on the scale that Lord Fisher had in mind was no longer feasible.<sup>201</sup>

Serious misgivings were raised against the plan to block the enemy ports with block ships and mines. If the blocking were to be effective, it would require a number of ships which, given the lack of cargo space, were not available. As a result of important groups of workers in the shipyards being added to the land army, the construction of merchant ships no longer kept pace with the destruction caused by mines and submarines (1).

Efforts were in progress to pull these groups of workers out of the troops, and the construction of merchant ships was declared as "*war work*"; but even then there were very strong fears whether the overseas supply could be maintained at all. Mine barriers alone had the disadvantage that, in order to remain effective and to prevent clearance, they had to be constantly monitored by naval forces, and this was again only possible if the German fleet had been defeated beforehand. From all of this it was concluded that the previous wait-and-see attitude should not be abandoned; all that could happen would be further attempts to induce the German High Seas Fleet to advance out of their bases and lure them into a trap.

But also for this purpose the previous distribution of the "Grand Fleet" left a lot to be desired in the opinion of the Admiralty. Even before Lowestoft was bombarded, it had already subjected this question to a new examination in Whitehall at the beginning of April. Here the First Lord stated, quite apart from the fact that the previous distribution for the southern area of England offered no protection, the bulk of the fleet would be positioned too far north to prevent the attacker in cases such as the bombardment of Warmouth, Scarborough and Hartlepool in 1914, which similar endeavors could follow at any time, cut off and damage. As long as this concentration of their own naval forces was maintained high in the north, the enemy would not commit suicide and advance so far that they could be put to battle far from their bases. Unless he is given an incentive by dividing the fleet with substantial armed forces advancing to the bases on the south-east coast of England, he will never come to battle, but rather only further subordinate German advances by airships and less important naval forces can be expected, even if it is to be assumed that under Admiral Scheer they would be supported more actively than before by the action of the High Seas Fleet.

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1) Corbett: Naval operations, Volume III, page 314.<sup>202</sup>

In order to provide the latter, the "Grand Fleet" must be stationed further south and take up separate positions in Rosyth and the Humber. Steps had already been taken to prepare both bases to accommodate the required number of ships, but the planned regrouping could only begin once these measures were fully implemented. The only means that could provide a temporary remedy would be the separation of the V Battle Squadron, the fastest, from the battle fleet and assignment of it to the battle cruiser fleet. There are even special reasons not to hesitate any longer with this measure. As far as is known, "Lützow" and "Hindenburg" would soon be ready for the front, and it is precisely this circumstance that demands immediate reinforcement of the Rosyth forces. Therefore, the V Battle Squadron must replace the III Battle Squadron, which consisted of ships from the pre-dreadnought period, as soon as possible.

This solution found a warm advocate in Admiral Beatty, but Admiral Jellicoe found himself grave objections. As great as the speed of the V Battle Squadron would be, it seemed to him that it would not be able to put "Lützow" and "Hindenburg" into battle. Even more significant, however, is that the ships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, according to the battle plan, would be assigned the task of a rapid division in the actual battle fleet, free from the tactical ties of the other squadrons, pressure on one of the enemy wings or some other part of them enemy line and thus compensate for the disadvantages of the previous rigidity of the battle line. As a result, it was decided to leave the V Battle Squadron for the time being with the bulk of the fleet and only then to tackle the planned larger regrouping, when the new battleships were ready for the front and the actual battle fleet was brought to a strength of 24 capital ships by this. In the meantime it had to be accepted that the east coast would still be exposed to enemy attacks without adequate protection. However, the risk must be taken if one does not want to disregard the larger aspects. It could not even be ruled out that this very nakedness would lead the enemy to take the offensive even without the division of the "Grand Fleet". In any case, all measures to bring him to battle in this case too had to be taken, and by mid-April certain possibilities seemed to have opened up in this direction. By that time the "Grand Fleet" had reached the intended strength. On the 15th, the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces was informed that the proposed regrouping would take place as soon as the outer anchorages of the Firth of Forth had been protected from submarines.<sup>203</sup>



Since the Humber systems were expanded at the time to accommodate stronger armed forces, the III. Battle Squadron and III. Cruiser squadrons to be relocated there. The effect that was expected of this was that the enemy would be compelled to support a new attack against the coast with battle squadrons closer to the advancing armed forces. That might provide the desired opportunity to put him into battle, but only if capital ships were ready in time to come to the aid of the Humber Squadron. Admiral Jellicoe was therefore advised to consider whether, at the same time as the new barriers progressed in front of the Firth of Forth, at least a few ships of the actual battle fleet would be placed there instead of the previous ones in Scapa. At the same time he was informed that, in order to expedite the matter, the material which had been provided to block the Dover Strait was to be used in front of the Firth of Forth. Even before these instructions were taken, however, the attack on Lowestoft took place. The expected blow from the enemy had fallen before the planned defensive measures had been taken. The supposedly long-awaited opportunity to come to battle had thus been missed again. Something had to be done immediately in order to be better prepared in the event of a recurrence. The Admiralty therefore hastened to demand new proposals from the fleet chief. "The enemy," he explained, "has now established our weakness in the southern waters through a practical experiment and will probably proceed as soon as possible to the next offensive in these waters." Commodore Tyrwhitt had after the outcome of the battle at Lowestoft only via a small cruiser, and before the others were repaired, the protection of the threatened area fell to the commander-in-chief of the "Grand Fleet". Admiral Jellicoe was by no means willing, however, to abandon the previous strategy of restraint and concentration of all valuable capital ships in the north. His only admission was that he agreed to send the III. Battle Squadron and III. Cruiser Squadrons south from Rosyth immediately, not to the Humber, but to the Swin, the northern exit from the Thames, or to Sheerness or Dover. The submarines previously stationed in Rosyth would also have to be moved to Yarmouth. If minefields were also laid out off the east coast, these measures would have to offer adequate protection against new coastal bombardments, while the III. Battle squadrons together with the "Dreadnought", as soon as they had finished their repair time, represented a notable cover squadron even against the German battlecruisers, given their current strength.<sup>204</sup>

This proposal was approved by the Admiralty except for the laying of mine barriers, which would have restricted and endangered the freedom of movement of the English armed forces in an inadmissible manner. The III. Battle Squadron and III. Cruiser Squadron arrived in Sheerness on May 2nd, and at the same time the submarines of the fleet were moved to Yarmouth, with the exception of two that remained in the Forth.

However, these could only be transitional measures, since after the German advance it was no longer in doubt that the planned larger regrouping, if it should take place at all, should not be hesitated any longer. Admiral Jellicoe was only ready for this when the barriers against submarines east of the Forth Bridge and in the Humber were completed. Only then did he intend to permanently station a squadron of capital ships and the 1st Cruiser Squadron in the Humber and to move the rest of the battle fleet from Scapa to the Firth of Forth.

In order to come to a final decision, a meeting was held in Rosyth on May 12th under the chairmanship of the First Lord to move the "Grand Fleet" temporarily or permanently to the south, the expansion of the Firth of Forth to the main base of the fleet is an urgent requirement of the overall military situation. Admiral Jellicoe was also convinced of this now, but on the basis of his views and experiences he wanted Scapa to be retained as a second base, as this place was used both for exercises by the squadrons and as a base for the X. Cruiser Squadron and the armed forces, which it assigned in maintaining the trade blockade support, is of the greatest value. The Humber should be made usable as a third base. At the same time they wanted to create a new IV. Battle Squadron from all the battle ships that were armed only with 30.5 cm guns\*, which, depending on the situation, was to be set up either in the Humber or another southern base. The Forth itself was to be made ready to accommodate the battle cruiser fleet already stationed there, the I and II battle squadrons and the II cruiser squadron with the associated light forces. It was hoped that everything could be ready before winter began.<sup>205</sup>

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\* 12"

A consensus on the question of whether the transfer of further armed forces of the "Grand Fleet" to the south was necessary or advisable, however, could not be achieved. Admiral Jellicoe also objected again to the intention to remove the 5th Battle Squadron from the formations of the battle fleet and to assign it to the battle cruiser fleet and was only prepared to relocate this squadron or the newly formed IV at least occasionally to Rosyth. But since the III. Battlecruiser Squadrons ("Invincible", "Inflexible", "Indomitable") should go to Scapa for exercises, the Commander-in-Chief declared that he would replace these battlecruisers with the ships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class during the time. So it happened that, when the day of battle finally drew near, the distribution of the fleet was different from that planned according to the battle orders. In the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, the basis of these orders was thus shaken in one essential point. As long as it was stationed in the Firth of Forth, the fast division would not be in the hands of the fleet chief with any certainty.

A further weakening of the previous organization of the "Grand Fleet" resulted from the fact that a new division of the destroyer flotillas had to be carried out just now. According to a decision made in August 1915, the "Grand Fleet" was to receive six flotillas, one for each of the five battle squadrons and one for the battle cruiser fleet, as the new build program of destroyers progressed. To do this, the number of destroyers at that time had to be increased from 65 to 100, but this could only be done when all the old boats of the 1st, 2nd and 4th flotilla were replaced by new ones. This addition was in the best of stages when, in early 1916, the strong demand for light cruisers made further reorganization necessary. At a conference in the Admiralty on January 17th it was decided to get some flotilla leader cruisers free by converting the flotilla from six to four. In this way, however, the flotillas, three of 24 boats in the battle fleet and one of 28 boats in the battle cruiser fleet, became too big. On March 28, Admiral Jellicoe therefore proposed the formation of five flotillas, four of 18 boats each, two of which were to be used as reserves for the battle fleet, one of 28 boats for the battle cruiser fleet, each flotilla divided into two half-flotillas, each with one cruiser and a flotilla leader, or two ships of the latter class, and only the flotilla of battlecruisers was to be assigned a small cruiser and two flotilla leaders.<sup>206</sup>

The most important innovation, however, was that now, following the German model, all flotillas were jointly subordinated to a leader of the torpedo boat forces (Commodore "F"). This received a cruiser, H. M. S. "Castor", as a flagship. Due to the constant addition of new boats, the flotillas were still in the process of being reformed, and the new leader had not even managed them practically when the new organization was about to be put to a decisive test.

The war organization of the "Grand Fleet" at the end of May 1916 was roughly as follows:

In Scapa Admiral Jellicoe had the I. and IV. Battle squadrons, the III. Battlecruiser Squadron, the II. Cruiser squadron (armored cruiser), the IV. Light Cruiser Squadron and the IV., XII. and part of the XI. Destroyer Flotilla, a total of 35 combat-ready destroyers with a light cruiser and four flotilla leader ships. There was also a balloon ship and an aircraft carrier (1). In Cromarty was the II. Battle Squadron and the I. Cruiser Squadron with the rest of the XI. Flotilla, consisting of a flagship and 10 destroyers.

In the Firth of Forth under the command of Admiral Beatty lay the I. and II. Battle cruiser squadrons, the V Battle Squadron, the I., II. And III. Light cruiser squadrons and 27 destroyers, including ten from the XIII. Flotilla, while the rest of two divisions of the IX. and X. Flotilla, which had been brought up from Harwich, since otherwise the number of destroyers in the battlecruiser fleet was insufficient for the anti-submarine defense. "Engadine", the second aircraft carrier in the "Grand Fleet", was also based in Rosyth. Finally, as a further special unit of the latter, a new submarine flotilla, the XI., Was formed in the spring to operate from Blyth, north of the Horns-Reef-Flamborough Head line, while the area south of this line was to operate fell to the submarine flotillas at Harwich and Yarmouth.

When the "Grand Fleet" set sail on May 30, 1916, it had to leave the capital ships "Royal Sovereign", "Queen Elizabeth" and "Emperor of India", the battle cruiser "Australia", the armored cruiser "Achilles", "Donegal" and 17 destroyers in the shipyards and ports. It therefore consisted of 24 "Dreadnoughts", 4 "Queen Elizabeth's", 9 battle cruisers, 8 armored cruisers, 26 light cruisers, 5 flotilla commanders and 74 destroyers during the fighting.

1) The III. Battle Squadron and III. Cruiser squadrons had been assigned to the local coastal defense in Sheerness since May 2nd. See page 184.<sup>207</sup>

(For the division of war on May 30, see Appendix 4 and Map 1.)

In addition to this most powerful fleet the world had ever seen, the "Harwich" forces came into question for cooperation against the enemy, their strength being 5 light cruisers, 2 flotilla commanders and about 17 destroyers; however, it was doubtful from the start whether they would be able to intervene at the given moment, given the great distance from the main fleet.

The German high seas forces, for their part, were mainly concentrated on the Jade. In addition to the fleet flagship, the ships of the I. and III. Squadron with a total of 17 capital ships, of which, however, "King Albert" was not ready for war at the time. The newest ship of the line, the first to be equipped with 38 cm guns, SMS "Bayern", had been in service since March 18, but was still busy with test drives and exercises in the Baltic Sea and was only ready for use in an emergency in the event of attacks directly against the German coast. The II. Squadron, made up of six older ones and not even the III. British battle squadron, consisting of fully evolved ships of the "Germany" class, lay on the Elbe. The reconnaissance forces also lying on the Jade had received a substantial increase in combat power in the battle cruiser "Lützow" and consisted of five battle cruisers of the I., four small cruisers of the II. and four small cruisers of the IV. Reconnaissance group, to which SMS "Hamburg", the flagship of the commander of the submarines, joined as the fifth (1). On the other hand, the small cruisers "Graudenz" and "Stralsund" were in the shipyards of Wilhelmshaven and Kiel to be armed with 15 cm guns or for repairs. Of the torpedo boat flotillas with an average of 11 and 12 boats for a boat material reserve, which were led by the cruisers "Rostock" and "Regensburg", the II., V. and IX. fully available, on the other hand there were seven boats of the I. Flotilla, four boats of the III. and two of the VI. Flotilla for repairs at the shipyard in Kiel. In total, therefore, 62 torpedo boats, 11 small cruisers, 6 older ships of the line, 5 battle cruisers and 16 capital ships were ready for action. (Organization of the war of May 30th, see Annex 6.)

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1) The III. Reconnaissance Group, consisting of the older armored cruisers, had been subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Sea Forces since April 20, 1915 and was finally disbanded on January 15, 1916.<sup>208</sup>

Thus the strength ratio of the German and British fleets, as it appeared in the Skagerrak battle, was the following:

	Capital ships	Battle cruiser	Older ships of the line	Armored cruiser	Small cruisers	Flotilla leader	Destroyers or torpedo boats
German	16	5	6	0	11	0	61 (1)
British	28	9	0	8	26 (2)	5 (3)	74 (4)

The British superiority was therefore:

37:21 in capital ships,

105:72 in light forces.

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1) "V 186" was sent back on the morning of May 31st due to a capacitor failure.

2) Plus five small cruisers in Harwich.

3) Plus two flotilla ships in Harwich.

4) In addition about 17 destroyers in Harwich.<sup>209</sup>

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## 8. Skagerrak. - Operation plan and deployment.

In view of the operations planned for the middle of the month, from May 8th onwards, in order to protect personnel and material, which at the time seemed harmless, the German side was relieved of the readiness, and all should not be on outposts until further notice, the ships in place will not be ready to sail until six hours after the order has been received. In addition, the readiness of the torpedo boat flotilla, which has recently been heavily used, was considerably reduced so that they could gather forces for the upcoming operations and prepare the machinery for maximum performance. On May 9, the chief of III. Squadron, Kontreadmiral Behncke, with the ships of the line "König", "Kronprinz", "Kaiser" and "Kaiserin" returned from the Baltic Sea after the exercises were completed, and all preparations were already made to start the planned operations on May 17th, when on some ships of the III. Squadron's condenser accidents, the elimination of which made it necessary to postpone the operation until May 23. But in order not to let the interim time pass unused, especially since there were no reports that would indicate imminent operations by the enemy, the II. Squadron and the I. Leader of the torpedo boat forces with his flagship "Rostock", the III. and IX. Torpedo boat flotilla and the 13th half-flotilla sent to the Baltic Sea for exercises. On the 15th, "Lützow" also went there. All armed forces should arrive in the North Sea ready for use again on the morning of the 23rd. It was assumed that the English fleet was spread over the ports of the Scottish north-east coast, the Channel and the Humber. As a result, the plan of operations was to appear before Sunderland with the two reconnaissance groups and the three fastest flotillas on a day to be determined when it was light, to bombard the militarily important facilities of this city and thereby force the enemy to advance armed forces. To attack this, the I. and III. Squadrons with the IV Reconnaissance Group and the rest of the torpedo boat flotillas line up between the south-west flat of Dogger Bank and Flamborough Head, about 50 nm east of the latter point, while the submarines of the fleet are in front of Scapa Flow, the Moray Firth, the Firth of Forth, the Humber and north of Terschelling to occupy the submarines of the Marine Corps off the Thames attack positions and others had to previously contaminate the exits of individual enemy ports with mines.<sup>210</sup>



In addition, all airships were to enter the service of the company and, apart from the immediate security at the battlecruisers, scout in the direction of the Firth of Forth, the Humber, the Hoofden and the Skagerrak. During the absence of the fleet, the original plan was to transfer the security of the German Bight to the II Squadron, but at the urging of the squadron chief, Kontreadmirals Mauve, to let this also take part directly in the enterprise despite the low combat strength and lack of resilience of his outdated ships.

When it turned out on May 13th that the start of the operation would have to be postponed from May 17th to May 23rd, the commander of the submarines, Fregattenkapitän Hermann Bauer, suggested that the submarines, which are ready for use earlier, should be sent to sea immediately in order to allow the advance of the high seas forces to be preceded by the most detailed possible reconnaissance of the northern North Sea, and mainly in an area in which, according to previous calculations and observations, the enemy main body always took up positions when they either wanted to cover an advance by English light forces against the German Bight or to stand ready to repel a German advance. Admiral Scheer agreed and so 10 submarines (1) received orders, from May 17th, 18th and until May 22nd in a sea area between the latitudes of Jäderen and Hanstholm from the Norwegian coast to about 100 stretched nm east of the Firth of Forth to hunt down enemy warships. For this purpose, the submarines were assigned activity strips of around 15-20 nm in length and 100-120 nm in latitude from west to east in the order given below, in which they cross on north and south courses and, if they were seen, the Should appear as though they were engaged in trade war ventures on the way to or from the west coast of the British Isles. From the 23rd onwards they were supposed to line up in front of the enemy bases, "U 43" and "U 44" in front of the Pentland Firth, the remaining seven submarines in front of the Firth of Forth, and there crossed for ten days in mutually demarcated sectors whose common center was in the exits of the respective bases (Map 1).

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1) "U52", "U 24", "U70", "U 32", "U 66", "U47", "U43", "U 44", "U63" and "U 51".<sup>211</sup>

Within the sectors, the submarines had freedom of movement to move their location to sea or land depending on the weather, counteraction and level of training of the crews, some of whom were still inexperienced. It was of the utmost importance, however, that they were not discovered prematurely in the waiting positions. F. T reports should therefore only be submitted in urgent cases, in particular when sighting enemy forces, but only after any prospects of an attack have been exploited. In order to be able to give the exposed submarines a safe message about the beginning of the actual fleet operation, it was intended to announce to them the time of the entry of the High Seas Fleet under the heading: "Expect the departure of enemy armed forces" by radio message. In this way it was hoped that if the submarines had left the coast for repairs, to rest the crew or for similar reasons during the long period of lay-out, they would be able to push themselves up to the coast in good time.

In addition, another submarine, "UB 27", was dispatched on the 20th to penetrate the Firth of Forth itself and, if possible, to look for an opportunity to attack incoming and outgoing warships within May Island. The operation of the submarine was calculated for 14 days. Another special task was assigned to "U 46". This boat was supposed to be on the night of 21./22. May clear up in front of Sunderland, the probable point of attack of the high seas forces, and report his observations on guarding, traffic, navigation and mine closures with harmless keywords, in which the area itself was not allowed to be mentioned under any circumstances. Thereafter, the submarine should be on hold in the Peterhead area until June 2nd. in between the Firth of Forth and Moray Firth. However, since "U 46" was not ready to sail in time, "U 47", which was originally supposed to operate together with the other boats in the northern North Sea, had to be used for this task. It was also planned that the large submarine mine-layers "U 72", "U 74" and "U 75" in the Firth of Forth, Moray Firth and west of the Orkney Islands should lay barriers of 22 mines each. If, as intended, the naval operation got under way immediately after these barriers had been laid, there was a prospect that the enemy would have had little or no time to search for and clear the new barriers.<sup>212</sup>

But even if the mines were found prematurely, it was hoped that the barriers would impede the enemy fleet considerably as it left the port. After "U 74" had already set sail on the 13th to complete this task, the other two large submarine minelayers followed on May 23rd and 24th.

In order to also keep the Humber under observation, where, according to a steamer report on May 14th, numerous warships, including capital ships, also appeared to be drawn together, "UB 21" and "UB 22" went to sea on May 21st to take off from 23. On the connecting line from Spurn Point - lightship peace situation to Outer Dowsing lightship war buoy or to occupy waiting positions for ten days north of this line. Finally, a submarine line northwest of Terschelling was supposed to cover the intended fleet operation from flanking also from this direction, and for this purpose the chief of the 4th submarine flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Prause, was on May 22nd with "U 67" and "U 46" dispatched. "U 22", which was also supposed to join him, had to be left behind because it was ready for use too late.

But also the enemy, busy with the preparation of operations very similar to those on the German side, pushed forward to launch the same submarines at the time, namely the British naval command dispatched apart from the units of the regular submarine blockade of the German Bight, already on May 15, "D7" and "E 30" in the Kattegat, where they should wait in front of the mouth of the Sound and at the island of Anholt. Another submarine set sail on the 18th to cross off Gothenburg, and on the same day the British naval command, thanks to the excellent intelligence and espionage service, learned "through a reliable report (1) that an extraordinarily large number of German submarines were operating in the North Sea. However, after the operation against Lowestoft it had become so quiet on the German side that from this fact alone one was in no way inclined to infer a major operation of the German High Seas Fleet. It was known that after the air raid on Tønder at the beginning of May the III. Squadron was immediately sent back to exercises in the Baltic Sea, and the submarines advanced for long-range reconnaissance against the German Bight also reported no activity by the German naval forces, apart from the regular trips by minesweepers and outpost boats. As a result, even when it became known by May 22 that at least eight, and probably more, German submarines were cruising the northern part of the North Sea, there was a greater tendency to believe that the submarine trade war was resuming instead of a large German naval operation.

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1) Jellicoe: The Grand Fleet, page 294.<sup>213</sup>

Nevertheless, on the 19th the ships of the Xth Cruiser Squadron were withdrawn from their usual blockade lines across the North Sea as far to the west as possible. In addition, the guard in front of all bases has been increased. Special measures were also taken to protect incoming and outgoing ships against submarines and to protect themselves from surprises by means of German submarine mine barriers placed in front of the bases. In particular, on the 21st and the following days, the fleet's mine sweepers drove the area east of the "Long Forties", through which the fleet used to sortie on advances to the south, with deployed equipment, and on the 23rd special, deep mine barriers were set up in the Moray Firth to prevent enemy submarines from entering this base.

The German submarine offensive therefore unfortunately did not meet any unprepared opponents. When the ten submarines destined for reconnaissance in the northern North Sea left the Dogger Bank on May 17 and 18, three to the west and the rest to the east, "U 52", Kapitänleutnant Hans Walther, already 90 nm northwest of Terschelling a destroyer, from "U 66", Kapitänleutnant v. Bothmer, at the northeast corner of the Dogger Bank, and by "U 63", Kapitänleutnant Otto Schultze, individual enemy guard vehicles were found on the Großer Fischerbank. In the area of activity itself, however, no significant armed forces were sighted, although radio messages from Bruges reported an enemy squadron southeast of Bergen, other armed forces in front of the Humber and finally those north of the German Bight. The counteraction by enemy guard vehicles was limited to the left wing of the submarine line and was only felt more strongly by "U 52" (Walther), whose activity strip coincided exactly with the outer guard line in front of the Firth of Forth. With the great visibility, the mast tips and chimneys of fish steamer were almost always visible, so that the overview of the area was considerably impaired by constant evasion and diving. As early as on the 20th, "U 52" was probably reported by a steamer which, immediately after sighting it, ran back to the Forth at high speed. On the following day (May 21), at around 9 a.m., about 110 nm east of Aberdeen, "U 52" sighted a submarine and, behind it, a small cruiser and twelve destroyers or submarine hunters, which were transmitted by radio message about the cruiser "Arcona", the FT repeater of the submarines.<sup>214</sup>

In the reconnaissance line, this radio message, although repeated from Bruges, was only picked up by "U 43" (Jüsst) and "U 66" (v. Bothmer). On the 22nd, "U 52" had two encounters with twelve submarine hunters and a destroyer. On both occasions it was no longer possible to evade, so that only deep diving at 50 m remained. The submarine had probably been sighted the day before when the radio message was given and the increased counteraction that was now taking place was due to this circumstance.

As the further events showed, the advance of all units of the "Grand Fleet", prompted by the operation of the High Seas Forces, actually led through large parts of the area in which the submarines crossed until the afternoon of the 22nd. The meeting point of the British battle squadrons was also in this area. The field of activity of the submarines had thus been chosen extraordinarily well in itself. Unfortunately, however, the German naval operation had not yet started when the submarines, in accordance with their orders, left this sea area again to occupy the positions in front of the Pentland Firth and Firth of Forth, in which, due to the original intention of the whole arrangement, they should have arrived only after the naval operation, in order to attack enemy forces again only when they approached after the expected battle. As the situation developed, however, they faced a long and grueling waiting time immediately in front of the enemy bases and from now on in full enemy counteraction. (Map 1.).

It is true that the high seas forces dispatched to the Baltic Sea for exercises had returned to the North Sea as planned on May 22nd, but the undertaking that was intended immediately afterwards had to be postponed again. The reason this time was an inadequate repair of the battle cruiser "Seydlitz". This ship, which had hit a mine on April 24th (1), was reported as ready for war by the Wilhelmshaven shipyard on May 22nd, however, a flood attempt carried out for safety on the night of 23/24 showed that the torpedo broadside, which was particularly badly damaged by the mine hit, was not yet watertight; rather, the leaks in the transverse and rampart bulkheads were so extensive that a new repair was necessary. However, since the fleet boss did not want to do without this ship, but the repair took up the time until May 28th, for the start of the enterprise, for better or worse, May 29th came into question.

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1) See page 135.<sup>215</sup>

In the meantime, the ordered relief of the state of readiness of the ships in the roadstead and in the port remained, but now the deployment area of the fleet of enemy submarines and mines was to be kept clean as far as possible by patrols and torpedo boat advances into the border area of the German Bight. In addition, the commander of the naval airship division received instructions to carry out air strikes on the northern and southern parts of the British east coast, the central part, which the attack by the High Seas Fleet should apply, but not to be alarmed. Until the end of the month, however, the weather conditions did not allow airships to travel, so that reconnaissance in the border area of the German Bight was limited to the frequently interrupted activities of the pilots from List, Helgoland and Borkum, as well as inspection trips by the mine search divisions and barrier breaker groups. During this task, the Heligoland aircraft patrol "562" and "483" under Leutnant zur See Rogge discovered an enemy submarine 35 nm south of Horns-Riff-Feuerschiff on May 24th, which appeared near the Dutch steamer "Juno" and attempted to ram the aircraft "483", which went down on the water to investigate the latter. A cooperation between the steamer and the submarine did not seem to be ruled out. As a result, the VI. Torpedo boat flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Max Schultz, sent north to patrol the area between Horns-Reef and List the following night (24/25 May) and, if possible, to bring in the steamer. However, the advance was just as fruitless as the repetition on the night of 25/26. May through the IX. Torpedo boat flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Goehle.

In the meantime, "U 43" and "U 44" in their sectors in front of the Pentland Firth, "U 66", "U 63", "U 51", "U 32", "U 70", "U 24", "U 52" in which in front of the Firth of Forth it was systematically attached to the enemy bases. During this time, "U 52", Kapitänleutnant Hans Walther, was still approaching the Firth of Forth on the 22nd at around 6 o'clock pm. about 90 nm east of May Island under water in a net. The boat leaned over strongly to starboard, but was able to tear itself away by going deeper to 50 m and found on surfacing the following night that both supports of the mine deflector had been bent and the head of the central viewing tube had been torn off. Of the other boats on this day, while proceeding against the coast, "U 32", Kapitänleutnant Freiherr Spiegel von und zu Peckelsheim, sighted a minesweeper of the "Arabis" class, and "U 63", Kapitänleutnant Otto Schultze, 180 nm east of the Cromarty Firth an older cruiser with a destroyer, two smaller vessels and a submarine, but they turned around before the attack could begin.<sup>216</sup>

After intercepting radio messages, the submarine was apparently reported, had to break through a strong guard line as it penetrated further towards the coast and on the 23rd steered via Tod Head along the coast into the sector assigned to it. In the evening of that day, "U 51" (Rumpel) sighted an approximately 10,000 t auxiliary cruiser with a destroyer 50 nm northeast of May Island, who passed the submarine at 7.30 pm at high speed on a southerly course at a distance of 6000–7000 m. At 8:40 pm. this was also seen by "U 70", Kapitänleutnant Wünsche. Since the auxiliary cruiser, with its peculiar stern shape, could be considered a mine-layer and seemed to be heading in the direction of the Amrum Bank, it was reported by "U 70" by radio message. Meanwhile, one of the two submarines set up in front of the Pentland Firth, "U 43", Kapitänleutnant Jüst, had sighted two cruisers of the "Cities" class close to the entrance at 7 p.m., which it could no longer reach due to several machine accidents.

The weather, too, was actually only favorable for the activity of the submarines on two days; the rest of them were either in a smooth sea, with even the periscope becoming a traitor, invisibility, which at times turned into fog near the coast, or there was so much swell and sea that depth control at depth of attack was very difficult, but above all the necessary overview through the periscope was hardly guaranteed. In addition, it soon became apparent that the submarines in the sectors closest to the coast were being exposed to ever more severe counteraction and were also considerably limited in their ability to act, especially since they were unable to move in the narrow areas of activity assigned to them to evade the guards without getting into the neighboring sectors and obstructing the submarines lying there. Where all boats had the same chance of success, namely 10 to 15 nautical miles east of May Island, the sectors were only 3 to 4 nautical miles wide, which was not enough for the safety of the individual boat, especially after being detected by eavesdropping on enemy radio messages and observation was that enemy submarines were also working in this area to hunt down the Germans. The English radio messages also showed that individual submarines had been sighted very soon and that they were eagerly searched for, and even cruisers and destroyers were dispatched against them at night.

In the meantime "U 47", Kapitänleutnant Metzger, had on the night of 21./22. May the reconnaissance of the area in front of Sunderland carried out according to plan and found that the city was too well shielded from the sea, beacons were not burning and the blast furnaces did not provide any point of light for navigation.<sup>217</sup>



As far as it could be judged from the ship traffic, mine barriers off the coast were not to be expected. After these findings, which were sent to the fleet management by cue on the 23rd, the boat swung out in a wide arc around the Firth of Forth in order to reach its waiting position at Kinnaird Head.

"UB 27", Kapitänleutnant Dieckmann, arrived at the same time as the other boats to carry out his special task off the Firth of Forth. On May 23, it had an encounter with "U 32" (v. Spiegel), then an encounter with "U 63" (Schultze), received from these boats the radio messages that had since been received from Bruges about the movements of enemy armed forces in the North Sea as well as part of the newspaper service and urged, while "U 63" distracted the guards from the north over Bell Rock towards the Forth. Soon after midnight, however, the boat only made slow progress due to multiple engine malfunctions, so that the commander decided, in order to rectify these, to head for St. Andrews Bay first. On the same night (23 to 24 May) "U 63" (Schultze) crossed water close to the Forth and sighted at 2:45 am. a small cruiser of the "Arethusa" class, which approached from there so quickly that the submarine, although it immediately went on a parallel course with extreme force, could no longer take advantage of the safe firing opportunity at 300 to 500 m; rather, it had to dive before the torpedoes were clear to fire, since the cruiser could open gunfire at any moment. A second dimmed vehicle that followed the cruiser at a distance of 2000 m could no longer be clearly seen. The incident showed, however, that Bell Rock was apparently the point of approach for the outgoing and incoming ships, so the commander decided to continue cruising in this area.

In contrast, "UB 27" (Dieckmann) observed at 7 a.m. (May 24) four armored cruisers, apparently of the "Monmouth" -class, which left the Forth at long intervals in keel line, while numerous destroyers stood south of them. Since the ships were heading east at full speed, the attack that had already been planned had to be abandoned soon. The hope still remained that the armored cruisers were only the vanguard of a larger group. As a result, "UB 27" ran at a high speed to the south towards the North Carr lightship. At 8.30 a.m. in the east it actually saw the outlines of two cruisers or destroyers, which, however, without further ships following, around 9 a.m. disappeared again.<sup>218</sup>

Apparently it was the IV. Light Cruiser Squadron, which, according to later English reports, had left Rosyth on the 24th under destroyer escort to cross the Norwegian coast from Lindesnes to Utsire and then return to Scapa. As a result, "U 72" (Krafft) also sighted three small cruisers of the "Cordelia" and "Calliope" class in line abreast on an easterly course on its advance to the Moray Firth on 24 about 120 nm west of Hanstholm behind two submarines, but which passed at a great distance in front of the bow of the submarine at such a high speed that it could no longer be fired. On the 25th, it sighted at 8:30 p.m. 120 nm north of Kinnaird Head another small cruiser of the "Cordelia" class, this time on a westerly course, but could not approach again.

As "UB 27" meanwhile on the 24th to 9:30 am having waited in vain for the hostile main body, the commanding officer concluded from this that it had either gained the open sea further south at Bass Rock or must still be in the Firth of Forth. In the latter case it seemed important to try to break into the bay the next night. Before that, however, it was necessary to lay the boat aground in St. Andrews Bay in order to clear the engine malfunctions. After this had been carried out, Kapitänleutnant Dieckmann headed submerged to May Island, broke through a destroyer line there at dusk and, following some steamers, penetrated the Forth. It was only after 18½ hours underwater that he could emerge and the boat after a successful breakthrough with a charged battery at 2:45 a.m. (May 25th) lay aground again in Largo Bay. As "UB 27" at 5 a.m. went back to periscope depth to advance further inward toward Inchkeith, there was a grinding and rumbling sound over the boat, as if cables and other heavy objects were being dragged across the deck. But since the boat steered well to depth, no further meaning was attached to the noise. But at 6:30 a.m. the commandant accidentally spotted a long chain of green glass spheres astern while looking round the periscope. So the submarine was dragging a net behind it, which it had probably got caught in during the night in Largo Bay. At any moment it could be betrayed by this. The commander therefore immediately turned to the north, sounded a 35 m point and tried to get away from the network by reversing the machines under water. Here, however, the latter got entangled in the screws and brought them to a standstill. An appearance was out of the question.<sup>219</sup>

So there was nothing left but to let the boat sink to the bottom to a depth of 40 m and wait for it to get dark. After all preparations had been made to clear the net and to blow up the boat in case this should be surprised by guards while surfacing, "UB 27" dived at 10:30 pm. (May 25) after staying under water for almost 20 hours and luckily found particularly favorable, slightly foggy weather for the work. Thanks to the quick and determined work of the crew, the net was removed in 20 minutes and stowed in the boat. The port prop, however, remained unclear, and thus any further stay in this area was forbidden. As the submarine was just about to leave the Forth to clear the prop in the open sea, it got serious again Danger. Soon after midnight, driving across water, it suddenly came to a jerk when it breached between two guard vehicles and was stuck in a net that was apparently being dragged by the two vehicles. This soon afterwards began to burn in its entire extent with small flames, but even before the enemy ships had approached, the uppermost wires of the net were cut, and ten minutes later the boat was free. Immediately afterwards it got caught in a net again, but then passed Elie Ness at 2:31 a.m. (May 26th) May Island and at 7 a.m. Emerge 10 nm east of the island. As the position of the clouds of smoke in sight showed, "UB 27" was still in the midst of numerous groups of outposts set up like a chessboard. Heading further east, it sighted at around 10.40 a.m. (May 26th) an auxiliary cruiser coming from the south-east of about 10,000 t and fired a torpedo shot, although the distance was estimated to be over 3000 m, since in the opinion of the commander the port screw could probably no longer be cleared and thus a better chance of firing this at this time was no longer to be expected. The shot failed, and the attack confirmed that the boat with an engine was difficult to keep under water during such a time. When it turned out that, despite all efforts, the steel line that had wound around the shaft of the port propeller could not be removed, "UB 27" continued the march back on the 27th and entered Heligoland on the 30th.

"U 72", Kapitänleutnant Krafft, also had to give up his venture on May 26th. On that day, when it was still about 100 nm east of the Moray Firth, which it was supposed to contaminate with mines, it turned out in the swift swell that the submarine was leaving a wide trail of oil due to a leak in an outer bunker, which was widened when diving.<sup>220</sup>

In addition, the oil machines showed operational uncertainties, so that a successful completion of the task, especially since the nights were only very short, no longer seemed possible. "U 72" therefore started the march back on the same day and arrived at Lister Tief on the 29th.

Meanwhile, the other submarines off the Humber, Firth of Forth and Pentland Firth tried their ungrateful task with tenacity, but on those days only sighted submarine hunters, guard vehicles and destroyers. Because of strong counteraction, poor weather and fog, they often had to remain under water even during the day, and they were often pushed far outwards. The counteraction was particularly strong just below the coast, especially on the driveway that led north from the Firth of Forth via May Island and Bell Rock. As a result, the boat "U 66" in the northernmost sector, Kapitänleutnant v. Bothmer to suffer most from hostile counteraction. If it wanted to remain unseen - and only then would it have a chance of attacking more valuable warships - it had to remain under water from 3 in the morning to 10:30 in the evening because of the numerous guard vehicles. Under these circumstances, the overview of the area of activity was extremely poor. For future cases, it seemed to the commander more expedient to leave the coastal area to the submarine miners and the smaller "UB" boats, but to use the large and fast submarines outside of the guard, so that they, in the Usually driving over water, clearing up more effectively, picking up radio messages with greater certainty and thus also being able to improve their position after these, if necessary. In accordance with this view, he continued his activity outside of the guard on the 25th. In the evening he met "U 47" (butcher) who was cruising between Kinnaird Head and Peterhead. The next morning (May 26th) "U 47" was seen by a fish steamer in hazy weather before it could dive, and on the following day (May 27th) "U 74" (Weisbach) got hit - whether before or after Completion of his mining task in the Firth of Forth, was never cleared up - on the "Long Forties" in a battle with the armed fish steamers "Ranger", "Bodino", "Oku" and "Kimberley" and was about 25 nm southeast of Peterhead and destroyed with the entire crew.

In the meantime, the presence of German submarines had also been detected off the Pentland Firth, so that on May 27 the flotilla leader ship "Broke" with 12 destroyers left Scapa to reinforce the guard. "U 43" (Jürist) and "U 44" (Wagenführ) were therefore often hunted on this and the following day.<sup>221</sup>

For the latter, there was even several opportunities to shoot destroyers, which the commander deliberately did not take advantage of in order not to give himself away prematurely. On the 29th, after lively English radio traffic had betrayed measures to strengthen the defense against the submarines, "U44" left at around 10 p.m. with severe invisibility to a depth of 20 m and immediately heard the screw noise of a destroyer driving over the submarine. It could only be at 5 a.m. (May 30th) reappear. On this day "U 43" (Jürist) sighted at around 12.30 p.m. 12 vehicles of the "Foxglove" class, which were initially mistaken for small cruisers and drove in tightly closed search groups. The submarine fired a long-range shot at six overlapping vehicles, which, however, missed at the great distance (2000-2500 m). Since the shot had been observed by "Gentian", one of the minesweeper gunboats, a half-flotilla of destroyers immediately set out from Scapa to chase the submarine together with aircraft. While "U43" quickly evaded the pursuit, "U 44" (Wagenführ), which had headed for the Pentland Skerries in the morning, came into full counteraction. It was true that when heavy English FT traffic was observed in the course of the afternoon and it was concluded that the submarine had been seen from land, it had immediately departed from the coast on the center line of the sector, but it was chased by destroyers towards evening and had to go to a depth of 20 m around midnight due to severe lack of vision; immediately afterwards a destroyer drove over the boat at high speed.

While in this way the attention of the enemy concentrated more and more on the area east of the Orkney Islands, "U 75", Kapitänleutnant Curt Beitzel, on the 27th of Utsire walked around in a wide arc outside of any guard and counteraction north of the Shetland Islands and approached on the night of 28/29. May from the west of the islands (Map 1). With constantly overcast skies and frequent fog, the submarine had had no position fix since Norway, and even now it soon found itself in thick fog again, so that a large shielded warship passing at midnight was only seen at the last moment when it was for a torpedo shot was already too late. But then it cleared up, and at 1.10 a.m. the lighthouse at Noup Head was spotted. It had been learned that south of this point between Marwik Head and Brough of Birsay there was a warship route along the coast at a distance of about 2 nm, which "U 75" was supposed to close. This succeeded. Completely undisturbed by enemy guard vehicles, it threw its cargo of 22 mines from 6 a.m. to 8.35 a.m., Distributed over various individual barriers and set at a depth of 7 m under high water, and then began the march back.<sup>222</sup>

After "U 72" had to give up its enterprise prematurely and "U 74" had been destroyed, one could hope that at least the barrier of "U 75" would come into effect.

Meanwhile, in front of the Firth of Forth on May 28, "U 66" (v. Bothmer) exchanged experiences and messages with "U 51" (Rumpel) and "U 63" (Schultze). Apparently the intended German naval operation had still not got underway, on the other hand it emerged from the English radio messages that "U 63" had intercepted that after the sighting of a German submarine at Bell Rock, the entire English guard had already been alerted. On the 27th, the enemy submarine "E 30" was also dispatched to hunt down the German boats, so that several times there was almost a fight between submerged German submarines. On the 28th, "U 63" was chased by enemy guard vehicles for six hours. As a result, "U 66" went north to the border of its area. When there was a noticeably stronger counteraction from numerous fish steamers and systematic night patrols, Kapitänleutnant v. Bothmer on the 30th, since the prospects of success no longer corresponded to the mission, to leave the sector assigned to him completely at his own risk by submitting an FT report and, in order not to disturb "U 63" and "U 47", for example on the Scapa Flow – Horns-Reef line, 60 nm east of Peterhead. This decision was later justified by an important reconnaissance report, which the submarine was able to deliver from the position it had chosen. In the meantime, "U 63" (Schultze) intercepted a radio message that H.M.S. "Trident" would probably cross the sector of the submarine during the following night, and came in at 10.30 pm. a vehicle corresponding to this ship in sight. However, a torpedo fired at 1000 m was unsuccessful.

Even before the Humber, the efforts of the submarines had been in vain. For six days the sea was like a mirror, the scope, lake and sky blurred into one another in the periscope. The nights were so white and bright that the boats had difficulty in recharging the battery under guard without being detected, and often had to lay aground after recharging. Although "UB 22" (Putzier) had sighted six large blue-painted auxiliary cruisers from 3000 to 4000 tons on the evening of the 24th and "UB 21" (Hashagen) had sighted a minesweeping gunboat of the "Foxglove" class on the 28th, otherwise there were no destroyers no enemy forces seen.

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1) One of the two pilot destroyers of the Blyth submarine flotilla.<sup>223</sup>

If warships sailed in and out of the Humber area at all, the commander of "UB 21" assumed they were closer to the coast and therefore left the previous waiting position on May 28th to move between Spurn Point and Flamborough despite the increased Cross Head guarding since the 27th.

In the waiting positions north-west of Terschelling, which had been occupied by "U 67", Kapitänleutnant Nieland, and "U 46", Kapitänleutnant Hillebrand, since May 23, nothing of significance had happened either. Although "U 67" had already sighted 20 destroyers on a westerly course at lightning 40 nm NNW from Terschelling on the 23rd, contrary to expectations, no larger armed forces followed them. On the other hand, it soon became apparent that the Terschelling Bank also served as an area of activity for several enemy submarines, which made it impossible to stay above water for a long time and thus also greatly reduced the reconnaissance value of the German submarines standing there. At night, on the other hand, staying above water was dangerous because of the many floating mines. Despite all caution, "U 46" was attacked by an enemy submarine with gunfire on the 24th and later, just as it was about to warn "U 67", it was put into serious danger by a torpedo shot. On the 27th, "U 67" was surprised by an enemy destroyer in thick fog, but was still able to dive before it opened hostilities. On the 30th, after the only periscope of this boat had become unusable due to the ingress of water, "U 46" had to return to Emden to replace it.

The planned waiting time of the submarines in front of Scapa, in front of the Firth of Forth, the Humber and in front of Terschelling was now coming to an end, but, apart from "U 46" and "UB 27", no boat had left its position when On the 30th from Bruges and the cruiser "Arcona" the longed-for key word was finally given, which announced the beginning and implementation of the German fleet operation with the sentence "Expect the sortie of enemy forces on May 31st and June 1st".

As early as May 28th, decisions of far-reaching importance had been made on the German naval flagship. According to the previous orders, the submarines should give up their waiting positions on the evening of June 1st. Therefore, if one did not want to forego the cooperation of the same, the offshore forces had to leave soon. On the other hand, with the intended close approach of the fleet to the enemy bases, the cooperation of the airships was not to be dispensed with, since such an advance led into a sea area in which the fleet could not under any circumstances allow itself to be engaged in battle against its will.<sup>224</sup>



However, due to the unfavorable weather conditions, there seemed to be no prospect of using the airships. In the event that this did not change on May 30th, there was nothing left but to give up the operation against Sunderland for the time being. But then it was to be replaced immediately by one in the Skagerrak, where the Jutian coast in the east offered a certain cover against enemy surprises and the great distance from the enemy bases significantly reduced the risk of involuntary involvement in a battle. As a result, aerial reconnaissance was of less importance in this case. A corresponding operation order was sent to the subordinate officers on the same day (May 28). However, the fleet chief reserved the final decision to carry out one task or another, especially since the advance to the northwest appeared to be undoubtedly the more effective one. At midnight an order was given that all ocean-going forces in the port and in the roadstead should steam up and prepare for battle. Around noon (May 29), "Seydlitz" reported that it was ready for war again. But also on the 30th, east to north winds were blowing in the German Bight, so that at first no air reconnaissance could take place again, and at 3 pm. Korvettenkapitän Strasser, the commander of the naval airship division, reported that one could hardly be expected for the next two days either. But then the undertaking against Sunderland had to be given up once and for all. In their place came the plan for the advance to the north and, while the High Seas Forces were still inconspicuously gathering on the outer roads, where they put their anchorages for tightened readiness until 8 pm. should have taken, they received as well as the Marine Corps with the radio message: "31. May Gg. 2490 (1) "the keyword that announced May 31st as the first day of operation for the new enterprise. Then around midnight (May 30/31), the chief of the Flanders submarine flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Bartenbach, set sail from Zeebrugge with all the boats available in his flotilla, around the High Seas Fleet against enemy forces advancing from the Thames ports, for example to secure.

The purpose of the new naval operation was the same as that planned against Sunderland, namely to induce the enemy to advance armed forces. But this was no longer to be achieved by bombarding the coast, but by the appearance of the German cruisers in front of and in the Skagerrak.

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1) The number of the operation order.<sup>225</sup>

Vizeadmiral Hipper, the commander of the reconnaissance forces, had orders, in the first hours of the morning of May 31, with the I. and II. Reconnaissance Group, the II. Leader of the torpedo boats on "Regensburg" and the II., VI. and IX. Torpedo boat flotilla to leave the Jade and advance northward out of sight of the Danish coast, to show up on the Norwegian coast before dark so that the English could hear of the enterprise, and during the late afternoon and the following night before and in the Skagerrak cruiser - and to wage trade wars. If he encountered enemy armed forces that had repeatedly been reported in this area, he should try to destroy them, but take precedence without counting on airship reconnaissance. For this purpose, Admiral Scheer intended with the I. and III. Squadron, the IV Reconnaissance Group, the cruiser "Hamburg", the first leader of the torpedo boat forces on "Rostock" and the rest of the torpedo boat flotillas on June 1st at 5 a.m. to stand about 45 nm south of Lindesnes and pick up the cruisers. Further behavior had to be based on the development of the situation.

At the last moment, however, Admiral Scheer decided to change the plan of operations, which originally also required aerial reconnaissance, in two essential points. In fact, he ordered that the 2nd Squadron, which according to the operational order had to take over the security of the German Bight during the absence of the other armed forces, whereby the use of the same was reserved for the union with the main body, jointly with the other squadrons from the start should go to sea. Even more important, however, was that, contrary to the original order of operations, he allowed the bulk of the ship to leave immediately after the cruisers. The main consideration for this decision was that the lack of aerial reconnaissance required all armed forces to be particularly tightly united in order to ensure their operational cooperation from the outset. Around 1 a.m. (May 31) reported Helgoland SW wind, strength 3–5, Borkum WSW, List W, on refreshing, and at 2 a.m. Admiral Hipper and his forces left the Jade. Around 3:30 a.m. followed the IV. Reconnaissance Group, the III. Squadron, the fleet flagship and the I. Squadron, while the II. left the Elbe at the same time. (Map 1.)

It was a very peculiar coincidence, but given the escalation of the strategic tension described, not purely accidental but inevitable, that Admiral Jellicoe was also busy at the end of May with the preparations for a very similar undertaking.<sup>226</sup>

Under the pressure of the public opinion in England, which had been greatly agitated since the bombardment of Lowestoft, and the ideas raised by the Russian side, the British Supreme Commander, after the failure of the previous however, very weak attempts to lure the German fleet as far out of their bases as possible in order to then perhaps put them to battle far away from them with superior strength, prepared a plan which, according to the semi-official English account (1), "went beyond everything he had ever dared". According to this supposedly so bold plan, two squadrons of light cruisers with a battle squadron were to appear as support on June 2 when it was light before Skagen and from there to advance through the Kattegat to the northern exits of the Great Belt and Sound in order to defeat the German enemy who was up to would have set out to counter-attack immediately after every British attack, to induce strong armed forces to advance north from the German Bight. He was then to be intercepted by the other battle squadrons and the battle cruiser fleet, which had to take a waiting position for the purpose between Horns-Reef, the large and small fishing banks. In order to prevent the early discovery of the trap set in this way, the aircraft carrier "Engadine", accompanied by destroyers and a light cruiser squadron, was supposed to cross at Horns-Riff and prevent airships from approaching the British main body. But in the event that the enemy still did not advance far enough north to be put into battle, it was hoped that this would at least cause him serious losses, that the mine-layer "Abdiel" throw a new mine barrier west of the mine barrier that had already been laid out on the night of 3/4 May south of the Vyl lightship and that three of the "Harwich" submarines were to be lurking for attack from June 1 to 3 immediately north of this mine lock. Eventually, two more submarines from the Blyth-based flotilla were supposed to cross east of Dogger Bank for the same purpose. However, the plan was thwarted by the German enterprise before it was implemented, so that it was Admiral Scheer who prescribed the law of action for the enemy. If the English plan was already described as bold, given the existing balance of power, this had to apply all the more to the German, especially since the English fleet was already at sea when the German naval forces left, which always had to be expected, even if more the German intention was that only the appearance of the German cruisers in the Skagerrak triggered counter-movements. For this reason everything had been done to make the preparations for the German enterprise as inconspicuous as possible.

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1) Corbett: Naval Operations, Volume III, page 320.<sup>227</sup>

But despite all precautionary measures and despite all restrictions in FT traffic, there were already signs on the morning of the 30th that the German High Seas Forces were gathering on the outer roads, and this fact in connection with the hitherto puzzling activity of the German submarines in the North Sea indicated a German movement of unusual importance. Accordingly, as early as midday on May 30th, the British Admiralty issued a warning to Admiral Jellicoe that the German fleet would probably go to sea early the next morning and that about 16 submarines had already left the German ports most of which probably crossed in the North Sea. It was believed that they knew that a certain larger operation had been planned by the German side some time ago and that this should perhaps be carried out now, but beyond this assumption, no insight into the intentions of the German naval commander could be gained. Final orders for the fleet could therefore not yet be issued, but as a precaution the "Harwich" destroyers and the minesweeping gunboats off the east coast have already been recalled and increased readiness for all submarines has been ordered. But shortly after 6 p.m. (30th V.) it became known that all units of the High Seas Fleet had obviously received a particularly important operational signal ("May 31st, 2490"). Although this could not be interpreted in more detail, it left no doubt that major movements were imminent. So there was no more time to lose, and so went up at 6:40 p.m. a telegram from the Admiralty to the Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty, taking into account the latest news from the enemy, to concentrate their armed forces in the usual way about 100 nautical miles east of Aberdeen and to await the further development of the situation there. They were also informed that both the armed forces in Harwich and in the Nore would be held back until the situation was cleared up, but that, in accordance with the plan for the intended operation of their own fleet in the direction of the Skagerrak, three submarines were already in the border area of the German Bight west of the Vyl lightship, two more east of the Dogger Bank.

In the opinion of the Admiralty it could not be ruled out that the movement of the High Seas Fleet to the north-west, expected with regard to the formation of the German submarines, was only a ruse to cover some operation in the southern waters. Therefore, while all auxiliary cruisers and outpost boats were being recalled off the east coast, Admiral Bradford had already received orders to advance his cruisers to the planned readiness position in the Swin and to take the III. Battle squadron to go to sea from Sheerness.<sup>228</sup>

Likewise, Commodore Tyrwhitt was instructed to keep all light cruisers and destroyers available in Harwich in intensified readiness at the same time. In this way all preparations had been made to be able to face an enemy attack immediately in the southern waters.

In the north everything was equally clear, and by 11:30 (30./31. V.), that is 2½ hours earlier, when the first German armed forces left the ports, all units of the “Grand Fleet” were in three columns after the ordered meeting point at sea, namely from Scapa from Admiral Jellicoe with the I. and IV. Battle Squadrons, III. Battle cruiser squadrons, II. Cruiser and IV. Light cruiser squadrons, as well as the IV., XII. and a division of the XI. Flotilla; von Cromarty from Admiral Jerram with the II. Battle Squadron, the I. Cruiser Squadron and a guide ship and nine destroyers from the XI. Flotilla; von Rosyth from Admiral Beatty with the I. and II. Battle Cruiser Squadrons, the V. Battle Squadron, the I., II. and III. Light cruiser squadrons and 27 destroyers from the XIII., IX. and X. Flotilla (Map 1). For the rather difficult departure of so numerous armed forces at night, an extensive organization was created, similar to that on the German side, the main value of which was based primarily on the fact that only two short signals were required to set the gigantic apparatus in motion: In response to a preparatory signal, which consisted of only one word, all ships immediately opened steam for 18 nautical miles and were clear to sea in two hours, while the admiral in command on the Shetland and Orkney Islands informed the outposts of the impending departure of the fleet. The second signal contained the time at which the first squadron should lift anchor, as well as the voyage to be started after passing the submarine network locks. Everything else, such as the order in which the squadrons had to leave port, the squadron and division spacing, the choice of departure course north or south of the Pentland Skerries, and the deployment of the anti-submarine defense by the destroyer flotilla, was precisely defined and required no further signals. Finally, the organization also stipulated that after the squadrons had passed the Pentland Skerries, taking into account the danger of the submarines, they would drive until dawn on three different routes which were 7 nm apart (1). Similar arrangements were made for the departure from the Moray Firth and Firth of Forth.

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1) Jellicoe: The Grand Fleet, page 299.<sup>229</sup>

## **9. Skagerrak. - From the departure of the fleets to the meeting of the cruisers.**

The lively activity of the German submarines directly in front of the bases of the "Grand Fleet" urged special caution this time when they depart. A few hours before Admiral Beatty and his armed forces left the Forth, a submarine attacked the destroyer "Trident", one of the guide ships of the Blyth submarine flotilla, and another attacked the minesweeper in the afternoon in front of the Pentland Skerries "Gentian" was torpedoed and a third was sighted off Aberdeen that same day.

Of the many submarines of the High Seas Fleet at sea, initially only "U 67" (Nieland), "UB 22" (Putzier), "U 70" (Wünsche) and "U 32" (v. Spiegel) had the keyword for the beginning of the German undertaking, and only these were therefore prepared for special events after the long and futile waiting period on the night of May 31st and the following morning.

After receiving the radio message, "U 32", to which the central sector in front of the Firth of Forth broadcasting in an easterly direction was assigned, arranged the overnight voyage in such a way that when it got light on the 31st it was about 80 nm east of May Island. The commander started from the idea that the English, who had to know about the presence of German submarines for many days if they ran out to counter-attack, would, if at all possible, use the darkness to pass the endangered area. If this was the case, and if they went to sea accordingly in the evening, they had to arrive in the area monitored by "U 32" when it got light. The correctness of this consideration should very soon become apparent. At 4.40 a.m. (31st V.) two warships came into view from the Forth, which were soon referred to as the small cruisers "Attentive" and "Adventure" (in reality "Galatea" and "Phaeton"). At a distance of 600 m from each other, they ran 18 to 19 nm and, due to the great lack of vision, approached so quickly that "U 32" only came within 900 m. As he was about to fire two bow shots at the forward cruiser and a stern shot at the second, the commander was disturbed by the fact that when the first shot had already been fired, the periscope remained in the extended position and betrayed the submarine.<sup>230</sup>


With the second shot the cruiser in front turned hard and the cruiser in the rear turned directly towards the submarine. This could just reach a depth of 15 m when the cruiser drove over the boat with a loud noise. As "U 32" at 5:10 am went back to 10 m depth, two battle cruisers surrounded by many destroyers wandered south-east through the periscope in the south at the limit of visibility; however, it was no longer possible to get a shot on these as well. Immediately they surfaced, erected the F. T. masts and submitted the extremely important report about the departure of enemy forces (map 1). Although a second boat, "U 70" (Wünsche), was standing in the neighboring square at the time and picked up the radio message, it did not sight enemy ships either before or after.

Meanwhile, at 2 a.m., also "U 66" (v. Bothmer) in its new waiting position 60 nm east of Peterhead received the keyword from Bruges about the start of the German fleet operation. The captain's first thought had been to return immediately to the inner part of his assigned sector in front of the Firth of Forth. However, since he believed that the German advance would take place in the direction of Sunderland, it seemed to him unlikely that English forces would leave the Forth in a north-easterly direction and thus come through the sector assigned to "U 66". In addition, based on previous experience, if British forces left close to the coast, the counteraction would be so strong that the submarine would see very little if the very hazy weather forced it to go underwater from the outset. For these reasons, the commander felt it would be more correct to remain in his current position in the hope that perhaps Scapa Flow forces would also depart towards Horn's Reef. This decision paid off. At 6 a.m. about 60 nm east of Kinnaird Head from a distance of about 5000 m from a thick cloud of fog suddenly an armored cruiser ran at high speed (20 nm) towards the submarine. This dived immediately and made all tubes clear to shoot. At that moment, however, the cruiser ("Duke of Edinburgh" class) accidentally turned and quickly disappeared into the haze. Now, however, a small cruiser with four funnels ("Birmingham") was approaching from the same direction, and soon a large number of destroyers could also be seen approaching the submarine in line abreast, 1000 m behind them a squadron of eight Capital ships approached in double keel line.<sup>231</sup>



Immediately giving up the already scheduled attack on the small cruiser, "U 66" ran into the ships of the line, "U 66" ran into the ships of the line, but had to go to a greater depth in front of a destroyer at a distance of 300 m while the squadron drove over the boat. (See text sketch 1.) The hope of running vertically from the enemy under water and still getting a shot at one of the final ships after passing the escort did not materialize.

Text sketch 1.  
Textskizze 1.



Angriff von „U 66“ auf Teile der britischen Flotte (31. Mai 1916).

Attack by "U 66" on parts of the British fleet (May 31, 1916).

When the periscope could be extended again, the ships of the line were already over and immediately afterwards disappeared in a thick layer of haze. It was less because of the destroyer counteraction than because of the foggy weather that the events had happened too quickly to be able to take advantage of the brilliant shooting opportunity. This confirmed the experience of the last few days that, in order to be successful, the submarines had to work over water and therefore had to remain outside the guard. Only when they were above water could they notify each other in good time by radio of the sighting, location and course of the enemy and then maneuver together towards the enemy. "U 66" appeared at 7.35 am and gave a radio message about the events.<sup>232</sup>

The aim of the enemy forces was uncertain, but futile to follow them. Only on their march back was there perhaps a chance of getting to them again. The commander, however, thought it unlikely that the sighted squadron, which in his opinion had left the Firth of Forth, would return there on the way back due to the known submarine danger, rather he believed that it would then go to Scapa Flow. He was therefore about to run at high speed into the line connecting Utsire to this base when the weather cleared up to the greatest possible range of vision; but this seemed to him to have a greater chance of meeting the enemy again if he advanced about 15 nm to SE at high speed in order to stand 50 to 60 nm east of Peterhead again in the evening.

Of the other boats in front of the Firth of Forth, "U 63" (Schultze) had, after having remained under water during the night in rainy and invisible weather and only at 5.45 a.m. had surfaced, received the radio messages from "U 32" and "U 66" about the sighting of enemy armed forces one after the other at 6.25 a.m. and 7.16 a.m. According to this, the English fleet had set sail during the night! After an English radio message about the formation and distribution of the outpost forces, however, it was to be assumed that enemy forces intended to leave or enter the next night as well. The commanding officer therefore decided to go to Bell Rock and cruise there at dusk and dawn on May 31 and June 1, respectively, perhaps that the enemy forces would return to the Forth after their end of their venture via this point. It had just as little noticed of the departure of the same as the neighboring boat "U 51" (Rumpel), although this too had been above water in its sector since 4:00 am, albeit close to the coast. "U 52" (Walther) had stood further to Sea in order to be able to charge the battery outside the guard. However, like "U 51", it did not learn anything about the departure of the enemy armed forces. On the other hand, "U 24" (Schneider), which had also kept under land south-east of the Forth from Hellhaben, immediately turned around to the radio messages from "U 32" and "U 66" and pushed outwards in its sector, but was able to no longer get in touch with the enemy. For "U 47" (Metzger), which was standing close to the coast near Kinnaird Head, it turned out to be hopeless from the outset, especially since wind and sea had increased considerably in the meantime.<sup>233</sup>

The attack by "U 66" on the II. Battle Squadron departing from Cromarty is not mentioned in the English description, rather submarines were allegedly only reported to the battle cruiser fleet departing from the Firth of Forth, namely the small cruiser "Galatea", the left wing ship of the advanced cruiser security, which at 4.50 a.m. was attacked by "U 32". While the first torpedo broke through the surface immediately in front of the bow of the "Galatea", the second passed behind the stern. Another submarine was reported from the cruiser "Yarmouth", right ahead of "Lion", the flagship of Admiral Beatty. This the battle cruisers dodged by turning 8 lines to port, only to turn back 20 minutes later, but before the old course was taken again, "Turbulent", one of the destroyers of the U-boat security, spotted a third submarine which, however, could no longer come to attack. The main hazard area seemed to have already passed by at the time. The setting up of the German submarines close to the hostile ports of call, on which so great hopes had been placed on the German side for the damage to the enemy before the battle, had not proven itself. But also in the reconnaissance service the overview and the marching speed of the submarines proved to be insufficient to allow the German fleet chief to recognize from their reports even the fact that the entire armed forces of the "Grand Fleet" were leaving. When at 6.37 a.m. the fleet flagship received the report from "U 32" that it had sighted two capital ships, two cruisers and several destroyers 60 nm east of the Firth of Forth on a south-easterly course, and this report about an hour later was the more significant of "U 66" following eight enemy capital ships, small cruisers and torpedo boats 60 nautical miles east of Peterhead (Map 1) on a north-easterly course, these reports from the fleet management suggested that the enemy, as so often, knew ahead of time of the departure of the German armed forces could have received. On closer inspection, however, the shortness of the time available to transmit the message of the departure of the German deep-sea forces seemed to speak against this assumption, as well as the composition and the widely differing rates of the reported units, so that in the end a connection between the enemy movements that had become known and one's own enterprise was considered improbable. In this view, the fleet management could not be shaken by the fact that immediately before the radio message from "U 66" was received, the main deciphering office in Neumünster had reported that after intercepted English radio messages, two capital ships or groups of those with destroyers had left Scapa Flow.<sup>234</sup>

The report also gave no picture of the enemy's intentions. It did not indicate any operational cooperation between the various armed forces that were sighted, nor any action against the German Bight, or any relationship with the German operation.

The news did not change anything in the ordered project, but only fed the hope that it would be possible to bring part of the enemy fleet to battle. But on the English side too, in the course of the morning (May 31) they were still quite unclear about the full extent of the German undertaking. Apparently the English submarines had achieved even lower reconnaissance results in front of the exits of the German Bight than the German ones in front of the British ports of call, and the observation of the German FT traffic also helped the English line, which is otherwise so spoiled in this regard, thanks to some clever German measures not the information he would have liked to have had. The mere fact that with the beginning of the enterprise the German fleet flagship, "Friedrich der Große", had exchanged his F. T. call signal with that of the F. T. station on the 3<sup>rd</sup> entrance in Wilhelmshaven, was enough to keep the departure of the naval flagship, and thus that of the German majority, a secret from the enemy. Even around noon, the English F. T. directional stations suspected the German battle fleet was still in the jade. Constantly informed by the Admiralty of all observations, Admiral Jellicoe had no reason to expect an imminent battle for his part, rather he concluded from the incoming reports that only one of the usual German cruiser advances was in progress and that the German battle fleet would leave considerably later to pick up the cruisers on their march back. So he had not yet adjusted to the fact that since the beginning of the Scheer era every undertaking on the German side was definitely looking for battle. One consequence of this underestimation of the enemy, but also of the German undertaking against Lowestoft, was the too extensive division of his armed forces. While he met with those of Admiral Jerram, who had left Cromarty, at 3 p.m. wanted to meet on the Peterhead – Lindesnes line, about 90 nautical miles west of the Norwegian coast, Admiral Beatty had orders to stand with the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the V Battle Squadron around this time about 70 nm south-southeast of the Gros, 110 nm west of the Jutian coast in the area of the Greater Fischer-Bank (map 1). Only then should both parts, the battle fleet to the south and the battle cruiser fleet to the north, converge within optical signal range. For the actual task of pulling the enemy into the battle fleet, this distance between the battle cruiser fleet and the main body was apparently too great.<sup>235</sup>

Since, however, after the entire course of events in the North Sea so far, one was only too inclined not to reckon with a battle at all, over time one had become more and more accustomed to the fact that the main task of the battle cruiser fleet was not so much a tactical interaction the battle fleet, as seen in the defense of German attacks against the English south-east coast, while the battle fleet must be held back far enough to prevent the enemy from rushing without counteraction on the X. Cruiser Squadron, and thus to roll up the northern blockade lines. A distance of 50 nm between the two parts of the "Grand Fleet" seemed the least that met these conditions, and the setup which Admiral Jellicoe chose in this case was the result of long considerations than the normal procedure, which had always been used before when, according to certain indications, a major German operation with an unknown destination was imminent. Only in the case of an own attack undertaking had so far deviated from this procedure and the distance was reduced to around 40 nm (1). This strategic combination would probably not have turned out to be flawed in the present case, if Admiral Scheer had not changed the original operational order at the last moment, taking into account the lack of aerial reconnaissance, to leave with the main body immediately behind the cruisers, a decision that proved to be extremely advantageous in later development and contributed significantly to the German victory in the battle of the cruisers.

The path paved by the mine search formations west of the Amrum Bank through the enemy minefields led the High Seas Forces safely into the open sea. Around 8 a.m. the I and II Reconnaissance Groups reached the area 35 nm west of the Lister Tief. Around 10 a.m. if the squadrons stood north of the English mine barriers, they moved from there to the northwest, passed the Horns Reef lightship at a distance of 35 nm and headed for the same route that the cruisers had taken two hours before them, the one in front of the south exit of the Skagerrak, the Lesser Fischer-Bank (map 1). In the event that the weather conditions improved, the fleet management had ordered that five airships should rise on May 31st and June 1st, one for long-range reconnaissance in the Skagerrak, another for that in the Hoofden, and three more in the sector North to West 280 to 200 nm from Heligoland.

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
1) Corbett: Naval operations, Volume III, page 325.<sup>236</sup>

As a result, according to the instructions of the Commander of the Navy Airship Division, Korvettenkapitän Strasser, the airships destined for the north and northwest should be scheduled for 2 a.m., the two for the southern area at 6 and 8 a.m. rising up; However, the further unfavorable weather conditions only allowed this in the later hours of the morning. Two of the airships, "L 11" and "L 17", could not leave their fixed halls at this time because of cross winds. In their place were the airships "L 21" and "L 23" housed in the revolving hall of Nordholz, and at 12:30 noon (31st V.) all five airships were underway, "L 14" in the direction of the Skagerrak, "L 23" after a point 240 nm east of Noss-Head (Pentland Firth), "L 21" after such a point 120 nm east of Peterhead (Moray Firth), "L 9" after such a 100 nm east of Sunderland and "L 16" after such a point 80 nm east of Flamborough Head (Humber). Arrived there, the airships were to strive in the line indicated by these points to the south to the respective nearest point and thus ensure the advance of the German fleet on an outpost line between about the 2nd and 4th degree of longitude against the English coast. Soon after the ascent, however, it became clear that the airships could only gain a very limited view in the very hazy weather and a lower cloud limit of 300 m.

In the meantime the armed forces had continued the advance as planned. The Main Body marched in a long keel line, order III. Squadron, Fleet Flagship, I Squadron, II Squadron (see text sketch 2). All associations were complete, only from III. Squadron was missing a ship, "König Albert", because the repair of the capacitors could no longer be postponed. The small cruisers "Stettin", "Munich", "Frauenlob", "Stuttgart", "Hamburg" and "Rostock" marched in a circle around the ships of the line with a torpedo boat each, 26 other boats were in the Submarine security at the individual squadrons. We marched forward about 50 nm, with the IX. Torpedo boat flotilla as submarine protection, the five battle cruisers, in front of them at a distance of about 8 nm in a quarter-circle reconnaissance sector from northwest to northeast the II Reconnaissance Group and the flagship of the II commander of the torpedo boat forces, right ahead the small cruiser "Frankfurt" with five boats of the 12th half-flotilla, on starboard the small cruiser "Wiesbaden" with four boats of the 11th and "Regensburg" with two boats each of the 3rd and 4th half flotilla, on port side the small cruiser "Pillau" with three boats of the 3rd and "Elbing" with three boats of the 4th half flotilla (see text sketch 3).<sup>237</sup>

Text sketch 2.

Textskizze 2.



Marchformation der Hochseeflotte (31. Mai Nm.).


Marching formation of the High Seas Fleet (May 31st pm.).<sup>238</sup>



At 3 p.m. stood the head of the III. Squadron about 55 nm west of Lyngvig, the battle cruiser 65 nm west of Lodbjerg.

At the same latitude, almost perpendicular to the course of the I Reconnaissance Group, the British battle cruiser fleet approached, at the head in two columns side by side the I and II Battle cruiser squadrons, 5 nm behind the V Battle Squadron, while the ships of the I, II. and III. Light cruiser Squadrons meet in a SE facing

Text sketch 3.




**Marchformation der deutschen Aufklärungsstreitkräfte (31. Mai 1916).**

Marching formation of the German reconnaissance forces (May 31, pm.).

Scout sector 8 nm in front of the capital ships. (Map 1.) Had Admiral Beatty continued on this course, it would have been around 5:30 p.m. about 40 nm behind the German battlecruisers and 20 nm in front of the German Main Body have crossed the course of the High Seas Forces. The intention associated with the German naval advance to cut off part of the enemy forces and put them into battle before the entire superiority of the British battle fleet could be thrown into the balance would probably have been achieved in this way. However, since the British Battle Cruiser Fleet had orders to turn north from the position ordered for that time and to run towards the "Grand Fleet" at 3 p.m., if nothing of significance had happened by then, events took a different turn. Even at 2:30 p.m. Admiral Beatty, who led the armed forces from the "Lion", his flagship, from the head of the 1st Battlecruiser Squadron, placed the reconnaissance line of the small cruisers on a different bearing, namely ENE-WSW, in the middle of the SSE line of "Lion", in order to have the small cruisers as cover between his own squadrons and the likely direction of approach of the enemy during the intended march north.<sup>239</sup>

At the same time he changed the formation of the capital ship squadrons so that the II. Battle Cruiser Squadron 3 nautical miles, the V. Battle Squadron 5 nautical miles north of the I. Battle Cruiser Squadron, to turn one of these squadrons on starboard and port side of "Lion" (See text sketch 4).

Text sketch 4.



### Marching formation of the British Battle Cruiser Fleet (May 31, 4 p.m.).

This change in formation delayed the advance in an easterly direction; But at 3 p.m., when the British cruiser commander assumed that he was only 10 nm away from the position ordered for 3 o'clock - in reality he was still 5 nm further north-west - he gave the signal that all armed forces of the battle cruiser fleet would be at 3:15 pm. should go on a northerly course.<sup>240</sup>

At the time he was with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron 45 nm west of the German battle cruisers, and even between the western wing of the German and the eastern wing of the British cruiser security there was still a gap of 16 nautical miles. Although the converging courses of the German and British armed forces should, sooner or later, have brought combat contact, it would undoubtedly have been more favorable for the latter if this point in time had come as late as possible. The longer this postponed, the closer the armed forces of Beatty's and Jellicoe's would have come in the meantime, the more unfavorable the situation would have become for the German armed forces. It was therefore a fortunate coincidence for the German fleet that immediately after the British battlecruisers turned northward, a very minor event led to premature contact with the battle.

Already at 3 pm. "Elbing", Fregattenkapitän Madlung, was on the left wing cruiser of the German reconnaissance line, a cargo steamer in the west - it was the Danish ship "U. Fjord" - sighted and "B 109", the leader boat of the 4th torpedo boat half-flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Adolf Dithmar, together with "B 110", Kapitänleutnant Vollheim, sent to investigate the same. Almost at the same time, however, this steamer was also sighted by "Galatea" and "Phaeton", the two cruisers on the eastern wing of the British reconnaissance line, in ESE about 12 nm (Map 2). It was noticed that this ship had stopped and was blowing off steam. While all the other ships in the British battlecruiser fleet swiveled north at 3:15 p.m., Commodore Alexander Sinclair, the leader of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron embarked on "Galatea", ran with his two ships towards the steamer to find out more, the second division, "Inconstant" and "Cordelia" immediately followed - and soon afterwards the commodore recognized first one and then a second warship near the steamer's masts and chimneys. Coming closer, he held the two very large boats of the 2nd Flotilla - because these were the ones in question - for cruisers, began to hunt them and reported them by radio at 3:20 pm with the simultaneous flag signal "Enemy in sight". Eight minutes later, the armed forces sighted were recognized as torpedo boats and taken under fire by "Galatea" and "Phaeton". Given the great distance, this could not be answered successfully by "B 109" and "B 110", which were very soon surrounded by impacts. But help was already approaching from the northeast, because in the meantime "Elbing" had also seen clouds of smoke in the direction indicated by the headlight signal from "B 110" and turned towards them at full speed.<sup>241</sup>

However, she initially mistook the vehicles that appeared under the clouds of smoke at the high forecandle as battlecruisers, reported them as such by radio message at 3:27 p.m., and only when the enemy forces turned to the north for the passage battle with "Elbing" they were recognized as small cruisers. Now also "B 109" reported by radio message: "Individual enemy forces in 164 γ IV" (about 90 nm west of Bovbjerg): At 3:32 o'clock "Elbing" opened fire at 130 to 140 hm, immediately afterwards also heavily shot at and scored a hit against "Galatea" very soon, despite the considerable passing speed, the first in the Skagerrak battle! The shell hit under the bridge, broke through two or three decks, but unfortunately did not detonate (1).

Already after the first covering salvo, the "Galatea" turned off at 3:39 pm, while the two other ships of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, "Inconstant" and "Cordelia", were now approaching and were clearly trying to keep the German ships to the northwest behind them to pull in. With this, Commodore Sinclair, since he had in the meantime identified a number of other German small cruisers and torpedo boats in the northeast and stronger clouds of smoke "as from a fleet" in the east-northeast, the purpose of the battle cruiser fleet, which he at the time was about 20 nm west-southwest of "Galatea" "Already on the advance to the east knew how to make it possible to seize the sighted German armed forces from the south. But in this way he gave up any further clarification from the start. Not enough with that, the III. Light cruiser squadrons of this movement immediately after the leader of the same, Admiral T. D. W. Napier, had instructed the aircraft mother ship "Engadine" to seek cover with the battlecruisers. "Elbing" for its part turned up immediately and followed the enemy on the course he had taken, but was cautious enough to go north after a few minutes, so that from 3:48 to 4:07 o'clock they only saw "Galatea" and "Phaeton" could still take fire with interruption and at a very great distance, while the English cruisers standing further to the west kept out of range. At the same time, at about the same level as "Elbing", "Frankfurt" and "Pillau" joined from the east (Map 3).

On "Frankfurt", the flagship of the leader of the 2nd Reconnaissance Group, Kontreadmirals Boedicker, a headlight signal from the "Elbing" was read incorrectly via the detection signals used by the enemy at 3:20, as was the case on "Lützow", which gave it the meaning that "Elbing" reported a hostile main body of 24 to 26 ships of the line.

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1) Battle of Jutland, Official Dispatches, p. 172. The Fighting at Jutland by H. W. Fawcett and C. W. W. Hooper, p. 6.<sup>242</sup>

Admiral Boedicker had thereupon immediately given up the reconnaissance in the previous direction, which he could do all the sooner since the horizon to the north was very clear, and, with calls from the other cruisers of the reconnaissance line, immediately pushed forward at full speed to the west. "Pillau" attached itself as it passed, and at 3:40 pm the radio message from "Elbing" was received, with which this enemy battle cruiser reported 105 nm west of Hanstholm. Thereupon Kontreadmiral Boedicker changed with "Frankfurt", Kapitän zur See Thilo v. Trotha and "Pillau", Fregattenkapitän Mommsen, going on a 26 nm voyage, course in this direction, and 10 minutes later came across the "Elbing" while some torpedoes were already running towards the German cruisers, five ships of the "Caroline" class in sight on a northbound course; however, battlecruisers were nowhere to be seen. There is no doubt that the signal from the "Elbing" was an error or a F. T. error, which has now been corrected by a radio message. While "Elbing" now took the lead and gradually eight enemy small cruisers could be counted, "Frankfurt" and "Pillau" also opened fire against the two enemy top ships at 4:12 p.m. at 150 hm, but had to do so after a few volleys to stop again at 4:17 pm, as all enemy cruisers were staggered and the distance became too great in this way, although the German cruisers continued to chase the enemy at full speed.

The I Reconnaissance Group had soon joined the movements of the "Elbing" and later those of the "Frankfurt" and "Pillau". Already on the first report of the "Elbing" that clouds of smoke were in sight in a south-westerly direction, Admiral Hipper was at 3:27 am with the battle cruisers, which "Wiesbaden" and "Regensburg" joined from the eastern wing of the reconnaissance line, advanced in a broad squadron to WSW. But soon afterwards, under the impression created by a signal error that "Elbing" had reported an enemy bulk of 24 to 26 ships of the line, he had them swivel back to the keel line on SSW course, as he anticipated an imminent battle in this direction in view of the projectile impacts that were already recognizable around "Elbing". The further reports of the "Elbing" and the leader of the II Reconnaissance Group let him win the opinion that initially there were only four small cruisers of the "Calliope" class, those of "Elbing", "Frankfurt" and "Pillau" "Chased north. Already at 3:45 p.m., Admiral Hipper threw the battlecruisers with a turn to the west, at 3:50 p.m. to WNW, nine minutes later on NNW again formed the keel line and at 4:10 p.m. chased after the small cruisers with a speed of 23 nm (Map 2 & 3).<sup>243</sup>

With this move he was unconsciously meeting Admiral Beatty's intentions. When the reports from the "Galatea" revealed that it was by no means a single German cruiser, but rather a larger armed force, he decided to abandon the original plan of operations as obsolete by the events in order to save the reported armed forces, if possible to cut off from their line of retreat. As a result, Admiral Hipper and his battlecruisers had scarcely turned towards WSW than Admiral Beatty swiveled with the 1st and 2nd Battlecruiser Squadrons to SSE, a movement which the V Battle Squadron, as the corresponding flag signal could not be recognized from there, was not until then followed a few minutes later. However, this brief delay in command had sufficed during a voyage of 22 nm to increase the distance between the latter and the battlecruisers to more than 10 nm. At 3:35 o'clock "Galatea" ENE reported from their position further thick clouds of smoke "like from a fleet", and this moved Admiral Beatty, at 3:46 o'clock the destroyers "Onslow" and "Moresby" to the nearby aircraft mother ship "Engadine" to dispatch and from the latter to schedule an aircraft in the reported direction. However, it took 20 minutes for it to be lowered into the water and ascended. On the other hand, "Galatea" reported at 3:51 p.m. that the clouds of smoke they saw, apart from small cruisers and destroyers, came mainly from seven larger ships (Map 3). From the bearing, location, and course still north of the same, Admiral Beatty believed that he had now reached enough south to put them into battle before they could run back to Horns Reef. So he now gradually swiveled the three columns of his capital ships further and further to port, until it was soon after 4 o'clock pm. steered East course, ready to go to the top of the engine at any moment. In fact, the German battlecruisers on a WSW course were just meeting them at this time. However, the distance was still 29 nm when the latter soon afterwards, but out of sight of the British heavy forces, pulled away across the course direction of the latter to the northwest in order to follow the "Elbing", "Frankfurt" and "Pillau". After Admiral Beatty had therefore seen nothing on the east course and in the meantime it had emerged from the reports of the "Galatea" that the I. and III. Light cruiser squadrons were still dragging the enemy to the NW, he swiveled to NE at 4:15 p.m. at 24 nm. At this time the V battle squadron was about 7 nm WNW, the II. Battle Cruiser Squadron 3 nm NNE of the I Battle Cruiser Squadron, while the II. Light cruiser squadron "Nottingham" and "Dublin" were on the starboard side next to the II. Battle Cruiser Squadron, "Southampton" and "Birmingham" followed about 5 nm behind it (Map 3).<sup>244</sup>

At 4:20 pm, the German battlecruisers spotted two columns of large ships approaching rapidly in a west-southwest direction; at 4:22 am, two battlecruisers from their tripod masts (the II. Battlecruiser Squadron) were already clear from "Seydlitz" at a distance of about 15 nm to recognize. A minute later the battle cruiser "Princess Royal" also drew attention to clouds of smoke in E by N, but it was not until 4:25 pm that the other British ships in ENE also recognized five strong columns of smoke, soon afterwards mast tops and chimneys (Map 4). Whether the British ships stood out better against the brighter horizon in the west, whether the German measuring and observation devices were better or the light gray paintwork of the German ships was fortunate, and in which of these circumstances the reason was that the British ships were sighted earlier than they were German, may remain open; In any case, it was still a long time on the German side before further details about the formation and course of the armed forces sighted could be observed. Only so much seemed certain that the newly sighted forces, among these six large ships, were heading north, and that determination was decisive in the choice of course of action. In accordance with the German plan of operations, in no way inclined to avoid the opportunity for combat that presented itself here, Admiral Hipper was determined, even though the northern course distanced him from his own main body, to take up the engagement even in this unwelcome direction. He therefore stayed on course, approached the II Reconnaissance Group, and ordered the fire to be distributed from the right, ready to give the signal to open fire at the next moment. At 4:29 p.m., however, a change of course was noticeable on the opponent's side.

Around this time Admiral Beatty, since he had in the meantime seen from the enemy bearing that he had gone too far north for his intention to cut it off, turned back on an easterly course, called "Clear ship to battle" and ordered at 4:33 Clock, while the II. Light Cruiser Squadron with the destroyers of the IX. and XIII. Flotilla took the lead, the II. Battlecruiser Squadron, on the ESE course behind the I. to the battle line. At the same time, the V Battle Squadron, which at the time was still 8 nm behind in a west-north-westerly direction, received the signal to advance further east at maximum speed.<sup>245</sup>



The visibility was good, the sun behind, the wind WNW. If Admiral Hipper stayed on the previous course, the British battlecruisers stood between the enemy and his base. Whether or not he received assistance, it was Admiral Beatty's job to put ships of the same class as his own into battle, and to keep in touch with them so long as he himself was not evidently inferior in number. In this case, however, he had a great advantage, his situation seemed to him tactically and strategically equally favorable and so he could not be in doubt about the correctness of his decision.

But scarcely had it been observed on the German side, in a certain misunderstanding of the movement of the II. Battlecruiser Squadron at 4:33 p.m., that the enemy seemed to swing south from the column formation to the battle line when Admiral Hipper in turn swiveled to starboard and started on a south-easterly course. He followed the new movement of the enemy all the more because it opened up the possibility of drawing the enemy forces on his own. At the same time he went down from 23 to 18 nm in order to allow the three ships of the II Reconnaissance Group still 10 nm behind to approach. Shortly before, the latter had seen the enemy aircraft. Because of the very low cloud cover, this had to fly extremely low and was briefly fired at 40–50 m above sea level (map 4). Admiral Boedicker was about to send a fleet torpedo boat to a steamer in sight, which could be considered an aircraft mother ship, when Admiral Hipper ordered that the small cruisers should rally to the 1st Reconnaissance Group. They turned, and that movement was the only thing of any importance that was detected by the plane and reported over the radio. When it wanted to continue the reconnaissance, the engine failed, so the plane had to go down on the water at 4:45 p.m. and was recovered a quarter of an hour later.

Meanwhile all the measuring instruments and telescopes on the German and English battlecruisers were aimed at one another. According to the observations on “Lützow” the enemy seemed to be on a southerly course with all ships at 4:35 pm, at the head 3 “Lions”, then “Tiger” and 2 “Indefatigables”, behind them, only now recognizable, at a greater distance 4, according to other observations 5 “Queen Elizabeths”, while small cruisers and destroyers also steamed south in large numbers. All men had long been on combat stations and everyone was eagerly awaiting the signal to open fire.<sup>246</sup>


At 4:44 o'clock the German ships of their class were recognized by the "Lion", and it was believed that the "Hindenburg", "Lützow", "Derfflinger", "Seydlitz" and "Moltke" were in front of them. It was a tremendous impression that nobody could escape who witnessed it, when, after the breathtaking haste of the march, the German and British battlecruisers, the most powerful and beautiful ships of both fleets, turned to the battle line in majestic security, like "fate itself" and the first thunder of the guns was preceded by moments of the greatest calm and concentration of all forces.

It is true that once before, on January 24, 1915, these ships had measured themselves in battle; but this time the situation was completely different. At that time the meeting took place without the German side being prepared for it or even having made any preparations to accommodate the German battlecruisers. This time, however, the meeting was wanted on the German side and the entire German battle fleet was ready not to let the German battle cruisers stand alone against superior forces. However, in the mistaken idea that the German battle fleet had not left the Jade even by noon, and despite the large number of its light forces without sufficient effective reconnaissance before the top, Admiral Beatty believed that this time he could achieve what he had not succeeded at the time: to cut off the German battlecruisers from their bases and destroy them with 10 capital ships against 5. Victory seemed certain to him as he turned towards Horns Reef towards the battle line; he did not yet know what this decision would cost him.

Admiral Jellicoe also believed the majority of the German fleet was still in port when he received the first signal from the "Galatea" at 3:20 pm on "Iron Duke", 65 nm north-northwest of the place where the German ships were sighted. Already at 3 o'clock he had stood back 19.5 nm from the position intended for this point in time after the position of the "Iron Duke", as he had been held up by the usual stopping and examination of the merchant ships and fishing vessels encountered. An increase in the speed of the fleet, which was marching at 15 nm, did not seem possible to him if the destroyers were to keep enough fuel to accompany the squadrons at sea for two more days, as intended.

Admiral Jellicoe's impression when the first radio messages were received was also, since they only spoke of enemy small cruisers and destroyers, that the reported German light forces, when sighting the British superiority, were due to the danger, being cut off by these from their line of retreat towards Horns Reef would see no other way out than to escape through the Skagerrak.<sup>247</sup>

Text sketch 5.



Marching formation of the "Great Fleet" (May 31, pm.).

But then there was III, which was marching around 20 nm in front of the British battle fleet and was already (50 nm WSW from Lindesnes) close to the entrance to the Skagerrak. Battlecruiser squadron in an extraordinarily favorable position to thwart this attempt by the enemy as well. (See text sketch 5 and 6) As a result, he hesitated, the III. Battle cruiser squadron, as originally intended, to be sent immediately to the battle cruiser fleet, and for the time being he also saw no reason to deviate from the previous direction with the battle fleet. He therefore only ordered that all the armed forces should immediately open steam in all the boilers and otherwise continued to steer zigzag courses on the previous course and with the previous voyage.<sup>248</sup>

Only when he learned from a radio message from the "Galatea" at 3:43 that it had seen thick clouds of smoke "like from a fleet" in an east-northeast direction from its location, 95 nm west of Lodbjerg, did Admiral Jellicoe give this so far with consideration for them Zigzag driving carried out under the submarine danger, and advanced with the battle fleet at a speed of 17 nm on SE by E course. 12 minutes later (3:55 hrs) he was already at 18 nm and ordered the opening of steam in all boilers to be accelerated by all means and the final preparations to be made for "clear ship for battle". At 4:02 p.m. he swiveled all columns on SE by S in the direction of Horns-Riff and ordered the forward cruiser security to increase the distance to 16 nm. A few minutes later he received the location of the "Elbing" and the torpedo boat "B 109" for 3:31 o'clock according to the British F. T. direction stations by the Admiralty, a strategic advantage that the German fleet chief did not have. It was only when Jellicoe received Admiral Beatty's position at 4:15 pm and saw that the two flagships "Iron Duke" and "Lion" were still 71 nautical miles after their cutlery (which, however, as was only later discovered, contained considerable navigational discrepancies) apart, he went to 19 nm. At this large distance, however, there were initially no concerns, especially since Admiral Beatty was on a NE course at 23 nm after the same report and the enemy followed the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron in a north-westerly direction after a report from "Galatea". Rather, the British fleet commander saw that the battlecruiser fleet was chasing some enemy small cruisers and destroyers north. If this was the case, the latter had at 5 p.m. encounter the advanced cruiser security of the battle fleet. As a result, orders were given to all flag officers to report the situation to the divisions they led, and in particular, Commodore Hawksley, leader of the destroyer flotilla in the battle fleet, was advised that he could expect the appearance of enemy forces within a very short time.

No sooner had the corresponding flag signal been brought down than the situation turned out to be completely different on the basis of new reports. At 4:40 pm an urgent radio message was received from "Lion", according to which five enemy battlecruisers with a large number of torpedo boats had been sighted, a second radio message indicated their course as S 55° E and a third reported that Admiral Beatty was already in action. All hope of being able to intervene with the battle fleet in the near future had thus failed.<sup>249</sup>

More than ever it seemed as if a general battle was not to be expected again, but only a repetition of the hunt for the enemy battlecruisers, which had always been in vain. The British fleet chief's wait-and-see attitude so far had come to an end due to the last radio reports. Around 5 p.m. he went with all squadrons to 20 nautical miles, had the ships of the line pull out of the wake of their men in front in order to increase the speed over the bottom in this way, and ordered the III. Battle Cruiser Squadron, Kontreadmiral The Hon. H. S. Hood, to seek connection with the battle cruiser fleet at top speed and to support it.

Admiral Hood was up with his battle cruisers "Invincible", "Inflexible", "Indomitable", the small cruisers "Chester" and "Canterbury" and the destroyers "Christopher", "Ophelia", "Shark" and "Acasta" at 4:15 pm on the first radio messages from the "Galatea" that it was being chased north by hostile light cruisers, had already pushed forward at 22 nautical miles to the east on its own initiative in order to cut off the latter, and on the news that the enemy cruisers had turned south, he had already changed course to S 26 ° E of his own accord when he received the welcome order to join Admiral Beatty. At that time, Admiral Hood's armed forces were already about 25 nm to port ahead of "Iron Duke" and about 43 nm N by E from the position indicated by "Lion", the flagship of the 1st Battlecruiser Squadron, for 4:50 pm. Since "Lion" was already steering S 55° E after its last report, Admiral Hood believed that he could reach this ship the quickest on an SSE course. At 5:12 p.m. he therefore advanced in this direction at a speed of 25 nm. The prospect of reaching the considerably faster ships of the I and II Battlecruiser Squadrons, if they maintained the southern course, was extremely slim, however. Only later did it become apparent what an unforeseen effect this advance by III. Battle Cruiser Squadron would exercise.

After the III Battle Cruiser Squadron was detached, Admiral Jellicoe had half an hour of anxious anticipation, because not a word reached the highest commanding officer of what had happened in the meantime with the battlecruiser fleet. In particular, he was without any news about the V Battle Squadron. When he asked his chief, Admiral Evan Thomas, at 5.17 am whether the squadron was with Beatty's battlecruisers, the only laconic answer was: "Yes, I am in action".<sup>250</sup>

Admiral Jellicoe had at the time the firm confidence that "under the determined leadership of Sir David Beatty with a force of 6 battlecruisers and 4 of the best and fastest British battleships would inflict very heavy casualties on the 5 Germans, provided that the latter could be kept within the range of fire of British artillery (1). The ships of the 5th Battle Squadron in particular were far superior to the German battlecruisers in terms of combat power, and even the slowest ship in this squadron had such a speed that it could avoid superior forces at any time." The British fleet commander was much more concerned about the fact that with the march of all armed forces south, he released the Skagerrak and the northern waters between Scotland and Norway and in this way made it easier for German blockade breakers, auxiliary cruisers and mine layers on the way to break through to the Atlantic Ocean. In order to prevent this, he ordered the chief of the X. Cruiser Squadron, Admiral Tupper, at 5:38 p.m. to push his forces, which had been withdrawn as a result of the German submarines to the west, back to the Norwegian coast. At 5:50 p.m., however, Admiral Jellicoe sent the significant radio message to the Admiralty that a battle was imminent on the basis of further reports that had since been received from Beatty's cruisers. Thereupon all shipyards and ports along the coast were made ready. Tugs, pump steamers and other auxiliary ships opened up steam in order, for example, to be able to bring help to ships of the "Grand Fleet" that were damaged in a battle. But nowhere was the tension greater than among the squadrons and flotillas that had remained behind in port; the half-red radio message forms, which by their very color announced urgent signals, were sufficient evidence that great things were going on in the North Sea. The "Harwich" forces suffered particularly under Commodore Tyrwhitt from the fact that they were held back, although it had always been emphasized that, if a battle was imminent, they should immediately join the "Grand Fleet" at full speed. A request for an order to that effect was not answered by the Admiralty. On the other hand, went at 6 p.m. a radio message to Commodore Tyrwhitt, according to which Admiral Bradford had decided to go with the III. Battle Squadron and III. Cruiser squadron to advance from its readiness position in the Swin to the Black Deep lightship. Now the leader of the "Harwich" armed forces could no longer be held. He was still able to reach the area near Horns-Riff, which his cruisers and flotillas frequented so frequently, in time to attack German armed forces that were returning there during the night.

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1) Jellicoe: The Grand Fleet 1914/16, page 329.<sup>251</sup>

At 6:15 he reported to the Admiralty that he was going to sea, but almost at the same time received the order to continue with the fuel replenishment; he might later have to relieve the light cruisers and destroyers in the battle cruiser fleet. The commodore saw in this instruction only the answer to his first inquiry. He therefore decided to wait for the effect of his last radio message, that he was already at sea, and continued the advance. But 20 minutes later he found himself in possession of the order: "Return immediately and await orders (1).

The reason for this was that the Admiralty, repeatedly fearing that a German advance to the north or north-west might only be intended as a diversionary maneuver for a large undertaking against the English Channel, could not make up his mind to expose the eastern canal exit of armed forces in the interests of the naval action. In any case, she wanted to await the further development of the situation before making new decisions.

On the German side, on the other hand, all available armed forces had been deployed for the naval advance from the outset, regardless of the protection of the rear and the protection of the German Bight. There were therefore no more reserves of any importance in the port. Only six of the eleven flight worthy airships were left in the halls; The commander of the naval airship division, Korvettenkapitän Strasser, however, in accordance with the order of operations, considered it more correct to save them for the second day of the operation, especially given the unfavorable weather. The ascent of the other airships was also delayed by about 12 hours due to the weather, so that when the German and British naval forces first met, none of the airships had crossed the Terschelling-Horns-Riff line. It is impossible to predict what course the events of the day would have taken if, in particular, "L 23" and "L 14" had reached their assigned reconnaissance area in front of and in the Skagerrak as early as it was originally planned. One had to hope all the more that the airships would now gain contact with the enemy. Almost all airships involved had very soon received information about the battle of the II Reconnaissance Group as well as the location and course of the German and British battlecruisers through the radio messages transmitted to them. "L 21", Kapitänleutnant of the Reserve Dietrich, who was supposed to clear up the north-eastern part of the Dogger Bank, however, since "L 23" and "L 14" to the east of him had to be considerably closer to the scene of the upcoming fighting, these radio messages did not dissuade them from their task of taking over the north-west security of the fleet, especially since "L 9", Hauptmann Stelling, who had been responsible for the western security, had already turned back due to an engine breakdown.

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1) Corbett: Naval operations, Volume III, page 350.<sup>252</sup>



However, "L 23", Kapitänleutnant v. Schubert, who was able to reach the battlefield the fastest from his location, at 5 p.m. from Horns Reef there. When the commander saw from the other radio messages, however, that Admiral Hipper was in action with superior forces, he changed his mind and decided to replace "L 14", which in his opinion had to be far behind, the now most important northern security to take over for the battlecruisers. The commander of "L 23" felt encouraged in this decision when "L 14", Kapitänleutnant of the Reserve Böcker, reported at 5:50 p.m. that he was heading for the reported enemy forces from a point 15 nm north of Horns-Riff. Shortly afterwards, "L 14" came into view to starboard astern, while "L 23" now advanced about 45 nm west of Lyngvig on north 30° east into the Skagerrak. Meanwhile "L 16", Kapitänleutnant Sommerfeldt, had at 5:10 p.m. reached a point 60 nm west of Terschelling in order to monitor the Hoofden from there, while "L 9", Hauptmann Stelling, who was responsible for the western security to the north, was already at 4:28 p.m. about 60 nm north of Terschelling due to a break in the starboard propeller shaft, as already mentioned, the ordered reconnaissance had to break off, and at 6:45 p.m. landed in Hage. In contrast, "L 21" (Dietrich) was on his route map at 6:30 p.m. only 50 nm WSW from the place where the first meeting of the German naval forces with the enemy took place, but could not gain a greater view with the hazy air, rarely illuminated by sunshine and low cloud cover. German or British armed forces had not yet seen any of the airships, contrary to expectations, with visibility changing between three and ten nautical miles.

The German fleet commander therefore remained dependent on the forward cruisers and torpedo boats for all reports about the enemy. At 3:28 p.m., he had already learned that "B 109" had sighted individual enemy armed forces about 85 nm WNW of Bovbjerg (map 1 and 2). At the time, the head of the III squadron had reached the area 50 nm west of Lyngvig, so the enemy was 50 nm NW of the main body, about 25 nm south-west of the German battlecruisers. But it was not yet clear from the reports what kind of armed forces it was.<sup>253</sup>

The Fleet Commander then let the squadrons close to the battle line while "Hannover", the flagship of the 2nd Admiral of the II Squadron, sat at the end of the line, but maintained the course, speed and formation as before, without entering into march in columns. Only half an hour later, when Admiral Hipper reported strong enemy forces, Admiral Scheer had drum and horn struck "clear ship for battle" and set off with the squadrons on a 15 nm voyage. The next radio messages from the leaders of the I and II Reconnaissance Groups were disappointing, as they were used to revoke reports about strong armed forces, especially enemy battle cruisers. Apparently only four small cruisers had been sighted and hunted in a northwesterly direction. At 4:30 p.m., however, Admiral Hipper again reported heavy enemy forces, which consisted of six ships were steering a north course about 95 nm west of Lodbjerg while the enemy small cruisers had turned off. A complete clarification of the situation was only brought about by the radio message received at 4:55 p.m. with the following content: "Six enemy battlecruisers and light enemy forces 151 gamma (95 nm west of Lodbjerg) steer SE. I. Reconnaissance Group 004 epsilon (85 nm west-northwest of Lodbjerg), SSE, 18 nm. I'm in action with six battlecruisers. Request location of your own Main Body. Commander of the reconnaissance forces." (see. text sketch 6 and 8.) Accordingly, a very favorable turn had occurred insofar as Admiral Hipper seemed to have succeeded, as intended in the order of operations, to provide part of the enemy armed forces and fight on it to draw their own Main Body. The distance between the German battle cruisers and the latter, however, was still 60 nm at the time. It was therefore a matter of relieving the burden on the German battlecruisers, who were considered materially weaker, as quickly as possible, but also, if at all possible, to postpone the retreat of the enemy. As time was pressing, Admiral Scheer refrained from letting the squadrons, as usual, march side by side from the keel line in the direction of the enemy and in this way take up the so-called "preparatory formation", instead, while the torpedo boats were gathering security from their flotilla commanders from the submarines, they advanced at full speed on a NW course at 5:05 p.m., a decision which he transmitted to the commander of the reconnaissance forces by radio, stating the location. The situation with the I and II Reconnaissance Groups then seemed to develop more favorably than initially assumed, in particular no further enemy heavy armed forces were reported. As a result, Admiral Scheer believed he still had enough time for a larger bypass movement and at 5:18 p.m. had the squadrons swivel on a west course in order to bring the enemy between the battlecruisers and the main body and thus prevent the former from turning away while sighting the main body and could escape with superior speed.<sup>254</sup>

Even while the course was changing, however, the II Reconnaissance Group reported a squadron of ships of the line of allegedly five ships north of the six enemy battlecruisers, the former following on an SE course and intervening at any moment in the battle that broke out between the battlecruisers, but at least had a crash and at speed cut off and destroy damaged German ships. Under these circumstances, the situation for Admiral Hipper was bound to become critical very soon. In addition, the western course of the fleet proved to be unfavorable for lookouts and later development for combat. As a result, Admiral Scheer felt compelled to break off the bypassing movement, which had just been initiated and in itself promising, and now to seek immediate union with the battlecruisers by all means. At 5:25 p.m. he therefore swiveled back in the fleet keel line with all the squadrons on a north course.<sup>255</sup>

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## 10. Skagerrak - First phase. - Battle of the battlecruisers and pursuit of the British north.

The battle of cruisers had been raging for more than half an hour. Already at 4:40 pm, the signal "Fire distribution from the left" was blowing on "Lützow", the flagship of Admiral Hipper. But the German Leader was still reluctant to give the order to open fire, since the measured distance from the enemy top ship was still 187 hm at the time. But this was about the upper limit of the range of the 30.5 cm guns of the "Lützow" and "Derfflinger", while the 28 cm of the "Moltke" could only fire at 178.5 hm. In contrast, "Seydlitz" and "von der Tann" with their 28 cm cannons had ranges of 192 and 205 hm respectively (1).

Although the 30.5 cm guns of the two English tailships could not fire at a distance greater than 170 hm, the 34.3 cm of the three top ships had a range of no less than 210 hm, and that of "Tiger" even over a distance of 219 m. Given the crucial importance of the first hit, Admiral Hipper had to do everything in his power to get through the danger zone, in which only the British ships could fire, as quickly as possible. At 4:45 p.m. he therefore had the battlecruisers turned two lines to starboard to SSE in order to achieve a faster approach to the enemy in a steep relay. To everyone's amazement, however, the guns of the enemy, who was still developing, remained silent. Admiral Beatty was fully aware of the tactical advantage of the greater range of his guns, and one should have assumed that, given the speed of his battlecruisers, which were several nautical miles superior, he would have been able to take advantage of them, which is all the more necessary was when the advantage of larger caliber and higher speed had only been obtained at the expense of armor.

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1) At these ranges, the increase in guns on "Lützow", "Derfflinger" and "Moltke" was 13.5°, on "Seydlitz" 16° and on "von der Tann" 20°. Reason for the lower elevation on the newer ships see North Sea, Volume III, page 207. All 15 cm guns had a maximum range of 149.5 hm at 19° elevation.<sup>256</sup>


It turned out, however, as in the battle at Dogger Bank, that the theoretical requirement of British artillery tactics to open the battle at the greatest possible distance, just outside the upper limit of the range of the German artillery, was not so in practice was easy to do. Quite apart from the fact that the development of the efficiency of the measuring instruments on the British ships had not kept pace with the increase in the range of the guns, the visibility from the windward position to the east, where the outlines of the German ships due to their light gray paintwork, was almost identical Air and water blurred than the much less favorable one. So it came about that Admiral Beatty, when the distance had actually dropped to 180 hm, believed he was still out of the range of his guns. It was only at 4:45 p.m. that he gradually swiveled his flagship to ESE, the intended combat course, while the other battle cruisers staggered on signal from the keel line to the line bearing NW-SE and in this bearing, taking into account the northwest wind direction, the chimney smoke and powder smoke seemed the best to follow the flagship in the battle line.

But the British battle cruisers were still in this formation transition when it flashed along the German line at 4:48 p.m. (see text sketch 6 and map 4 and 5). Half a minute later, the top ships of the British line began to fire the final ships "New Zealand" and "Indefatigable" only considerably later. The first salvo fell from "Lützow", Kapitän zur See Harder, at 154 hm, from "Derfflinger" and "Seydlitz", Kapitän zur See Hartog and v. Egidy, at 150 hm distance, from "Moltke", Kapitän zur See v. Karpf, at 142 hm and from "von der Tann", Kapitän zur See Zenker, at 162 hm. Here, according to the signal "fire distribution from the left", every German ship took the hostile one corresponding to its position in the line, but instead "von der Tann" took the fifth the final ship under fire, so that "New Zealand" with the smaller number of German battle cruiser initially remained unengaged. On the other hand, Admiral Beatty endeavored to bring his over a ship superiority to bear by concentrating the fire of the two top ships against "Lützow". As a result, the "Queen Mary" should have set fire at "Derfflinger" as the third ship. This English battle cruiser had not received the fire distribution signal and therefore first fired at "Seydlitz", so that "Derfflinger" remained completely unengaged for about 10 minutes. But even "Tiger" had not read the signal and therefore fired at the "Moltke" together with "New Zealand", so that it was shot at by two ships of the enemy line at the same time, like "Lützow". Only "Seydlitz" and "von der Tann" fought ship against ship, namely against "Queen Mary" and "Indefatigable". As a result of the poor visibility for the British and their unreliable distance measurement, the British fire was initially slow and unsteady.<sup>257</sup>

As from "Regensburg", which at the time was about 20 hm away in fire lee of the German line with boats of the II. and VI. Flotilla steamed up to the top, could be observed, the German battle cruisers were initially far overshooting, so that "Regensburg" and the torpedo boats were at times more endangered by the impacts than the large ships. An enemy battle cruiser (probably "Tiger") with its battery even stayed on "Regensburg" for about 10 minutes when it was at the height of the "Moltke". In addition, the advantages of the leeward position, in which the chimney smoke and smoke from the guns withdrew from the field of vision more quickly than in the windward position, were on the German side.<sup>258</sup>

Text sketch 6.

Textfigur 6.



Stellung beider Flotten 4.48 Uhr Nm.

Position of both fleets at 4:48 p.m.

The sighting-in was also made considerably easier for the German ships by the use of excellent measuring devices and observation instruments. In particular, the newly introduced periscope of the directional systems, through which the batteries were kept closed from the artillery control station by electrical remote transmission on the same target, made it possible to make out all the details of the enemy ships even at a great distance and to observe the effect of the hit with great reliability. In addition, on the German side, special emphasis had always been placed on quick sighting in and the highest rate of fire in effective shooting, even during training. The results of this education were now shown in the most brilliant light, and so the first artillery officers of the German battlecruisers, the Korvettenkapitän Paschen, v. Hase, Kapitänleutnants Foerster, Schirmacher and Korvettenkapitän Mahrholz, soon after shooting in, a decided fire superiority over their opponents (Map 5). Within a minute or two, the British battlecruisers disappeared almost completely in the huge columns of water of the German grenades striking and dying around them. After the first volleys, "Lion" and "Princess Royal" were hit twice each, "Tiger" four times at 4:51 p.m. (1). While the two hits on "Lion" caused major failures among the crews of the 10.2 cm guns, on "Princess Royal" the foremost turret was put out of action by a heavy shell. Ten minutes later, one of the guns can resume fire, but the other is silenced for the duration of the fight. Immediately afterwards the second turret was hit. In this case, however, the grenade does not penetrate the armor, but creates a smoke and gas hazard in numerous rooms of the ship, which are also shrouded in darkness for a long time due to the failure of the electrical light. The disturbances on "Tiger" that occur right at the beginning of the fight are even more difficult. The ship was hit in the forecastle at 4:52 p.m. Immediately afterwards, two grenades strike at once from a covering four-shot volley. One of them breaks through the 23 cm thick barbed armor of the rear turret, but unfortunately the grenade remains in the middle of the turret between the two guns without exploding. On the other hand, the other detonated on impact on the ceiling of the third turret and, in addition to destroying the telescopic sights and the measuring device, put both guns out of action for a time.

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1) The hit information here and still does not relate to German observations, but rather English statements.<sup>259</sup>



Due to the temporary failure of two heavy turret at once, it is difficult for "Tiger" to stay on target with the battery.

In the meantime, Admiral Beatty had gradually brought the enemy further and further astern by making small turns to starboard on a voyage during which the ships behind had to run 26 nautical miles. Nevertheless, the fighting lines at first came even closer, so that the German medium artillery, which was actually stronger, could begin to fire immediately after the sighting; however, it soon had to turn to some English destroyers, who had come too far astern due to the sudden pivoting of the two lines to the south and were now trying to steam to the point between the two lines, whereby they impaired the view of the German battlecruisers even further through heavy smoke from the chimney. At 4:54 pm, the distance had fallen to 118 hm according to the English measurements, and only now, after the German battlecruisers had swiveled to the keel line and Admiral Beatty had ordered the rate of fire to increase, did Queen Mary score at 4:55 am and 4:57 am one hit each against "Seydlitz". One of these put the front switch point for electrical current out of operation, but the second penetrated through the Barbette armor into the reloading chamber of one of the middle turrets and ignited the cartridges there. The turret fell out, and almost all of its crew fell victim to the flames; but it was possible to submerge the associated ammunition chamber in time and in this way to prevent worse. At 5 o'clock "Lützow", the German flagship, was hit for the first time. A heavy volley hit the forecastle, but did not result in any combat values being lost. In the meantime, Admiral Beatty had turned two lines from the enemy at 4:57 p.m. in order to increase the greatly fallen distance in consideration of the lesser armor of his ships and to evade the all too effective fire of the German artillery as quickly as possible. Two minutes later, Admiral Hipper also staggered a line in order to disrupt the targeting of the enemy (map 5). But neither minor changes in course by the British, nor their final turn by two lines from the enemy, could prevent the German batteries from reaching their destination. On the contrary, the bitterness of the battle now increased from minute to minute, and German artillery soon reached a climax. The four-shot volleys of the single German battle cruiser now followed each other at intervals of only 20 seconds and threw up columns of water around the enemy ships in such quantities that they literally thought they were going through a forest of fountains.<sup>260</sup>

On "Princess Royal" the rearmost turret is put out of action by a heavy hit, while another shell penetrates the upper deck at the height of the middle turret. At 5 o'clock, "Lion" received a hit that could easily have been disastrous for the ship. A heavy shell hits the turret located between the two rear funnels, tears off part of the turret ceiling, dies over the left gun and ignites the cartridges behind it and in the elevator. The crew is killed except for two men (see text sketch 7). The tower commander, himself fatally wounded, gave orders in good time to close the doors to the ammunition chamber and flood the latter. The jet flame that flared through all the floors of the turret and above it can therefore no longer reach the large number of cartridges stored in the chamber. It was only thanks to this circumstance that the British flagship was saved from the fate that now overtook the "Indefatigable", the line's final ship. This was barely 15 minutes under the fire of the "von der Tann" when it was observed from the latter ship at 5:03 p.m. how the British battle cruiser disappeared under several strong explosions in the middle and stern aisles in an enormous cloud of black smoke from twice the mast height. As could be ascertained at the same time from the neighboring ship "New Zealand", the ship was apparently first hit by two or three shells in a volley at the height of the aft turret, whereupon smoke from the stern emerged without the flames being visible "Indefatigable" no longer followed in the wake of the man in front turning to port, but began to sink over the stern. Immediately afterwards two more shells struck, one on the forecastle and one in the forward turret. This time, too, there was nothing conspicuous from the outside, neither fire, flames, nor smoke. The shells had penetrated the interior of the ship through the armor without detonating, and the tremendous effect was not visible until 30 seconds after the impact. Starting from the front, flames and clouds of smoke blow out of the hull, heavy debris is hurled up to 60 m into the air, the battle cruiser that was hit leans heavily to port and capsizes, dragging 57 officers and 960 men with it (1) (map 5). 52 - 28 cm and 38 - 15 cm shells from "von der Tann", at distances of 162 and 149.5 respectively. Fired up to 123 hm were enough to achieve this result.


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1) Two men were later rescued by the German torpedo boat "S 68".<sup>261</sup>

With "Change of target left", "von der Tann" moved its battery to the fifth ship, "New Zealand", which received 52 rounds of heavy artillery at a distance of 123 to 160 hm until another target change was necessary due to the course of the battle. After the sinking of the "Indefatigable", "New Zealand" also abandoned its previous target ("Moltke") and switched to "von der Tann" with its fire. But so tremendous was the tension of the nerves of enemy and friend, so deafening the thunder of their own volleys, the screeching and howling of the grenades flying over the ships or striking in front or behind them and so the iron combat discipline and the concentration on the combat activity incumbent on each one that on the other ships only a few noticed the sinking of the "Indefatigable" immediately. On the British flagship in particular, you had enough to do with yourself, because from 5:03 to 5:07, no less than six grenades fired by "Lützow" hit one behind the other, so that fires broke out in various places and there were heavy losses of dead and wounded.

Text sketch

7.



**Hit in the middle tower of the battleship "Lion".<sup>262</sup>**

Page 242      10. Skagerrak - First phase. Battle Cruisers and pursuit of the British. North.

From "Lützow" it therefore seemed as if the British flagship at that time slid out of the line with a list of 10° to starboard and, wrapped in thick smoke, temporarily came out of sight behind it. But the good effect on the target was also unmistakable from the other German ships, and the type of impact observed clearly testified to the considerable penetration and explosive power of the German projectiles. At times the opponent's fire ceased entirely, and the tactical context of the English line also seemed considerably loosened in places.

The reason for this lay, as can be seen from the English descriptions, for two reasons. On one occasion, the smoke obstruction by the top ships and the five destroyers steaming up between the two lines in light westerly to northwesterly winds made itself particularly noticeable at the time for the British line, so that Admiral Beatty, in order to reduce this, made another line at 5:06 p.m. had turned to starboard; at the same time, however, the British line was troubled by several reports of torpedo runways being sighted. It was "Moltke", which was the only battle cruiser between 5:04 and 5:08 p.m. at a distance of 105 to 95 hm from the enemy line who thought the time had come to use the torpedo weapon in which the German battle cruisers were superior to the English bring and fire a total of four torpedoes against the third battle cruiser ("Queen Mary") from the bow and starboard front broadside tube at an angle of 45° and 55°. Already at 5:11 pm a torpedo runway was sighted close behind the stern by "Lion", while a second torpedo passed under the "Princess Royal" and a third, as observed by the destroyer "Landrail", between "Tiger" and "New Zealand" seemed to pass the line of battlecruisers. Strangely enough, however, the impression arose on "Lion" and "Princess Royal" as if the sighted torpedoes were coming from "Fire lee", i.e. the side facing away from the enemy, so that they could only have been fired by enemy submarines. Admiral Beatty saw himself reinforced in this mistaken assumption by the fact that the destroyer "Landrail", which at the time was standing on the port side abeam of "Lion" in order to steam to the tip, actually hit the periscope of a U- shortly before the torpedo shot was observed. Believed to have sighted the boat and at the same time a second submarine was reported to starboard from the small cruiser "Nottingham", which was further ahead.<sup>263</sup>

Page 243      5:11 p.m.      Intervention of the 5th battle squadron.

Admiral Beatty therefore firmly believed he was passing a line of German submarines at the time, and while the smoke obstruction from the destroyers "Lydiard" and "Landrail" in Fire windward had previously been extremely uncomfortable, he was now grateful for the protection, which the destroyers gave his ships as submarine security (1).

After the impressions on the German flagship, the enemy had tried from the beginning to increase the distance, so that Admiral Hipper, in order not to lose the feeling of the battle, had to move from SE by S to SSE from 5 p.m. onwards, constantly increasing the speed and finally to turn to S by E. When, soon after the destruction of the "Indefatigable", a new turning of the enemy flagship became evident, Admiral Hipper, unwilling to allow the fire superiority he had just achieved to be snatched away from him as soon as possible, approached the enemy even more sharply at 5.10 a.m. with a turn on SzW (Map 6). This movement not only brought him within torpedo range of the enemy - at 5:11 a torpedo ran at an acute angle towards "Moltke" and made a curve shortly before the ship, apparently at the end of its run, while two more tracks behind the stern were sighted - but also made it possible for the V Battle Squadron to get within firing range of the German battlecruisers and thus to weigh in on the strong numerical superiority of the British armed forces.

At 4:57 p.m. this squadron was about 7 nm behind the British battlecruisers. Then immediately after the start of the battle the latter had disappeared in clouds of gun smoke, without the German ships with which they were firing, could have been recognized and without the V Battle Squadron having received any signal that would have made it easier for them to intervene more quickly. Therefore, Rear Admiral Evan Thomas stopped further east and immediately afterwards spotted three small cruisers heading south, four points to port, in faint outlines. It was the ships of II Reconnaissance Group which, due to the sudden development of the battle cruiser on a southerly course, had not yet been able to reach the position prescribed for them in front of the head of the I Reconnaissance Group, but were about 7 nm behind it.

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1) It is difficult to determine whether the torpedoes fired by "Moltke" or just "false alarms" were the cause of the alarm on the English line. If you stick to the specified times of firing and passing the enemy line, the distance seems too great and the interim time too short for the torpedoes of the "Moltke" to have even been able to reach the target within it. Then two torpedoes would have made a curve after passing the enemy line and thus gave the impression that they were running towards the line from "Fire leeward". In particular, an influence of the torpedoes fired by "Moltke" from the sinking of the "Queen Mary" appears to be unlikely.<sup>264</sup>

At the same time the leader of II Reconnaissance Group, Kontreadmiral Boedicker, saw five masts on the western horizon and behind each of them two chimneys apparently growing over the horizon. From this he concluded that he was facing five ships of the II British Battle Squadron, which he reported as such by radio message. Only then could he see a second mast on each ship, from which it emerged that there were four ships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class. The newest, strongest and fastest ships of the line in the British fleet had now appeared on the battlefield. No sooner was this established than the first 38 cm salvos struck at "Frankfurt", "Elbing" and "Pillau" at a distance of almost 170 hm, forcing these ships to move eastwards at maximum speed and smoke themselves, where they were effectively supported by one of the five boats of the 12th half-flotilla, "G 37", Lieutenant Commander von Trotha, who had stayed behind, and were standing by them (map 5).

Soon afterwards, however, the V Battle Squadron was presented with a better target. While Admiral Evan Thomas was still chasing the small cruisers east, at 5:05 p.m. he gained a view of the German battlecruisers standing south of them for the first time and immediately discovered that Admiral Beatty had turned south from his original combat course. This offered the opportunity to reduce the distance between the British battlecruisers and the V Battle Squadron, which had already grown again to 8 nm, more quickly and to bring help more quickly to the apparently hard-pressed leader of the former. Admiral Evan Thomas therefore immediately swerved after the battlecruisers and, as soon as the new course was in place, "Barham", the top ship, at an estimated distance of 174 m, opened fire at 5:06 pm on the final ship of the German line ("von der Tann"). Soon afterwards "Valiant", "Warspite" and "Malaya" fell into this fire, which they concentrated in pairs against "Moltke" and "von der Tann". Just as the Hydra grew new for every head that was cut off, four far more powerful opponents appeared on the scene for the "Indefatigable" that had just been destroyed. Fortunately, however, the German line was already so shrouded in mist and smoke that at great distances from the V Battle Squadron, more than one or two ships could seldom be seen. Often the flash of shots in the German line was the only clue for measurement and agreement. In addition, the destroyers of the V Battle Squadron made the mistake of trying to steam in "Fire windward", ie between the two lines, and restricted the overview even more with their chimney smoke.<sup>265</sup>



Page 245      5:11 p.m.      Intervention of the V battle squadron.

Nevertheless, the well-directed fire of the 38 cm batteries of the four "Queen Elizabeths" equipped with all modern aiming and firing devices proved to be extraordinarily effective, all the more so as the five German ships, already bound by as many enemy battlecruisers, against the ships of the line, which were initially far astern, were initially unable to free any artillery to respond. Soon, therefore, the German final ships were exposed to a veritable barrage of 38 cm projectiles and surrounded by the tightly packed impacts of full salvos fired in quick succession. As a result of the grenades striking in the immediate vicinity of the ship's side, the hulls trembled and roared, and right at the beginning, "von der Tann" was hit close to the stern by a heavy grenade fired by "Barham". The violent blow against the outermost end of the hull causes the hull to vibrate violently, like a tuning fork. The shell penetrated the impact between two armor plates just below the waterline, detonated in the process and hurled heavy chunks of armor through several decks. The steering machine overheats, the steering gear room is flooded by the penetrating water, but the worst, a steering failure, as on "Blücher" during the Dogger Bank battle, which would have handed the ship over to the urgent ships of the line, is avoided. The rudder continues to work after a brief interruption, the bulkhead behind the rear engine can be supported, and only 600 t of water remain in the ship for good and, with a list of 2° aft, allow it to sink to a draft of 10 m.

At 5:16 pm, "Moltke" is hit after many covering volleys. A 38 cm shell penetrates one of the coal bunkers and rips open the ammunition shaft of a 15 cm gun, jets of flames wound the chamber operator, the casemate deck is penetrated right behind the gun and the entire operator fails. But then both ships succeed in evading the almost all too closed salvos at least for some time with success by changing course and voyage in good time to suit the enemy's shooting procedure.

Meanwhile the fierceness of the artillery engagement between the two battlecruiser lines, despite all Admiral Hipper's attempts to stay on the edge of the enemy, had slackened considerably with increasing distance since 5:06. Observation became more and more difficult on both sides, especially when their own impacts coincided with the flashing of new enemy salvos, and according to British observation the German fire was often short at the time.<sup>266</sup>

## Page 246      10. Skagerrak - First phase. Battle Cruisers Pursuit of the British. North.

Enemy short salvos on their part threw enormous masses of water in front of the German ships, so that this also impaired the view of the enemy, and even if a better overview was possible from the observation posts in the battle masts, it was missing on the German ships in contrast to the English at the time still had facilities to direct the fire directly from this elevated position. When the distances increased over 180 hm, the aim point on some German ships was moved from the waterline to the upper edge of the chimneys, and finally to the enemy's battle masts, but that didn't help for long either, so that the German fire finally had to be stopped for a short time. The English fire also became weaker because, as on the German side, care had to be taken not to waste the scarce ammunition in the uncertain observation conditions over the great distances. As early as 5:10 pm, "Tiger" had great difficulty keeping an eye on its target, as "Regensburg", which stood in front of the head of the German line, was often counted as a battle cruiser. As a result of this mix-up, "Tiger" fired from now on several times against the third ship ("Seydlitz") instead of the fourth ("Moltke") of the German line. At times some of the English ships also had to cease fire. But when Admiral Beatty recognized the intervention of the V Battle Squadron, he too sought a new rapprochement with the battlecruisers in order to simultaneously increase the pressure on the German bottom ships (Map 6). Already at 5:12 p.m. he turned two lines and at 5:15 p.m. two more to the German line, and since Admiral Hipper had meanwhile maintained the previous course S by W and only from the turned-up squadron, which exposed the German final ships too much to the fire of the V Battle Squadron, had swiveled towards the keel line, the battlecruisers were now quickly approaching each other again, and soon the battle between them flared up again with renewed fierceness. Again "Lion" is in heavy German fire, receives several hits and, especially since a violent fire raged on it from before, is soon so wrapped in smoke and smoke that it is temporarily invisible to the ships behind "Lützow". As a result, "Derfflinger", since now considers "Queen Mary" to be the second ship of the enemy line, relocates fire on this at 5:16. At 5:17 pm, a hit from the "Queen Mary" put a 15 cm casemate on "Seydlitz" out of action. At 5:20 p.m., a grenade hit "von der Tann" through the barbette of the front heavy gun turret. The turret is put out of action and is fixed.<sup>267</sup>

Page 247      5:26 p.m.      Destruction of the "Queen Mary".

The ammunition chamber is initially flooded, but the risk of fire, smoke and gas, as well as the total explosive effect of the grenade, is extremely low. Apparently, as has often been observed in other cases, this bullet also broke on impact. Only a few of the crew, including the turret commander, are slightly injured by flames. Three minutes later a third shell broke through the armored battery deck and penetrated the support cylinder and the barbette of the rear heavy gun turret, six men fell out, and the turret, whose ammunition chamber was flooded, could only be opened after the debris had been removed and the dented deck plates had been blown away be swiveled again. Smoke and gas penetrated the two steering gear rooms through torn ventilation shafts. These must be left for 20 minutes; however, the rudder itself continues to work during this disturbance. Parts of the torpedo protection net torn overboard can be removed before they get caught in the propellers and thereby render the ship incapable of maneuvering. At the same time, the first interference with the reception of the F.T. equipment appears, as the large antennas tore when the impact of the hits hit them. Fortunately, however, the ship is now so enveloped in smoke by a fire that started smoldering for hours in the substructure of the last hit turret that "New Zealand", which was hit only once, started its fire at this time from "von der Tann" moved to "Moltke".

The stern of this battle cruiser was hit at 5:26 p.m. Protective bunkers and rampart cells are broken through, but the undamaged torpedo bulkhead keeps the penetrating water masses away from important parts of the ship. Immediately afterwards (5:27 p.m.) another shell punched a circular hole 0.5 m in diameter from the side armor directly above the waterline, the shell exploded in the coal bunker, tore open the battery deck, but could not penetrate the armored deck. During these events at the German final ships, the distances quickly fell from 184 to 132 hm, and now the German shells crash like a hailstorm on the English battlecruisers. Although Admiral Beatty immediately stopped the enemy again, "Princess Royal" was hit by "Lützow" at 5:26 pm. At the same time, "New Zealand" and "Tiger" each received a hit, but especially "Queen Mary", having already been hit twice before, begins to suffer heavily from the concentric fire of "Seydlitz" and "Derfflinger". At 5:26 pm, "Seydlitz" fires at 135 hm distance, "Derfflinger" at 132 hm distance against this ship, when suddenly, as can be clearly seen on the top German ships, the masts and chimneys of the "Queen Mary" collapse inwards, while one from the hull Pillar of smoke and fire rises to a height of 700 m, in which "Tiger" and "New Zealand" temporarily disappear completely.<sup>268</sup>

Page 248      10. Skagerrak - First phase. Battle Cruisers Pursuit, the British to the north.

As observed from "Tiger" and "New Zealand", three of a volley of four shells hit the ship at the same time. After the splinters exploded and the dark red glow of fire on impact, it almost looked as if these shells hadn't broken through the armor, which in reality must have been the case when two more shells from the next volley hit the ship. In this case, too, initially only a small black cloud, apparently coal dust, came out of the shot holes, but then a huge dark red flame with a thick, heavy mass of black smoke struck from the middle of the ship, the hull seemed to burst with a gap. The same phenomenon followed in the foredeck, the battle cruiser collapsed in the middle, the turret ceilings flew 30 m high, then everything was gone except for the stern with the propellers still whirling. If necessary, "Tiger", who was sailing 24 nm at a distance of 450 m in the wake of the "Queen Mary", was able to veer to port in order to avoid the sinking stern of this ship. As he passed it at a distance of only a few meters, glowing debris pelted down on the battlecruiser with a clang, while puffs of poisonous smoke, sucked in by the ventilation machines, fill the lower rooms. The rear part of the "Queen Mary" still swam from the aft chimney to the stern, as well as "New Zealand", veering to starboard, passed it about 150 m abeam. But now the last part of the ship capsized and disappeared into the water with violent explosions. 57 officers and 1,209 men found their sinking with the ship<sup>(1)</sup>. All that was left of "Queen Mary" was a huge cloud of smoke, widening upwards like a pine tree, which remained in the sky for a long time and for a time prevented the final ships of the English line from seeing the German battlecruisers. "Tiger" and "New Zealand" had to try to join forces with "Lion" and "Princess Royal" in order to close the gap.

Given the superiority of the top German ships by fire, it was understandable that even in that phase of the battle they hardly received any hits.

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1) 6 men were later rescued from the destroyers "Laurel" and "Petard", and 2 men from the German torpedo boat "V28".<sup>269</sup>

The final ships "Moltke" and "von der Tann" saw themselves all the more endangered by the fire of the ships of the line of the V Battle Squadron, which were approaching ever closer. In doing so, these remained practically unscathed. It is true that the only battle cruiser "von der Tann" opened fire at 5:18 pm on the foremost enemy line ship ("Barham") and scored a hit against it at 5:23 pm, which caused severe damage, but after 24 shots fired at 155 to 170 hm, the German ship had to return to the old target, the "New Zealand", after the failure of both of the two middle turrets at their unfavorable sweep angles the previous target could no longer be reached. But now a new, very dangerous disturbance appeared on "von der Tann" without any action on the part of the enemy. In the second turret, the forward run of the hot tubes failed, so that the battlecruiser now only fired from two heavy guns.

With the intervention of the V Battle Squadron and the sinking of the "Queen Mary", the artillery battle had reached a severity that could hardly be surpassed. At the same time, however, with the decrease in the distance between the fighting battle cruiser lines, the point in time at which the torpedo boats or destroyers had to be able to be used was getting closer and closer. However, as a result of the sudden development of the battle in a southerly direction, only part of the light forces of both parties had for the time being succeeded in taking up positions suitable for the attack in front of the head of the battlecruisers, while the rest were still in the process of steaming. Nevertheless, Admiral Beatty had already ordered the eight destroyers of the XIII and four destroyers of the IX and X flotilla in front at 5:09 pm, only a few minutes after the sinking of the "Indefatigable", to relieve his heavily pressed line. As a result of the failure of the FT facility on "Lion", however, the transmission of this order by "Princess Royal" was delayed until 5:15, but even then it took five minutes until the foremost group of the small cruiser "Champion" was under captain J.U. Farie led XIII. Flotilla, the destroyers "Nestor", "Nicator", "Nomad", "Marborough" and "Pelican", under Lieutenant Commander Bingham, were in a sufficiently advanced position in order to advance in front of the bow of the "Lion" to attack the line of the German battlecruisers, which at the time was about 8 nm to the northeast (Map 6).<sup>270</sup>

Page 250      10. Skagerrak - First phase. Battle Cruisers Pursuit of the British to the north.

It was followed as the second group by the destroyers "Obdurate", "Nerissa" and "Termagant", while the third group, the destroyers "Narborough", "Pelican", "Petard" and "Turbulent", the latter two by the small cruiser "Nottingham" were pushed aside and only some time later, followed by "Moorsom" and "Morris", breaking through the line of British battlecruisers, were able to attack.

On the German side, only one, the IX. Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Goehle, reached their combat position in front of the battlecruisers and, when the latter were apparently trying to make a decision with a sharp approach to the enemy, tried to deploy an inconspicuous attack. Immediately afterwards, however, Kommodore Heinrich, the II. Leader of the torpedo boat forces, ordered the attack under full action in steaming from the small cruiser "Regensburg" after the distance from the enemy line had decreased to 100 hm after a measurement. Even before the red, jagged double stand "Z" waved as a sign of attack on "Regensburg", Korvettenkapitän Goehle had come to the same decision as a result of the surprisingly quick and sudden reduction in the distance between the two lines and with the group "V 28", "V 26", "S52", Kapitänleutnants Lenssen, Hans Koehler and Ehrentraut, pushed past "Lützow" vertically towards the center of the enemy line. The flotilla boat group was followed by the chief of the 17th half-flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Ehrhardt, with the boats "V 27", "S 36" and "S51", Oberleutnant zur See Buddecke and the Kapitänleutnant Franz Fischer and Dette, who was the squad "V 29" and "S 35", Kapitänleutnants Erich Steinbrinck and Ihn, and as the fourth group the chief of the 18th half flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Werner Tillessen, with the boats "V30", "S34", "S33" under Oberleutnant zur See Ernst Wolf and the Kapitänleutnants Andersen and V. Münch. But scarcely were the German boats free of their own line when the English destroyers ran towards them from the south, approaching the German battlecruisers. While the fight of the heavy artillery, ship against ship, continues across the boats, the middle artillery now opens a furious rapid fire on both sides at the attacking boats and destroyers. At the same time, the attacking flotillas clash at top speed, and so in the sea plowed by shells between the lines of the capital ships, individual battles between the destroyers and torpedo boats in the passage battle, which is carried out with the greatest bitterness at the closest distance with artillery and torpedo (Map 7 ). The sequence and details of these battles can hardly be recorded.<sup>271</sup>

At 5:33 pm, however, "Nomad", the second boat of the "Nestor" group, is hit by "S 51", Kapitänleutnant Dette, the third boat of the Ehrhardt group, in one of the boilers and is immediately given by "S 52", Kapitänleutnant Ehrentraut, the third boat of the Goehle group was fired by a torpedo. Immediately afterwards, "Petard", who followed the "Nestor" group with "Turbulent", fired a torpedo at "V 29", the Steinbrinck group's guide boat, which also lay where it was, but fired four torpedoes at the enemy battlecruisers while it was still sinking. As a result of these battles, the other boats of the IX Flotilla with the destroyers, which are considerably stronger in terms of combat power and speed and almost twice as large, only manage to approach the enemy line within 70 to 80 meters of distance. From 5:27 p.m. to 5:35 p.m., ten torpedoes are fired, especially against the second, third and fourth battlecruisers. At 5:34 pm, "Lützow" also fired a torpedo against the third ship on the enemy line, while the British battlecruisers and ships of the line declined by two lines each after "Queen Mary" had already blown up. Whether the destruction of this ship was part of the torpedoes of the IX. the observations on the enemy side seem at least doubtful. But even if this was not the case, the attack was successful in that the enemy's fire against the German battlecruisers temporarily ceased. Immediately after the attack, the boats had to return and break through again the groups of enemy destroyers in a fierce artillery fight. At 5:34 pm "V 27", the Ehrhardt group's lead boat, was hit by two artillery hits on the starboard side of the forward engine, the steam pipes were torn apart, and the boat had to be blown up in view of the approaching four "Queen Elizabeths". In the midst of enemy fire, however, "V 26", Kapitänleutnant Hans Koehler, goes alongside and rescues the entire crew, including two seriously injured, causes "V 27" to sink completely through artillery fire, dodges a torpedo fired by a destroyer and then rescues still most of the crew of "V 29" (Steinbrinck). The rest of the crew resides in "S 35", Kapitänleutnant Ihn, and returns to "Regensburg" with the other boats of the flotilla, only a few of which had suffered minor injuries. This cruiser, which at the time was the only one to reach the top of the I. Reconnaissance Group, had meanwhile advanced in a south-westerly direction to attack and retreat the IX. Flotilla to cover, and together with the boats "G 101", "G 102", "G 103" and "G104" from the II. Flotilla, which had followed him, carried artillery fire essentially to relieve the IX. Flotilla and rescue of the crews of "V 27" and "V 29". An attempt by the gang "G 103", Kapitänleutnant Fritz Spieß, and "G 104", Kapitänleutnant v. Bartenwerffer, afterwards also to attack the enemy line, had to be given up, as it was now swiveling to the north.<sup>272</sup>



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But even the British destroyer attack did not develop fully as a result of the German counter-attack. "Obdurate", "Narborough", "Pelican", "Moorsom" and "Morris" were pushed aside, with "Obdurate" also receiving two hits from artillery. Meanwhile, however, "Nestor" and "Nicator" are 55 to 45 hm distance and are each firing two torpedoes against "Lützow", one of which "Nicator" breaks in the launch.

However, Admiral Hipper recognized the threat of attack in good time. After the battlecruisers had turned to SE at 5:28 p.m., they staggered off during the attack of the destroyers on ESE and finally to east at 5:36 p.m. As a result, the torpedoes fired by "Nestor" and "Nicator" bypass the ships ineffectively. But at 5:38 p.m. Admiral Hipper turned on SSE, and at 5:41 p.m. on S by W again approached the enemy. Despite all the successes, however, the situation of the German battlecruisers, which after the intervention of the four "Queen Elizabeths", despite the destruction of the "Queen Mary" and the "Indefatigable" had been fighting against double superiority from 5:11 pm, had to become critical, if not soon help approached. But concerns of this kind had hardly taken shape on the German battlecruisers when clouds of smoke were sighted in the south and a message could be given from the command posts to all combat stations through the mouthpiece, which on December 16, 1914 and January 24, 1915 were hardly larger Cheers. It read: "Own main body in sight."

At the same time, the opponent's movements showed that he too had recognized his appearance on the battlefield. The German battlecruisers had just moved east before the first destroyer attack when Commodore Goodenough came in at 5:30 from the "Southampton", which at the time was about two nautical miles to port from "Lion" at the head of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron Southeast saw a small cruiser with four funnels - it was the "Rostock" marching in front of the German Main Body. Three minutes later, "Southampton" gave the surprising signal that ships of the line were in sight in the south-east. Approaching them at full speed, the cruiser, as unbelievable as this seemed to the British at first, immediately turned off the German battle fleet.<sup>273</sup>

Page 253      5:38 p.m.      The German Main Body in sight.

It was a moment of great importance when "Southampton" at 5:38 a.m. sent an urgent radio message to the chiefs of the battle cruisers and battle fleets: "Have sighted enemy battle fleets in the southeast. The enemy's course is north. My position 56° 34' N, 6° 20' East. "(Map 7)

The signal was all the more surprising to Admiral Beatty as he had still firmly believed that Admiral Scheer had not yet left the Jade. But if there were still doubts about the correctness of this report, they were resolved by the fact that the cruiser "Champion", which had advanced in a south-easterly direction to cover the destroyer attack, reported almost simultaneously with "Southampton": "The enemy battle fleet is on course ENE, formation keel line. Vanguard dreadnoughts. SE is in the middle of the enemy line. My position 56° 51' N, 5° 46' East (1)."

What was to be done? Admiral Beatty, who had tried to increase the distance from the German battlecruisers since 5:30 pm, while "Lion" against "Lützow", "Princess Royal" against "Derfflinger", "Tiger" against "Seydlitz" and "New Zealand" against "Moltke" fired and immediately swiveled to port in the direction of the newly reported enemy, but by 5:40 he was already certain by sight. Twelve nautical miles to the southeast appeared a ship of the line and then, accompanied by small cruisers and a swarm of torpedo boats, an apparently infinite line of battleships. This phenomenon, which had never been seen in the entire course of the war and was almost impossible, deprived Admiral Beatty of the last hope of turning the battle of the cruiser in his favor after heavy losses. There was no choice. At 5:43 pm, the callback signal for the destroyers and the signal for the battlecruisers and ships of the line to turn around waved on "Lion". Immediately afterwards Admiral Beatty throws the former around on a NW course and at 5:46 p.m. sets the battle cruisers at full speed on a north course in order to reach their own battle fleet as quickly as possible by the shortest route.

For this purpose, the position of the flagships "Lion" and "Iron Duke" to one another was of the greatest importance. At 5:45 am, Admiral Beatty therefore sent the following radio message to the Commander-in-Chief via "Princess Royal": "Have sighted enemy battle fleet, heading southeast.


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1) This location given by "Champion" was incorrect due to a navigational error, the real location was 12 nm further south, the real location of the "Southampton" 13¼ nm west of the reported one. These mistakes played no role for Admiral Beatty, who had both cruisers in sight, but they were all the more important for Admiral Jellicoe, as will be shown later.<sup>274</sup>

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My position  $56^{\circ} 36' N$ ,  $6^{\circ} 04' E$ , 5:45 pm." (See map 7 and text sketch 8.) This signal was transmitted correctly by the "Princess Royal" and also by some of the ships in the "Grand Fleet" removed correctly, but in the form in which it received "Iron Duke" at 6:05 pm, it gained the meaning: "26 to 30 battleships, probably enemy ones, bearing SSE, steer SE (1)." Only that of "Lion" The specified location came through perfectly and so the Commander-in-Chief knew at 6:05 p.m. where "Lion" had thought to be at 5:45 p.m. Another question was which documents "Lion" had for assessing the location of the "Grand Fleet". According to the last position communicated by the Commander-in-Chief, it was at 4:15 p.m. at  $57^{\circ} 50' N$ ,  $4^{\circ} 15' E$ , heading SE by S, driving 19 nm. If this was the case, the "Grand Fleet" had to be at  $57^{\circ} 30' N$ ,  $4^{\circ} 56.5' E$  at 5:45 hrs, ie 66 nm NNW from "Lion".

Text sketch 8.



**Position of both fleets 5:48 p.m.**

1) "Iron Duke" does not seem to have received the signal immediately, but only indirectly via "Benbow".<sup>275</sup>

Page 255      5:46 p.m.      Withdrawal of the British battlecruisers.

If the course was chosen more northerly, this was evidently related to the fact that Admiral Beatty did not want to lose touch with the enemy and was also forced to cover the destroyers of the XIII Flotilla returning from their attack (1).

The movement of the battle cruisers was followed by the flotillas and the I. and III. Light cruiser Squadrons immediately to sit in front of the head of the battlecruisers, and only Commodore Goodenough with the small cruisers "Southampton", "Nottingham", "Birmingham" and "Dublin" of the 2nd light cruiser squadron at a speed of 25 nm in a south-westerly direction in order to determine the course, speed and composition of the newly sighted armed forces more precisely and, if at all possible, to attack them with torpedoes. But only "Nottingham" fired a torpedo at 140 hm distance at 5:40 pm against the German line, then the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had to retire due to enemy rapid fire at 5:48 am at 118 hm range (Map 7).

Already at 5:30 o'clock the "König", the top ship of the German Main Body, had sighted fighting ships in a north-north-westerly direction, and the situation was soon cleared that starboard ahead were the German battlecruisers, port ahead two columns of enemy ships heading south towards the German Main Body. Of these, the eastern column, four battlecruisers, was in action with the I. Reconnaissance Group, the other, pulled forward to the southwest, seemed to be composed of small cruisers of the "Chatham" class. Between the lines of the cruisers, the German fast flotillas returned from torpedo attacks and were in combat with numerous enemy destroyers. Since Admiral Hipper was also engaged in heavy artillery combat with the German battlecruisers at the time and was therefore unable to send the fleet chief a report about the enemy's losses and the condition of his own ships, Admiral Scheer and Kontreadmiral Behncke remained, the chief of the vanguard III. Squadron, relying on their own observations. At least later (6:10 pm) it became clear from a radio message from the leader of II Reconnaissance Group that there were only four enemy battlecruisers left, that the enemy must have already suffered considerable losses. What at that time appeared to some commanders of the German ships of the line as a challenging arrogance, the approach of the British battlecruisers at close range to the German Main Body, was only a consequence of the complete surprise that the appearance of the German Main Body meant for the leader of the British battlecruiser fleet.<sup>276</sup>

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1) Narrative of the Battle of Jutland, page 25.

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It was obvious that from now on the German side had to try everything not to allow the British ships to escape from this dangerous situation with impunity, despite their superior speed.

At 5:38 pm the German battle fleet therefore went from 15 to 17 nm, soon afterwards it was reported from the Foremast of the "König" that the enemy capital ships seemed to be turning north, and at 5:45 pm the German battle fleet went in seven columns with a battle turn in divisions by two lines to port towards the enemy. Immediately afterwards, two groups of enemy ships from the German naval flagship, which drove at the head of the I. Squadron, were clearly identifiable, of which the northern one apparently consisted of five "Queen Elizabeths", the southern one of battlecruisers. The signal "distribute fire from the right ship against ship" was followed by the command to open fire from the fleet flagship at 5:46. The top of the British battlecruisers had therefore just turned to the north when "Lion" by "König", "Princess Royal" by "Großer Kurfürst", "Tiger" by "Markgraf" was taken under fire. The first shots from "König" against "Lion" were short, even with the greatest increase in guns, at a distance of 192 hm, so that "König", gradually increasing the speed to maximum speed, hit the second battle cruiser after a few volleys had to pass from the left ("Tiger"), which was also kept under fire by "Markgraf" at varying distances. At the same time the medium artillery of "König", "Großer Kurfürst" and "Markgraf" fired at about 120-80 hm for a short time against 2 destroyers ("Nestor" and "Nicator"), one of which turned hard after a few volleys, while the other remained unable to maneuver and sank soon afterwards. "Prinzregent" also fired at a battle cruiser, but had to stop shooting at 6:04 pm after 8 volleys fired at 204–195 hm, as the impacts were mostly short and the enemy disappeared in the haze. At 6:08 pm, however, he was able to fire again at a cruiser of the "Indefatigable" class ("New Zealand") under considerably more favorable conditions at 190-180 hm and apparently continue this fire for a long time with one salvo per minute, apparently with good success. In contrast, the "Kaiser", "Friedrich der Große" and the ships of the I. Squadron offered no other targets than the four ships of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron.<sup>277</sup>

The latter was therefore temporarily at 130–190 hm under the fire of no less than 10 German ships of the line, which, however, hindered each other's observation with the large number of impacts, so that most of them stopped the fire again after a few volleys. Only "Ostfriesland" and "Nassau" continued the fire for a long time (until 6:10 p.m. and 6:15 p.m. respectively), but no hits were scored because the enemy ships immediately turned and zigzagged into the smoke of the capital ships to the north of them. (Map 8 and 9.)

In an effort to get out of the fire of the German ships of the line as quickly as possible, Admiral Beatty had meanwhile not succeeded in informing the V. Battle Squadron in time of the intervention of the German Main Body. Even the flag signal called by "Lion" and also intended for the "Queen Elizabeths" to turn around was not recognized until latter, which at the time was still 8 nm behind. As a result, the V Battle Squadron initially maintained a southerly course in combat with the German battlecruisers. Admiral Evan Thomas saw that Beatty's ships were suddenly turning, but could not explain the reason for this and therefore considered it his duty to continue the battle on the previous course. At 5:48 pm, however, the two-sided top ships "Lion" and "Barham" were approaching each other on an opposite course at 4 nm. Again the signal blew on "Lion": "V Battle Squadron turn 16 line to starboard", with the latter being sent the position of the German battle fleet at the same time. At the high speed of passage of both squadrons, however, Admiral Evan Thomas had already steamed on the battle cruiser in Fire leeward before he could execute the order to turn around. The 38 cm batteries of the "Queen Elizabeths" had to be silent as they passed by because the battlecruisers obscured the targets, and the latter were counted with an understandable tension. "Queen Mary" and "Indefatigable" were missing. But no sooner was "Barham" free from the final ship of the battle cruiser squadron than in the southeast, advancing in three or four columns, the German battle fleet was sighted and the ship was showered with violent volley fire. It was "Kronprinz" and "Kaiserin", who at 5:50 pm with an initial distance of 192 hm took the top ship of the V Battle Squadron under fire and continued this in the most effective way until "Barham", at 186 hm and almost abeam of the German ships of the line, swiveled north after the battlecruisers at 5:58 p.m.<sup>278</sup>

Here "Barham" received two heavy hits, the first of which was the auxiliary F. T. station, the second the main F. T. station was destroyed, so that Admiral Evan Thomas did not receive any more radio messages from now on and was thereby significantly hindered in assessing the battle situation. (Map 8) At the same time, the hits had put many rooms in the ship under Smoke and fumes. Cartridges in the battery deck had caught fire, and explosives had penetrated the substructure of the command post and the rooms under the armored deck, and this had caused serious casualties among officers and men everywhere. At 6 o'clock, Commodore Goodenough swiveled with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron approximately in line with the last ship of the V Battle Squadron and at the same time to the north. The small cruisers standing in the fire luffward of the V Battle Squadron were literally showered with fragments and explosives from the impacting German grenades; they succeeded, however, by skilful zigzag driving, avoiding hits and casualties and effectively disguising the pivoting of the V Battle Squadron. Meanwhile, the shooting of "Kronprinz" and "Kaiserin" had given the English the impression that the pivot point of the V Battle Squadron in particular had been put under strong fire, but "Valiant" managed to swing after "Barham", without being hit, and also "Warspite", the third ship, was no less happy, while "Malaya" had already turned up and at 6 o'clock was taken under fire by the "von der Tann".

In the meantime, Admiral Hipper had taken advantage of the moment while the two enemy formations were passing each other on the opposite course, and the enemy fire was getting weaker, and at 5:50 p.m., in a brilliant maneuver by turning around, sat in front of the German Main Body with "Lützow" at the top with maximum speed to keep the lead in the new battle direction. With this movement, however, he was just accepting the risk that he had hitherto tried to avoid by staggering. Not all enemy destroyers had yet followed the callback signal that had been blowing on "Lion" since 5:43 pm, rather the destroyers "Petard" and "Turbulent" had only three torpedoes each against the second shortly before the I. Reconnaissance Group turned at 5:50 pm or third German battlecruiser fired while "Nerissa" and "Termagant" unleashed their torpedoes on a northbound course on the 5th ship of the I. Reconnaissance Group. With the sudden turn to the north, the German battlecruisers ran straight into the torpedo runways, and only when it was too late to evade were several torpedoes, a surface runner and 2 torpedo runways sighted on "Seydlitz", and immediately afterwards (5:57 pm ) the battle cruiser was hit by a torpedo in the forecastle.<sup>279</sup>



Page 259      5:57 p.m.      "Seydlitz" torpedoed.

The watertight bulkhead of Division XIV leaks and the front station for electrical auxiliary machines fails. The torpedo bulkhead holds, however, so that the 28 cm and 15 cm ammunition chambers of the forecastle and the torpedo broadside remain ready for action. The ship lists slightly, which, however, does not play a role at first. The speed can also be kept at full speed.

Meanwhile, the II Reconnaissance Group, Kontreadmiral Boedicker, with the 12th torpedo boat half-flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Lahs, had sought after the fire of the "Queen Elizabeths" on a south course connection to the battlecruisers and the "Wiesbaden" standing next to them. At 5:25 p.m. the British small cruisers that had been chased away at the beginning of the battle came into view again in a north-north-westerly direction, and at 5:35 p.m. "G 37", Kapitänleutnant Wolf v. Trotha, who had remained a little behind, advanced behind the II. Reconnaissance Group to attack them inconspicuously and fired two torpedoes at about 90 m above sea level, which, however, apparently had no effect. (Map 7.) After that, the II. Reconnaissance Group quickly reached the connection to the battle cruisers and now, with "Wiesbaden" and the 12th half flotilla, took the lead in the new battle direction, while between the battle cruisers and the III. Squadron more German boats advanced to attack. In fact, while "Wiesbaden" was steaming to the I. Reconnaissance Group, the chief of the VI. Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Max Schultz, noticed that the enemy battlecruisers were turning to the north, while another formation of capital ships was visible further east behind the I. Reconnaissance Group. Since the VI. Flotilla, however, had received no information about the position of its own Main Body, it was only later recognized as hostile. At the moment of the swing of the I. Reconnaissance Group to the north, however, which had to considerably reduce the artillery effect of the battlecruisers, Korvettenkapitän Schultz decided to advance against the enemy line with the 11th Half-Flotilla standing behind him, Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Rümnn, and to relieve the latter to fire two torpedoes per boat against them. After an advance of about 6000 m in the violent fire of the British squadrons, the destroyer and small cruiser he was with the boats "G 41", "V 44", "S 49", "V 43", "G 87" and "S 86", Kapitänleutnants Böhm, v. Holleuffer, Baustaedt, Carl, Karstens and Conrad Grimm, approach the enemy line at 90–80 hm. Then the latter fired, partially hindered by the returning boats of the IX. Flotilla, a total of 7 torpedoes, turned to the east and, breaking through between the I Reconnaissance Group and the III Squadron, approached the cruiser "Regensburg" at full speed (Map 7 and 8).<sup>280</sup>

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Although the chances of hitting were particularly good because the enemy battlecruisers and ships of the line were pulling past each other during the attack, no effect of the torpedoes could be observed. According to British findings, a torpedo went ahead, one behind "Valiant" through the line of the V Battle Squadron, but no hits were made against either the ships of the line or the battle cruisers.

Simultaneously with the attack of the VI. Flotilla "Nestor" and "Nicator" started against the German Main Body. Immediately after the first torpedoes had been fired at the German battlecruisers, both destroyers had swiveled abeam of them on a south course and when they turned to the north they were suddenly again in a favorable attack position. But now Lieutenant Commander Bingham sighted a long line of battleships on "Nestor" south of the cruisers. The High Seas Fleet that was supposed to be on the Jade! Quickly determined, he decided to bring the last torpedoes to bear against them, ran in the rapid fire of the "Regensburg" and the "Rostock" and the middle artillery of the German ships of the line, steaming up in front of the head of the German Main Body, towards the latter. At 32 hm, "Nestor", at 27 hm, "Nicator" shoots one torpedo each against the first and second ship. But then "Nestor", hit in the forward boiler room, turned hard to starboard. "Nicator", who just avoided a collision, can no longer fire the fourth torpedo either, has to turn away and runs off to the west with the other destroyers, only now following the recall signal from "Lion".

While the German IX. Flotilla had managed to save the crews of "V 27" and "V 29" themselves, "Nestor" and "Nomad", unable to maneuver near the two sinking German boats, were left to their fate by the English. But before both are completely destroyed by the fire of the "Rostock" and the German ships of the line, which is now rapidly approaching, they manage to fire the last torpedo against the German line, albeit without success. Then the survivors are rescued by German torpedo boats and are taken prisoner. Of the 21 torpedoes that had been fired by the British destroyer flotilla in the course of these battles, only one had reached its target, moreover with relatively little effect. Nevertheless, the attack carried out with courage immediately after the sinking of the "Queen Mary" and immediately before the approach of the German bulk brought a very effective relief for the British line, as he hit the German battlecruisers at this crucial moment, even if only for a short time, had forced to turn off.<sup>281</sup>

In the meantime all the German ships that could reach the enemy with their guns had tried to hold on to the enemy in order to paralyze at least one or the other ship before he was able to evade the pursuit with superior speed. Immediately after the U-turn, "Lützow", "Derfflinger", "Seydlitz" and "Moltke" opened fire again at 5:55 pm against the British battlecruisers, who have also been shot at by "König", "Großer Kurfürst", "Margrave" and "Prinzregent" since 5:48 pm. As a result, "Lion" and "Tiger" were hit again at 5:59 pm and turned hard to the west, followed by the other two battlecruisers. However, the "Lion" hardly swerved north again when two shells hit the ship at the same time at 6:01 pm (Map 8). Fires broke out in various places, which could only be fought with great difficulty due to the destruction of numerous fire extinguishing pipes by explosives. In particular, the fire, which was still smoldering in the heavy turret that had been hit earlier, soon flared up to new strength and ignited further cartridges, to which the entire crew of the ammunition chamber fell victim, while jet flames also endangered the higher decks. Immediately afterwards, "Lion" passed the sinking site of the "Queen Mary", where the latter almost suffered the fate of the latter, and ran with the other battlecruisers while the V Battle Squadron covered the retreat on a north-westerly course from action.

This movement was not recognized in time by the destroyers "Onslow" and "Moresby", which had meanwhile connected to the 1st Battlecruiser Squadron from the aircraft carrier "Engadine", so that, navigating NNE, they approached the German line faster than their own. So eager to catch up on the attack they had missed through their own dispatch to the aircraft carrier, they ran soon after 6 p.m. against the German battle cruisers. But before they were within torpedo range, they came under heavy defensive fire from the German II. Reconnaissance Group, which had not been visible to them before, as well as the attacked battle cruisers and had to turn away. In doing so, they hindered the view of their own line against the enemy so significantly with their thick chimney smoke that "Moresby" turned back and ran between the lines further south. As a result, the destroyer was soon in attack position for the III. Squadron and fired violently from the top ships at 7500 m against the third ship of the line ("Kronprinz") a torpedo, which missed its target; both destroyers returned from the attack without losing any of their combat value.<sup>282</sup>

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Of the other destroyers, the I. Flotilla with "Fearless" was at the battlecruisers, the XIII. Flotilla with "Champion" at the V Battle Squadron, while the I. and III. Light cruiser squadron starboard forward, the II. port drove aft of the British battle line.

As a result of the German defensive fire, the smoke of the destroyers, the fires on "Lion" and "Tiger" and the spray and explosive clouds of the heavy grenades that hit, such a layer of vapor had now settled between the tips of the fighting lines that especially from the British battlecruisers from the enemy soon nothing was to be seen. A short artillery battle (Map 8) at 116 to 140 hm range broke out between the II Reconnaissance Group and the I Light Cruiser Squadron between 6:05 p.m. and 6:10 p.m. 6:12 p.m. even by "Lion", which, as the top ship, was the least obstructed by smoke. This ship had suffered the hardest so far. On the southern course alone it had received 10 hits, some of which were very effective, while "Tiger", hit by 16 heavy shells, nevertheless had fewer combat disruptions (1). However, none of the battlecruisers or battleships now being pursued had been rendered incapable of maneuvering or reduced in speed by the German fire. Admiral Beatty was therefore already so far outside the effective German fire range at 6:10 that he could go down with his ships to a speed of 24 nm in order to seek connection to the "Grand Fleet" on the NNW course.

In vain did Admiral Scheer, while the machines, especially the III. Squadron, gave everything they could, and at 5:59 p.m. on the signal of the fleet flagship, the divisions had turned 2 lines further to port on the enemy, tried to keep sharp on the heels of the British battlecruisers on a NW course. Only "Margrave" continued his fire against "Tiger" for some time, though not without a temporary break, but after the divisional pivoting of the battle to NW, which brought the enemy into an increasingly prominent position, the target could only be reached with the two front turrets and finally had to stop the fire at 6:25 p.m. at 190 hm in order not to endanger the man in front.

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1) Narrative of the Battle of Jutland, p. 24. Fighting of Jutland.<sup>283</sup>

Page 263      6:20–6:35 p.m.      Pursuit battle against the V Battle Squadron.

In contrast, the "Großer Kurfürst" went into pursuit against the V Battle Squadron, already at 6 o'clock from "Princess Royal" with an initial distance of 174 hm to "Valiant", "König" at 6:10 o'clock from "Tiger" to "Barham", but 5 minutes later this ship could only be with the two of them reach the front towers and therefore also took "Valiant" under fire. Then "Großer Kurfürst" had to stop fire against this ship at 6:16 pm because the distance was too great. (Map 9.)

Meanwhile the British battlecruisers, although Admiral Hipper followed them at full speed, had run so far out of the action that they were inaccessible even to the guns of the German battlecruisers. These, too, had to turn very soon to the V Battle Squadron, which thus, in effective cover for the British battlecruisers, increasingly had to bear the burden of the battle. The ships of the V Battle Squadron stood out clearly against the yellow western horizon, while the German ships almost completely disappeared in the haze of the darker eastern horizon. Only when the low sun broke through the cloud cover, the outlines of the German ships, which otherwise could only be recognized by the flashing of the guns, became more clearly visible at a glance, and the German gunmen were dazzled. "Barham", the top ship of the squadron, had received two more serious hits by 6:11. The further the enemy leaders withdrew from the German guns, the more they concentrated on the enemy ship "Malaya". Although "Lützow" fired against "Barham", "Derfflinger" against "Valiant", "Seydlitz" against "Warspite" at 6:27 pm, "von der Tann" had already started firing at "Malaya" at 6 pm. At 6:08 pm, "Kronprinz", at 6:10 pm "Kaiser", and at 6:27 pm "Moltke" fell into this fire, so that, according to their own observations, from 6:05 pm to 6:30 pm, "Malaya" was continuously under covering salvos. Six volleys a minute were the rule, and once even nine volleys were counted in uninterrupted succession, which struck around the heavily pressed ship. It sheared to port in vain, the German ships stayed on target, and at 6:20 p.m. a hit on starboard caused severe tremors just above the waterline. Immediately afterwards, projectile fragments smashed the steam pipeline to the front siren, and the sound of the steam flowing out made the connection with the fire control center in the foreshore impossible. At 6:27 pm a heavy shell hit the ceiling of the rearmost heavy gun turret, which was almost completely torn loose, and "Malaya" wanted to put short shots in the water close to the ship with its own 15 cm battery in order to get behind the impacts of the enemy Evade observation when the entire starboard 15 cm battery was incapacitated by two grenades striking in quick succession.<sup>284</sup>

Page 264      10. Skagerrak - First phase. Battle Cruisers Pursuit of the British to the north.

Finally, while the guns of the "Malaya" were still able to fire at maximum range, another heavy shell broke through the armor in the waterline at 6:35 pm, so that "Malaya" received around five heavy hits between 6:20 pm and 6:35 pm. The ship suffered a loss of 63 dead and 68 wounded, "Barham" suffered a loss of 26 dead and 46 wounded, which mainly occurred during this phase of the battle. While the "Malaya" oil was pouring out in large quantities from the leaky and burning hull, it slowly shifted to starboard, but could be held. "Valiant" and "Warspite" had evaded similar effects only because they were withdrawn from the line immediately after the start of the battle, relocated to port and sought protection in the lee of the flagship. By 6:40 pm, the ships of the V Battle Squadron had received hits on the northern course "Barham" 4, "Valiant" 0, "Warspite" about 5 and "Malaya" 7 hits.

Nevertheless, the fire of the V Battle Squadron, from which "Barham" and "Valiant" fired mainly on the German battle cruisers, "Warspite" and "Malaya" on the top ships of the German battle fleet, did not remain ineffective, although it was only at the beginning this phase of the battle was supported by fire from the British battle cruiser. "Großer Kurfürst" was hit once at 6:09 pm, "Markgraf" at 6:10 pm, "Lützow" at 6:13 pm and "Derfflinger" at 6:19 pm showered with explosives. But only on "Lützow" the hit had more serious consequences. The main and reserve F. T. station was put out of action, so that from now on the most important connection between the naval flagship and that of the commander of the reconnaissance ships was limited to headlight signals. In particular, however, there were considerable disruptions to the combat on "Seydlitz" in this section of the battle. Between 6:06 p.m. and 6:08 p.m. the battlecruiser was hit twice in the forecastle, at 6:10 a heavy projectile broke through the front wall of the 2nd heavy turret and put the right gun out of action, while another shell hit the rear wall of the already fixed 3rd turret and in this caused a second ammunition fire, similar to the one on "Lion". The 4th and 5th port 15 cm casemates also failed due to hits, and finally another shell made the right tube of the 5th turret unusable; on the other hand, a hit on the ceiling of the 4th turret was rejected by this.<sup>285</sup>

In contrast to this, "Moltke" and "von der Tann" received no hits, but the second serious failure occurred on the latter ship during the battle Recoil when firing in the cradle mounts no longer ran out. Despite the failure of all heavy artillery, the commander, Captain Zenker, decided to stay with his formation so that the enemy was prevented from increasing his fire against the other battlecruisers by taking into account the "von der Tann" in the target distribution. But since the steadiness of the course no longer had to be taken into account with regard to the effectiveness of one's own artillery, it was initially possible to protect the ship from further hits through maneuvers, despite its reduced combat strength and despite the fact that it maintained its place in the I Reconnaissance Group.

In the meantime, the visibility conditions that had hitherto been favorable for the German line had turned into the opposite. The enemy, who was now facing the low sun, was barely recognizable when it broke through the clouds. Impact observation became impossible, and in places the German battlecruisers drove only as a disc, while the distance between them and the Main Body, as well as within the latter between the 5th and 6th divisions of the ships of the line, as a result of the persistent pursuit, which was taken up with the utmost power of the machines (Map 9.) Admiral Beatty immediately took advantage of the reduction in German fire caused by the deterioration in visibility, in order to gradually get around the head of the German armed forces on a north and north-northeast course, initially with the light forces. As Admiral Scheer at 6.21 p.m. Admiral Hipper ordered his ships to go in pursuit so as not to let the enemy get out of range, if the leader of the German battle cruiser was about to report the encircling movement initiated by the enemy, which apparently had not yet become visible to the fleet flagship, which was far behind. Unfortunately, this radio message could no longer be delivered due to the failure of the main and reserve F.T.. Admiral Hipper therefore had no choice but to obey and, despite the unfavorable conditions, turn the battle cruisers north-west at 6.27 a.m. in order, if possible, to approach the enemy battle cruisers again at full speed.<sup>286</sup>



Page 266      10. Skagerrak - First phase. Battle Cruisers Pursuit of the British to the north.

This movement, however, only facilitated the encirclement sought by the enemy, and at 6:39 p.m. Admiral Hipper had to turn back to the northeast. Admiral Behncke on "König" had meanwhile also observed that the enemy forces, having hitherto been separated, were gradually moving around to the north. He had followed this movement with the 5th Division, which was joined by the other lines of ship columns, also by slowly turning to starboard. As a result, the German battle fleet soon drove in a widely spread keel line behind Admiral Hipper's 7 nm ahead armed forces, while Beatty's squadrons and flotillas chased north in the pale light of the low-lying sun, port ahead, in order to seek the connection to the "Grand Fleet", at times almost completely covered by huge billows of smoke. (Map 10) The first phase of the battle was over. But the feeling of combat was not yet so completely broken that the German fleet would have found time to regroup and to protect itself from surprises in a broad preparation formation, the squadrons side by side, the cruisers in the reconnaissance line.<sup>287</sup>

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## 11. Skagerrak – Second phase. – The clash of the battle fleets.

As at 6:30 p.m. the fire between the British battle cruiser fleet on the one hand and the German battle cruisers and ships of the III. Squadron, on the other hand, slowly died out, the British battle fleet stood under Admiral Jellicoe, the three battleship squadrons in six divisional columns side by side, still 23 nm north of "Lion". After the deployment of the III. Battle Cruiser Squadron only had five, but brand new ships of the IV. Light Cruiser Squadron ("Calliope", "Constance", "Comus", "Royalist" and "Caroline"). But instead of using them far advanced in the reconnaissance, Admiral Jellicoe had them set up immediately in front of the liner divisions as submarine protection and the older small cruisers "Active", "Boadicea", "Blanche" and "Bellona" the same assigned to both sides of the battle fleet. In view of the later, not easy development of the numerous squadrons into combat, this was at least dubious, since the very important reconnaissance in front of the battle fleet was now left to the eight armored cruisers of the I. and II. Cruiser Squadrons, which were quite outdated and relatively slow for this purpose. According to the original order, they were supposed to march in a 40 nm wide reconnaissance line, the direction ship 16 nm in front of the fleet flagship, but the former had barely reached half of the commanded distance as it, since the ships of the line were already traveling 20 nm already encountered the enemy. (see text sketch 5 and map 9 and 10.) The reconnaissance line itself had also shrunk to a width of 25 nm due to the constantly decreasing visibility, which did not reduce its value any less. From the III. Battlecruiser Squadron had not been heard since the detachment, although it had been dispatched to reinforce the battlecruiser fleet in good time that at 6:30 p.m. it had a lead of 21 nm over the core of the British battle fleet and must actually have already arrived on the battlefield.<sup>288</sup>

Only later did it turn out that this squadron was about 18 nm east of the armed forces due to a strong difference in the location of the various flagships, based on incorrect calculations, in particular the "Iron Duke" on the one hand and the "Lion" and "Southampton" on the other. Beatty's had pushed past, so that although it was about the same latitude at 6:40, it did not see them. This originally not intended position of the III. Battle Cruiser Squadron was nevertheless intended to give the later development a favorable turn for the British fleet. Because, while the German leaders were steadily approaching the marching security forces of the "Grand Fleet" steaming towards them from the NW, they were surprisingly captured by the forces of Admiral Hood in the still free flank.

As a result of the turn of the German battle cruisers to the north-west and the simultaneous swing of the British battle cruisers to the north-north-east (6:33 p.m.), the feeling of battle, which had only been demolished for a short time, was quickly restored. Already at 6:40 p.m. Admiral Beatty was able to recognize his opponent and opened fire again with the battlecruisers, which had been relieved for a while by the V. Battle Squadron. At the same time, Admiral Evan Thomas saw the German battlecruisers again and intensified the fire against them with "Barham" and "Valiant", while "Warspite" and "Malaya" continued the fight against the still recognizable top ships of the III. Squadron, albeit in intervals.

At the same time the I. and III. Light cruiser squadrons, after they had resumed contact with the German battlecruisers at 146 hm distance in execution of an order issued at 6:27 p.m. and had determined their course, in front of them further and further north, so that Admiral Hipper had to turn back with the battlecruisers to NE, to stay outside the torpedo range of the two light cruiser squadrons. From 6:40 p.m. onwards, the German Main Body also had to keep slowly to N and then to N by E course because it was already outflanked by the enemy ships of the line. Since the cohesion of the German line had already loosened considerably due to the high speed of the 5th Division and the gaps within the division itself had noticeably increased, the top ships of the same were now standing, "König" and "Großer Kurfürst", Kapitän zur See Brüninghaus and Goette, with the battlecruisers alone opposite Beatty's armed forces that were outflanking. While the latter had so far stood out more and more sharply against the setting sun, a rapidly spreading, initially light, then increasingly dense haze made it partially disappear completely, so that "König" and "Großer Kurfürst" could no longer reach a target with their heavy artillery by 6.40 am and 6.43 am respectively.<sup>289</sup>

Page 269      6.50 p.m.      Pressure on the German top.

However, they themselves seemed to offer all the sharper targets, because at 6:40 pm numerous heavy shells hit the area around "König", and at 6:47 pm this ship was in such violent fire that it gave the impression that there were at least three enemy ships of the line at the same time their artillery on the at the time far ahead of the other ships of the III. Squadron would have united standing top ship. It received its first hits during this phase of the battle. In order to strengthen the cohesion again, Kontreadmiral Behncke had the speed reduced to 18 nm at 6:49 pm, while at the same time he swiveled to NNE with "König". Meanwhile, after the pursuit of the faster enemy had proven hopeless, Admiral Scheer had also recognized the need to reunite the divisions that had been driven forward with "extreme strength". He therefore ordered the speed to be reduced to 15 nm at around 6:50 p.m. and swiveled with the I. and II. squadrons behind the III. into the line. Since it was already becoming more and more difficult to overlook the situation from the fleet flagship at the head of the I. Squadron, he simultaneously gave Admiral Behncke the choice of the combat course to be taken with the signal "Leadership in front".

As a result of the inevitable lagging behind of the ships of the line, the pressure of the enemy winging around the German battlecruisers began to be felt more and more, especially since difficulties arose, especially on "von der Tann" and "Moltke", the high speed, sometimes increased to 26 nm to hold even longer. The fires that had not been cleaned since 4 p.m. were heavily slagged due to the stony coal and, since the crews had not received any food since 12 p.m., the stokers and coal trimmers were already showing signs of exhaustion, because the additional oil firing also failed several times due to the clogging of the lines by the sediment stirred up in the tar oil cells. But it was even more worrying that the enemy's fire, which the enemy was evidently able to intensify constantly while approaching, could not be counteracted by any noteworthy counteraction, since, as a result of the complete reversal of the previously favorable visibility conditions, only the guns of the battlecruisers were the opposite were able to achieve targets occasionally and for a short time. For example, "Derfflinger" fired no shot according to his shooting list from 6:42 pm to 7:16 pm. In order to put an end to this situation, Admiral Hipper therefore led his ships closer and closer to the enemy at 6:47 p.m. by turning the battle on NNW, and at 6:51 p.m. by turning another on N, hoping in this way to bring the fast flotillas to attack and thereby relieve themselves.<sup>290</sup>

Page 270      11. Skagerrak - Second phase. - The clash of the battle fleets.

Of these, however, only the II. Flotilla had reached the commanded attack position starboard ahead of the battle cruisers again. In contrast, the IX. Flotilla, which attacked at 5:30 p.m., was still far back, and Kommodore Heinrich and Kontreadmiral Boedicker were with their forces, including the VI. Flotilla, still evolving to the top. The enemy was at the time of "Regensburg", the flagship of Kommodore Heinrich, from nothing to see than the flash of salvos that covered the German battle cruisers and also often forced the small cruisers and torpedo boats to evade.

While the German flotillas were still in the lead in order to relieve the battlecruisers from there on Beatty's armed forces, which had become invisible despite their effective fire, the "Grand Fleet" approached from the north-west and, even before the German side, even had the slightest sign of it, contact between Beatty's and Jellicoe's light forces was closed. (Maps 9 and 10.) Already at 6:33 p.m. sighted Rear Admiral Napier, on "Falmouth" at the head of the III. Light cruiser squadron approaching 4 nm in front of "Lion", two or three armored cruisers coming from the northwest. They belonged to the reconnaissance line of the I. and II. cruiser squadrons, which ran from "Black Prince", 11 sm south of the western wing column of the ships of the line, via "Duke of Edinburgh", "Defense" and "Warrior", "Minotaur" and "Shannon" extended to the ENE from the east wing column of the ships of the line marching "Cochrane". (Text sketch 5) The securing of the battle fleet by these old and slow armored cruisers marching so close in front of the columns of the ships of the line should prove to be completely inadequate, because the fighting lines were already rushing inexorably against the "Grand Fleet" from the south and, Even before the leader of the latter had even a reason to get a picture of the location of his own and enemy armed forces in action, the clash took place with terrible force.<sup>291</sup>

It is true that the "Black Prince", closest to the enemy of the armed forces of the "Grand Fleet", had already responded to a headlight signal from the "Falmouth" at 6:40 pm, just as Admiral Beatty started fire against the German battlecruisers again (6:40 pm) Battle cruiser reported 5 nm south of its location, but although it was Beatty's battle cruiser, the radio message that Admiral Jellicoe received considerably later (1) referred to it as "hostile" for reasons that were never cleared up. Since it was to be assumed that the German battle fleet was only a few nautical miles behind their battlecruisers, the report of the "Black Prince" relocated the former a few 20 nm northwest of the point at which it had to be according to the previous signals from Commodore Goodenough. Admiral Jellicoe therefore very soon came to the correct conclusion that the message from the "Black Prince" must be Beatty's battle cruisers. Nevertheless, this inaccurate report did its part to increase the uncertainty in which the British fleet commander, as a result of the scanty and confusing news, which he had received so far from the battle events was still in a moment in which the decision to turn to the battle line could no longer be postponed. Because while "Black Prince" dodged west to make way for Beatty's armed forces approaching him, his eastern neighbor, "Duke of Edinburgh", shots were already fired and at the same time gunfire was heard or seen along the entire line of the armored cruisers and the IV. Light Cruiser squadron marching close to the battle fleet. Soon afterwards the battlecruisers Beatty's appear in front of the western wing of the march protection in a violent engagement, while north of the latter, lying in numerous medium and long-range blows of heavy caliber, the I. and III. Light Cruiser Squadrons chased into the middle of the march protection of the developing battle fleet without being able to carry out Beatty's order at 6:50 p.m. to attack the German top with torpedoes. But then the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron succeeds in breaking through to the north between the 4th and 5th battleship divisions, thus making room for the other armed forces, which concentrated in a confined space with the destroyer flotillas of the battle fleet, to strive for their positions for the imminent intervention of the battle fleet. At the same time the III. Light cruiser squadrons with the ships of the march protection of the battle fleet, the IV. Light cruiser squadron and the armored cruisers of the I. and II. Cruiser squadrons, and turn with these to the east in order to gather at the head of the battleship squadrons in the likely battle direction (map 10). While changing course, however, Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, the chief of the I. cruiser squadron, of "Defense", his flagship, suddenly saw three or four small cruisers on a NE course at 6:47 pm four lines to starboard: the 5 nm to starboard II. Reconnaissance Group standing in front of the German battlecruisers!

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1) "Black Prince" was destroyed during the night fighting.<sup>292</sup>

Already north of him the III. Light Cruiser Squadrons on an easterly course when he opened fire with "Defense" and "Warrior" against the most clearly visible second or third German cruiser ("Wiesbaden") and, since the first three salvos of both armored cruisers were brief, turned hard towards them. At the same moment heavy shells hit the German ships from the east, while Beatty's capital ships steamed up from the west in engagement with the German battlecruisers. These too had encountered the march security of the fleet at 6:50 and 6 minutes later Admiral Beatty had sighted the top ships of the British columns of the line 4 nm north of "Lion". In the immediate decision to prevent Admiral Hipper's armed forces from ascertaining and reporting the imminent intervention of the battle fleet, he then went with the battlecruisers from NNE- to E-course, at full speed, followed and supported by the V. Battle Squadron, the German tip to turn in this direction. As a result, the distance from the German battlecruisers in sight, which battleships of the "König" class seemed to be following, quickly reduced from 128 m to 110 m, but the approach of Beatty's ships, which were still invisible, was only due to the increased fire effect German side recognizable. At 6:55 pm, "Derfflinger" was hit by a heavy shell above the bow torpedo room and quickly sank deeper as a result of the water ingress, while the forecastle had to be cleared and all entrances to it closed. At the same time, "Seydlitz" was hit by several hits in the forecastle, so that at 6:57 a fire broke out under the forecastle. The situation will therefore soon become unbearable for the German battle cruisers, who are exposed to this strong pressure without being able to return fire, especially since numerous cruisers and destroyers are now visible north of them, apparently preparing to attack with torpedoes, while the German fast flotillas are attacking at the same time exposed their own top in order to turn against a new opponent who unexpectedly appeared from the east. Admiral Hipper is therefore forced to break off the attack movement already initiated against the enemy battlecruiser fleet at 6:56 p.m., steer to an E-course and finally, when heavy fire hits his ships from the north and east, through them at 7:05 p.m. to throw a turn around over S to SW in order to temporarily free oneself from the effective area of fire of the enemy.<sup>293</sup>




Page 273      6.55 p.m.      Intervention of the III. British battlecruiser squadron.

However, other circumstances, which have only been hinted at, contributed to this decision, because at the same time, as unforeseen for the German leadership as for the British, the III. Battle cruiser squadron intervened from the east (see text sketch 9 and map 10).

Text sketch 9.

Textskizze 9.



Stellung beider Flotten 6.45 Uhr Nm.  
Position of both fleets at 6:45 p.m.

With this squadron, Admiral Hood had already advanced up to 25 nm southeast of the battle fleet, but had not yet sighted Beatty's armed forces or enemy forces, when at 6.27 hrs the small cruiser "Chester", advanced 5 nm to the west, had heard the thunder of cannons in SW. From this direction thick masses of smoke drifted towards the British cruisers, so that the shallowness varied between 130 and 50 hm and was often only 20 hm.<sup>294</sup>

Page 274      11. Skagerrak - Second phase. - The clash of the battle fleets.

Soon afterwards, however, gunfire flashed in this sea of mist, and at 6:36 pm, in the smoke of battle, "Chester" spotted the uncertain outlines of a cruiser with three funnels, which, accompanied by several destroyers, was steaming northwards. In the event, however, not, as expected, of Beatty's vanguard and then having to secure himself from torpedo shots, "Chester" immediately turned on a parallel course, while now two more appeared like a phantom behind the first cruiser and immediately afterwards the British ship was showered with a hail of shells. (Map 9 and 10.) It had encountered the II Reconnaissance Group under Kontreadmiral Boedicker, which was about 5 nautical miles northeast of the German battle cruisers. The latter had succeeded in deceiving the British cruiser, which suddenly burst out of the misty horizon, by showing the English identification signal that had been announced earlier by radio and allowed it to come within 55 hm. It was only when he turned off that "Frankfurt", the flagship, Kapitän zur See v. Trotha, at 64 hm the fire, in which successively also "Pillau", "Elbing" and "Wiesbaden" as well as the boats of the II Flotilla standing northwest of the II reconnaissance group and the 12<sup>th</sup> Half-flotilla standing behind the cruiser joined in. Completely surprised, "Chester" only returned fire after the third volley and the fourth put the first port gun out of action and killed and wounded a large number of crews on the second and third guns, so that only the fourth could fire. In order not to make impact observation unnecessarily difficult, "Wiesbaden" and "Elbing" received orders to stop the fire. At the same time, Kontreadmiral Boedicker followed the fleeing cruiser with maximum speed in a northeasterly direction and ran so on the III. Battlecruiser Squadron too. But no sooner had Admiral Hood noticed the flash of shots in the direction of "Chester" when he was at 6:40 pm, followed by four destroyers and the small cruiser "Canterbury", which stood was 5 nm south of the III. Battlecruiser Squadron, swung nine lines to starboard and threw itself at full speed between "Chester" and his pursuers. At 6:55 pm he opened fire with the battle cruisers "Invincible", "Inflexible" and "Indomitable" at 73 hm and continued this in the most effective way until soon after 7 pm the last German cruiser had also disappeared in a large cloud of smoke "(1).

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1) Here he also approached his own fleet so quickly that his ships were almost under fire as enemy ships by "Minotaur" and "Shannon".<sup>295</sup>

Page 275      6.58 a.m.      "Wiesbaden" unable to maneuver.

This fire of the heaviest caliber from a direction in which enemy armed forces had not previously been sighted, reported or suspected, while all of Beatty's heavy armed forces appeared to be engaged in combat in W and NW, came not only for the II. Reconnaissance Group, but also for the battle cruiser Hippers to the southwest and the fast flotillas steaming up to the point between the two reconnaissance groups, it was all the more surprising as the enemy from whom this effective fire originated initially remained completely invisible. Later, too, only brightly shining bow waves and finally only for a short time, almost ghostly, at 6:58 p.m. the outlines of capital ships and other armed forces became visible. Admiral Boedicker believes he can see two cruisers of the "City" class and several ships of the line or battle cruisers on a NW course, "Elbing" and "Pillau" count four capital ships, doubtful whether from the "Malaya" -, "Iron Duke" - or "Agincourt" type. If it was Beatty's ships that, contrary to expectations, had already moved so far around the German top, it was the armed forces entering the battlefield or even the top ships of the enemy battle fleet, which was still shrouded in mist, accompanied by small cruisers and destroyers had intervened? Any question seems idle. "Wiesbaden", Fregattenkapitän Reiss, is already lying there unable to maneuver and reports both machines out of action, while the salvos of invisible opponents (from "Tiger" or "Defense" and "Warrior") from the German small cruisers are now also coming from the west and north hit. At the same time, their own battle cruisers are in the heaviest fire in the west. There is no room to go there. "Frankfurt" therefore turns with hard-to-starboard rudder on the opposite course, a movement that the other ships of the II Reconnaissance Group follow by turning, with the exception of "Wiesbaden". While turning, "Frankfurt" and "Elbing" each shoot a torpedo against the capital ships in the east, then both escape the enemy behind clouds of artificial fog and miraculously escape undamaged. Only "Pillau", Fregattenkapitän Mommsen, was hit by a 30.5 cm shell at 6:58, which penetrated through the front chimney into one of the boiler rooms. Oil and coal dust flare up in a fire, four boilers fail, chartroom, upper and lower bridges sink into rubble, the reserve F.T. station is destroyed, and the ship can only run 24 nm; but he succeeds, likewise in a foggy manner, in gaining contact with the other cruisers.

In the middle of the turning maneuver of the small cruisers, the attack of the 12th half-flotilla leads first on an easterly, then on a northerly course under Lieutenant Lahs.<sup>296</sup>

Page 276      11. Skagerrak - Second phase. - The clash of the battle fleets.

In the process of torpedoing the badly damaged "Chester", the latter sighted "an enemy bulk of numerous ships of the line" on a north-westerly course at 6.55 am southeast of the small cruiser, abandons "Chester" and pushes, recognizing the danger for the ships of Kontreadmirals Boedicker, against the enemy capital ships in front, while behind them the destroyers "Shark", "Acasta", "Ophelia" and "Christopher" attack for their part (Map 11). The front group, "V 69", "S 50" and "V 46", Kapitänleutnants Stecher, Recke and Krumhaar, fired four torpedoes at an range of 70 to 60 hm, while other torpedoes fired by the destroyers on the II Reconnaissance Group passed the German boats. This is warned by a signal, then the first group of the 12th Half-Flotilla turns to the west in heavy fire of the attacked ships, without being able to observe the success of their own shots in the smoke and fog. Of the second group, which in the meantime has moved even closer to the enemy, it is only "V 45", Kapitänleutnant Laßmann, possible to fire a torpedo against the enemy capital ships, as the cruisers that are turning off are now in danger of falling into the line of fire. "G 37", Kapitänleutnant Wolf v. Trotha, can therefore only turn to the attacking destroyers and unleash a torpedo on them at 50 to 60 hm. But already the returning boats of the 12th half flotilla come before with "Z", the IX. flotilla under Korvettenkapitän Goehle countered. Obstructed by the 12th half-flotilla in approach, however, only the flotilla boat "V 28", Kapitänleutnant Lenssen, as well as "S 52", Kapitänleutnant Ehrentraut, and "S 34", Kapitänleutnant Andersen, can each fire a torpedo at 60 hm at large ships that only become visible in the haze for a very short time. The other boats are immediately involved in battles with the enemy destroyers, which are often mistaken for small cruisers because of their size. "S36", Kapitänleutnant Franz Fischer, attacked two alleged small cruisers with four funnels at an altitude of 75 hm, of which the front one stopped after a torpedo was fired at 75 hm, and the flotilla boat also fired again at 7:08 p.m. at 40 hm on a small cruiser on an SE course. Then the II. Flotilla, Fregattenkapitän Schuur, pushes between the fighting groups (Map 11).

This flotilla had at the beginning of the intervention of the III. Battle Cruiser Squadron stood at the head of the German line port ahead of the II Reconnaissance Group, opened fire together with the latter on "Chester" and turned around with them.<sup>297</sup>

Then the boats "G 101", "G 102", "G 103" and "G 104" follow under the Kapitänleutnants Rudolf Schulte, v. Varendorff, Fritz Spieß, v. Bartenwerffer, led by Korvettenkapitän Boest, the IX. Flotilla attacking, but "G 101" and "G 102" cannot see the enemy, as the enemy is hidden by the returning cruisers and boats. Only the rear group, "G 103" and "G 104", when suddenly "an enemy battleship squadron" came into view in the east, turned to torpedo fire at the tip of the same. But now the target is masked for "G 103" by a group of the 12th half-flotilla returning from the attack. A second attack is not possible, as the own battle cruisers now seem to be pushing ahead at the new enemy at full speed and the boats are have to make room, so that only "G 104" comes to attack next to a squad of the 12th half flotilla and fires a torpedo at 60 to 70 hm at 6:55 pm on the second ship.

The other boats of the II. Flotilla under Fregattenkapitän Schuur are already starting to attack, when on "Regensburg", the flagship of the II. Leader of the torpedo boats, which with the leader of the VI. Flotilla and the 11th Half-flotilla were still steaming up to the top, the signal was blowing: "Follow the Leader". This pulls with "Regensburg", the Half-flotillas still in its vicinity and the boats that were collecting after the attack from the distressed position between the I and II Reconnaissance Groups to the south, pushing between the battlecruisers at full speed at 7 pm and small cruisers and opened fire against the English armed forces, destroyers and a cruiser approaching from ESE. A destroyer is shot at from "Regensburg" from 7:04 pm to 7:08 pm at a range of 68 to 26 hm meters and remains in the fire. The guide boat of the VI Flotilla, following behind "Regensburg", "G41", shoots at this as long as it can reach it while driving past and then fires artillery at a second, apparently stationary destroyer of 80 to 60 hm, so that it stops firing after the first covering volley. Since the own capital ships are approaching from the west and might have given this destroyer the opportunity to fire a torpedo, "G 41" fires a flat shot at 7:06 pm, which detonates at the stern of the destroyer. The 11th half-flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Rümman, also took part in this battle, then "B 97", Kapitänleutnant Leo Riedel, a boat of the II. Flotilla, scored several artillery hits against the same destroyer, the middle chimney went overboard on the latter, and "B 97" was already planning to fire two flat shots at the stopped destroyer when it was hindered by the "Regensburg" pushing in between.<sup>298</sup>

Page 278      11. Skagerrak - Second phase. - The clash of the battle fleets.

From 7:08 p.m. to 7:17 p.m. at 80 to 84 hm range, it fires at a small cruiser, which turns off and soon disappears in the fog. Meanwhile, on "B 98", Kapitänleutnant Theodor Hengstenberg, the guide boat of the II Flotilla, the aft pair of tubes was hit while the torpedo tubes were pivoting. Both pipes fail and the mast goes overboard, so that it has to turn away and attach itself to "Regensburg".

In the sea, churned up by such a large number of propellers, the torpedo boats lurch and pound, water splashes over the telescopic sights, making the agreement unsafe. "B 112", Kapitänleutnant August Claussen, fired 82 10.5 cm grenades in a battle on the small cruiser at 75 hm and against a destroyer at 45 hm in a very short time, while "B 110", Kapitänleutnant Vollheim, was last Boat, when the others are already being forced to turn by their own armed forces, only fire two or three salvos. The Boest group also took part in the battle of the B-boats from 7:05 pm to 7:20 pm, and at 7:15 pm, "Frankfurt", right astern, saw a destroyer ("Shark") that was set on fire and apparently in decline 113 hm still achieved several covering volleys. While another destroyer ("Acasta") tries to go alongside, but is driven away by the German fire, the sinking one sets the white flag, but still fires from a cannon. An English cruiser to the south of this is also put under fire, but this has to be stopped soon afterwards, as observation is no longer possible, while "Frankfurt" is still in impacts of the heaviest caliber.

In the uncertain light between the haze and the clouds of fog, the enemy forces suddenly intervening in the battle from the east appeared to be considerably stronger than it actually was, and indeed, especially with Kommodore Heinrich, the II. Leader of the torpedo boats, they were Well-founded notion that the numerous impacts of the heaviest caliber and the appearance of capital ships, cruisers and destroyers from this direction meant the intervention of the British battle fleet. If this idea was correct, however, it was not only important to protect the German battlecruisers against the attack of the destroyers suddenly approaching from the east, but above all, the British battle fleet as soon as it appeared on the battlefield by deploying the entire fleet, at the head of the German Line to agglomerate torpedo boats, regardless of enemy forces in the north and west.<sup>299</sup>

In reality, however, the enemy attacked here, who appeared so powerful in the mist and clouds of smoke, was so few in number that he hardly offered sufficient targets for the large number of torpedo boats deployed, which only hindered each other.

"Invincible" had to veer to starboard at 7:13 pm and, as it seemed to the following ships at first, stop because of a torpedo hit, and immediately afterwards "Inflexible" and "Indomitable" also sighted several torpedoes, one of which went through under the former ship without detonating; about four other torpedoes that were observed close to the ships, however, ran so slowly that they had apparently already reached the end of their course and could easily be maneuvered with hard rudder and with extreme force. Even on "Invincible", the supposed hit had apparently caused so little damage that this ship soon afterwards brought down the signal that indicated it was incapable of maneuvering and again took its place at the head of the squadron. "Chester" was also incapacitated with three guns, crashed boats, riddled funnels and multiple hits that hit the side armor and break through the ship's side and slightly damaged two boilers, with completely intact machines rescued in fire leeward of the III Battle Cruiser Squadron, so that the only total loss of the English in this battle was limited to one destroyer.

It was "Shark", Lieutenant Commander Loftus Jones, who had already fired the front and rear torpedoes in the attack against the II Reconnaissance Group, turning to port, when he was unable to maneuver at 7:15 pm with a shot oil pipe and smashed oar gear. The reserve torpedo was just about to be loaded when it was hit by a shell, so that its air chamber exploded. Inundated by the fire of the "Regensburg" and the German flotillas, "Shark" was soon only able to fire from the middle gun, then it received a torpedo hit at 40 to 60 hm and began to sink. "Acasta" wants to rush to help, but is also hit in the fore and aft and "Shark" heroically refuses to accept any help. In the meantime, the destroyers "Ophelia" and "Christopher", following in the attack behind "Acasta", have been repulsed by the fire of the German cruisers and flotillas and turn off as "Shark" comes to a stop. The small cruiser "Canterbury", which had tried to bring help to "Shark" and "Acasta" with heavy defensive fire on a southerly course, soon had, Hit by a 10.5 cm shell, which penetrated several bulkheads but did not detonate, expand the distance.<sup>300</sup>



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The small losses of the English at this point were in no relation to the gain that the surprising appearance of the III. Battlecruiser Squadron in the free flank of the German armed forces, a proof of the tactical possibilities of a squadron operating not in a fleet but separately from this squadron. Without the intervention of the same, the attack of the German flotillas, which had already been initiated, would presumably have taken a different direction, namely against Beatty's armed forces, and thus probably brought the winging of the German leadership to a standstill as it did later that of the British battle fleet. In this case, however, the German battle cruisers and ships of the III. Squadron surprised the enemy fleet in the midst of development and brought it into the "crossing the T (1)" instead of later finding itself in a tactically untenable position as a result of Beatty being outflanked.

When Admiral Beatty drove into the middle between the top ships of his own columns of ships of the line and the German battlecruisers and ships of the III. Squadron approaching from the other side at around 7 o'clock, he evidently had the idea that Admiral Jellicoe was about to swing onto the western wing column to the battle line. Only if this was the case, however, could the former be able to sit down in front of the top column quickly enough without disturbing the development of the fleet and hindering its outlook against the German one. For Admiral Jellicoe, therefore, Beatty's sudden change of course to the east was difficult to understand. The only radio message he had received from Admiral Beatty since 5:48 pm: "Have sighted enemy battle fleet, bearing SE. My position 56° 36' N, 6° 04' East ", was, as already mentioned, completely distorted when it came to "Iron Duke" and after deciphering it had the meaning: "26 to 30 battleships, probably hostile, bearing SSE, steer SE". The British fleet chief had also received no news of the loss of the "Indefatigable" and "Queen Mary". On the other hand, Commodore Goodenough, the chief of the II. Light Cruiser Squadron behind the V Battle Squadron, had him issue about five important and very precise reconnaissance reports from the "Southampton" at 5:38 pm.

1) Technical term for the tactical maneuver of pulling yourself across the tip of the enemy lines and sweeping them lengthways with the guns of all ships.<sup>301</sup>

Page 281      Development of the British battle fleet into a battle line.

Admiral Jellicoe had known from these radio messages since 5:48 p.m. that the vanguard of the German battle fleet consisted of ships of the "Kaiser" class, that the German battlecruisers had joined the fleet from the north and that it was heading north. The change of course of the same to NNW and then again to the north was communicated to him in this way. In addition, these reports had been substantially supported by the fact that the F. T. directional stations on the British east coast aligned the German ships with each transmission of the radio message. At the same time, the German radio messages were deciphered by the Admiralty and transmitted to the British fleet chief with very little delay. Already at 6 o'clock the latter received the location of the German fleet, accurate to 4 nm, and at 6:53 p.m. he knew from a radio message from the Admiralty that the German fleet was at 56° 31' N, 6° 5' East at 5:30 p.m., heading north, 15 nm drive. This location report was also accurate to 3 nm. According to all these reports, he had to expect the German battle fleet ahead. But as soon as he could see from the head of the 3rd battleship division that the battlecruisers were in action with an enemy who was still invisible to him passing across his columns, he gave Beatty the headlight signal: "Where is the enemy battle fleet?" (7:01 p.m.). It was clear that there must have been some misunderstanding, for Admiral Beatty had come into view much further west than his previous position reports had suggested. As already emphasized several times, this erroneous assumption was based on combined errors of the two flagships (1), namely "Lion's" calculated location was about 7 nm east, that of "Iron Duke" about 4 nm northwest of the actual one, so that the entire error was about 11 nm (2).

After this had become apparent when sighting the battlecruisers, Admiral Jellicoe therefore believed that despite the fact that the F. T. directional stations were taking bearings that were independent of the ship's position errors, the enemy would no longer come into view ahead, but further west. As a result, without waiting for Beatty's response to his signal, he set out with the columns of ships on a south course at 7:02 p.m. in order to gain space to the west and to sit in front of them in the likely direction of advance of the German fleet. (Map 11.)

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1) "Combined" means to determine the respective location of the ship on the basis of the distances elapsed according to the time.

2) Corbett: Naval Operations, Volume III, page 355. Narrative of the Battle of Jutland, page 34.<sup>302</sup>

A few minutes later, however, on the basis of a brief reflection, he convinced himself that the new course must be inexpedient. This course brought the top ships of the individual columns into a line bearing which, having pulled the western wing far forward, had to make turning into the keel line on an easterly course very difficult. As a result of the navigation difference between the two flagships, which became apparent during inspection, which contained not only an error in length but also in width, contact with the German battle fleet had to occur probably 20 minutes earlier than had originally been expected. However, before the columns of ships of the line were able to march back to the line abreast after changing course to the south from the divisional squadron formed in this way, the enemy would have already been at the combat range. Therefore it now seemed of the greatest importance to bring the columns again as quickly as possible into a line bearing that would allow them to develop on both sides at right angles to the advance course, and in order to achieve this, at 7:06 a.m., Admiral Jellicoe ordered the columns to turn south-east again. Only then did Admiral Beatty, who was just passing in front of the western wing division only 2 nm south of "Marlborough", receive the message: "Enemy battlecruisers are sighting SE", anything but an answer to the question he had asked the location of the German battle fleet. As a result, this signal only increased the already existing uncertainty about the situation, especially since it directly contradicted a radio message from Commodore Goodenough received about 10 minutes beforehand, according to which the German battlecruisers were to be accepted not in front of but behind the German battle fleet (1).

In order to clear up this contradiction, there was no other choice than to address the question to Admiral Beatty again: "Where is the enemy battle fleet?" However, since at the time the German battle cruisers had been staggered and "Lion" had lost touch with the last German ships that this ship had still in sight, the British fleet chief initially received no answer, so that precious minutes passed without him getting the certain clues he wanted as to which way to go to the battle line. In addition, the overview of the situation was not made easier by the fact that Admiral Beatty had neglected to indicate the course of the German battlecruisers in advance with the bearing of the German battlecruisers.

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1) "Southampton" had reported at 6:50 pm: "Enemy battle fleet has changed course to north. Enemy battle cruisers are SW of the battle fleet."<sup>303</sup>

Page 283      7.15 a.m.      The British squadron swung into the eastern wing column.

At the moment, however, the latter did not know where the latter had gone either.

Between the two lines there were already huge masses of smoke from the hundreds of ships approaching the battlefield and their battle stations at full speed. These smoke masses moved with the light southwest breeze to the NE, mixed there with the artificial fog clouds of the II Reconnaissance Group and torpedo boats and together with the former formed an impenetrable battle smoke, which was only torn apart here and there by the flash of volleys, the detonation of impacting grenades, the flaring up of fires and explosions. The idea is gradually breaking through on the German side that new enemy armed forces must have intervened in the fight, but the German leaders are still dominated by the thought that the intervention of the enemy battle fleet on the basis of the report of the II Reconnaissance Group from the east and south-east is to be expected. The uncertainty on the English side is not quite so great, even if the chimney smoke of the flotillas and cruiser squadrons passing in front of the British columns of ships of the line still hides the prospect of the enemy. The all-important reconnaissance immediately before turning to the battle line, however, had failed completely despite the large number of armed forces available for this purpose on the English side. Beatty's report about the position of the German battlecruisers was still the only stopping point.

The first and only too natural thought of the British fleet commander had been to swing onto the western wing column to the battle line, since this was the closest to the enemy. With this decision, however, since heavy shells were already striking between the columns of ships of the line, he would be the weakest division, which consisted of the oldest and least powerful ships in the fleet, while still developing, they were exposed to the concentrated fire of the best German ships and the danger of a mass attack by German torpedo boats. In this case, the other liner divisions, forced to pivot to starboard to the line and then to turn to port to the battle line after the 6th division, would have caught the heaviest fire at the pivot point before their own artillery could take effect. Ultimately, if Admiral Jellicoe carried out this decision, the battle would have to be within range of the torpedoes of the German ships of the line from the outset, which would have contradicted his views on the importance of arming the German ships with more torpedoes.<sup>304</sup>

It will have to be admitted to the British leader that such a decision would in fact have brought his navy into a position which the Germans could only wish for. The second possibility would have been to take the lead with the flagship from the middle of the columns, but also this maneuver, although possible and often practiced, it was too complicated for a moment when one was already so close to the enemy. All that was left, therefore, was to turn over to the eastern wing division to the battle line and thus accept the disadvantage that this movement first had to lead the fleet again to a greater distance from the enemy.

Already at 7:06 pm, Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, the leader of the 5th Division on "Colossus", gave the signal: "Remember the traditions of the glorious First of June! - Revenge Belgium! (1)

However, as a result of the development on the eastern wing, it was still a long time to pass before the British battle fleet actually came into action, because Admiral Jellicoe did not make the first preparations to take the combat formation until 7:08 p.m. by taking two of his destroyer flotillas at the head and sent one to the end of the line, and only at 7:14 p.m., four minutes after he had tried again to find out the position of the German battlecruisers by means of the headlight signal with Admiral Beatty, was he released from his doubts about the correctness of the decision to head for the eastern wing column to swing the battle line. Just at the moment when "Defense" and "Warrior" crossed the course of the I. Battlecruiser Squadron before "Lion", Admiral Beatty was able to recognize the top ship of the German III. Squadron and report it by means of a headlight signal: "I have sighted the enemy battle fleet, bearing SSW." Immediately afterwards, "Lion" and "Tiger" were again in a fierce battle with the German battlecruisers. Also on "Barham" was the top of the III. Squadron was sighted, direction south-southeast. A report about this could only be brought through when it was no longer relevant, because at 7:15 pm, Admiral Jerram, who was on "King George V" at the head of the eastern wing column, received an order from the fleet chief to head south-east by east with this to take the lead at the top. At the same time, the other divisions swung to port on the signal to form the keel line and then to follow the leading division into the battle line on the course it had taken. But she had only just initiated this movement when the first two shells struck near the fleet flagship.

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1) "Remember the traditions of the glorious first of June! - Avenge Belgium!"<sup>305</sup>

The situation for the leaders of the British columns of ships of the line was by no means cleared up. The picture that emerged from the top ships was something like the following: Beatty's battlecruisers were in heavy fighting to starboard ahead, without it being possible to see which forces of the enemy were being shot at by them. In front of the columns of ships of the line and between them and the enemy, whose position could only be recognized by the flash of shots, armored cruisers, small cruisers and flotillas, lying in strong fire, tried to take their positions on the flanks of the fleet developing into the battle line (Map 12). Their excess voyage, however, was too little to clear the field of fire for the ships of the line quickly enough, so that the main body of the latter, exposed to the torture of Tantalus, were initially unable to intervene in the battle at all and finally, in the absence of other, more valuable targets, partly on the defenseless "Wiesbaden" lying between the lines began to fire, whereby on "Marlborough" a heavy artillery very soon failed as a result of a damaged gun barrel.

Given the limited visibility, the British final squadron in particular found itself in a dangerous position as soon as it swung into the battle line. Admiral Burney at the head of the final division (6th) had scarcely swiveled to port to sit in the wake of the battle fleet columns to the north-east of him than at "Agincourt" and "Hercules", the two bottom ships of the line Covering salvos struck and the ships were flooded with the water from the splashing shot, proof of the situation the British fleet would have been exposed to if Admiral Jellicoe moved to the line of battle, instead of the eastern to the western wing division, which was almost within range of the German torpedo weapon would have developed.

"Whatever the circumstance that caused the battlecruiser fleet to fall back on the battle fleet in the way it happened, the result was a very unfortunate one. As a result, the 5th Division was also unable to open fire on the enemy because the battlecruisers were standing in between, and when these were clear of the battleships, it was difficult to decide whether the ships in sight in the smoke of battle were enemy or were friends (1). "

Only when the battlecruisers had passed by, at least four ships of the "Kaiser" class and four of the "Helgoland" class could be made out on the 6th Division standing at the end of the line, so that "Marlborough", the top ship of the former, opened fire at 7:17 pm at 119 hm on a battleship of the "Kaiser" class, but had to stop it again after the seventh salvo at 7:21 pm.

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1) Report by Admiral Gaunt: Battle of Jutland, Official Despatches, page 77.<sup>306</sup>

It was a fortunate coincidence for the English that the final squadron of the battle fleet could be relieved in this critical situation by the V Battle Squadron, which here again, as in the battle of the battle cruiser, took over the cover of the final ships.

When Admiral Evan Thomas at the head of the same division at 7:06 p.m. spotted the "Marlborough", the top ship of the division led by Admiral Burney, and only a few minutes later the other ships of the same type, he believed, as did Admiral Beatty, that he was still of the other columns of the line there was nothing to be seen that this could be assumed to be northwest of the 6th Division and that in the latter he was therefore facing the head of the fleet that had already been developed into a battle line. In this case, however, the course already taken by Admiral Beatty had to bring him across the line in front of the 6th Division, as intended, together with the battlecruisers at the head of the line. But while he was still crossing the course of the 6th Division in the fierce battle with the German battlecruisers and the head of the III Squadron, ships of the other columns of ships of the line came into view at 7.19 a.m. and it soon became apparent to him that the first impression had been based on a mistake; the British fleet was still in the middle of development, not on the western but on the eastern wing column. The combat station of the V Squadron as a fast division directed him to the head of the 1st and not the 6th division in this case. But getting there was impossible without completely masking the development of the fleet, which was already severely hampered by the battlecruisers. There was therefore nothing left for Admiral Evan Thomas but to swing in a wide arc with reduced speed to port behind the 6th Division and, contrary to the orders for the battle, to choose his place at the end of the line (1). With this maneuver he was faced with no easy task with the large number of light armed forces advancing between him and the battle squadrons towards their battle stations, especially since now, initiated by a new advance by the German battlecruisers, the fighting lines were inexorably approaching one another.

1) In the event that the battle line was formed in the direction of Heligoland, the orders for the battle stipulated that both the battle cruiser and the V Battle Squadron should be at the head of the line. Only in the case of a development towards the battle of Heligoland in the direction of its own bases, the V. Battle Squadron had to take up position at the end of the line.<sup>307</sup>



At 7:05 am, the German battle cruisers were still on a south course while they were being disconnected, with "von der Tann", who was closest to the enemy in the turn, on starboard 4 enemy battle cruisers and 4 ships of the line, i.e. the I and II battle cruiser and V battle squadrons, could be made out. At the time, the water that had penetrated on "Seydlitz" was already above the intermediate deck in the forward compartments, so that the forecastle barely had any buoyancy any more and the battle cruiser slowly pulled to starboard. While grenades hit Hipper's ships from both sides, reported Kontreadmiral Boedicker, prompted by the intervention of the III. Battle cruiser squadron, by radio message that he had sighted enemy ships of the line in an easterly direction and that "Wiesbaden" was unable to maneuver in their vicinity, He had already given up hope that this would succeed, since a radio message from "Derfflinger" at 7.17 a.m. said Admiral Hipper, that the I reconnaissance group must be disconnected, when the latter, under the leadership of "Lützow", took a second turn at the head of the German line and advanced at high speed against the "Wiesbaden". A number of enemy small cruisers and destroyers rushed onto these, as could also be observed from "König". The enemy's heavy ships also maintained a violent fire against the cruiser, who bravely defended itself against the overwhelming odds. To relieve the same and the new preceding battle cruiser, Kontreadmiral Behncke at 7:15 p.m. with the III. Squadron with increased speed turned 2 lines towards the enemy, and this movement was followed at 7.18 am by Admiral Scheer with "Friedrich der Große" and the I Squadron, in order to bring "Wiesbaden", if possible, behind its own line. At the same time, behind the armored cruisers "Defense", "Warrior" and "Black Prince", the III and IV Light Cruiser Squadrons pushed forward, as it seemed, to an extraordinarily dashing torpedo attack against the German leaders and also took "Wiesbaden" under fire, where "Falmouth" shot a torpedo at 46 hm. But the British cruisers had engaged so firmly in the fight against the "Wiesbaden" that they even responded to the lively defensive fire of the III. Squadron did not turn away, and so the unfortunate cruiser now became more of a focus of violent fighting that took place immediately in front of the British battle fleet, which was still invisible to the German ships.<sup>308</sup>

Page 288      11. Skagerrak - Second phase. - The clash of the battle fleets.

Now the destroyer "Onslow" also advanced from the battlecruisers to attack. After the attack on the German battlecruisers, which had been carried out with "Moresby" one hour earlier, but had been rejected by the II Reconnaissance Group, he had positioned the "Lion" starboard ahead and at 7:05 pm, about 55 hm from the 1st battle cruiser squadron, sighted the "Wiesbaden". Since this seemed to be in a favorable position to fire torpedoes at the British battlecruisers, "Onslow" took the ship under fire at 36-18 hm with 58 salvos, but then he found himself, as the German battle cruisers had in the meantime again advanced against the "Wiesbaden", suddenly 4 lines to port of these in a favorable firing position (map 11). When the latter was close to 73 hm, the commandant, Lieutenant Tovey, ordered all torpedoes to be fired. But only one torpedo, aimed at the middle battle cruiser, had left the tube when "Onslow", captured by the middle artillery "Lützow's", was hit by two shells amidships and the escaping steam completely enveloped both torpedo tubes. However, the danger for "Lützow" was not eliminated, because now the destroyer "Acasta", Lieutenant Barron, who had been with III. Battlecruiser Squadron had been ready to attack. The latter had just left the destroyer "Shark", which had broken down in heavy fire (1), when, as a result of Admiral Hipper's new advance, he was suddenly in a no less favorable position to attack the flagship of the latter. Although he was approaching the attack in the accrual, received by the German ships with a hail of projectiles, he was still able to fire a torpedo against "Lützow" at 40 hm distance. This time, however, the persistence that characterized the English destroyers in these attacks was not rewarded, because "Lützow" was not hit, while "Acasta" had to run away with a shot rudder line and torn steam pipes, wrapped in smoke and could neither stop nor steer until 7:30 pm. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Tovey, the commander of the destroyer "Onslow", discovered that, contrary to his original intention, only one torpedo had been fired during the attack against the battle cruiser. Then he ran up to the "Wiesbaden" at 32 hm and shot a torpedo at it, which hit the cruiser below the command post, but still did not make it sink. Scarcely had this shot been fired, however, when the British destroyer presented itself with an incomparably more valuable target for the two remaining torpedoes. A number of German ships of the line, the III. Squadrons, visible, approaching at high speed.

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1) See page 279.<sup>309</sup>

Page 289      7:16 p.m.      Destruction of the "Defense".

Although a boiler room on "Onslow" had already failed and the engines could only give the ship a voyage of 10 nm, so that the destruction of the destroyer had to be expected with almost absolute certainty, Lieutenant Tovey attacked again and fired his two last torpedoes on the ships of the line. One of these was spotted on "Kaiser" at 7:25 p.m., but ran on the surface so that it could easily be avoided. (Map 13.) But the destroyer escaped. The attention of the German ships was drawn to a much greater extent by other events.

The armored cruisers "Defense", "Warrior" and probably also "Black Prince" opened fire on the "Wiesbaden" at 7:05 p.m., then they crossed at 7.15 a.m. right in front of the bow of "Lion". The course of the British battlecruisers, forcing the latter to swerve to port. However, if Admiral Arbuthnot had believed that the destruction of the "Wiesbaden" would have an easy time of it, this error was to take terrible revenge. For now the German battlecruisers and ships of the III Squadron emerged from the smoke of battle to the southwest of this one in huge outlines. Suddenly from "Lützow" a ship with four funnels is recognizable at close range in fire leeward of the still visible top ships of the 1st British Battlecruiser Squadron, which is initially generally mistaken for the German cruiser "Rostock", as the thought of the appearance of old armored cruisers was far from the observers close to the German line. The commander, Kapitän zur See Harder, is sure of his cause to have an English ship in front of him, and at 7:16 pm, while hesitating on "Derfflinger", opens fire and shoots a torpedo at 70 hm range, while at the same time "Großer Kurfürst", "Margrave", "Kronprinz" and "Kaiser" join in the fire. (Map 12 and 13.) Admiral Arbuthnot realizes his dangerous situation too late. At 7:20 p.m., all three armored cruisers were caught in a concentrated and extraordinarily violent fire. Volley after volley of the German heavy artillery fell at regular and very short intervals, while the medium artillery, as it seemed to observers on the V battle squadron, placed barrage at a certain distance from the German ships. In the next instant, "Defense" is enveloped in the columns of water of exploding shells, first aft, then in front huge flames erupt from under the turrets, and then the third of the huge catastrophes that only affected English ships in this battle occurs.<sup>310</sup>

"Defense" flies with an explosion that can be heard on all ships of both fleets from a crater of flashes into the air. Where there had been a ship before, there was soon only a cloud of smoke over the water, no survivor testified of its sinking. "Black Prince" and "Warrior" only manage to escape a similar catastrophe with great difficulty. It is true that a violent explosion breaks out on the latter at the stern of the ship and envelops it in a thick cloud of black smoke, but under its protection the armored cruiser can reach the V Battle Squadron, from which "Warspite" at this very moment, as a result of an rudder accident, has to leave in the direction of the enemy, so that "Warrior", covered by this, escapes.

When Admiral Evan Thomas turned in with the V Battle Squadron behind the 6th Division, he and his ships came under heavy fire from the German 6th Division, which was probably unsafe due to poor observation. Here, "Kaiserin", Kapitän zur See Sievers, who shot at "Warspite" for a short time from 7:17 pm at distances of 110 to 115 hm, scored a hit that affected the helm of the British capital ship. When the "Valiant" swung too close to port, "Warspite" had just wanted to dodge the former to starboard. when the rudder could no longer be placed amidships as a result of the hit, so that "Warspite" slipped out of the line just below the stern of the man in front and ran towards the German III squadron. All efforts to bring the ship back into line were in vain. The commander therefore quickly decided to go to "Extreme Force" in order to return to the line with a full circle to starboard. But even this daring maneuver only succeeded after the ship had made a second circle towards the enemy. The veering saved - luck in misfortune - the burning "Warrior", which was thereby covered and saved from complete destruction, but at the same time drew fire to a number of German liners on "Warspite", most of which were the first in this ship found a reasonably visible target. At 7:20 pm the fleet flagship "Friedrich der Große", at 7:22 pm "König", at 7:24 pm "Helgoland", and immediately afterwards "Ostfriesland" and "Thuringia" opened fire with all heavy and medium artillery at 88 to 140 hm while they passed at high speed on a north-easterly course. However, as the III. Squadron soon turned to ENE and then E course as a result of the battle situation, "Warspite" for "König" came out of sight at 7:26, so that he had to stop firing.<sup>311</sup>

Page 291      7:17 p.m.      "Warspite" out of action.

Even "Thuringia" went over to the next ship to the right ("Malaya") after 20 shots, and at 7:35 p.m. "Friedrich der Große" and "Helgoland" could no longer reach their destination, while "Nassau" was now at 140 hm range, three minutes later "Oldenburg" started fire against "Warspite". Only "Ostfriesland" was able to bombard the English ship, from which long red fiery fires struck out after the third and fourth volleys, until 7:45 p.m. At the time, however, it was difficult to make out in the increasing twilight and when there was heavy smoke development at times, so that firing could only take place slowly and intermittently at distances of 130 to 160 hm. When, finally, directional periscopes, distance measuring devices, and turret sights could no longer hold the target, all ships had to stop firing, where the heavy fogging of all telescopes as a result of the moist air set a limit to the use of artillery earlier than visibility itself. It was only thanks to these circumstances that "Warspite" was able to withdraw to the north from the fire area of the German ships, although it was hit eleven times in a row in a very short time and only responded weakly to the German fire. However, after another control station was put into operation, it had to give up an attempt to re-enter the line behind "Malaya", as it now turned out that water penetrated into the machines from the shattered stern when they made more than 16 nautical miles. As a result, the commandant, Captain G. P. W. Hope, was ordered to leave the battle line for good and return with the ship to Rosyth.

On the other hand, the other ships of the V Battle Squadron had hardly suffered from the German fire while they were swiveling in behind the 6th British Division. Several heavy volleys had passed over them, but apart from "Warspite" only "Valiant" had been hit several times on the side armor and chimneys by 15 cm shells. The heavy hits: six on "Barham" by the German battlecruisers, one on "Valiant", seven on "Malaya", three of them by the battle cruiser, four by the ships of the line (1), had mainly entered during the pursuit north from the German fleet. When the V Battle Squadron at 7:30 p.m. behind the ships of the line in the wake of the "Agincourt" was swung, it took partly ships of the German I., partly those of the III. Squadron and "Wiesbaden" under fire.

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1) Battle of Jutland, Official Dispatches, page 194.<sup>312</sup>

Meanwhile, the inevitable disadvantages of the development on the eastern wing, which initially continued from the German fleet, and thus prevented energetic intervention by all English battleship squadrons in the battle of the battle cruisers, the V Battle Squadron and the armored cruisers, had not escaped the British commander in chief. But no sooner had Admiral Beatty with the 1st and 2nd Battlecruiser Squadrons passed the naval flagship so far that it was free of the smoke and chimney smoke of the same, when Admiral Jellicoe could occasionally recognize and spot one or more of the German ships in the glow of the setting sun, that these ran eastward in a violent engagement with the battlecruisers on a slightly converging course to the British battle fleet. He also received further signals from "Southampton" and "Lion" about the position of the German battle fleet at 7:24 pm and 7:27 pm. With one fast division at the head and one at the end of the now almost completely developed line, the possibility now seemed to be offered of bringing the entire superiority of the British fleet to bear in the current battle, ship against ship, by approaching effective shooting range. At 7:29 p.m. he therefore ordered the ships of the line to turn from the previous SE by E course to SSE in order to get closer to the enemy. But a moment's thought was enough to convince the British leader that the signal should be withdrawn. The necessity of reducing speed to let Admiral Beatty pass had delayed and made the development of the battle line, which had already begun very late, even more difficult. As a result, the line behind the fleet flagship had already compressed, so that some ships and units had to stop temporarily and even pull out, obstructing each other's view, and the final squadrons, traveling only 12 nautical miles, had not even reached the pivot point. The squadrons of the battle fleet were therefore, instead of in a straight line, still at a sharp, highly undesirable angle to one another, and it was part of the peculiarity of the rigid British ship of the line tactics that it did not seem possible for the British fleet commander to take the planned turn from such a formation to run the meeting on SSE. At the same time, however, another difficulty emerged. Admiral Beatty had already passed the final squadron at a speed of 26 nm, but was still masking the other ships of the line and was now approaching the tip on a strongly converging course, so that Admiral Jerram had to give way to port on "King George V." and so on even removed the top squadron from the enemy. (Map 14)<sup>313</sup>

Page 293      Concentration in front of the top of the German line.

For the reasons mentioned, however, there was now nothing left for Admiral Jellicoe but to maintain the previous course, and it was only at 7:33 p.m. that the battle cruisers were far enough ahead to allow the former to resume a journey of 17 nm with the battle fleet. As a result, the intervention of the battle fleet was delayed and could not be felt until about 7:25 p.m.; but the reason for this was that, as a result of the sudden collision with the German fleet in an unexpected bearing, the development on the eastern wing had become inevitable, and this in turn meant that Admiral Beatty saw no other option but to do so happened to steam up along the whole British line between this and the enemy at the top, in order to take up the position before the latter which he was commanded for the battle.

As disturbing as the course he had to choose for this turned out to be for the British battle fleet, the maneuver, on the other hand, had a positive influence on the further development of the battle for the British. Because already at 7:20 p.m., the III. Battlecruiser Squadron under Admiral Hood intervened in the fight, while Admiral Beatty turned now to E and at 7:26 o'clock on ESE to unite with the III. battlecruiser squadron. While the German ships were still occupied by the bombardment of the "Warspite", "Defense" and "Warrior" and concentrated their attention on the rescue of the "Wiesbaden", a new one was being prepared without this being apparent to them Concentration of heavy and fast enemy ships immediately in front of the German head, which, especially since it was already completely bare of torpedo boat flotillas, would soon prove to be intolerable.

Although the fire effect of the 1st and 2nd British Battlecruiser Squadrons remained low even after passing the "Defense" and "Warrior", which had hindered their view up to now, "Lion" in particular no longer seemed intense due to the hits it received to be able to participate in the fight, and also "Princess Royal", on which at 7:22 o'clock two shots of a volley that went over "Warrior" had a gun turret put out of action and breached the ship's side at the level of the rear engine room, fired at the time from 7:20 pm to 7:35 pm apparently only twice, while "Tiger" and "New Zealand" fired seven and eleven times respectively from 7:21 pm to 7:29 pm; felt the intervention of the III. Battle cruiser squadron.<sup>314</sup>



Page 294      11. Skagerrak - Second phase. - The clash of the battle fleets.

The German battlecruisers and the III. Squadron behind them were still on a north-easterly course when, immediately after the sinking of the "Defense", they suddenly received a fast and immediately extremely effective fire from a north-north-easterly direction to about 100 to 110 hm. In connection with all of the foregoing, the idea was only too obvious that it must be a matter of a surprising new formation of enemy ships of the line emerging from this direction. The fire was so effective that "Moltke" led it back to eight to ten ships of the "Malaya" or "Iron Duke" class. In reality, however, it was Admiral Hood's battlecruiser squadron mentioned earlier that suddenly first sighted "Lützow", then other German battlecruisers and ships of the line, and, passing in front of the head of the same on a westerly course, took them under crossfire from 7:20 p.m. to then, between the III. and IV. Light cruiser squadron passing through, at 7:22 p.m. to sit in a brilliant maneuver about 2 nm in front of the tip of the British battle fleet and, running in front of it, again, now to starboard, to take up the fight against the German battlecruisers.

However, this maneuver was only the initiation of a fire attack against the German top ships, which was to increase in a few minutes to a climax of British artillery effect during the battle, because now the British battle fleet was about to intervene. The top divisions were still masked by the chimney smoke and powder smoke of the Beatty's battle cruiser, but at 7:24 p.m., "Agincourt", the final ship of the line, and immediately afterwards from the middle of the line also "Bellerophon", recognized the German battlecruisers and the fire open against them while "Conqueror" fired at a "König" -class ship. A minute later, the "Thunderer", the eighth ship of the line, which drove directly in front of the fleet flagship, also saw four enemy ships, battle cruisers and those of the "König" class, but could not shoot them because it was strong at the time compressed line was hindered by "Conqueror". At the same moment, however, "Lützow" and "Derfflinger" are also used for the III. Light cruiser squadrons, Rear Admiral Napier, as well as the destroyer "Ophelia" returning to "Invincible" after its first visible attack. The cruisers and the destroyer attack immediately, and at 7:25 and 7:29, "Falmouth" and "Yarmouth", then "Ophelia" fire at 54 and 73 hm torpedoes respectively.<sup>315</sup>

Page 295      7:30 pm.      Full intervention of the British battle fleet in the battle.

But while the medium-sized artillery of the top German ships was trying to repel this attack with rapid rapid fire, "Hercules", "Colossus", "Benbow" and "Iron Duke" opened fire on the ships of the "Lützow" - and "König" - Class at 7:30 p.m. At 7:31 pm, "Conqueror", at 7:32 pm "Orion", then also "Monarch", "Thunderer", "Royal Oak" and "Revenge" join the fire against "König", and if the serves partly also in the haze disappear and most ships can only fire four to eight salvos at 100 to 120 hm under the uncertain observation conditions, but considerable results will soon be achieved. Here the British naval flagship was particularly fortunate. After Beatty's battle cruisers had passed and cleared the field of fire, fire had hardly opened against the top ship of a ship of the line of the "König" -class, now in sight, at 110 hm range, than this ("König") of the in North 54° the sun was shining brightly on the west, while "Iron Duke" remained completely invisible to his opponent in the haze. In four minutes and fifty seconds, the British flagship could fire nine volleys (43 rounds in total), even without being fired at, until the German top ship came out of sight again in smoke and fog.

Suddenly, in front of the German point, from northwest to northeast, there was the muzzle flash of an incalculable line of heavy ships, while salvo after salvo struck almost continuously all around, an impression that was all the more powerful since the fire could hardly be returned by the German ships, as well not one of the British capital ships in the smoke of battle could be recognized (Map 14). In particular, "Lützow" and "König" were in the heaviest enemy fire. It often seemed as if several opponents had united their fire on the two German flagships at the same time. From 7:26 pm onwards, "Lützow" receives hit after hit in the forecastle, from 7:32 pm onwards, "König" is also hit several times. The forecastle catches fire, splinters and gas clouds from the grenades hitting the forecastle penetrate the navigation bridge and after violent tremors in the forecastle, "König" leans about 4½° to port. At this moment, however, Commodore Michelsen, the first leader of the torpedo forces, who, with "Rostock", the III. Flotilla (seven boats), and the 1st half flotilla (four boats) since 6:45 in the afternoon starboard ahead of the tip of the III. Squadron standing, waiting in vain for an attack opportunity, the time has come for one. Indeed, an attack launched with full energy just now would have to relieve the pressure on the top German ships considerably. The enemy was so little visible from the torpedo boats that the chief of III. Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Hollmann, on the order to attack, asked Commodore Michelsen, which is understandable in view of the situation, as to which bearing the attack should take.<sup>316</sup>

But hardly had he, according to the instructions, passed "Rostock", port ahead of the latter between the German battlecruisers, giving the instructions to the boats to turn to starboard to fire and to shoot three torpedoes each as above powder smoke lying on the water suddenly at 65 hm, albeit still indistinctly, the outlines of enemy capital ships came into view. However, since the flotilla is hardly seriously fired at even at this distance, the chief of the flotilla decides to go even closer. At that moment, however, he received a radio message from the Commodore Michelsen not to attack, and then, despite the favorable shooting opportunity, which could no longer be assessed from the Commodore's flagship, the attack was canceled in order to return to "Rostock" (1). However, the boats "G 88", Kapitänleutnant Scabell, and "V 73", Kapitänleutnant Delbrück, which had not received the last order, and probably also "V 48", Kapitänleutnant Eckoldt, fire a torpedo at 60 or 70 hm distance, which must have passed immediately behind the I and II British battlecruiser squadrons, and almost reached the top of the British battle fleet, because at 7:47 o'clock the armored cruiser "Duke of Edinburgh", which was standing directly in front of it, had to avoid a torpedo runaway, which he apparently traced back to a submarine. At the same time, it is also observed on "King George V." how a torpedo lands abeam about 36 hm starboard. In the meantime, however, a different danger than this attack, which unfortunately was broken off at the most favorable moment, faced the British III. Battle cruiser squadron proved to be more terrible, because at 7:30 the smoke of battle broke for the German ships for a short time, "Invincible" clearly stood out from the black smoke and powder clouds that still veiled the other British ships, and immediately concentrated "Lützow" and "Derfflinger" on 100 to 88 hm their fire against the ship that has just become visible. The British battlecruiser still replies, although it has already received several hits, with such good effect that Admiral Hood calls out to his artillery officer, Lt. Cmdr. Dannreuther, through the mouthpiece after the control center in the pre-top area: "Your fire is very good, go on like this, maximum rate of fire - every shot is a hit", but immediately afterwards the fate of his flagship is fulfilled. Already with the second salvo, "Lützow", on which the 3rd artillery officer, Kapitänleutnant Gustav Bode, directed fire from the rear artillery stand, is at the target, and simultaneously with the sound of the impact alarm clock on the impact of the third volley, the terrible catastrophe repeats itself on the enemy ship, to which "Indefatigable", "Queen Mary" and "Defense" had already fallen victim.<sup>317</sup>

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1) For the reason for the callback signal, see p. 303.

Page 297      7.33 a.m.      Destruction of the "Invincible".

At 7:33 pm, the third full volley of the "Lützow" hit the British battle cruiser between the central towers, breached the armor, detonated inside, causing the turret ceiling to blow up and igniting the ammunition underneath. Flames shoot out of the ship, a tremendous explosion makes the crews of the German and British battle cruisers sit up and take notice - at the point where the "Invincible" had been visible shortly before, a huge black column of smoke rises, mixed with ship debris, hundreds of meters up to the Heaven, and "the mother of all battlecruisers had gone the way of the other two who were no more (1)". (Map 15.)

When "Inflexible" and "Indomitable" swung to port to avoid the simmering wound bed of the "Invincible", they saw that the ship had broken in two, so that the stem and stern, standing far apart on the bottom, were high protruded from the shallow water, while a group of six men, the only survivors, including the artillery officer, rescued themselves on a raft and soon afterwards, on the orders of Admiral Beatty's, were rescued by the destroyer "Badger" from the 1st Flotilla. But Admiral Hood, worthy of his famous ancestors, had sealed his outstanding part in initiating the battle with death. Four minutes later a heavy grenade hits the ceiling of the command post on "König", the projectile slides off and detonates 50 m from the ship, with Kontreadmiral Behncke, the chief of III. Squadron, was wounded, but without relinquishing the command of his squadron.

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1) Corbett: Naval Operations, Volume III, p. 366. "Invincible" was the first ship of this class.<sup>318</sup>

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## 12. Skagerrak - Third phase. - From 7:30 p.m. until nightfall.

The explosion, in which "Invincible" was destroyed, brought a phase of the day-to-day battle to an end in which the English suffered heavier losses than the Germans despite the intervention of the battle fleet, but aided by the surprising appearance of the "Invincibles" achieved a tactically extraordinarily advantageous position for the German ships on the free German flank as well as due to the extraordinary deterioration in visibility. This was, however, made much easier by the efforts of the German line to hold fast to the enemy once it had been captured - something that was self-evident and explainable after the long period of restraint. If this urge to move forward had dominated the German leaders and sub-leaders less powerfully, then the presumption of strong enemy forces in the north would have caused the naval command to pursue the British battlecruiser less vigorously, and at times to regain the squadrons more firmly in the hands of the leader and in a broad preparation formation (for example in the line bearing north-east-south-west) with careful reconnaissance with less speed to the north, in order to swing again at the given moment across the sighted British battle fleet to the battle line. The head of the German line would then probably not have run into the ring of the British battle fleet that was forming in the north as it had now, without immediately receiving strong support from the squadrons further behind (1).

In fact, the German fleet flagship had already been considering how long this should be continued in the pursuit of the British battlecruiser fleet in view of the advanced times, since an advance into the Skagerrak was now no longer an option because the purpose of the same was the encounter with enemy forces had already been achieved.

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1) Comment in the war diary S. M. S. "Kaiser", Kapitän zur See Baron v. Keyserlingk.<sup>319</sup>

Page 299      7:35 p.m.      First turnaround of the German fleet.

If the pursuit was continued for too long, the danger was that it would no longer be possible to shake off the English light forces before dark and to avoid losses among the German main body through night destroyer attacks. But this seemed essential, since after sighting the battle cruiser fleet there was no longer any doubt that the British battle fleet would have to be somewhere nearby. In this case, however, everything depended on the latter, if the latter were to offer battle the next morning, with undiminished strength. However, these considerations had not yet led to a decision when the collision with ships that were evidently already part of the vanguard of the enemy battle fleet, and now Admiral Scheer's intention was clear: to fight through the upcoming battle with full commitment while maintaining the previous combat course. While the ships of the I. Squadron as well as "Friedrich der Große" and "Kaiserin" were still in combat with "Warspite", and those of the III. Squadron opened fire on Defense, Warrior and Black Prince, but the enemy fire increased towards the top without giving the majority of the German ships of the line an opportunity to intervene. Only "Prinzregent" was able to maintain a prolonged fire on a ship of the actual British line ("King George" class) from 7:15 pm from 172 to 160 hm. At the same time, "König", as could be observed from "Friedrich der Große", was already in the heaviest enemy fire, and soon the line in front of the German naval flagship, Obviously yielding to an overflight by the enemy, assumed a curve which must have been very unfavorable in terms of artillery tactics and which deprived the II Flotilla standing there from the opportunity to develop freely (Map 14 and following). At the time there was nothing to be seen of the German battlecruisers that were standing further ahead. In reality, however, they, who for the past three hours had primarily had to bear the full severity of the fight, had again at 7:26 p.m. under the pressure of the encirclement in front of the head of the III. Squadron on a south-easterly course must be disengaging from the enemy.

At the same time Admiral Scheer received a radio message from the Vth Torpedo Boat Flotilla that, according to the testimony of prisoners of the destroyer "Nomad", 60 large enemy ships were in the vicinity, including 20 new ships of the line and 6 battle cruisers - and this statement was confirmed when the horizon around the German tip turned into an unbroken line of flashing fiery chasms. If, therefore, the fleet continued to hold out to the east, a tactically extremely unfavorable situation for the German battleships would develop at the pivot point in front of which the enemy line, as could be seen from the flash of gunfire, gradually passed.<sup>320</sup>

The wind, too, had meanwhile gone from WNW to W and then further to the left, so that the smoke and fumes of the German ships drifted over their own point towards the enemy and almost completely covered the latter, while the German ships became increasingly clear in front of the light Background of the setting sun had to stand out. For this reason, even if it was possible to pass the pivot point, which was under heavy fire, without major losses, an ongoing battle on a southerly course, with the enemy fleet in the east, could only have a detrimental effect on artillery tactics. From this situation there seemed to be only one way out of the German fleet commander: to turn the line around on the opposite course in a U-turn in order to clear the top ships and the torpedo boat flotillas standing in their vicinity and then to resume the attack from a more favorable tactical position. Between the decision and the execution, however, the situation had deteriorated even further. At 7:36 o'clock, "König" was already on a south course following the movements of the battle cruisers, the other ships of the 5th Division were turning to the south-east, while the rest of the III. Squadron still east, the I. Squadron steered north-east. The excellent tactical training of the German fleet, to which Grand Admiral v. Koester had laid the foundation, but gave Admiral Scheer the confidence that, despite this curvature of the line and the enormous enemy counteraction, the intended movement could be carried out without great difficulty even in the midst of the heaviest enemy fire, a trust in which he was not betrayed by his subordinates and commanders (1).

At 7:33 pm, Admiral Scheer gave the signal from "Friedrich dem Großen" immediately after "Invincible" had blown up air: "Turn around to starboard until the wake line was made in the opposite direction!"

1) In the English representation (see Jellicoe: The Grand Fleet 1914–1916, page 404, and Corbett: Naval Operations, Volume III, page 369) there is a tendency to turn around twice in battle under the protection of smoke curtains and torpedo boat attacks to be presented as a carefully considered and frequently practiced maneuver, which the German fleet wanted to use in any case when it met the British, in order to evade superiority as quickly as possible while renouncing its own artillery effect. The turnaround therefore formed the general tactical idea of the German fleet for an imminent battle. In reality, the German plan for the battle was none other than the English one, namely to have the squadrons swivel on a combat course when they encounter the enemy, based on a broad preparatory formation, on which all the ships' guns simultaneously and, if possible, from a position in front of the Opponents could be brought into action from the broadside. In the present case, however, due to the unfavorable circumstances already described, this had not succeeded, and only now, on a sudden inspiration, did Admiral Scheer take advantage of the turnaround as one of the many tactical maneuvers practiced for the vicissitudes of the battle, but not around to break off the battle as quickly as possible, but only to resume it immediately under tactically more favorable conditions.<sup>321</sup>



In response to this signal, Kontreadmiral Mauve would have begun this movement with the II. Squadron according to the regulations given for this purpose, and the final ship of the I. Squadron, "Westphalia", Kapitän zur See Redlich, only allowed to turn on after the second squadron has acted. However, since the II. Squadron could not yet be brought into the general combat course due to the high speed and the repeated combat turns of the fleet and was currently still on a northerly course, Kapitän zur See Redlich led the move with "Westphalia" regardless of the same "As the first ship to take off independently and, when the heading signal" West "blew on the fleet flagship at 7:39, now took the lead on the commanded course at the new head of the fleet. (Map 16.) As a result, the II. Squadron got into the fire of the I., so that Admiral Mauve was already considering moving behind the III. Squadron to attach to the end of the line and only refrained from doing so because otherwise it would have hindered the German battlecruisers and flotillas standing there; On the other hand, however, by the immediate turning of the "Westphalia" to the west without taking into account the II. Squadron, it was avoided that a too sharply curved line was created, which would have removed the new head of the fleet further from the English armed forces still in the north corresponded to than the Intent of the fleet chief. While Kontreadmiral Mauve tried to gradually move the II. Squadron back in front of the bottom ships of the I. Squadron in the new battle direction, the other ships of the latter followed the movement of the "Westphalia" within a few minutes. However, the about-face interrupted the fire against "Warspite", which had continued so far. Only "Ostfriesland" was able to fire two more volleys against this ship after the turn, then the distance increased quickly from 125 to 160 hm. Before "Warspite" finally came out of sight in the haze, it seemed to have been on a westerly course, and from this, Vizeadmiral Ehrhard Schmidt, the chief of the I. Squadron, concluded that the entire enemy line had probably turned around to the Germans on the to follow a new course in a westerly direction, an observation that "Prinzregent", Kapitän zur See Heuser, wanted to have made.<sup>322</sup>

Page 302      12. Skagerrak - Third phase. - From 7:30 p.m. until nightfall.

This ship, too, when it turned the battle immediately after the naval flagship and the "Kaiserin", about 30 hm south of the "Wiesbaden", had to cease fire since 7:15 pm against a ship of the "King George" class. As before, however, the ships of the German 5th Division were in the heaviest enemy fire, and so it happened that on "König", since the F. T. station for combat signals had failed, the signal for the U-turn was not removed. However, when it was reported at 7:40 pm that the final ships of the 1st Squadron were turning on the opposite course and at 7:41 pm the heading signal "West" was blowing on the ships behind "König", the latter also turned on this course and began to catch up with the I. Squadron behind those of the 6th with the ships of the 5th Division increasing their voyage. Here, however, "Margrave", Kapitän zur See Seiferling, had to stop the port engine as the camps had warmed up and could only maintain his place in the line with particular effort. On the whole, however, the difficult and dangerous maneuver had already been carried out at 7:45 p.m. thanks to the seafaring skill and the excellent tactical training of the German liner commanders (Maps 17 and 18).

On the battlecruisers that were outside the line, the squadron's turn around was recognized earlier as "König", so that "von der Tann" turned to port over east to north at 7:38 o'clock, to follow "König" to set, while "Moltke", "Seydlitz" and "Derfflinger" staggered to the west with the starboard rudder for the same purpose. Only "Lützow", who had only made little speed since 7:37, was no longer able to follow this movement and tried to evade the fire that was now on her with full force on a SW course. "Derfflinger" also had to stop the engines for two minutes in order to clear the torpedo protection net, from which parts torn by hits endangered the propellers, while on "Seydlitz" it was temporarily steered out of the steering wheel room because the coupling in the forward steering engine was caused by the vibrations of the ship was blown out by hit. The command of the battle cruiser was now transferred to Kapitän zur See Hartog on "Derfflinger". However, since all the flaglines on this ship were already burned or torn and the bridge lights were unusable, the commander had no means of signaling with which to give any order to the other battlecruisers.<sup>323</sup>

Page 303      7:37 p.m.      "Lützow" out of action.

Meanwhile, Kommodore Michelsen ran with "Rostock" and the boats of the III. Flotilla and 1st half flotilla between "von der Tann" and "König" in Fire leeward of the 5th Division. Hardly had the U-turn of the line on west course become recognizable for him when, as already mentioned, the III. Flotilla had called back from the attack scheduled at 7:32 p.m., because at this new turn of the battle he was immediately dominated by the thought that the bulk of the flotilla would later need the flotilla in a more easily overlooked situation, especially since the II., VI. and IX. Flotilla must have already fired a large part of their torpedoes. He also had the feeling that the enemy had now also turned away, and that the flotilla would therefore be pushed into the void or, at most, would encounter light enemy forces. However, when he later found out what a favorable opportunity for attack the flotilla had faced, he too was of the opinion that, despite the recall, it would have carried out the attack better. But now the hard-pressed situation of the "Lützow" forced him to take immediate measures to rescue this ship. At 7:50 p.m. he dispatched the previously held back 1st Half Flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Conrad Albrecht, to the battle cruiser, on which the boats "G 37", Kapitänleutnant Wolf v. Trotha and "V 45", Kapitänleutnant Laßmann, arrived from the 12th half-flotilla. In the middle of the heaviest enemy fire, the leader boat of the 1st half flotilla, "G 39", Oberleutnant zur See v. Loefen, alongside "Lützow" and took Admiral Hipper on board with his staff to transfer him to another battle cruiser, while "G 40", Kapitänleutnant Beitzen, and "G 38", Kapitänleutnant Metger, after the process of "V 45" and "G 37" cleverly began to create a thick veil between "Lützow" and the enemy line, which was still firing violently, through the development of heavy smoke from the oil boilers. Even before this veil took effect, however, "Lützow" received four more serious hits in quick succession at 8:15, and it was only through these that the ship's artillery was seriously affected. The right side wall of the second foremost turret was broken through, the loading equipment and the right barrel destroyed and the turret temporarily put out of action by a burning cartridge. Another hit between the 2nd and 3rd tower destroyed the electrical supply to the 4th turret, so that it was dependent on manual operation. At 8:45 pm, "Lützow" fired its last shot during the battle. At the same time, however, as the smoke curtain completely covered the battle cruiser in the meantime, the enemy had to cease fire and soon lost sight of the ship for good. (Map 19 to 21.)<sup>324</sup>

Page 304      12. Skagerrak - Third phase. - From 7:30 p.m. until nightfall.

In the meantime, soon after the about-face of the fleet on its return from the attack, the chief of the 6th Half Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Theodor Riedel, with "V 48", Kapitänleutnant Friedrich Eckoldt, and "S 54", Kapitänleutnant Karlowa, encountered a destroyer lying between the German and English lines, and immediately rushed at it in a violent artillery battle. Here, however, "V 48" very soon received a hit that significantly reduced its speed. The destroyer was sunk immediately afterwards by "S 54" with a torpedo flat shot fired at 40 hm range, but then several ships of the British line opened a devastating fire on "V 48". Unsuccessful attempted Kapitänleutnant Bernd v. Arnim with "G 42", which had meanwhile also come up and had taken part in the artillery battle against the destroyer, to tow "V 48" or at least to rescue the crew. Finally, in order to avoid being destroyed by the fire of enemy ships of the line and battle cruisers, he had to leave "V 48" to its fate. Running towards the top of his own line at full speed, the commanding officer now saw this too endangered by enemy fire, and so, in order to cover it during the U-turn, put a thick smoke curtain between the German tailships and the enemy.

This smoke mixed with the black smoke of the boats that were parked at "Lützow" and soon had the desired effect. The final ships of the German line, which was now heading west, received breath, and at 7:48 p.m. Admiral Scheer had divisions swiveled two lines to starboard in order to get closer to the rearguard of the enemy fleet, which had been in sight until the U-turn. At 7:55 pm the fire against the German final ships subsided noticeably, at the same time from "Friedrich the Great" the German battle cruisers came into view again. The about-face had therefore had the desired success, the German fleet commander was again in control of his decisions. On the English side, the sudden tossing of the German line on a westerly course went almost unnoticed. In particular, the two remaining ships of the III. Battle cruiser squadrons, while they were pulling to port to avoid the wreck of the "Invincible", lost the feeling of battle on the German battle cruisers. They had observed that a ship of the "Lützow" class had to pull out of the line and, as they believed, had sunk soon afterwards, but although Captain Ellis was the same with the "Inflexible", followed by "Indomitable" after the evasive maneuver turned two lines to starboard again and set sail at 7:45 p.m. on the SE course to resume the battle, the German battlecruisers were no longer sighted.<sup>325</sup>

On the other hand, after his torpedo attack against "Lützow" with the small cruisers "Falmouth" and "Marmouth" at 7:35 p.m. only about 100 hm northeast of the German battlecruisers, Admiral Napier noticed that they were soon after the "Invincible" turned west, apparently did not consider this observation important enough to report it or to immediately advance against the enemy on the basis of it, but merely tried to take his place at the head of its own line again as soon as possible. It was only when Admiral Beatty asked at 7:40 pm: "How are the enemy battlecruisers taking bearings?" Battlecruiser Squadron would have changed course to the west. Meanwhile, "Lion", "Princess Royal", "Tiger" and "New Zealand" had to gradually stop their fire, while the boats of the III. Flotilla fired torpedoes forced them to evasive maneuvers between 7:37 p.m. and 7:40 p.m. The last thing Admiral Beatty had seen of the enemy was therefore an apparent compression of the German tip, in which "Lützow" seemed to have turned on a SW course. As on the German side from the course of the "Warspite" on which the English fleet was inferred, Admiral Beatty now suspected that the other German battlecruisers would have followed their flagship on the course they had taken. At 7:44 p.m. he swiveled to SE and at 7:48 p.m. to SSE, but then, although the German ships were no longer visible again, did not turn more sharply, but at 7:50 p.m. also called the two ships of III. Battlecruiser Squadron from their previous position and ordered them to attach themselves behind "New Zealand" to the battlecruisers led by him (map 18 to 21). At 7:53 p.m. he went down with the I. and II. Battle Cruiser Squadrons to 18 nm in order not to let the distance between his ships and the battle fleet increase. At the same time he turned south. At that moment, however, the gyrocompass failed on "Lion" with the effect that the ship made a complete circle, which delayed the advance of the entire battlecruiser to the south by a further seven minutes. Only at 8:01 pm was "Lion" back in the same place at which he had started the course change to the south.<sup>326</sup>

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As a result of the failure of the English cruiser reconnaissance at the head, Admiral Jellicoe found himself again dependent solely on his own observations at a critical moment in the battle. Even during the few minutes in which almost all the ships in the battle fleet had fired, the vanguard and center of the line had seldom seen more than three, or at most four, German ships at the same time, and only the bottom ships of the British line had a better view. Now when the fire died out even on the battlecruisers standing 3 nm starboard ahead of the fleet, it was not strange that the ships of the line could no longer find a target either. For this reason, "Iron Duke", at 7:37 pm "Orion" and at 7:39 pm also "Marlborough" had to cease fire for this reason, and only "Neptune", "Canada", "Benbow" and "Barham" found beyond 7:40 p.m., sometimes until 7:48 a.m. and "Barham" until 7:50 p.m., targets that they were able to keep under fire, often without monitoring impact and only with interruptions. The observations of the ships of the line were, however, limited to the fact that the enemy had then come from view, turning the pointed ships to starboard, and on "Thunderer", "Benbow" and "Barham" it was believed that a ship was the "King" Class caught fire and blew up at 7:50 pm. From all this it emerged that the enemy must have turned, but it remained questionable whether they had taken the opposite course to the previous direction of advance or, without changing the line, had simply taken a course for Heligoland by swiveling the previous tip. The only movement which would have brought clarity to the British naval commander very soon and enabled him to maintain the so happily achieved embrace of the German leadership would have been for the liner divisions to turn immediately towards the enemy. However, all tactical considerations of the British fleet chief were based on the assumption that under all circumstances, especially in the early stages of the battle, at least the middle and the rear ships of the British line had to be kept out of the range of the German torpedo boat flotilla and the ship's torpedo weapon. He also believed, erroneously to be sure, that not only the German cruisers but also all capital ships had mines on board and would probably make use of them if they moved away from the enemy. He also strongly anticipated the danger of submarines. As natural as it was, therefore, the idea of immediately following the enemy with the whole fleet, and as much as this would have been in keeping with the traditions of the British navy from the time of the Nelsonian era, this did not seem to the British leader to be still possible given the importance that the development of the torpedo, the mine and the submarine had gained as a weapon of the weaker.<sup>327</sup>

As early as October 1914, Admiral Jellicoe had emphatically pointed out in a memorandum to the Admiralty which changes in tactics caused the development of this new weapon (1). For this reason it is not always possible to follow the enemy in a battle in the direction he has chosen. “If, for example,” he explained, “the enemy turned in front of an approaching fleet, I would assume that they intended to lead us over mines and submarines and would refuse to allow me to be dragged into them. The Admiralty, in which Lord Fisher, at that time First Sea Lord, had re-entered, had fully agreed with this view. This view had been confirmed by a war experience of six months, and on April 5, 1915, Admiral Jellicoe had brought about a new declaration of approval by the Admiralty in this regard. However, the situation in which he now found himself deviated not insignificantly from the views of the memorandum. He believed he had every reason to expect the presence of German submarines. He knew that quite a number of them were already in the North Sea, and during the course of the battle so far, one ship after the other had repeatedly reported submarines. On the other hand, the collision with the German fleet had occurred so suddenly that it seemed very questionable whether this could have found time to set a trap for the British fleet with mine barriers or submarines. But even if this was not the case, the remaining doubts about following the enemy in the direction he had indicated persisted; they were exacerbated by the fact that the British destroyer flotillas, the best protection against German torpedo boat attacks, were still steaming up to their combat positions and therefore could hardly intervene in time. All considerations as to how an evasion of the enemy could be countered under the protection of his torpedo weapon had culminated again and again with the conclusion that “nothing but sufficient time and superior speed could bring a solution to the problem, and this means that if the encounter the fleets did not take place reasonably early in the day, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to fight the battle through to a decision”. The day was drawing to a close, however, and so, in view of the turning of the German fleet and the modest sea depth, the British fleet commander saw little possibility of how the battle, having started so favorably, could be brought to a decision. Another possibility of restoring the lost sense of battle would have been, instead of turning towards the enemy, to immediately shift one's own line on a westward course and maintain the position north of the German fleet.<sup>328</sup>

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1) The memorandum has already been published in full in North Sea Volume II, page 324ff.



But then the latter would presumably have got into a forward position from which it could have made use of the torpedo weapon with hardly less effect than in the first case. The only way to overcome these difficulties would therefore have been to split the British fleet, and especially to have the top and bottom squadrons take action independently, in order to hold the top or bottom of the German line in the artillery fight, and in clear weather and less advanced Time of day would undoubtedly have something achieved in this way. However, under the prevailing poor visibility and as late in the evening as was actually the case, the cooperation of separately operating squadrons seemed so little guaranteed that the danger of the enemy would have the opportunity to throw himself with full force and his entire armed forces on part of the British fleet, which could not be dismissed.

Moreover, Admiral Jellicoe did not yet know in which direction the enemy had retreated, but it was most likely that Admiral Scheer would set course for the German Bight. So there was now only one decision for the British fleet commander: to lie across the assumed line of retreat as quickly as possible, because sooner or later the enemy would have to be sighted again on this line.

At 7:44 p.m. he therefore had the liner divisions swivel to SE. Immediately afterwards at the end of the line "Marlborough", the top ship of the 6th Division, had to avoid a torpedo. Then the "Revenge" driving behind "Marlborough" felt a shock like a torpedo that had hit the ship but had not detonated, and at 7:54 p.m. a heavy explosion occurred on "Marlborough" close under the forward bridge (Map 19). In the front boiler room, the grates flew out of their bearings, water streamed from the smashed lower bunker and the perforated transverse bulkhead into the furnace and put five boilers out of operation. The rooms for diesel engines and hydraulic pumps were also flooded, the ship leaned 7 degrees to starboard until the pumps kept the water level with the floor slabs of the boiler room hit and the ship could maintain its place in the line with a speed of about 16 nm. Simultaneously with the explosion, "Agincourt", the division's final ship, reported an enemy submarine, and at 8 o'clock three more torpedo runways were sighted on "Marlborough". It was difficult to see where these came from.<sup>329</sup>

Page 309      7:54 p.m.      "Marlborough" torpedoed.

Immediately before the explosion itself, no torpedo trajectory had been seen at all, so that a mine hit was already believed when the "Wiesbaden", which now passed by the ships at 85 hm distance, was suspected, despite the fact that it had already endured the fire of the whole line had to have shot the torpedoes. However, since at the same time the destroyer "Acasta" was driving past incapable of maneuvering, "Wiesbaden" was initially also mistaken for an English cruiser by the "Marlborough" division; but then the latter began again to fire at the unfortunate but brave German ship. Already the third and fourth salvo of the "Marlborough" tore the side of the German cruiser open to the waterline, two chimneys of the ship went overboard. At 8:10 pm, "Marlborough" fired another torpedo against "Wiesbaden", then drifted astern as a burning wreck until the flames reached the waterline and went out there. But even this devastating fire had not yet been able to bring the German cruiser to sink. Meanwhile "Colossus" suddenly spotted a German torpedo boat that ran towards him and, taken under fire at 36 hm, disappeared on the impact of a heavy volley. Since no other German torpedo boat was so close to the British line at the time, it can only be the "V 48", Lieutenant Eckholdt, who was left behind during the previous attack by the III Flotilla have acted, who in a losing position, with irreversible annihilation in mind, sold their life here as dearly as possible, after perhaps, if it wasn't "Wiesbaden", they had also scored the goal against "Marlborough".

The heavy artillery fire which suddenly began at the 6th Division had drawn the attention of Admiral Jellicoe again to the final ships of his line. At 7:50 p.m. he asked Vice-Admiral Burney, the leader of the rearguard, whether he had any enemy capital ships in sight. When he found out that this was not the case, he believed that he had drawn far enough east to make sure he was between the enemy and their line of retreat. Therefore, at 7:55 p.m. he ordered the leading ships of the columns of the liner to turn four lines to starboard (Map 20) and radioed the battle cruisers that the battle fleet was now heading south. At the same time he passed with "Iron Duke" and behind him the whole line the wreck of the "Invincible", a gruesome sight, the effect of which was only lessened by the fact that most ships initially mistook it for that of a German cruiser.<sup>330</sup>

At 8 o'clock, however, the artillery battle at the end of the line began to revive again, because at the same time as the British columns of liners turned south, a new advance by the German fleet had surprisingly begun.

When Admiral Scheer withdrew from his grip on his head by turning west at 7:35 p.m., the idea was obvious that the enemy would not give up the tactical advantage they had already achieved, but would press it immediately. When, contrary to expectations, this did not happen, and rather the enemy fire very soon ceased, Admiral Scheer believed that this was less due to the hindrance of the enemy by the smoke curtain than to the serious losses that he would have suffered during the last engagements. On the basis of the uncertain observations, however, it was to be assumed that the enemy in the collision of the fleets a ship of the "Queen Elizabeth" class ("Warspite"), a battle cruiser ("Invincible"), two armored cruisers ("Black Prince" and "Defense." ") And two small cruisers, while an armored cruiser ("Warrior"), three small cruisers and three destroyers (including "Shark" and "Acasta") had to be badly damaged. In contrast, only "V 48" was missing on the German side, while "Wiesbaden" was unable to maneuver between the lines and "Lützow" with Admiral Hipper on board had come from view for the naval flagship in heavy enemy fire. The other German battle cruisers and "König", the flagship of the III. Squadrons, having suffered, held their place in the line. No sooner had Admiral Scheer regained the freedom of action than, far from finally breaking off the fight, but encouraged by the successful turnaround, he decided to strike a second blow at once. At 7:45 pm "Moltke" reported that the enemy point should take aim at East by South. Admiral Scheer had an hour until sunset and with the long twilight in the northern latitudes it could be some time before the darkness of the night would put an end to squadron fighting. But if, under these circumstances, he maintained the direction it had taken after the line had been diverted, and if the enemy still closed in, the behavior of the German fleet would very soon assume the character of a retreat, with all the disadvantages associated with such a retreat.<sup>331</sup>

Page 311      7:55 p.m.      Second turnaround of the German fleet.

Quite apart from the fact that, in such a case, ships with reduced speeds would have to be surrendered without further ado, the enemy could have put the German fleet at his will before dark, deprived it of its freedom of decision and finally relocated the retreat to the German Bight (1). In the opinion of the German fleet chief, there was now only one way to prevent this: "To deal a second blow to the enemy with another ruthless advance and to force the torpedo boats to attack. The maneuver had to take the enemy by surprise, overturn his plans for the rest of the day and, if the thrust was heavy, make the lot easier for the night. In addition, it gave the opportunity to make one last attempt to bring help to the hard-pressed "Wiesbaden" and at least to rescue the crew."

While the embracing of the German leadership at 7:30 p.m. as a result of some particularly favorable circumstances for the enemy had surprised the German leader, he was now guiding him despite the knowledge that the movement would very soon have to expose him to a second "crossing the T", the conscious intention, with all my might, this time of one's own accord, to strike again against the center of the enemy line.

The reasoning for this decision was almost the same as that used by Nelson in Trafalgar. The latter wrote at the time: "I think it will surprise and confound the enemy. They don't know, what I am about (2). "However, the match was only a coincidence. In no way did Admiral Scheer intend to simply adopt Nelson's procedure in an incorrectly applied analogy under the completely changed combat conditions of modern sea battles. Rather, the decision corresponded only to the intuition of the moment and was so bold, so surprising and so contrary to all the rules of the art that only success could justify it. The British are therefore inclined to attribute other than actual motives to this decision of the German Leader (3). It is believed that Admiral Scheer, when he made this decision, left the ship as a result of the surprise appearance of the III. Battlecruiser Squadron was still found to be fatally mistaken about the position of the former and assumed to be able to push past to the north of this, in order to then resume the fight from the east, covered by the dark horizon, under more favorable visibility conditions, to push the enemy off to the west by destroyer attacks and in this way to secure a free march back to Horns-Riff.

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1) Scheer, Germany's deep-sea fleet in World War I, page 225, and immediate report to the Kaiser, page 11.

2) "I think it will surprise and dismay the enemy. He will not know what the purpose of the movement is. "

3) Narrative of the Battle of Jutland, para. 41. Corbett, Naval Operations, Volume III, page 375.<sup>332</sup>

Page 312      12. Skagerrak - Third phase. - From 7:30 p.m. until nightfall.

Perhaps the position of the V Battle Squadron in the north led him to believe that the British fleet had split up and that such a maneuver might cut off parts of the British fleet.

None of these assumptions are correct, and as plausible as the plan based on the latter assumption would be, just as little does it take into account the fact that the German Leader would have required a completely different overview of the situation in order to carry it out than was actually the case. It therefore marks itself as a purely theoretical construction attempted on the basis of subsequent map study and does not do justice to the real situation of the German Leader, who in the greatest uncertainty had to make and implement decisions of the highest importance in a few minutes.

Already at 7:50 p.m. Admiral Scheer had the liner divisions swivel two lines to starboard in order to get closer to the enemy, a movement that had to be carried out again from the curved line (Map 20 and 21). At 7:55 p.m., however, the signal to turn the battle to starboard was already blowing again on the fleet flagship. At the same time, the fleet chief gave Kommodore Michelsen and the III. Flotilla orders to send torpedo boats to the "Wiesbaden", which appeared to be quite possible in the current break in the battle. It happened to be exactly the same point in time at which about 10 nm from the British fleet from the first "crossing the T" swiveled in division columns on a south course, while the 2nd light cruiser squadron at the end of the line was the only one attempting a battle reconnaissance had been engaged in an advance against the German line since 7:47 o'clock, "in order," as Commodore Goodenough, the leader of the same, later wrote in the battle report, "to be able to follow the movements of the German final ships more closely, since the course of the same had become doubtful".

As a result, the German battleships had scarcely carried out the commanded turnaround, with Admiral Behncke sitting at the head of the line with "König" at reduced speed in order to give the ships following behind him the opportunity to unlock and for the anticipated new section of the battle to give the battlecruisers the opportunity to advance when a number of cruisers with four funnels came into view on the heavily smoke-filled horizon in the north, which apparently intended to attack the "Wiesbaden" again and swiveled on an easterly course at 8:05.<sup>333</sup>

At the same time, Kapitän zur See Hartog led the battlecruisers that followed him in port squadron, even without a signal, and who had hardly noticed the about-turn of the fleet from the enemy, heading north in front of the head of the main body and then towards the enemy. At 8:05 pm, "Margrave", at 8:07 pm "Derfflinger", "König" and "Großer Kurfürst", and immediately afterwards also "Kaiser" and "Prinzregent" opened fire on the small cruisers at dusk at 90 to 165 hm. As a result, "Southampton", which led these ships at the head of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, soon found itself showered with enemy salvos. But even before she turned off with the other cruisers to return to the end of the British line, the purpose of the advance had been achieved, because even before the German fire had started, Commodore Goodenough had reported by radio that the German battle fleet, SSW from "Southampton" "in sight, steer ESE. At the same time, Admiral Beatty reported from the southern wing of the fleet that he had the enemy in sight as well, from the position of the battlecruisers in a westerly direction. Both reports seemed to confirm to Admiral Jellicoe the correctness of his previous movements. At 8:05 p.m., when the top German ships began to fire at the II. Light Cruiser Squadron at the end of the British line, he thought the moment had come to get closer look of the German line. (Map 22.) At that moment, however, both "King George V", the top ship of the line, and "Duke of Edinburgh", who at the time was about 3.5 nm to port from the flagship of the fleet, were at the same time fore and aft One submarine was reported on the port side of the latter, also appeared - but a misunderstanding of the attempt of the III. Flotilla to save the "Wiesbaden" crew - now from SW torpedo boats to attack the British line. Thereupon Admiral Jellicoe, who did not immediately realize that the alleged sighting of the submarines was again one of the many false alarms of the day, had the columns turn back south at 8:09 p.m., once, to turn towards the reported submarines, but then also to take a formation that is more favorable in terms of artillery tactics than the steep squadron to defend against the torpedo boat attack.<sup>334</sup>

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While these movements again brought a great deal of unrest into the British line, through increasing and decreasing voyage at different points there were strong compressions, and the "Marlborough" division was still firing at "Wiesbaden", suddenly, first of the two final ships, the "Colossus" division, but gradually observed by almost all ships in the line, how first one, then two, three or four German battle cruisers, accompanied by torpedo boats, emerged from the haze and finally behind them, albeit only a few ships, the faint outlines of other capital ships became visible. (Map 23.) As a result, soon afterwards, beginning at the columns at the end of the British line and spreading within a few minutes to the southern divisions, the volley fire of the British heavy artillery flared up into which the defensive fire of the Mixed medium artillery against torpedo boats. Simultaneously with the first broadsides of the English, the German top ships also began to fire.

At 8:04 pm, "Neptune" and "St. Vincent", the third and fourth ship of the "Colossus" division, at about 92 hm four to six lines starboard ahead on "Derfflinger" or "Moltke", "Revenge", the second ship of the "Marlborough" division, too against "Derfflinger". After the second salvo of the "Revenge", bright flames rise from the aft of the German top cruiser, "Neptune" is also covered with the third and fourth salvo, then "Revenge" with the battery goes over to "von der Tann" to leave the battlecruisers standing in front of this to the ships ahead. At 8:06 pm, "Agincourt", the final ship of the "Marlborough" division, opened fire at 100 hm distance on one of four battleships, probably "König" or "Großer Kurfürst", which are now coming out behind the German battlecruisers, but must follow dodging four covering salvos in front of a torpedo that was either fired by "Wiesbaden" or "V 48" but incorrectly mistaken for a submarine. The guns of the V Battle Squadron, which drove behind the "Marlborough" division and, as a result of avoiding torpedo runways, had got into the fire alley of the former, had to remain silent. At 8:10 pm, however, "Valiant", then probably also "Barham" and "Malaya" from this squadron could also open fire and shell German battleships and battlecruisers with their 38 cm guns.<sup>335</sup>



At the same time "Revenge" fired 10 salvos at "von der Tann" and at 8:15 pm also fired a torpedo against this ship. Meanwhile, despite some jams caused by the list of the ship, "Marlborough" had opened a devastating fire on a battleship of the "König" class from 8:12 pm at 93 hm and fired no less than 14 volleys in 6 minutes. Already after the sixth volley a huge cloud of gray and white steam allegedly rose near the front mast of the struck ship and in the 12th, 13th and 14th one could see two shells under the bridge and in the waterline struck the same. At the same time "Hercules", the third ship behind "Marlborough", fired at 82 hm at the second of several battlecruisers ("Seydlitz"), which were now clearly visible to the east of ships of the "Kaiser" class. "Hercules" believed that they would also score a hit in the fifth and sixth volleys, and from 8:13 pm to 8:20 pm, "Iron Duke" also fired four volleys at 140 hm at a German battleship, and then switched to a battle cruiser. In contrast, the "Ajax", the second ship of the top division, lay for a short time at 8:10 with a volley fired at 173 hm range, and was hindered in the further fire by the fourth light cruiser squadron standing in front of the top. Obviously, however, the German ships suffered from such poor visibility that they could only counter the English fire, which was soon extremely effective, only weakly in this phase of the battle. Only a few shells struck around "Hercules" and "Agincourt" and only "Colossus", the top ship of the 5th Division, which was closest to the enemy and from 8:12 pm to 8:20 pm at the extremely short distance of 82 to 77 hm also maintained a lively fire against "Derfflinger", was also hit on his part, apparently by "Seydlitz". After four volleys had gone into the water close in front of the British ship in quick succession, a heavy shell struck behind the front funnel at 8:16 p.m., followed by a second, but both only wreaked havoc on the superstructure and set some cartridges of the medium artillery on fire. The explosives of a third and fourth grenade, which again hit directly in front of the ship at 8.17 p.m., only tore a large number of holes in the front chimney, the chart house and the other superstructures and destroyed a searchlight.

The British ships therefore felt themselves threatened less by the German artillery effect than by an attack by German torpedo boats, which they had already observed, against which they now directed fire from their medium artillery and soon also the heavy ones. What they thought was an attack, however, was only an attempt by four boats of the III. Flotilla to save the crew of the "Wiesbaden".<sup>336</sup>

The latter had hardly broken their own line between the 5th and 6th Divisions for this purpose, when the German top ships began to fire on armed forces beyond the "Wiesbaden", while the latter was itself under heavy enemy fire. Then one volley after the other, fired by capital ships against the German line, struck immediately in front of the boats ahead. Soon the enemy fire was also directed directly against the flotilla. If she had continued the attempt anyway, it would not only have severely hindered the fire of her own line, but would very soon have been exposed to complete annihilation without getting to the "Wiesbaden". The flotilla chief, Korvettenkapitän Hollmann, believed that he could no longer be responsible for the further use of the boats, which were particularly valuable due to their completely intact torpedo armament, for such a hopeless task. So with a heavy heart he decided to give up the attempt to rescue "Wiesbaden's" crew. But while turning to their own line, "V 73", Kapitänleutnant Delbrück, shot one and "G 88", Kapitänleutnant Scabell, three torpedoes at a distance of 60 hm at the second and third of a group of capital ships that they believed to be battlecruisers they were actually ships of the "Colossus" and "Marlborough" divisions. (Map 22.) As early as 8:05 pm, "Colossus" had started to fire even with a heavy turrets at several boats, which came into view at a greater distance behind the "V 48", which was approaching at the same time. At 8:09 pm, the "Benbow" and "Bellerophon", the two top ships of the 4th Division, began to fire the heavy and medium artillery at 73 hm range at torpedo boats, and at 8:10 pm "Neptune", the third ship of the "Colossus" division, entered the fire with a heavy volley until the 4-inch guns were manned and could also take fire. At 8:11 pm "Iron Duke", the top ship, as well as "Canada", the tailship of the 3rd Division, aimed the middle artillery at 90 hm range against torpedo boats, and all ships wanted hits and observed that one of the attacking boats had sunk.

As already mentioned, however, two boats of the flotilla had already fired torpedoes despite the energetic defensive fire, and soon afterwards three torpedo tracks were sighted on "Neptune", the third ship of the "Colossus" division, one of which the ship passed so closely that that the only way to avoid it was by putting the rubber over at once.<sup>337</sup>

Page 317      8:12 p.m.      Dodging the final British divisions.

Since "St. Vincent" persevered, "Neptune" was overlapped by it and prevented from continuing to fire. At the same time, the "Benbow" division, led by Vice Admiral Sturdee, turned two strokes to port to avoid the torpedoes reported by "Neptune".

With the sudden unleashing of the most violent artillery battle at the end of the line, the divisions standing there were soon enveloped in thick smoke. As a result, Admiral Jellicoe could only make out faint outlines of the columns to the north-west of his division, so that he was no longer able to get an idea of what was going on. He saw only one thing: that "Colossus" was in heavy enemy fire and that German boats were attacking at the same time. Even before "Neptune" had to evade torpedo trajectories, the British fleet chief thought his final divisions were so endangered that he ordered the leader of the latter, Admiral Burney, at 8:12 p.m. to detach them from the enemy and head south behind those of to set up his self-run "Iron Duke" division. (Map 23.) When Admiral Sturdee recognized the execution of this maneuver, he too did not turn back into the previous bearing to the fleet flagship after evading the torpedoes reported by "Neptune" with the "Benbow" division, which had already been relegated at meetings, but sat down in analogous compliance with the order already issued for the 1st Squadron, now also in Keel line behind the division led by Admiral Jellicoe. No sooner had the artillery fight started again under brilliant conditions for the British battle fleet than the appearance of a few torpedo boats was enough to induce the British fleet commander to withdraw the divisions most favorable to the enemy in terms of artillery tactics. The V Battle Squadron, Rear Admiral Evan Thomas, followed this movement from the enemy, although in its capacity as a fast and independent division, nothing would have prevented it from approaching the enemy more sharply from its extremely favorable position. The failure of the F. T. on "Barham", the flagship of Admiral Thomas, may have contributed to this behavior. Nonetheless, Admiral Jellicoe was now anxious to bring at least the two divisions of the II. Battle Squadron south of him closer to the enemy. At 8:16 pm he ordered his leader, Admiral Jerram, to sit in front of the "Iron Duke" division by staggering to starboard in the line direction of the "Iron Duke" division. If the movement succeeded, the British fleet in the keel line on a south course was on the point of completing the "crossing the T", the most favorable artillery tactical position across the German point, for the second time.<sup>338</sup>

Page 318      12. Skagerrak - Third phase. - From 7:30 p.m. until nightfall.

But even before the movement of the II. Battle Squadron was carried out, this clever tactical combination of the British leader was destroyed by a violent maneuver of the German battle cruisers and torpedo boat flotillas ordered by Admiral Scheer.

However, the artillery battle of the British line against the German battlecruisers and ships of the "König" class, which began in overwhelming superiority by fire, had not yet reached its climax, because only at 8.14 o'clock could the "Orion" and "Monarch", the two top ships of the 2nd division, also be able to, at 8:17 pm also "King George V" and "Centurion", ships of the top division, as well as "Benbow", "Bellerophon" and "Temeraire", ships of the 4th Division, intervene in the battle. The first two fired five to six salvos against "Derfflinger" from 8:14 pm to 8:20 pm at 155 hm to 173 hm each, while "King George V", who took the same target at 100 hm under fire, was briefly on the battery. (Map 23 and 24.) At the same time, "Centurion", the second ship behind "King George V", which shot at a ship of the "Kaiser" class at an altitude of 160 hm, could only observe that it was apparently surrounded by destroyers was making very little speed or had even stopped, and at 8:24 o'clock "Marlborough" fired a torpedo against a ship of the "König" class. The other ships mentioned fired at battle cruisers. As if that weren't enough, heavy shells began to hit the top German ships from the starboard side, giving them the impression that new formations of the enemy had intervened from there. In reality, it was Beatty's battlecruisers. These were standing at 8:10 p.m. when the battle fleet came into action, about 8 nm southeast of Admiral Būrney's division, 3 nm port ahead of the top division Admiral Jerram's, but had then gradually moved around to SW by W with increased speed. Nevertheless, at 8:15 hrs they were still about 5 nm further away from the German point than the "Colossus" division, which was closest to the latter at the time. In the meantime, however, the low sun had disappeared behind the clouds and this improved the visibility so much that "Lion" in WNW can now make out about 165hm from enemy ships and with "Tiger" and "Princeß Royal" together could also take up fire against the German battlecruisers. At the same time Admiral Beatty increased the voyage in order to cut off the ships he had just sighted, which he believed to be the German vanguard.

From 8:12 p.m. onwards, the top German ships were faced with a fire that was steadily increasing in strength, while nothing else could be seen from the enemy other than the flash of shots.<sup>339</sup>

As far as could be seen from this, the enemy line extended from NNE in a flat arc across E to SE, while it concentrated its fire on the German battlecruisers and ships of the 5th Division, on which they judged according to the location and speed of the impacting volleys, apparently found good targets. An attempt on "Kronprinz" to measure the flashes of the shots and then to open fire failed. Rather, it could only be replied weakly and with frequent interruptions by all ships which the unfavorable position to the enemy line permitted shooting at all. At around 8:14 pm the situation was therefore the most unfavorable during the entire battle. The enemy fire coming from the front streaked the length of the German line and the ships of the 5th Division began to suffer all the more than they did because of the speed of the battlecruisers, which was leading the way, had decreased and, as a result of the compression of the whole line, just like that of the 6th Division, had to partially stop and go back. For some time, therefore, they lay with almost no speed, tightly unlocked, and made an excellent target for enemy fire. "König" had to turn back to SE in order to better bring the broadside to bear on a parallel course to the enemy, and it already seemed that heavy casualties would be inevitable in the further course of the fight when Admiral Scheer decided to use the battlecruisers regardless of losses, to use them to bring the already ordered mass attack of all flotillas as close as possible to the enemy and, under the protection of this maneuver, to withdraw the battle fleet itself from the enemy's grasp for the second time with a third turn of the battle. (Map 23.)

At 8:13 pm, "Friedrich der Große", the signal, which had become of historical importance since then, wafted: "Battle cruiser approach the enemy, use full force". 3 minutes later (8.16 p.m.) (1) the signal for the ships of the line: "green pendant, battle turn to starboard on the opposite course."

The execution of the maneuver, however, was this time so close to the enemy and under the full force of his entire artillery effect considerably more difficult than the first time. The top ship "König" had been lying in the heaviest enemy fire since 8.10 am, at 8.15 am even "Helgoland", the fourth ship behind "Friedrich der Große", was hit by a heavy shell, which punched a piece of armor with a diameter of 0.5m from a plate in the foredeck, and almost simultaneously with the signal to turn around on "König" Smoke and gas hazard from a direct hit behind the 3rd turret.

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1) According to the war diary on "König". According to the command of the High Seas Forces, it was not given until 8:18 p.m.<sup>340</sup>

Although the “Kronprinz” and “Margrave” remained unharmed, the “Großer Kurfürst”, the second ship of the 5th Division, was hit by heavy shells no less than four times within two minutes, including those from 38 cm guns. In order to accelerate the U-turn, Admiral Schmidt, the chief of the 1st Squadron, initiated the squadron's flagship "Ostfriesland" without further ado, while at the same time, although he would have had to wait for the closing ships of his squadron to start to avoid the risk of collision according to the regulations “Friedrich der Große” turned to port at the instigation of the fleet chief in order to give the heavily pressed ships of the 5th and 6th Divisions space to turn to starboard. The crowding together of so many units in a confined space in the middle of the strongest enemy fire had already led to critical situations. Even before the U-turn, "Kaiserin" had run so close to the man in front at a short speed that she had to veer to starboard. When the ship then increased the distance from the flagship of the 1st Squadron "Ostfriesland" by reducing speed in order to leave space for the fleet flagship, which had turned to the other side, the "Prinzregent" quickly came up to starboard at high speed, so that "Kaiserin" was outside the line for a long time until she was able to cut in behind "Prinzregent" again. “Margrave” also turned in front of the “Kronprinz” in front of the man behind him and staggered south for a longer period in order to avoid the point on which the enemy volleys were particularly concentrated. After the port engine had already failed on this ship, the commander, Kapitän zur See Seiferling, it is necessary to get out of the unfavorable, permanently under fire bearing line “König” - “Crown Prince” as soon as possible and to gain as much space as possible from the outset because of the reduced speed of his ship in the presumably new course direction in order to be able to keep the ship in formation. As a result, the "Großer Kurfürst" was forced to run alongside the "Margrave" southwest course for a long time, until the latter was able to cut back into the line between "Kronprinz" and "König" behind "Kaiser" and "Kurfürst".

As a result, for some extraordinarily dangerous minutes, the ships of the 5th and 6th Divisions and the naval flagship were almost in line abreast at low speed in a confined space, and again it was only thanks to the excellent tactical training and seamanship of the admirals and commanders that neither the movement of the fleet flagship to port was misunderstood, nor did clashes occur.<sup>341</sup>

Page 321      8:16 P.m.      Third turnaround of the German fleet.

Correctly aware of the dangerous situation, "König", Kapitän zur See Brüninghaus, sat down 400 m from Luvard and, still covered by heavy volleys, laid a veil of smoke between the enemy and his own line. But even after the U-turn, the 5th Division was shot at by Beatty's battlecruisers for some time and apparently particularly hard. Several impacts were so close to the "Kronprinz" that they caused strong vibrations in the ship, but this was just as little hit as before. At 8:25 hrs, "Kaiser" fired his last salvo to starboard astern at 160 hm. At the same time, there were heavy impacts in front of and on both sides of the ship, explosives hit the outer skin and damaged the torpedo protection net and some living rooms, but only one shell hit the ship directly, penetrated the armor of the 15 cm casemate on the starboard side and closed in a hammock box Fracture. At 8:28 p.m., the commandant, Kapitän zur See, Freiherr v. Keyserlingk to develop as much smoke as possible, since the enemy apparently still found targets in the German line while he himself remained invisible apart from the flash of shots. At 8:35 pm, "Margrave" received a severe hit that put a 15 cm casemate on the port side out of action. (Map 25 to 27.) Apart from that, however, immediately after the U-turn, the use of battle cruisers and torpedo boat flotillas provided relief, which soon became increasingly noticeable.

At the signal: "Go to the enemy!" Were meanwhile "Derfflinger", "Seydlitz", "Moltke" and "von der Tann", although they were already considerably impaired by losses in the use of all weapons and in some cases already badly damaged, under the leadership of their commanders, the Kapitän zur See Hartog, v. Egidy, v. Karpf and Zenker, in accordance with the orders received, ran at full speed ruthlessly against the line standing in a wide arc in front of them and continuously firing from all calibers. (Map 23.) Especially on both of the top ships, hit after hit had hit from 8:13 p.m. on "Derfflinger" almost all 15 cm guns on port side had already been put out of action when a 38 cm projectile hit the ceiling of the 4th turret on the edge between the inclined and horizontal plate above the right gun, completely hurling the turret around up in the direction hard port ahead, detonated in the right cartridge elevator and ignited a large part of the powder ammunition.<sup>342</sup>



This filled the tower with flames and poisonous gases and smothered the service of 75 heads with the exception of a single man in the flames. Gases penetrated through mouthpieces to the artillery junction, which the crew had to leave with the gas masks on after switching over the apparatus and which could only be re-entered after 10 minutes. Immediately afterwards, "Seydlitz" was also badly hit in the stern. But the course of the battlecruisers still corresponded to the signal: "Get on the enemy", and apart from the combat distance of 70 hm, which is very short for capital ships, at which even the strongest armor offered no protection against impacting shells, they were already at the "Colossus" division approached when at 8:17 p.m. on "Derfflinger" the signal given by the fleet flagship at 8:14 p.m. was recognized that the battlecruisers should operate on the enemy point. Admiral Scheer therefore considered the difficult task of fully deploying these ships to be largely completed, and so Kapitän zur See Hartog threw his ship on a S by E course, parallel to the enemy line and could finally bring the broadside to bear against the enemy ships standing next to him and also the torpedo weapon. "Seydlitz" and "Moltke" also manage to pass the dangerous pivot point without any new hits and only hit "von der Tann" at 8:19 pm, when the battle cruiser is currently pivoting, a heavy grenade coming from the port aft Substructure of the aft command post, while a torpedo fired by "Revenge" at 8:15 pm is avoided by the change of course. (Map 24) Splinters and explosives from the grenade penetrate through the viewing slits of the aft command post, killing the III. Artillery officer, Kapitänleutnant Langheld, both rangefinders, a messenger and severely wounded the II. Torpedo officer, Oberleutnant zur See Plum, as well as all other occupants of the turret. The greater part of the effect of the grenade spreads outside the armor through the upper deck, battery deck and air shafts to the starboard engine, where explosives and ship debris remain on the capacitor. The light goes out and there is a strong smoke and gas effect in the engine room.

But despite the devastating artillery fire of the enemy, which the battle-tested German battlecruisers had little to counter due to the poor visibility, they nevertheless managed to lie down in the keel line at the closest distance across between the enemy and the final ships of one's own line, and thus cover the turnaround of the latter.<sup>343</sup>

Page 323      Full commitment of the German battle cruisers.

Then, at 8:20 p.m., they followed the movements of their own fleet, first on a WSW, then on a west course, in order to steam in the new direction as quickly as possible to the head of the line. But while it was still disengaging, "Derfflinger" was once again caught in the heaviest enemy fire. At 8:23 p.m. coming from port aft, a 38 cm shell strikes through the barbed armor in the third tower and detonates between the two guns under the gunner's position. In this case, too, the cartridges ignite and kill all but five men. There is a strong gas hazard in all engine rooms, then two more shells penetrate the rear chimney and a fourth the front chimney. The front command post also received a 30.5 cm direct hit at this time. Yellow gases strike in through the viewing slits, but the strong armor resists the impact of the grenade and the ship's command and artillery command are not interrupted. While the ammunition chambers of the 3rd and 4th turrets are flooded, the torpedo bow room is full of water. The rudder and port engine rooms fill with toxic gases. Then, however, the enemy fire, hampered by the smoke and fog of the German torpedo boats and the II Reconnaissance Group, standing southwest of the battle cruisers, slackened noticeably. It is true that "Seydlitz" also received another hit at 8:27, which put the right barrel of the aft turret out of action, and a 15 cm casemate also failed; on the other hand, the other ships, especially "von der Tann" and "Moltke", were spared further hits, and soon thereafter there was a lengthy pause in the fighting, as the opponent's attention was now completely turned to the mass attack of the torpedo boats.

It was only when Admiral Scheer made the second thrust against the enemy line at around 8 o'clock that Kommodore Heinrich, the II. Leader of the torpedo boat forces, with "Regensburg" and the VI. and IX. Flotilla after the attack on the III. Battlecruiser squadrons can get closer to their own battlecruisers again, and only the II. Flotilla was standing after the return from the battle with "Canterbury" and the destroyers of the III. Battlecruiser Squadron pushed away from II Reconnaissance Group, even further back. But also the 12th half flotilla remained partly with that one, partly with "Lützow", so that the VI. Flotilla only had four boats. The IX. consisted after the loss of "V 27" and "V 29" in the battle of the battle cruiser only 9 boats and had already fired some of their torpedoes. At the same time, after returning from the unsuccessful advance to "Wiesbaden", the III Flotilla collected again at "Rostock", the flagship of the first leader of the torpedo boat forces, Kommodore Michelsen, which at the time was positioned to starboard ahead of the head of the III squadron.<sup>344</sup>

Two boats, however, "S 54" and "G 42", had not yet found their way back to the flotilla after the first attack, so that at the moment it consisted of only four boats. When the artillery battle of the lines had started with renewed force soon afterwards, whereby "Regensburg" with the two flotillas in front was already caught in heavy fire, and when, judging by the extent of the enemy muzzle flash, the enemy seemed to have received reinforcements from the northeast, according to the impression of both leaders of the torpedo boat forces, the situation for their own top ships soon became so critical that that rescuing them from the devastating fire of the enemy, who was invisible except for the flash of shots, only appeared possible through the immediate deployment of the flotillas. No sooner had this decision been made than the order was issued by the chief of the High Seas to set up the torpedo boats. At 8:15 p.m. the VI. and IX. Flotilla, at 8:23 p.m. the bulk of the III. with ESE course towards the enemy line. The first two were accompanied by "Regensburg" up to the height of "Derfflinger", then the latter turned away to bring the second flotilla to attack, while the German battle cruisers swiveled south. Soon to the east of them were the VI. and IX. Flotilla disappeared in the thick wall of smoke, which had meanwhile been placed between this ship and the enemy by the boats standing at "Lützow". But the first two flotillas had scarcely penetrated the wall of smoke when they saw a sight that had never been seen before any of the German ships. An iron ring of around 24 capital ships, numerous small cruisers and destroyers held the German line on a huge arc on the ESE to SSE course, from which all the guns spewed death and destruction. When the VI. Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Max Schultz, running through the middle of covering volleys, was approaching about 70 hm, a grenade hit in the forecastle of the flotilla boat "G 41", Kapitänleutnant Boehm. Two officers and two men are wounded by explosives on the navigation bridge. At the same time, "G 86", Kapitänleutnant Conrad Grimm, was hit. At 8:25 p.m. a heavy grenade detonated in the immediate vicinity of the forecastle, explosives wounded the commander and nine men, penetrated the F.T. room, the navigational bridge, the wheelhouse, damaged a torpedo head in the front tube and also caused a leak in the forward oil bunker.<sup>345</sup>

The complete annihilation of the flotilla can be expected at any moment, so it is important to fire the torpedoes before it is too late. Immediately after the hits on "G 41" and "G 86"

Korvettenkapitän Max Schultz therefore turned off to shoot. (Map 25.) Using his last strength, the already seriously wounded torpedo officer, Oberleutnant zur See Wagner, personally fires two torpedoes on "G 41", while at the same time and sometimes shortly beforehand on the other three boats, 11th half-flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Rümmer, three torpedoes each leave the tubes in the direction of the enemy line under the most favorable firing conditions.

Then all boats manage to run back to their own line with heavy smoke and fog, although "G 86" can only run 25 nm and "G 41" is also greatly reduced in speed. For a time this smoke curtain also covers the north of the VI. attacking IX. Flotilla, but scarcely has it passed through it, than the enemy line seems to give way to the German battlecruisers now heading south and to unite their fire on the flotilla. Here too, the flotilla boat "V 28", Kapitänleutnant Lenssen, received a hit in the foredeck, and when the boats had approached 70 hm distance, it was high time to turn the gun off before they were put out of action. But in spite of the devastating fire, all boats get a shot. "V 28" turns, but only shoots one torpedo because the second one gets stuck in the tube. Also "S 51" and "S 36", Kapitänleutnants Dette and Franz Fischer, can only shoot one torpedo each, "V 26", the leader boat of the 17th half-flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Ehrhardt, fires two, but has to keep the third torpedo in the barrel because immediately after the first two shots the target is covered by the black smoke of the boat and "S 52" is also in the line of fire. The others, however, fire three torpedoes one after the other at 60 to 70 hm each, although the volleys striking around them make the view of the enemy extremely difficult, and seek each other through smoke and, pursued by cruisers and destroyers who are now breaking out of the enemy line to withdraw artificial fog from enemy fire. Nevertheless, "S 35", Kapitänleutnant Ihn, who, in addition to his own, also has part of the crew of the previously sunk "V 29" with its commander, Kapitänleutnant Erich Steinbrinck, on board, is hit amidships by a heavy shell, breaks apart and immediately sinks, and also on "S 51", Kapitänleutnant Dette, a boiler and the forward steering gear fail at 8:30 pm due to a hit.<sup>346</sup>

The flotilla boat, "V 28", can only run 17 to 19 nm due to a large leak in the forecastle. Korvettenkapitän Goehle is therefore initially handing over the command of the flotilla to Kapitänleutnant Ehrhardt, the boss of the 17th half flotilla. Later Korvettenkapitän Werner Tilleßen, the boss of the 18th Half Flotilla, takes the lead and collects at "Rostock", while "V 28" and "S 51" follow together at reduced speed, constantly smoking black. (Map 25 to 27.) Since some of the attacked ships were staggered and offered an excellent target within a safe range, the flotilla chief believed he could accept hits with certainty, even though observation was unfortunately made impossible by the smoke and columns of water from the grenades falling around the boats.

When Korvettenkapitän Hollmann with the III Flotilla started the attack, the German battle fleet was already in the middle of turning about, so that the boats on the opposite course had to break through a gap between the second and third ship of the 5th Division. Then, covered by the smoke curtain of the VI and IX Flotilla returning from the attack, they ran to the north as far as the border of the same, only to advance from there in an easterly and south-easterly direction against the enemy. To their complete surprise, however, they saw no more heavy forces beyond the wall of smoke and therefore swiveled south towards about six ships which, believed to be destroyers, were chasing a seemingly inoperable boat of the VI or IX Flotilla. Only "S 54", Kapitänleutnant Karlowa, which had only reconnected with the flotilla during the attack and followed it at a distance of about 600 m, pushed further east beyond the pivot point and could just make out the line of the enemy capital ships. However, despite the highest speed, it was no longer able to get closer than 90 to 95 hm and fired a torpedo at this distance at 8:45 hrs, while the "Wiesbaden" came into view again on port abeam at a very great distance. At about the same time, British destroyers were heading north for the other boats of the III. Flotilla approached and conducted a passing battle with it at about 60 hm distance, before turning south to the ongoing battle. Here "G 88", Kapitänleutnant Scabell, fired a torpedo at the second destroyer, which it initially took to be a cruiser. But when small cruisers and other destroyers came into view behind this enemy, the boats turned, developed smoke and artificial fog to cover the German battle cruisers, and sought connection to their own main body on a south-westerly course.<sup>347</sup>

It was even more difficult for the V and VII flotilla standing at the end of their own V and VII flotilla to attack during the second thrust of the German fleet against the center of the enemy line. They had already turned around with the fleet in order to take the lead in the new direction when they received the radio message from the fleet chief "Torpedo boats to attack". From their location it was impossible for them to gain an overview of the battle situation with the battlecruisers and the III squadron. As a result, Korvettenkapitän v. Koch found an attack hopeless and stayed with the VII Flotilla in the second squadron's fire alley so as not to completely expose the new head of the fleet to torpedo boats; Korvettenkapitän Heinecke, on the other hand, immediately turned in response to the radio message with the V Flotilla, which, like the VII, was still complete and had not yet fired a torpedo, and steamed towards "Rostock" at full speed. There he received orders to run immediately in an east-south-east direction; but it was not until 8:50 p.m. that this flotilla's attack had advanced so far that it was able to penetrate the increasingly thick wall of smoke and fog east of the 5th Division and the battle cruiser. (Map 28.) But now there were again only a few enemy cruisers and numerous destroyers on the southerly course, which took the boats of the 5th Flotilla under fire at a very great distance. Behind the light enemy armed forces everything was covered by smoke and smoke, so a further advance was not possible without the support of our own armed forces with the superior artillery of the numerous enemy cruisers and destroyers. Korvettenkapitän Heinecke therefore turned off at 8:52 p.m. and returned to his own main body on a SW course.

Unfortunately, in the meantime the most powerful, fastest and still in possession of almost all torpedoes, the II. Flotilla, Fregattenkapitän Schuur, had not been used at all. Even during the battles with the III. Battle cruiser squadrons the boats of this flotilla with their large turning circle in the back and forth of the other flotillas had been able to follow the movements of the leader cruiser only with difficulty and finally, pushed away by the II. Reconnaissance Group, lay almost on the spot for almost three quarters of an hour under the heaviest artillery fire. Finally the flotilla chief had made his way through a large circle and was about to move close behind the VI. Flotilla was about to attack the flotilla between the battlecruisers when the smoke curtain laid to protect the "Lützow" passed the flotilla and deprived it of any view.<sup>348</sup>

At that moment, Kommodore Heinrich gave the signal to "Regensburg": "Follow the Leader". The flotilla then broke off the attack and sat behind "Regensburg", which again resulted in difficult situations as the led cruiser now had to avoid the relegating battle cruisers. It was only thanks to the determination and nautical skill of the commanders that these maneuvers were carried out without any accident. The recall for the flotilla was due to the fact that Kommodore Heinrich was already during the attack of the VI. and IX. Flotilla had noticed a strikingly strong reduction in enemy fire, which soon ceased completely. Apparently the attack had caused the enemy line to turn away. But then the II. Flotilla would probably be similar to the III. pushed into the void.

This impression of the II Leader of the Torpedo Boat Armed Forces was correct, because in fact relief had already taken place immediately after the situation had become very critical for the German side at around 8:15 p.m. "Royal Oak", the ship behind "Iron Duke", started at 8:16 pm, "Agincourt", the final ship of the "Marlborough" division, at 8:19 pm "Marlborough" itself at 100 hm and at 8:20 pm also "Temeraire", the penultimate ship of the "Benbow" division, to fire at 82 hm range with the entire medium artillery at the attacking German boats. At the same time, the "Vanguard", the tailship of the "Benbow" division, was also aiming the heavy artillery on the torpedo boats. At 8:24 o'clock fell "Iron Duke", "Benbow" and "Canada", the former at 90 hm, at 8:27 from the top "Tiger" and "New Zealand" at 160 hm with the middle artillery, while at the end of the line "Valiant" and "Malaya", the latter with both 15.2 cm guns still ready for action and two 38 cm guns, also shot torpedo boats at a range of 73 hm. But nothing could stop the German attack, so that at 8:30 pm "Temeraire" and "Hercules" had to bring the heavy artillery to bear against the boats at 82 to 54 hm. (Maps 24 to 27.) Although a few salvos struck in the middle between the latter, the impact of the ships, which were severely hampered by the smoke of battle and the changes in course, was small, so that they could not bring the danger to a standstill with defensive fire alone. Already at 8:18 pm, the third-last ship on the line, "Barham" had to evade a torpedo to port, and at 8:25 pm, a torpedo runway was also seen on the other wing of the line of "Inflexible", the penultimate ship of the battlecruisers, that passed close behind the stern. At 8:20 p.m. Admiral Jellicoe therefore thought the moment had come to use the only means which he considered effective on the basis of thorough practical testing, even if it would cost him the loss of a decisive artillery effect from a tactically most favorable position against the enemy line had to turn off with all ships in front of the approaching torpedoes.<sup>349</sup>



At that moment, however, the "Orion" and "King George V" divisions were just moving up from the port side in order, in accordance with the previous order, to sit in the keel line in front of the "Iron Duke" division, so that they were intended Movement of the latter stood in the way. In order to gain space for this maneuver, the British fleet commander therefore ordered Admiral Jerram at 8:21 p.m. to turn four lines away from the enemy with the two top divisions, and only then (8:21 p.m.) could he and the rest of the battle fleet turn two lines away from the enemy. At the same time he ordered the IV Light Cruiser Squadron at the head, without preventing the battlecruisers further ahead in the fire, to advance with the utmost strength to the west in order to push away the torpedo boats. But now a second wave of attacks by the German flotillas was approaching the British squadrons at full speed. At the same time, measurements and calculations made in a hurry on the English naval flagship had shown that the turn by two lines would probably not be sufficient to avoid the torpedoes far enough. Admiral Jellicoe therefore felt compelled to order the meeting of the ships of the line at 8:25 p.m. to turn another two lines away from the enemy. (Maps 25 and 26.) At the time, the majority of British destroyers had still not reached their battle stations. Only part of the XI. Flotilla was therefore able to advance together with the IV Light Cruiser Squadron. Since Admiral Jellicoe was still unclear at the time about the extent to which the German capital ships would have turned, he ordered the cruiser squadron at 8:32 p.m. not to approach the German line too closely. After a short firefight with the German boats at 82 to 73 hm range, this squadron turned south at 8:36 p.m. to retake its battle station in front of the head of the battle fleet, with about six torpedo runways passing the cruisers in the direction of the squadrons. Admiral Jellicoe, however, who did not find out until later, believed, after the enemy ships of the line had been meeting at 8:21 p.m., that he had passed the torpedo danger zone at 8:35 p.m., and therefore ordered the divisional columns to turn back on S by W to the keel line. However, this untimely opening made the whole purpose of the turning maneuver, which was carried out at the cost of the decisive artillery effect at the height of the battle, as good as obsolete, because it was just now that the German torpedoes reached the British line, and it was only thanks to the extraordinarily favorable lighting and the almost smooth sea that the British navy were able to ensure that all endangered ships, without exception, were able to recognize the bubble trajectories of the torpedoes driven with compressed air in good time and to avoid them.<sup>350</sup>

At 8:33 hrs, three torpedo runways were sighted starboard ahead of the "Marlborough" starboard ahead, which had already been badly damaged by an earlier torpedo hit. The ship turns first to starboard, then to port, and so one of the torpedoes passes in front, one behind the ship, but the third runs close behind the stern or perhaps even under the ship without detonating. At the same time "Revenge", the second ship of the "Marlborough" division, has to avoid two torpedoes to port, one of which passes 5 to 10 m in front of the bow, the other 20 m behind the stern, and also the third and fourth. The ship, "Hercules" and "Agincourt", have to turn to port, sometimes up to six lines, in order to avoid two torpedoes each, one of which passes 35 m in front of the bow and one just behind the stern of "Hercules".

Then "Colossus", the top ship of the 5th Division, turns to port in front of torpedoes, while at the same time a torpedo is sighted to starboard on "Royal Oak", which is passing the fleet flagship at a low speed in a south-easterly direction at 180 m. Line between "Iron Duke" and "Thunderer" passes and only sinks beyond the same, about 1800 m from the ships. But even at 8:43 pm the "Marlborough" division is again endangered as "Revenge", the second ship of the same, has to turn to port again in front of two torpedoes that pass close behind the stern. At 8:45 p.m., a division of the XII. British flotilla from the end of the line and threw itself towards the last of the attacking boats (1).

Although none of the many torpedoes reached their destination due to the pure chance factors already mentioned, the tactical effect of the mass attack by the German boats was extraordinary. The twofold turning away from the enemy and the individual maneuvers of the ships to avoid torpedoes or the submarines that were repeatedly reported to accompany them, had completely confused the formation of the British battle fleet at a moment when it seemed to be victorious. The sharpness with which the attack of the torpedo boats was carried by the German battlecruisers almost to a good torpedo range from the enemy line, the tactical effect of the attack itself and the then cleverly placed smoke curtain, which finally covered everything, gave the English an insight into the aims of German tactics which made them fear the worst for repeating such an attack under visibility conditions that were less favorable to the timely detection of the torpedo trajectories.

1) At the end of the V battle squadron, a destroyer of the "V" class with the standard of a half-flotilla chief was allegedly brought to sink. It can only have been "V 48". However, see also page 346<sup>351</sup>

The English leaders and commanders were therefore convinced that precisely this important experience of the battle should not be taken lightly (1). But what was even worse for the English was that with the turning away from the enemy, the feeling of combat with the German capital ships was completely lost. "Iron Duke" had to cease fire against the German battlecruisers as early as 8:18 pm, as these were already almost completely hidden from the British naval flagship by the smoke curtain laid by the torpedo boats. The ship was able to point the guns at a battle cruiser for a brief moment at 8:20 p.m., but before the volley was fired, it had disappeared again in the haze. Only for "Canada" and "Superb", the two final ships of the "Iron Duke" division, were "Derfflinger" and "Seydlitz" at that time still recognizable in blurred outlines that a few salvos could be fired at them. Shortly before turning away from the enemy, "Monarch", the second ship of the "Orion" division, saw the four German battlecruisers disappear into the smoke haze, and also "Orion" itself, which just now wanted to reopen fire on a ship of the "König" - class, lost her target when she began the ordered turn to port. Only the ships of the final divisions and Beatty's battle cruisers had heavy German forces in sight for a long time. At 8:20 pm, "Derfflinger" and "Seydlitz" still offered "Collingwood", the second ship of the "Colossus" division, a clear disc at 73 hm; "Malaya" also fired at 92 hm against "Derfflinger" at the time. Soon afterwards, however, "Valiant", the penultimate ship of the V. Battle Squadron, also had to recognize how the German battle fleet was turning away from the enemy under the protection of the smoke curtain, and even "St. Vincent", the final ship of the "Colossus" division, which had been firing at "Derfflinger" almost continuously since 7:54, had to stop firing at 8:26. "Indomitable" opened fire against "Derfflinger" again from the top and was able to continue this, albeit with interruptions, until 8:40 am, but otherwise it was with the onset of the torpedo boat attacks and soon after the German line was turned off the greatest fire effect of the British fleet passed again after a sudden swell.

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1) See Jutland Dispatches, p. 98, Collingwood's War Diary.<sup>352</sup>

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It was generally limited to about 6 minutes.

The subsiding and finally silencing of the British fire gave the German side the definite impression that the enemy fleet was already on the attack of the VI. and IX. Flotilla would have turned off and probably would have suffered further losses from torpedo shots, the extent of which, however, could not be specified. Whatever the case, the intended thrust against the center of the enemy line was a success and the loss of the enemy in a tactically extremely unfavorable situation was not bought too dearly with the losses incurred. Although the battle cruisers and the top ships of the III. Squadron suffered again in this part of the battle and apparently suffered considerably more damage than in any previous phase of the battle, but despite all this they all seemed to be able to maintain their place in the line and maintain the high speed required for the night march. Even the battle cruiser "Lützow" was still able to run medium speed when it was sighted abeam of the fleet flagship at around 8:30 p.m.

During the attack of the IX. Flotilla had already reported to Korvettenkapitän Goehle, the boss of the same, at 8:15 o'clock from "V28", the guide boat, that the enemy was strong over 20 large ships and was steering SSE course. This radio message was followed at 8:20 p.m. by Kontreadmiral Boedicker, the leader of the II. Reconnaissance Group, that "Lützow" was being shot at from the northeast by strong enemy forces, and at 8:32 p.m. Korvettenkapitän Werner Tilleßen, the chief of the 18th half-flotilla, reported that there were heavy enemy ships to the SE also. It was only through these reports that Admiral Scheer was certain that he had been engaged in combat with the entire British fleet. It was now to be expected with certainty that the enemy would try to attack the German fleet again during the twilight and then, as darkness fell, push them further west by destroyer attacks, and finally when it was light they would join forces with all of their superiority second battle to face. If, however, it was possible to bring the enemy enclosure to a standstill and to reach Horns-Riff in front of the enemy, the German Leader would still have the freedom of decision he had just regained for the next morning.<sup>353</sup>

To make this possible, the majority had to immediately head for Horns-Riff on the next route, defying all attacks by the enemy. At the same time, attempts had to be made to get all flotillas to attack during the night, even at the risk of being absent from the expected new fighting at dawn. The VI and IX flotillas were therefore not yet back from their last attack when Commodore Heinrich, the II. Leader of the torpedo boat forces, received instructions to these two flotillas and the II, which had remained at "Regensburg", to attack the enemy bulk for the night. Then Admiral Scheer, following with the fleet flagship of the "Ostfriesland", had the I. and II. Squadrons swivel to the southwest at 8:27 pm and to the south at 8:45 pm, while the ships of the III. Squadron and the I. Reconnaissance Group joined. (Map 28.) It was only in the now occurring pause in combat that the combat disruptions on the latter could be overlooked to their full extent. "Kaiserin", "Kaiser", "Prinzregent Luitpold" and even "Kronprinz" suffered remarkably little. There were no personnel losses on these ships and the damage was hardly worth mentioning. Even on the other ships of the III. Squadron, of which all in all "Margrave" 5 times, "Großer Kurfürst" 8 times and "König" 10 times had been hit by projectiles of heavy caliber and a number of light grenades, all heavy artillery, medium artillery, torpedo weapons and machinery were still in full combat readiness had lost little of their combat value, and the personnel losses were also kept within moderate limits. A doctor and 44 men were killed on "König", two officers and 12 men on "Kurfürst" and 8 men on "Margrave", the latter two ships had 6 to 7 seriously wounded, and only on "König" was the main one due to gas poisoning, a larger number, about 20 crew members, were lost. In contrast, the other devastation on these ships of the 5th Division was considerable. On "Markgraf", for example, a section in the stern above the armored deck ran full of water due to an underwater hit and the propeller shaft of the port engine was apparently also bent. Another shell had penetrated the casemate and killed the operator of a 15 cm gun. Other hits had damaged the spars and rigging, destroyed all apparatus in the F. T. Station and explosives from a short shot hit the auxiliary observation post. On the port front of the "Großer Kurfürst" two heavy grenades had struck close to each other and had pushed three armor plates inwards at the waterline.<sup>354</sup>

Another hit had broken through the citadel armor in addition to the II turret, and the torpedo bulkhead had also been perforated by a punched-out piece of armor. After these two hits, the entire forecastle, with the exception of the torpedo rooms and trim cells, gradually ran full of water up to the intermediate deck. At the same time, the upper part of the forecastle was badly damaged by a shell that smashed against the barbette of the foremost turret. In addition, explosives from a projectile hitting under the casemate armor had destroyed the air supply shaft to the front boiler room, and loosened the other two panels of the belt armor so that the wall passages and protective bunkers behind them became full. As a result of the leak, "Großer Kurfürst" was listed 4° to port, but this could be reduced to 1° by counter-flooding. After the leak was sealed, 800 tons of water remained in the ship. On "König" too, a heavy hit had penetrated the forecastle and wreaked havoc in the forecastle. Another hit had pushed the armor transverse bulkhead 1.5 m aft, the casemate armor, battery deck and tween deck were penetrated by numerous explosives, the oil boiler room temporarily failed, two 15 cm guns were put out of action and the associated ammunition in the production shafts caught fire. In order to eliminate the gas hazard that then arises, the ammunition chambers concerned had to be flooded. Three other heavy shells had grazed the upper edge of the command post, the front wall of the forward turret and the forecastle, but did not detonate until after they had ricocheted off, without any particular consequences. Wall passages and protective bunkers were full of water at various points on the ship, so that under counter-tides to keep the ship on a level keel, about 1,600 tons of water had finally penetrated. Masts, tops, net and F.T. rigging as well as searchlights were riddled with explosives on all ships of the 5th Division; but with a feverish effort the crews succeeded in getting their ships almost fully ready for action again in the shortest possible time.

On "von der Tann" the failure of the two central turrets caused particular concern as a result of the delay in the advance of the guns that had already occurred at the beginning of the battle. But here too it was possible to eliminate the disturbance by 8:30 p.m., although it was to be expected that this would occur again if the fire continued. Soon afterwards, the rear gun turret became clear again after the strenuous work of the mechanic staff, the heavy work group and the turret crew removed bent sheets with the oxygen cutting apparatus, exposed flood and bilge pipe valves of debris and thus also succeeded in draining the ammunition chamber.<sup>355</sup>

However, the turret could then only be swiveled manually. Similarly, on the other battlecruisers, the pause in action was used to put out fires, drain flooded ammunition chambers, clear up and blow away ship debris where they prevented the operation of the weapons, to re-attach FT-rigging and signal lines and the searchlights for to get the night ready for operation.

While work on the accelerated restoration of full combat readiness was being carried out on the capital ships, the VI. and IX. Flotilla only returned from the attack. But already a first sighting by Kommodore Heinrich, the II. Leader of the torpedo boat forces, who had stayed with "Regensburg" near the battle cruiser, showed that both "V 28" and "G 41", the two guide boats of the VI. and IX. Flotilla, like "S52" had already fired all torpedoes, the other boats of the 11th, 17th and 18th half-flotilla all but one. In addition, "V 28" and "S 51", the latter being steered from aft due to the destruction of the navigating bridge, were reduced in speed to 17 to 21 nm as a result of severe water ingress in the forecastle. The group "V 28", "S 51" and "S 52" therefore joined the I. Squadron under the leadership of Korvettenkapitän Goehle; the five remaining boats of the IX. Flotilla, "V 30", "S 34", "S 33", "V 26", "S 36", to which "G 42" from the III. Flotilla, under the leadership of Korvettenkapitän Tilleßen, joined the first leader of the torpedo boat forces, Kommodore Michelsen, who steamed up with "Rostock" and the VII. Flotilla east of the I. Squadron to the head of the line. Kommodore Heinrich, who only wanted to use boats with two or more torpedoes for the night attack, sent there also the 11th half-flotilla under Kapitänleutnant Rümman, and so it finally emerged that he only had boats left for the commanded operation against the enemy main body, who hadn't participated in the last attack. The II. Flotilla and three boats of the 12th half-flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Lahs, "V 69", "S50" and "V 46", which until now took over the cover of "Lützow", but which soon added to the two other boats of the half-flotilla, "G 37" and "V 45" were all that was initially available to him for the night attack.

Meanwhile, the III. Flotilla on the run from the enemy made one last attempt to get to the "Wiesbaden", but ultimately lost sight and not yet found the connection with the main body as well as the V flotilla.<sup>356</sup>



The only clues as to where the British fleet should be looked for were initially only provided by the reports submitted by "V 28" and "V 30", but which have probably long since been overtaken by further developments. When Kommodore Heinrich then passed the "Seydlitz" at 9:02 pm, he received the message that six British battlecruisers had meanwhile pulled past the port of the "Lützow" and were taking bearings to the SSE. This report was based on an observation made by "Lützow" at 8:49 pm, according to which the head of the enemy line at the time was ESE of this ship. In the order to attack the II Flotilla, which he issued at 9:09 p.m., the II Leader of the Torpedo Boat Armed Forces still suggested that the enemy was probably to be found in Sector E to NE. It was only at 9:10 p.m. that he shifted the direction of attack for the II Flotilla to the ENE to ESE sector, while the three still available boats of the 12th Half Flotilla were to advance against the enemy in the ESE to SE sector. But in order to get a view unhindered by smoke and haze before the boats were released, he first went back with them to a starting position north of his own final ships. No sooner had he, however, released the II Flotilla and the 12th Half-Flotilla into the sectors just mentioned, when a radio message from the chief of the High Seas Forces was received, who now ordered the use of all flotillas and transferred the management to the I. leader of the torpedo boat forces. Kommodore Heinrich, who foresaw this and therefore limited himself with his flotillas to the tactically unfavorable northern sectors in order not to get in the way of the I. leader of the torpedo boats, thereupon immediately reported the orders he had issued by radio message, and Kommodore Michelsen, who was not aware of the state of readiness of the torpedo boats standing at "Regensburg", refrained from issuing new orders on his part in order to avoid a further delay in the deployment of the fast flotillas during the short night. On the other hand, he held back the boats of the V, VII Flotillas and 18th half flotilla standing by his own flagship, the Rostock, for the time being.

Unfortunately, however, neither "Regensburg" nor "Frankfurt", the flagship of the Leader of the I Reconnaissance Group, which had also read the message from the "Lützow", prompted the extremely important observation of this battle cruiser, which itself was as little as "Seydlitz" could transmit to the fleet manager by means of an FT signal. As a result, on the other German ships and with Admiral Scheer, the impression grew stronger and stronger that the last push against the middle of the British line had apparently spoiled any subsequent pushing; indeed, one was even now inclined to assume that the push had broken up the enemy line.<sup>357</sup>

In any case, no one seemed to be able to say where the British fleet had gone after the attack by the torpedo boats.

On the English side, the uncertainty about the movements of the German fleet after the last collision was no less great. Almost an hour had passed since Admiral Jellicoe had turned off the German torpedo boats before the attack without any news of the matter reaching him. When the German ships in sight of "Iron Duke" suddenly disappeared in thick clouds of smoke, there was still heavy fire at the end of the British line. The fact that it was very soon only a matter of defensive fire against the attacking torpedo boats, since the heavy artillery was also firing, could not be recognized on the British naval flagship. Rather, it seemed as if at the end of the line there were still fierce battles with German ships going on, which had come from "Iron Duke" only temporarily as a result of an increasing darkening of the western horizon and would soon have to reappear. Far from assuming that the German fleet had again made a complete U-turn, the British leader believed, as a result, that the change in course observed by the top German ships in no way had extended more than eight lines. When, therefore, after the torpedo boat attacks at 8:35 p.m. he was again five dashes to starboard, i.e. had turned towards S by W, he firmly reckoned that at any moment the German line would emerge anew out of the haze and the struggle would find its continuation. In this expectation, of course, he was only too soon deceived. He realized that the turning maneuver, avoidable or not, had probably cost him the day's success. The only thing he had achieved was that he was apparently still standing between the enemy and his line of retreat. He therefore decided not to give up this position under any circumstances until he had found out more about the opponent's location. This was the only way he could hope to win an opportunity for the decisive blow in the course of the evening. After the extraordinary restraint which he had shown in the course of the battle so far, it must be doubted that the British leader still seriously wanted to do this. If this was the case, he must have greeted a radio message from Admiral Beatty's at 8:40 with great relief; it emerged from this that at least with the battlecruisers the feeling of battle had not yet been completely broken, the enemy was rather 10 to 11 nautical miles NW by W of "Lion".<sup>358</sup>

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Admittedly, due to the still existing positional differences between "Lion" and "Iron Duke", this report moved the location of the English battle cruiser 2 nm port abeam of the British naval flagship, but it could be assumed without further ado that those, after they could no longer be seen from the battle fleet, would have to be 5 to 6 nm in front of the tip of the latter. This led to the corresponding conclusion about the position of the reported enemy in relation to the own fleet. Immediately after receipt of the report (8:42 p.m.), Admiral Jellicoe therefore ordered the keel line to be formed and to swing out of this in divisional columns to SW in order to seek approach to the enemy on the same course as the battlecruisers. By 8:45 p.m., however, the last German capital ship had disappeared into the mighty billows of smoke from the torpedo boats, even for Admiral Beatty, and what made the situation even more unclear was the fact that at the same time an urgent radio message from Commodore Goodenough, the chief of the II. Light Cruiser Squadron, came in from the end of the line, according to which the enemy had detached an uncertain number of ships of an unrecognizable type, and that these had steered their north-west course at 8:15 pm. What Commodore Goodenough had seen had actually been the U-turn of the German squadrons, but that this had in fact taken place had neither occurred to him nor to be seen in the contradicting version of his report. But now (8:45 p.m.) Admiral Beatty repeated his radio message about the direction finding of the enemy by means of a searchlight, which he directed to the head ship of the battle fleet via the armored cruiser "Minotaur", and three minutes later, apparently disappointed at the turning of the British battle fleet at the most important moment of the fight, in order to give even more emphasis to his message, he radioed the urgent message: "Suggest that the vanguard of the battleships follow the battlecruisers. We can then cut off the entire enemy battle fleet."

However, these two important signals have suffered a notable and never entirely explained delay. The radio message was only picked up by "Iron Duke" at 8:54 p.m. and, if one can consider the English information on this point as reliable, only came to the knowledge of the fleet chief after 9 p.m. due to the time it took to decipher it. In the meantime, however, the headlight signal reported at 8:59 p.m. had already been sufficient to make the latter turn with the fleet in divisional columns on west course at 9 p.m., and Beatty's urgent radio message had scarcely been reported to him when he told Admiral Jerram, the leader of the top division Gave instructions to follow the battle cruisers (9:07 p.m.). (Map 29.)<sup>359</sup>

In doing so he assumed, of course, that the latter were still in sight of the head of the British battle fleet; However, this was by no means the case, on the contrary, Admiral Jerram also did not know the exact position of the British battlecruisers at the time, and he could hardly hope that to reconnect with the latter quickly enough, since his ships were already sailing 19 nm and at this speed could only just maintain their place in front of the other columns of ships of the line with the multiple strong course changes of the fleet. On the other hand, it was also not clear what Admiral Beatty based his expectation on that the entire German battle fleet could be cut off. When he sent the radio message with this insurance, he had already lost touch with the enemy himself, but tried to restore it and for this purpose panned the battlecruisers to WSW at 9 o'clock, while at the same time he was the I. and III. Light cruiser squadrons ordered to scout ahead of him in the direction of the enemy in order to find the head of the German line before dark.

Under these circumstances, the situation remained as unclear as possible to the British fleet chief. Neither from one of his ships nor from the Admiralty did he have any information about strength, composition, the position and battle formation of the German fleet had been preserved, and he was still in a position to obtain these indispensable documents for any major tactical consideration by his own eyes. Everything he had sighted was limited to the temporary observation of the more or less shadowy outlines of individual German capital ships. But whether these belonged to the top, middle or bottom of the German line was a question to which he had not yet received an answer from any side. Now these few ships had also disappeared and it was still doubtful whether this phenomenon was simply caused by a deterioration in visibility or whether it was due to a major tactical maneuver by the enemy (1).

At this time, as far as the information on the route map can be regarded as correct, a German airship, "L 14", was standing about 11 nm north of the British naval flagship. At 9:19 pm, "Falmouth", the flagship of the III. Light cruiser squadron, having seen an airship briefly from the British vanguard.

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1) Corbett: Naval Operations, Volume III, page 384.<sup>360</sup>

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The five airships that rose around noon had, however, received orders from Korvettenkapitän Strasser, because of the uncertain weather conditions between 5 and 7 p.m. to return again and as a result, "L 9" and "L 16" from the western reconnaissance had already landed in Hage between 7 and 8 o'clock. In contrast, "L 21", "L 23" and "L 14" stood between 7 and 7:30 pm. 100 nm west of Bovbjerg or 40 nm NW and 60 nm west of Hanstholm. Of these, "L 21", Kapitänleutnant of the Reserve Max Dietrich, was on a southerly course as side cover for the fleet, cleared over the Dogger Bank, ran at 9:30 p.m. from a point about 100 nm NW from Borkum-Riff towards Heligoland and landed at about 2 a.m. in Nordholz. Also "L 23", Kapitänleutnant v. Schubert, went on SSW course at 7:30 p.m., stood at Vyl-Feuerschiff at 10:43 p.m. and landed at 2:30 a.m. had turned around 50 nautical miles SW of Lindesnes on the 6th degree of longitude, still had a prospect of reaching the enemy. When this airship at 9 p.m. a radio message from the IX. Flotilla received the enemy main body of 20 ships it sighted, turned 90 nautical miles west of Hanstholm with very little visibility to SSE and set course for Lyngvig lighthouse, which it sighted at midnight. But although it must have flown over the whole battlefield in this way, it did not hear the thunder of guns, nor could it make out any ships, and landed at about 5 a.m. in Nordholz. Both the location of "L 14" for the time shortly after 9 p.m. like the observation of the cruiser "Falmouth" therefore seems to have been based on an error. But if the case that the twilight of the falling day had not covered everything or had somehow given itself the opportunity to survey the area between the two fleets from an airplane or airship, then the observer would have been surprised to see that Both fleets were only 12 nm apart at 9:10 p.m., the British liner divisions steaming at high speed across the course of the German fleet, the German and British naval flagship almost at the same height, while the Beatty's battlecruisers were about to join them advanced light armed forces in turn to include the German top. (Map 29) A new clash between the two fleets seemed imminent.

On the German side, however, nothing betrayed the new rapprochement of the British fleet. The German units had united again more firmly and, with the squadrons turning, had taken a south course.<sup>361</sup>

With this change of course, however, "Westphalia" swiveled again at the same time as "Hannover", the top ship of the II squadron, so that the latter was now starboard ahead of the line of the I and III squadron, "Deutschland", the bottom ship of the II squadron, roughly in the height of the "Westphalia". Even the German cruisers, after all the vicissitudes of the preceding events, had caught up with the majority again and were on the point of to sit down again at the head of the fleet, namely the IV reconnaissance group was at 9:10 p.m. about 3 nm in front of the II, the II Reconnaissance Group about 4.5 nm in front of the I Squadron, while the battle cruisers, the enemy closest, 3 nm port abeam of the "Westfalen", vaporized, and brought "Lützow" around behind the squadrons to look for cover west of them. Only to the north-east of the German line was there still a certain amount of contact with the enemy, in so far as the V. Flotilla was attacked by light enemy forces in pursuit of its return. Already at 9:05 p.m. "Castor", the pilot of the XI Flotilla, which at the time was traveling about 5 nm in front of the British top division, had already observed a strong plume of smoke in WNW and had turned towards it with 8 destroyers, while Commodore Le Mesurier was with him the cruisers "Calliope", "Constance" and "Comus" of the IV. Light Cruiser Squadron followed in support. At 9:15 pm, "Castor" could already make out 12 German torpedo boats which, it was assumed, were about to attack the British battlecruisers further south on a SSW course. The British light forces immediately threw themselves against them, opened fire at 9:18 p.m. and chased them northwest. The boats of the V. Flotilla evaded and finally broke between the gaps of the III. Squadron through to the west. At 9:26 pm, therefore, battleships suddenly appeared in front of the pursuing British cruisers at a distance of 73 hm, in the middle, as they believed, those of the "Pomeranian" class, behind them those of the "Kaiser" class, heading south. Also "Prinzregent", "Kaiser" and "Margrave" can recognize port astern first one, then a second cruiser with three funnels, as well as some destroyers and open fire at 58 to 64 hm. While the British destroyers turned off immediately, without making a single attempt to take advantage of the brilliant attack opportunity, "Calliope" fired a torpedo at around 59 hm at 9:30 p.m.. The "Prinzregent" fires one, "Kaiser" two heavy volleys, "Margrave" fires with the middle artillery, then the enemy forces have already disappeared again in the haze. The short time was enough to inflict at least five hits on "Calliope", the top ship, by which two guns were put out of action, 10 men were killed and 23 were wounded.<sup>362</sup>

Page 342      12. Skagerrak - Third phase. - From 7:30 p.m. until nightfall.

During this battle, however, the guns of the III. Light cruiser squadrons and British battle cruisers thunder again. There, with the cruisers "Falmouth", "Yarmouth", "Birkenhead" and "Gloucester", which "Canterbury" had also joined, Rear admiral Napier had laid out a north-south reconnaissance line about 4 west of "Lion" and had already turned 9:09 pm on "Falmouth" from the north wing of the same sighted ships in N by W, which he reported immediately. Five minutes later he was able to see five German small cruisers in W by N, which were passing immediately in front of the British reconnaissance line to the south. Immediately he turned with "Falmouth" on a parallel course to the enemy just sighted and, running 25 nm, joined up with the other cruisers to the battle line. What he saw were the ships of II and IV Reconnaissance Groups. At 9:17 p.m. the latter also sighted four to five, the former two enemy cruisers of the "Cities" - class apparently on a SW course, and while Kontreadmiral Boedicker, the leader of the II. Reconnaissance Group, was reporting this by radio message, enemy cruisers came behind them Battle cruiser in sight. In order to be able to shoot himself and to clear the field of fire for the ships of the I. Reconnaissance Group and the 1st Squadron standing behind him, Kontreadmiral Boedicker immediately swung his ships to starboard, while Kommodore v. Reuter, who was more favorable for this, ran sharply towards the cruisers that had just been spotted with the IV Reconnaissance Group. With these he soon got into a violent battle on a converging course and distances of about 87 to 54 hm, in which the advantages of the better view were again entirely on the side of the enemy. Only the top ships "Stettin" and "München" were able to respond to enemy fire to some extent, the latter with 63 shots, whereas already for the fourth ship, "Stuttgart", only one enemy was recognizable, which was also already being shot at by others, and "Hamburg" also had to stop fire after the first volley, as observation was out of the question. Under these unequal combat conditions, the IV Reconnaissance Group was in a difficult position from the start. Apparently it offered the enemy good targets against the brighter western horizon, and very soon "Munich" received two 15 cm hits. One of these detonated in the port cutter, killing 4 men and putting the third searchlight out of action. The other one died in the upper part of the third chimney, tore out a three square meter hole and destroyed the cladding of the four boilers in the back due to the air pressure, so that the steam could only be held with great difficulty.<sup>363</sup>



Page 343      Resumption of the feeling of combat.

When the enemy finally reached around the head of the IV Reconnaissance Group with superior speed, Kommodore v. Reuter also slowly to starboard and finally turned eight lines in order to pull the enemy, who himself was still maintaining a sharp and well-positioned fire for more than 100 hm, onto the II. Squadron standing behind him. However, the enemy did not follow and quickly disappeared into the increasing darkness.

However, this skirmish was only the prelude to a series of major battles.

Admiral Beatty had hardly heard the thunder of cannons in the west when he approached them with the battlecruisers and at 9:18 p.m. spotted German battlecruisers in the northwest and ships of the "Helgoland" or "Deutschland" class ahead. Although three heavy artillery pieces had already failed on "Lion", two on "Princess Royal" and one on "Indefatigable" one of eight heavy artillery pieces and on "Tiger", which had a strong list, new masses of water entered the ship every time the rudder was laid (1), was the combat value of the British battlecruisers, most of which were still at full speed, but large enough to be able to take up combat from the shelter of the dark horizon, even without immediate support from the battleship squadrons. Admiral Beatty therefore immediately followed the III. Light cruiser squadrons into action, and "Inflexible", then "Princess Royal", "Tiger" and "New Zealand" with initial distances of 75 to 119 hm opened fire at 9:20 pm, into which at 9:23 pm "Lion" opened at 9:26 pm also "Indomitable" came up.

Beatty's sudden appearance in a position advanced so far to the south came as a complete surprise to the German battlecruisers, who, if they were still able to do so, could not yet have picked up the radio messages of the II. Reconnaissance Group about the enemy that had just been spotted. Admiral Hipper had just decided to stop the battle cruiser in order to embark on "Moltke" and take over the command again from there, when suddenly the gloomy south-eastern horizon was torn apart by the flash of heavy gunfire and the battlecruisers were once again exposed to the violent attack of fire by an almost invisible enemy. Nonetheless, they took up the fight immediately and opened fire almost simultaneously with the British battlecruisers - at 9:20 pm "Seydlitz" and "Moltke", then "von der Tann" and "Derfflinger" - with all the heavy and medium artillery guns still ready for action.

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1) Jutland Despatches, page 466.<sup>364</sup>

Page 344      12. Skagerrak - Third phase. - From 7:30 p.m. until nightfall.

At 9:32 pm "Lion" and "Princess Royal" are hit. The targets are seldom clearly recognizable, however, observation of the salvos is impossible. The fire must therefore be interrupted frequently (1). Under these circumstances, apart from the numerical superiority of the enemy, enemy fire is a lot more effective from the start. While "Lion" and "Princess Royal" apparently unite their fire on "Derfflinger", the German top ship, "New Zealand" and "Indomitable" shoot together at "Seydlitz" and soon a very significant hit effect can be seen on these two German battlecruisers. At 9:24 pm, "Seydlitz" was hit amidships, immediately afterwards a heavy shell hit "Derfflinger" with the last gun turret still in action and locked its pivoting mechanism for a few minutes. At 9:30 p.m., a heavy shell hit "Seydlitz" in the fourth turret, another hit the bridge, killing all the officers and men on the bridge, and even in the command post, the occupants were injured. As far as can be seen on the British cruisers, "Derfflinger" turns to starboard at 9:27 pm, in flames, and at 9:31 pm "Seydlitz" also shears after two or three covering salvos of the "New Zealand", heavily overlying to port, out of line. Both ships are now quickly out of sight, with "Seydlitz" appearing to be sinking. Even if the latter observation was not true, the two battlecruisers mentioned had sustained severe damage in the short time. In contrast, "Moltke" and "von der Tann" were again unharmed. From 9:30 p.m. they staggered at full speed, following the cruisers of the II Reconnaissance Group, to evade westward between the II and I squadrons and to clear the field of fire for the latter, and at 9:31 p.m. the last shot was fired at "Derfflinger".

Until then, Vice Admiral Schmidt had maintained course and speed with the I. Squadron without being able to see who the fire of the I and II reconnaissance groups in front of him was targeting. When "Westfalen" and "Rhineland" were sighted from torpedo runways at 9:22 pm, they were initially attributed to the attack by an enemy submarine that was being shot at by cruisers of II Reconnaissance Group. Soon, however proved wrong by the impact of some volleys of enemy heavy artillery going over the battlecruisers, which showered "Westfalen" and "Nassau", the two top ships with explosives.

1) "von der Tann" fired only 8 or 15 rounds with 4 guns of the heavy and 5 of the medium artillery in the course of the battle.<sup>365</sup>

Page 345      9:20 p.m.      New pressure on the German top.

However, masked by the battlecruisers, they could not return fire, and even when they cleared the field of fire, there was no target to be captured. The battle cruisers had staggered so hard in front of the head of the I. Squadron to the west that "Westphalia", Kapitän zur See Redlich, had to reduce speed and, followed by "Nassau" and "Rhineland", also had to turn west. Only the fourth ship, "Posen", Kapitän zur See Lange, was able to catch the enemy around the pivot point and fire it from 9:28 to 9:35.

The actual relief of the battlecruisers, however, came from a party from which they could least be expected, namely from the six old ships of the line of the II. Squadron, which had not yet intervened in the fighting of the day. While the I. and II. Reconnaissance Groups and the I. Squadron turned and came so quickly for the British battlecruisers that they had to stop their fire at around 9:30 p.m. against the previous targets, Kontreadmiral Mauve with the II. Squadron maintained course to get closer to the enemy. In doing so, he prevented Beatty's battlecruisers from turning behind their previous opponents and forced them to turn to the new enemy. Already at 9:32 o'clock, "Princess Royal" fired a torpedo against the II. Squadron, which however had no effect, and immediately afterwards all battle cruisers united their artillery fire on the new enemy. (Map 30.) Only when this came more and more from the front did Kontreadmiral Freiherr v. Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels with the top ship "Hannover" to starboard in order to bring all the guns to bear on a SW course. The hope of being able to better recognize the enemy now, however, was not fulfilled. "Pomerania" and "Schleswig-Holstein" could not return fire at all due to smoke obstruction and poor observation conditions, "Deutschland" fired only one, "Hessen" five, "Hanover" eight and "Schlesien" nine heavy-caliber rounds. On the other hand, the more or less invisible opponent himself was quickly shot in again. At 9:35 p.m. on "Schleswig-Holstein" a heavy grenade probably fired by "Princess Royal" put a 17 cm casemate out of action. Silesia "at 9:34 p.m., explosives reached the front auxiliary observation post. When Admiral Mauve saw this effect from the end of the line, he considered it right not to expose his ships, which were less powerful than the enemy, to its heavy fire."<sup>366</sup>

Page 346      12. Skagerrak - Third phase. - From 7:30 p.m. until nightfall.

At 9.35 p.m. he had the squadron turn eight lines to starboard; but, to everyone's amazement, the enemy did not seem to follow, but, as far as could be judged from the muzzle flash of his artillery, to pass on a south-westerly course at the head of the German fleet. Soon afterwards his guns fell silent too. "Princess Royal" had to cease fire at 9:36 p.m., "Tiger" at 9:40 p.m., then "New Zealand" and "Indomitable", "Lion" and "Inflexible", as there was no longer any target in the increasing twilight and the smoke of battle was to recognize. In addition, between 9:37 p.m. and 9:44 p.m., all of these ships were severely shaken by violent jolts, which were initially attributed to torpedoes or mines, but later, however, were attributed to the fact that the ships at that time had probably all driven over a larger wreck, perhaps that of the destroyer "Nomad" or "Nestor". (Map 31.)

No sooner was the fire silenced in the vanguard than it was revived in the rear guard. The advance of the II. Flotilla and 12th half-Flotilla for night deployment against the enemy bulk had already started at 9:30 p.m. from a point north of the German final ships. However, at the proximity of the latter and the direction of advance ordered by the German boats in the ENE to SE sector, they encountered enemy forces before dark, earlier than intended. Already at 9:30 p.m. the II. light cruiser squadron, which stood at the end of the British line, had sighted a German torpedo boat, probably "V 48", which was therefore still seeking connection to the German fleet and, now from "Southampton" and "Dublin" taken under fire and hit amidships by destroyers of the XII. Flotilla and was destroyed. Soon afterwards, the cruisers were able to watch more German torpedo boats approaching the British line from the northwest, in order, as the former believed, to attack the V. Battle Squadron. At 9:50 p.m., the II. Flotilla, Fregattenkapitän Schuur, had to evade four small cruisers and numerous destroyers to the south and finally to the west, and at 9:52 p.m. the three boats of the 12th Half-Flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Lahs, ran into the fire area of the II. Light Cruiser Squadron and were shot at extremely violently for about 20 minutes at 30 to 50 hm. Since an attack would have been pointless because of the still too great brightness, the boats turned west to northwest. "S50", Kapitänleutnant Recke, was hit by a 15 cm shell. Although this did not detonate, the main steam pipeline was so damaged that the boat had to return to the main body after a boiler, the forward steering gear and the electrical lighting system had failed.<sup>367</sup>

It was not until 10:10 p.m., Kapitänleutnant Lahs was able to return to the ordered course with the two other boats, and at 10:40 p.m. also the II. Flotilla, in order to repeat the attempt to get close to the enemy main body.

Shortly before this meeting of German boats with the rear cover of the enemy main body, German armed forces were again sighted in the advance guard of the latter. There the 2nd Division of the IV. Light Cruiser Squadron, the cruisers "Caroline" and "Royalist", had not participated in the advance of the other ships of this squadron against the German V. Flotilla, but was a few miles before the head of the "King George V" Division remained, and soon "Castor" with the XI. Destroyer flotilla reconnected to these cruisers. At 9:45 p.m., however, three German battleships were sighted in the northwest, and they seemed to be gradually approaching the British line. At 9:55 p.m. they were reported by the cruiser "Caroline" to Admiral Jerram on the "King George V", at the same time Captain Crooke, the commander of this cruiser, was preparing to proceed with the "Royalist" for the torpedo attack. But now Admiral Jerram intervened and ordered that the intended attack be refrained from, since he was of the opinion that the ships just reported must be Beatty's battlecruisers, which he had not had in sight for a long time. But Captain Crooke was sure of his cause. He was therefore not dissuaded from his plan by the counter-order and started the attack on his own responsibility. This was directed against the top ships of the I. Squadron, which had been on a south course again since 9:45 p.m. But also on the German side, when shortly after 10 o'clock several vessels were noticed on the "Westfalen" port ahead, in the uncertain twilight doubts as to whether one was facing an enemy or a friend, as the position of the IV Reconnaissance Group was not at that time was known for sure. Only when a searchlight call was not answered and seven destroyers led by a cruiser could be recognized soon afterwards, "Westfalen" and "Nassau" opened fire at 10:08 pm at 74 hm against the led cruiser and the destroyers behind it and waved six lines at the same time to starboard on WSW to avoid torpedo shots that have already been fired. (Map 32.) Only "Caroline" and "Royalist" were therefore fired with one torpedo each in the run-up to 73 hm. Then, after the fifth salvo of the "Westfalen", both ships turned at the same time as the cruiser "Comus", which had now caught up to the point again, and disappeared under the protection of a thick haze of smoke, while two torpedo tracks were observed on "Nassau", one of them despite immediate evasive maneuvers one close to the bow, the other under the foremost turret.<sup>368</sup>

The third and fourth ships, "Rheinland" and "Posen", had seen nothing of the attacking armed forces. The battle, in which "Westfalen" fired seven 28 cm shells, had actually only lasted 2 minutes 24 seconds, and at 10:10 the I. Squadron, led by the "Westfalen", turned back on its south course. While "Caroline", "Royalist" and "Comus", partly breaking their own line, withdrew from the German fire, the destroyers behind "Caroline" had made no attempt to bring torpedoes to the enemy despite the extremely favorable opportunity. However, the uncertainty about the position of the battle cruisers Admiral Beatty's had contributed significantly to this, which induced Admiral Jerram not to open fire on the ships that were sighted. Without support from the ships of the line of the top division, however, the destroyers considered a successful attack to be impossible as long as daylight enabled the opening of the enemy defensive fire from a greater distance.

During these battles, which were carried out in the widening dusk, a whole stream of reports had been received on the British naval flagship, and some of the events could be observed directly from the latter. Nonetheless, it took a long time to gain even some clarity in the view of the situation. As early as 9:21 p.m., when the gunfire was heard from the 1st Division of the IV Light Cruiser Squadron, which was 2 to 3 nm starboard ahead from the head of the battle fleet, it seemed that contact with the enemy had been re-established. As a result, Admiral Jellicoe and the columns of ships of the line immediately turned two lines from the enemy to WSW, in order to bring them back into line with the enemy, parallel to the expected course of the enemy. However, when immediately afterwards the gunfire of the battle cruiser Beatty's flashed in SW and 3 to 4 nm ahead of "Iron Duke" the small cruiser "Calliope" appeared to be in enemy fire, the British fleet chief turned the columns back on course to the west at 9:25 p.m. to get to the enemy faster. This movement was a complete success, as it had hardly taken place when the faint outlines of capital ships could be seen in advance of "Iron Duke" and no fewer than nine units were counted from a turret.<sup>369</sup>

Page 349      9:21–10 p.m. The situation in the opinion of the British fleet chief.

Even before the combat contact was established, Admiral Jellicoe had his columns swerved away from the enemy again at 9:28 p.m. to the south-west to the keel line, and even during this change of formation the enemy ships came out of sight again. Again, by being too careful, he had missed an opportunity to strike a decisive blow out of the invisible, for again nothing of the approach of the British columns could be seen from the German side.

The cruiser "Comus" from the IV. Light Cruiser Squadron was still firing and, at 9:38 p.m., responded to an inquiry about who it was targeting: "Enemy battlecruisers in the west". On the other hand, the position of the British battlecruisers now became doubtful. The thunder of cannons, which had previously echoed from the direction in which they had to be, suddenly ceased, and at 9:45 p.m. Admiral Jerram announced by means of an urgent radio message from the top that he was no longer in sight of the battlecruisers. So it is possible that the ships previously sighted by "Iron Duke" and also reported by "Comus" were not the enemy battle fleet at all, but rather Beatty's armed forces. Unable to clearly overlook the situation, Admiral Jellicoe thereupon asked Admiral Beatty to give the enemy bearing on his own initiative (9:46 p.m.). Hardly had this order been placed than by "Falmouth", the flagship of the III. Light cruiser squadron, which had to stand by the battle cruisers, received a report that the enemy was aiming north from this ship and was on a WSW course. Here "Falmouth" specified a location as its own, which was apparently 5 nautical miles further north than this could correspond to reality and thus also relocated the location of the British battlecruisers to starboard abeam of the English main body. About 10 minutes later (9:55 pm), Admiral Beatty asked "Minotaur" where Admiral Jerram had stayed with the head of the battle fleet, but could not receive any information from "Minotaur" either, as the latter had been the head of the British battle fleet 9:10 p.m. no longer in sight. Jellicoe's request to locate the enemy was also delayed, as the main F.T. network on "Lion" had been shot away; But before that, Admiral Beatty sent a message at 9:59 p.m. containing the answer to the question asked by the British fleet chief at 9:46 p.m. and had the following wording: "Enemy battlecruisers and older ships of the line are aiming north at 34° west of me, distance 10 to 11 nm, steer SW. My position: 56° 40' North, 5° 50' East. Course southwest, drive 17 nm. "<sup>370</sup>



At 10:05 this report was in the hands of the fleet chief. Only then was the situation more or less cleared up and, to make it even clearer, a radio message came from the end of the line, with which Commodore Goodenough reported that the II Light Cruiser Squadron, whose gunfire could be clearly heard, was fighting with German Torpedo boats that tried to attack the V Battle Squadron from the west. Immediately afterwards new gunfire flashed to starboard ahead, it was the defensive shooting of the German I Squadron during the attack of the cruisers "Caroline" and "Royalist".

From all this it emerged that the German fleet was again in close proximity to the British. "Falmouth" had been in combat with the small cruisers of the German vanguard, the battlecruisers had attacked and pushed away the top ships of the German bulk, "Caroline" and "Royalist" carried out a torpedo attack against the latter, and "Calliope" had apparently taken the German tailships under fire, while behind them German torpedo boats had attacked and were repulsed by "Southampton" and the II Light Cruiser Squadron. Even if the British battle fleet for its part had not seen the German since 8:59 p.m. - the observation of 9 German capital ships from "Iron Duke" at 9:25 p.m. was based on the individual observation of a single tower commander - the British fleet chief was able to do so there are only minor doubts about the actual location of the German fleet. At 10 o'clock he knew that it was approaching the British line again and would have only had to maintain the previous course with his columns in order to unleash a new battle of the squadrons at once. In such a case, however - at least he could assume - despite the unpredictability of a twilight battle, he would probably have succeeded in pushing the German ships further west than had already happened after the brief fire attack of the battlecruisers, and in pushing the destroyer flotillas that were destined for the vast majority had not yet come to intervene, to attack for the night. (See position of the two fleets at 10 o'clock, Map 31.) But the British fleet commander was no longer determined to do this. The sun had set about an hour earlier. The smoke of battle sank thicker and thicker over the battlefield, and any further attempt to bring the enemy to battle would have led to a night battle. Admiral Jellicoe wanted to avoid this at all costs. Therefore, during the advance and rear guard, II and IV Light Cruiser Squadrons, he was still in action and "King George V." and "Westphalia", the top ships of the British and German lines, were only 6 nm apart at 10:01 p.m. with the battle fleet in divisional columns on south course, and only Admiral Beatty ran with the battle cruisers, the I. and III. Light cruiser squadrons and armored cruisers of the II. Continue in the previous direction until 10:30 a.m. (Map 32).<sup>371</sup>

Of these armed forces, the III. Light Cruiser Squadrons remained in contact with the enemy for the longest time, as they had turned after the IV Reconnaissance Group up to the WNW course; in the end, however, it had had to withdraw on its own from the German battlecruisers. After that, nothing more of the German ships was sighted, but it was to be assumed that these were still to the northwest of the British battlecruisers. But the location of his own battle fleet was also uncertain, and it was only at 10:16 p.m. that Admiral Beatty saw from a signal from the top commanders [Oberstkommandierenden] the battle squadrons and destroyer flotillas six minutes later that the battle fleet had meanwhile been heading south. Under these circumstances, even with the growing darkness, Admiral Beatty no longer considered it right or desirable to get any closer to the German battle fleet, namely:

"1. Because of his distance from his own battle fleet, 2. because of the disruptions to the combat of the battlecruisers, 3. because of the apparent unity of the German armed forces, 4. because of the fact that the latter were accompanied by numerous destroyers "and finally because he was of the opinion that the position he had reached between the German ships and their base had to offer the guarantee that they could be re-established under very favorable conditions when the light came on. As a result, in his opinion, it must now best correspond to the wishes of the senior commanders if he too, with a corresponding report, went on the same course as the fleet. The task of the battlecruisers in this situation would be to ensure that the German fleet does not haul around the British from the west and reach the German Bight before the latter (1). At 10:30 p.m. he swerved with the battle cruisers and the II. Cruiser Squadron, which has been with since 8 p.m. also "Duke of Edinburgh" and "Chester" had connected, on a south course and went on 17 nautical miles, the cruising speed of the fleet, while the I. and III. Light Squadrons of cruisers, advanced a few miles, scouted south and west. (Map 32.) His considerations for this decision were in general the same as those that had previously induced Admiral Jellicoe to turn south, avoiding further fighting.

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1) Admiral Beatty's report dated June 12, 1916. Jutland Despatches, p. 138.<sup>372</sup>

Page 352      12. Skagerrak - Third Phase. - From 7:30 p.m. until nightfall.

These were described by the British fleet chief as follows:

“The British fleet stood between the enemy and their base. Each side had a considerable number of destroyers, and it was very likely that the adversary would have a considerable advantage in this regard if he, presumably had sent all possible destroyers and torpedo boats out to sea as soon as the collision between the fleets became probable. I therefore immediately rejected the idea of a night battle between the heavy ships, since such a battle could only lead to "désastre" because of the presence of such a large number of destroyers and the impossibility of distinguishing between our own and enemy ships. I was also at risk of forfeiting the advantage of the position if I went west or east (accepting further fighting), so I decided to steer south, which would have to be able to reopen the battle when it was light (1)."

Furthermore, the clear insight led him to this consideration of the inferiority of the British fleet in the defense against torpedo boat attacks at night (2): "I knew that neither our headlights nor their remote controls were the best at the time. The equipping of the battleships' central artillery with firing directors - a very important factor in night shooting - had only just begun, although this had been urged repeatedly. The delay was due to manufacturing difficulties and the labor issue. Without these improvements, however, as I well knew, our fire could not achieve maximum performance at night. We could not therefore count on repelling destroyer attacks with gunfire with certainty. Therefore, in the event that destroyers came into contact with the heavy ships, we had to reckon with serious losses, with no prospect of making up for them with corresponding successes. Our own destroyers were not a safe means of defense at night, since if distributed (around the fleet) solely for this purpose they would have been considered to be enemy destroyers and would have been taken under fire by our own ships."

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1) Jellicoe's report to the Admiralty of June 18, 1916. Jutland Despatches page 21.

2) Jellicoe: The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916, p. 373.<sup>373</sup>

“But even apart from the question of an attack by destroyers, the outcome of night skirmishes between heavy ships must always be viewed to a very large extent as a matter of chance, the greater or lesser skill of each side playing the least decisive role. Such a battle must be fought at very short distances, the decision depending on the development of events in the first few minutes. Because of these general conditions, it is not desirable to proceed in this way. The greater effectiveness of the German searchlights at the time of the battle and the greater number of torpedo discharge tubes of the enemy ships in connection with the numerical superiority of destroyers would, as I knew, have given the Germans the opportunity to bring great initial successes into their hands (1).

"After the British leader had therefore decided not to accept a night battle under any circumstances, the only task left for him was to put the German fleet back into battle when it got light, before it would have reached the protection of its native coastal defense. The prospects for such a resumption of the fight, however, depended on how the losses of both fleets in the day's battle were assessed. On the English side, the capital ships "Queen Mary", "Indefatigable" and "Invincible" were lost. On the "Lion" and Princess Royal "a turret had been put out of action, but otherwise the combat status of the battlecruisers was such that they could start fighting again at any time. Of the V Battle Squadron "Warspite" had not been destroyed, but had to march back to Rosyth. Also "Malaya" had suffered considerably and in particular lost a large part of the service crews of the middle artillery, likewise "Barham" had received a number of heavy hits, but otherwise the combat values of the V. Battle Squadron, in terms of speed and combat power, were almost the same as before the battle. This applied in an even wider sense to the battle fleet itself, in which "Marlborough" alone had been more severely damaged and reduced in speed. Apart from this ship, only "Colossus" had hits. Of the armored cruisers, "Defense" had sunk, "Warrior" was put out of action, and the losses of destroyers were limited to three ("Nestor", "Nomad" and "Shark"), those sunk, three ("Acasta", "Onslow" and "Defender") that were incapacitated.<sup>374</sup>

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1) Jellicoe: The Grand Fleet, page 371.

The full extent of these losses, however, was not even known to the British Supreme Commander at the time. All he knew was that "Invincible" and "Defense" had sunk, "Warspite" and "Warrior" were on their way back to their home ports and "Marlborough" had been reduced to 17 nm. On the other hand, he learned the fate of the "Queen Mary" and "Indefatigable" only on the following day and, as far as the destroyers were concerned, probably only the loss of the "Acasta", which he had been able to observe directly from the flagship of the fleet.

On the other hand, the German losses were significantly overestimated, especially since the British standard was applied to assess the resilience of German ships and desire was the father of the idea. Although in reality the total losses on the German side in the daytime battle were limited to a small cruiser ("Wiesbaden") and four torpedo boats ("V 27", "V 29", "S 35", "V 48"), in addition, one wanted to have destroyed at least one more battleship of the "König" - class, four other destroyers and even a submarine, not to mention the observation of further shipwrecks, which had remained doubtful. It was true that on the English side on the evening of the battle the combat value of "Lützow", "Derfflinger" and "Seydlitz" was no longer too high, on the other hand the ships of the "König" class had suffered considerably less than this corresponded to the English estimate, and the other German ships of the line had remained as good as undamaged. The reports of German casualties, however, were still so incomplete on the evening of the battle that Admiral Jellicoe initially had to rely on his own observations and assumptions on this point as well. But that much seemed certain to him: on the two occasions on which the two fleets had been in extensive combat contact at all, the German ships had been hit repeatedly and had finally returned fire only weakly. Although the reason for this was only to be found in the infinitely worse observation conditions for the German side at the time, Admiral Jellicoe believed that he could conclude from this that the shooting skills of the British fleet were superior to the German ones. Of course, as mentioned, the loss of the "Queen Mary" and "Indefatigable" was still unknown to him at the time. The reasons for turning off the German fleet twice had also been so little understood by the British leader that he concluded from what he had seen that the only thing that mattered to the enemy was to prevent every encounter with the "Grand Fleet", to avoid it as quickly as possible. Finally, the results of the three German torpedo boat attacks carried out between 8:10 and 9:15 p.m. convinced himself that he had considerably overestimated the effect of the use of the German torpedo weapon, at least as far as the hit result was concerned.<sup>375</sup>

Assuming that the experience of the British fleet commander in the daytime battle was limited to those mentioned and that he would in fact not have valued the proven fighting power of the German fleet on the basis of this finding, so this must have induced him to rush once more on the enemy with all the numerical superiority that he had at his disposal. In truth, however, the British fleet commander was no further from a thought than such a decision. Already after the first collision he had evaded all further fighting on his part and had finally avoided them consciously as dusk fell, proof of how less certain of the alleged superiority of English weapons, gunnery and tactics was even after the first impressions of the daytime battle. The day therefore came to an end without the British fleet having made up for its heavy losses with another attack.<sup>376</sup>

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### 13. Skagerrak - Fourth Phase. - The Night.

With the decision of the two British leaders to go south at 10:01 pm and 10:30 pm, the day's battle was over. With the deliberate avoidance of further fighting, however, they voluntarily released Admiral Scheer on the way to Horns-Riff, which he was determined to force through combat and, if necessary, even with the full commitment of his top squadrons. While the British leaders wanted to avoid night skirmishes as much as possible, the German saw precisely these as the best opportunity for the intended breakthrough. If this did not succeed, he was in danger of being cut off from his base by strong forces pushing in from the north or new forces advancing from the south and west from enemy bases. Therefore he had to stand at Horns-Riff under all circumstances when it got light and make his further decisions dependent on the results of the night battles and the situation after them. As a result, the repeated turning of the tip in the fighting that had started since 9:20 pm must have seemed extremely unfavorable to his intentions. However, he succeeded, intervening several times with orders, to bring the fleet back on the course to Horns-Riff again and again. When at 10:08 the top seemed to turn off again - a consequence of the attack by "Caroline" and "Royalist" - he ordered at 10:10 a radio message: "Main course SSE¼E, hold out! Journey 16 nm." The fact that "Lützow" came out of sight at 10:15 even for "König", the final ship of the line, could not change this decision. If the fleet adjusted its cruising speed to this damaged battle cruiser or ran back to it, it was out of the question to reach Horns Reef when it was light. Since the weather had turned rather hazy, the fleet chief hoped that "Lützow" would perhaps reach the port without such help, unnoticed by the enemy.

In the meantime, however, the contact of the V and VII Flotilla with the enemy, which was gathering at "Rostock", had been considerably delayed and made more difficult by the multiple turning of the tip. After the II Flotilla and the 12th Half-Flotilla had been attacked by Kommodore Heinrich from the end of the line in the ENE-SE sector at 9:10 p.m., Kommodore Michelsen determined the connecting sector SE-S by E for the VII Flotilla the sector S by E to SSW. for the V Flotilla.<sup>377</sup>



Page 357      Resolutions of the German Leader for the night.

He was guided by the idea that the enemy standing in the east when the battle broke out would probably run south under the Jutian coast during the night in order to put the German Main Body at Horns-Riff again to fight when it got light. In this case, the use of the flotillas in the direction ordered could cause serious damage to the enemy during the night and be of the greatest importance for the outcome of the renewal of the battle, which is to be expected when the light comes on. When Kommodore Michelsen released the two flotillas at 10 o'clock, however, he and his flagship "Rostock" were, as was later discovered, considerably further north than calculated, still west and at the end of their own line. But in order to prepare the torpedo boats, which were heavily slagged as a result of the demands of the daytime battle, even to some extent for smokeless driving and attack, these flotillas, which were still only fired with coal, were not allowed to travel more than 18 nm and at most 21 nm for steaming to the top. Even at 15 nautical miles they were visible from afar due to the spray of sparks and smoke. The flotillas also had to break through once or twice, as their own line made several changes of course in order to get on the attack course in the assigned sector, which was not without danger in the increasing darkness. Another difficulty arose from the fact that, given the uncertainty of the ship's positions, they always had to reckon with getting into the attack area of the other flotillas or even back into the territory of their own group, since the course of the latter with the advance direction, especially the VII. Flotilla, converged in a very dangerous way. As a result, whenever there was an opportunity to attack, strong doubts had to arise as to whether one was dealing with enemy or one's own armed forces. Korvettenkapitän v. Koch, the head of the VII. Flotilla, therefore initially renounced it and, since a higher advance speed would also have made the lookout more difficult, proceeded with a 17 nm cruise on an SE course. In the case of the V Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Heinecke, which was advancing on S½W, the transmission of the signal to move apart was delayed as a result of changing sides and the heavy smoke obstruction so that they could only proceed in individual groups from 12 o'clock onwards.<sup>378</sup>

Unfortunately, however, neither the small cruisers nor the torpedo boats were able to establish contact with the enemy main body, which is so essential for all prospects of attack, before dark. The flotillas, dependent on themselves, were also in danger of being worn out by the large number of enemy light armed forces when the light came on, or at least pushed aside to such an extent that they could not be there when the struggle was then to be renewed. Although Admiral Scheer had already resigned himself to the latter point when he ordered the flotilla to be deployed at night, Kommodore Michelsen considered it of the utmost importance to have the boats in hand again when it was light. He therefore ordered at 11:30 p.m. by radio message that all flotillas will be at 3 a.m. at Horns-Riff should be collected again by their own main body. Just in case they were driven away, as Commodore Heinrich had already ordered for the II Flotilla, they should take the route around Skagen.

After the dismissal of the V and VII Flotilla, Kommodore Michelsen only had five boats of the IX. and one of the III. Flotilla, which he initially kept at his disposal. While he attached himself to the IV Reconnaissance Group with "Rostock", Kommodore Heinrich followed after six boats of the III. Flotilla had rejoined him, with these boats and his flagship "Regensburg" first "Derfflinger" and finally "von der Tann" at the end of the line. "S 50" from the 12th Half Flotilla also returned there at 11:27 hrs. Although now Korvettenkapitän Hollmann, the chief of III. Flotilla to be used with his boats for night raids, but Kommodore Heinrich thought it more correct to keep a certain reserve in hand with these boats for unforeseen cases.

When the V and VII Flotillas were detached, the II Squadron was still at the head of the line. However, Admiral Scheer thought it was incorrect to leave it there, given the ships' poor resistance to torpedo hits. So at 10:10 pm he had already ordered that the line should end. The squadron was in danger there, too, if the enemy were to make contact from the north when it got light and put a heavy load on the queue, but then there was still time to give the II Squadron a different position. As a result of this order, "Westphalia" swiveled back to starboard to SW by S at 10:20 pm to be at the head of the I. and III. Squadron to steam past the II., which, very contrary to the intention of the fleet chief, delayed the start of the course to Horns-Riff again. Vice-Admiral Schmidt, the chief of the I. Squadron, was, because he could not see the reason for the new course change to port, already about to give "Westphalia" the instruction to steer SSE, when Admiral Scheer gave the course signal again SSE $\frac{1}{4}$ E gave and at 10:29 pm repeated the order to take the night march formation in the following form:<sup>379</sup>

"II. Squadron behind III. Squadron, battle cruiser to the end, II. Reconnaissance Group ahead, IV. Reconnaissance Group to starboard."

At the time, the II Reconnaissance Group was still on port abeam of the I and II Squadron in the process of steaming, while the IV, which had come to the starboard side of the II Squadron due to the detachment of the II Squadron, then sank up to the level of the rear ships of this squadron in order to take up their position as side cover with the I and III Squadrons. But the II. Squadron still had the order to move behind the III. Squadron to go, apparently not preserved, when "Hannover", the top ship of the same, very faint at 10:30, but just recognizable, right ahead the clouds of smoke from about four large ships and for a moment also a bright high masthead sighted and reported this observation through Radio message. What she had seen were the armored cruisers of the II. British Cruiser Squadron, which at this time must have passed a few miles in front of the II. Squadron in order to attach themselves to Beatty battlecruisers (1). (Map 32.)

Kontreadmiral Frhr. v. Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels thereupon immediately directed a message to the IV. Reconnaissance Group to move forward again. At the same time, Commodore Michelsen, the first leader of the torpedo boats, who was still steaming up with his flagship "Rostock" and the 18th Half Flotilla, ordered the latter to attack the reported armed forces, and later assigned it to the SSW – SW sector, if even with the great distance from the sighted enemy, whose presumably high speed and the complete lack of visibility of the sea area ahead, the prospect of success could only be small from the start. For his part, Admiral Mauve, the chief of the II. Squadron, only now received the radio message that referred his ships to the end of the line, but now waited until the situation at the head had cleared up before executing it.

1) The list of English radio messages attached to the Jutland Despatches contains on page 472 the following signal from "Duke of Edinburgh" to "Shannon", however given for 10:17 pm: "Your masthead lamp is on."<sup>380</sup>

Only when there were no further reports from there about the enemy that had just been sighted did he let his ships turn on the opposite course at 10.50 a.m. sat at 11.10 am with the II. Squadron in a swing behind "König", the final ship of the III. Squadron. (Map 33.) This late maneuvering to take the night march formation could easily have led to dangerous situations in the increasing darkness and the proximity of the enemy armed forces, especially since the battle cruisers were still outside the port line abeam of the I. Squadron. It was only at 10:05 pm that Admiral Hipper was able to transfer his staff from "G 39" to "Moltke". Apparently at the time he had not yet received the order to line up with the battlecruisers at the end of the line, for he had hardly taken over the command again when he gave the order to immediately vaporize again at a speed of 20 nautical miles to the top of the line. But only "Moltke" and "Seydlitz" followed this order, while "Derfflinger" could only walk 18 nm because of the damage they had suffered and "von der Tann" because of the slagging of the fire, the cleaning of which could no longer be postponed, so that the distance between "Moltke" and "Seydlitz" on the one hand, and "Derfflinger" and "von der Tann" on the other hand increased rapidly. Then the latter two ships, about abeam the naval flagship, received another order from the latter to go to the end of the line, and now attached themselves to the II. Squadron. Thanks to the seafaring skills of the squadron, flotilla chiefs and commanders, the difficult formation of the night march formation was achieved soon after 11 p.m. 24 ships were now, dimmed and ready to open fire at any moment, in a long battle line which was heading SSE $\frac{1}{4}$ E at 16 nautical miles.

If the German night march formation was fully prepared for the attack, the British were dominated by the idea of avoiding fighting during the night if possible. Seven minutes after Admiral Scheer's first order for the night march formation (10:17 pm), Admiral Jellicoe had given his instructions accordingly, with the following radio message: "Take positions according to Organization 2; Columns side by side in line abreast on port side of the directional column, distances between the columns 1 nm." With this order, the battle fleet, which was maneuvering into 6 divisions during the daytime battle, was grouped into three squadron columns for the night march, to which the V Battle Squadron was added as the fourth on the eastern wing. By reducing the six columns or, if the V Battle Squadron was added, seven columns to three or four with an extremely short distance from one to the other, he hoped to make it as difficult as possible for the German torpedo boats to find the British fleet, Better to avoid confusion between enemy and friend and to be able to maintain the connection more easily during the night.<sup>381</sup>

In doing so, however, he accepted that with the slightest counteraction, extremely difficult situations could arise. If one of the wing divisions came into action, or if it had to turn away and towards the other columns before a torpedo boat attack, the whole fleet could get into the most terrible confusion, one more reason to avoid any fight in this formation as far as possible. But the British fleet chief did not even want to use the destroyer flotillas offensively; rather, at 10:27 p.m. he ordered them to line up 5 nm behind the battle fleet as cover. He also feared that in the other case, with the known proximity of the German fleet, he could become a victim of the attacks of his own destroyers through mix-ups.

Determined not to venture into anything during the night, it remained the greatest worry for the British fleet commander, at least not to miss anything, in order to put the German fleet into renewed combat when the light came on. He believed he could eliminate the possibility that this would return on the way around Skagen through the Kattegat. When the daytime battle was broken off, Admiral Scheer was still 344 nm away from the Little Belt, so by choosing this route he would have given the British fleet a whole day to pursue and renew the battle. The far greater concern of the British Leader was therefore that Admiral Scheer would try to break through to the east during the night in front of or behind the British. There were three ways in which the latter could achieve the protection of its base. One led over Horns-Riff and Amrum-Bank, the second through a passage between the British and German minefields west of Heligoland, and the third under the Frisian coast from the Ems to the Jade. These routes were known to the Admiralty and the British fleet chief. Most unlikely that the German fleet would take the route across the Ems, because it was considerably longer than the other two. The one over Heligoland was also from the location of the German fleet for 10 p.m. about 175 nm, the one over Horns Reef, however, only 142 nm. But although everything accordingly spoke in favor of the latter route, Admiral Jellicoe, strangely enough, found himself compelled to head for a point with his armed forces which, in the first place, enabled him to cut off the enemy if he chose the route via Heligoland or the Ems.<sup>382</sup>

But in order not to leave the blocking of the way over Horns-Riff to the three submarines, which were in waiting position at Vyl-Lightship and were hardly able to do so, he ordered the minelayer "Abdiel" at 10:32 pm, Steam ahead at full speed and still at night, in accordance with an order that had already been prepared, to strengthen the British mine barriers south of the submarine waiting position. The greatest hope of being able to prevent the breakthrough of the German fleet in this direction, however, placed the British fleet chief on the destroyer flotillas positioned behind the fleet, since he was of the opinion that the German squadrons, if they encountered them, would certainly be subject to mass attacks would be pushed to the west.

From these mutual orders for the night the peculiar situation arose that the German fleet was now marching southwards at a very short distance behind the British, with the top ship "Westfalen" at 11:30 p.m. only 6 nautical miles aft of the British battlecruisers and in the same distance starboard abeam from the western wing column of the British battle fleet, which was concentrated in a confined space. Both fleets were on a slightly converging course and it could not be long before these courses had to cross.

As a result of the multiple course changes of the German squadrons during the taking of the night march formation, however, neither "Moltke" and "Seydlitz" of the I., nor "Frankfurt" and "Pillau" of the II Reconnaissance Group succeeded, as they intended, to be seated in front of the head of the fleet, rather they were still steaming up on the port side of the same. The IV Reconnaissance Group was also, although the leader of the same, Kommodore v. Reuter, presuming that he was southwest of his own main body in the ordered side cover to starboard, also got on the port side of the ships of the line. Here, "Elbing", which could no longer follow the II Reconnaissance Group due to a condenser accident, as well as "Rostock", the flagship of the 1st leader of the torpedo boat forces, joined the IV. Reconnaissance group (1). The VII Flotilla (2) was still further east, but further back. This was at 10:30 p.m. behind the III. Squadron went around on an attack course, with the 14th Half Flotilla already from a ship of the III. Squadron had been mistaken for enemy destroyers and had received a salvo at 18 hm range, which hit 50 m behind the stern of "S 23".

1) The cruisers "Munich", "Frauenlob", "Stuttgart", "Hamburg", "Elbing" and "Rostock" therefore followed behind "Stettin", the flagship of the IV Reconnaissance Group, while the II. Reconnaissance Group only consisted of "Frankfurt" and "Pillau".

2) Guide boat: "S 24". 13<sup>th</sup> Half-Flotilla: "S 15", "S 17", "S 20", "S 16", "S 18". 14<sup>th</sup> Half-Flotilla: "S 19", "S 23", "V 189", "G 172". "V 186" had already been sent back to Helgoland in the morning due to a capacitor failure.<sup>383</sup>

Page 363      11 p.m.      Battle of the VII Flotilla with the IV Destroyer Flotilla.

Thereupon the flotilla chief, Korvettenkapitän v. Koch, turned on the SE course, in order to deviate further from his own main body. But now the German cruisers and torpedo boats, which were still standing to the side of their own main body, were already met by British destroyer flotillas. (Map 33.)

At 10:27 p.m. they had received orders to line up 5 nm behind the battle fleet, and they were the XI. and IV. Flotilla on the western wing, the VIII., IX., X. and XII. further east, to the side and between the British columns of liner steamed to the north and just now, having reached position, was about to pivot to the south when the VII German Flotilla was already approaching them from the northwest at 17 nm. At 10:50 p.m., "S 24", the guide boat of the latter, sighted a row of destroyers right ahead, the 1st Half Flotilla of the IV Flotilla, which was led by the fleet master ship "Tipperary", and soon afterwards six more destroyers came into view on the port side (1). At a distance of 400 to 500 m, these were initially referred to as boats of the II Flotilla. But when the detection signal shown by the German flotilla boat remained unanswered, "S 24", "S 16", "S 18" and "S 15" each fired a torpedo at around 10:58 p.m., but perhaps through the muzzle flash of the ejection or the multiple breaches of the surface warned by one of the torpedoes, the enemy turned on the first shot, so that the other boats could no longer fire and none of the torpedoes reached the target. Thereupon the flotilla chief, correctly assuming that he had the safety belt of the battle fleet in front of him, immediately turned his boats on a south course, in order to pass the western wing of the fuse as unnoticed as possible without betraying himself by searchlights and artillery fire. Of the British flotilla, only the destroyer "Garland" opened fire at 11:02 hrs and reported the boats by radio message. Soon afterwards some torpedoes passed behind "Garland" while the German boats came out of sight. The only explanation on the German side of the fact that the British destroyers did not follow, but also apparently turned at high speed, was that they were apparently trying to attack the German fleet as unseen as possible.

1) The 1st Half Flotilla led by "Tipperary" consisted of the destroyers: "Spitfire", "Sparrowhawk", "Garland", "Contest"; the 2nd Half Flotilla from the destroyers led by "Broke": "Achates", "Ambuscade", "Ardent", "Fortune" as well as "Porpoise" and "Unity". The two destroyers "Ophelia" and "Christopher" still remaining from the "Shark" division were with the battle cruisers, "Owl", "Hardy" and "Midge" with the armored cruisers.<sup>384</sup>



In reality, however, the IV Flotilla had just turned and was soon on a south course again.

At the same time, a little further to the west and south, the two cruisers of the II Reconnaissance Group collided with the XI. Destroyer Flotilla, which was personally led by Commodore Hawksley from the cruiser "Castor" (1). The top ships of the latter were still on a northerly course when they were sighted by "Frankfurt", and the latter believed to have five cruisers in front of them, which they reported immediately by radio. A mix-up with the II Flotilla was impossible, as it had to be further north. As a result, "Frankfurt" and "Pillau" each shot a torpedo at about 1000 m, but then dodged to the west without lighting or firing in order not to pull the destroyers now sighted behind the cruisers onto their own main body. The British flotilla also turned and headed south. But now the IV Reconnaissance Group steamed up behind the II, and at 11:05 "Castor" sighted three or more cruisers to starboard, of which the top ship appeared to be an armored cruiser. They called with the English identification signal, which increased the doubts as to whether one had enemy or friend in front of them, but then shone with headlights and opened rapid fire at 10 hm, which was immediately replied by "Castor" (11:15 pm). They were the cruisers "Hamburg" and "Elbing" at the end of the IV Reconnaissance Group. On "Hamburg" the F. T. network is torn apart, the aft chimney, the engine deck light and the port side bunker are broken through, three heaters and the crew of the III. Guns are badly wounded. On the British cruiser "Castor", however, a grenade sets the motorboat on fire, the ship is brightly lit and receives six more hits. All signaling devices fail, 12 men are killed, 23 are wounded, and only the side armor protects the ship from even larger failures. While turning away, however, "Castor" and the destroyers "Magic" and "Marne" each fire a torpedo, one of which, despite an immediate countermaneuver, runs under the cruiser "Elbing" from astern to the front without detonating. The other destroyers, blinded by the gunfire of the "Castor" and still believing that they were mistakenly shot at by their own ships, no longer came to the gun.

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1) The XI. Flotilla in addition to the cruiser "Castor" and the pilot ship "Kempfenfelt", consisted of the destroyers: "Ossory", "Mystic", "Morning Star", "Magic", "Mounsey", "Mandate", "Minion", "Martial", "Milbrook", "Moon", "Marne", "Manners", "Michael" and "Mons".<sup>385</sup>

The headlights go out, and the leader of the XI. Flotilla can no longer make up its mind to make a second attempt because it does not want to give up its connection with its own squadrons of ships of the line marching in front of it. Apparently he thought it was more important to stand by the fleet at daybreak for the expected new battle than to achieve success in the night attack.

During this battle, the battle cruisers "Moltke" and "Seydlitz" were still on the other side of the IV. Reconnaissance Group and were now passing, about 1000 m to port abeam from the head of the I. Squadron, hard in front of the bow of the "Stettin" (11:35 p.m.). In order to avoid a collision, this has to go slowly, "München", "Frauenlob" and "Stuttgart" veer to port, and just at this moment four enemy cruisers of the "Cities" class come aft at 30 m above sea level Distance with converging course in sight (Map 34), the 2nd British Light Cruiser Squadron. On the point of taking its position behind the battle fleet, it had just observed the battle of the "Castor" when it was asked by the German ships to show the detection signal. In response, "Dublin", the second ship, opens fire at 700m. At the same time, around a dozen headlights flashed on the German side, while a hail of bullets fell on "Southampton" and "Dublin". On the other hand, "Nottingham" and "Birmingham", which do not let their headlights shine, remain almost unscathed and can counter the German fire all the more effectively. The fight, which now begins at the shortest distance, in which hardly a volley can miss its target, is of unheard of fierceness. "Stettin" and "Munich", "Frauenlob" and "Stuttgart" concentrate their fire on the two foremost cruisers and, although they are considerably inferior to them in terms of combat strength, Fires break out in several places after the first volleys on "Southampton" and "Dublin". The headlights of the British flagship go out and its guns are silent. "Stettin", Fregattenkapitän Friedrich Rebensburg, wants to turn to the torpedo shot, but at this moment, like "Munich", Korvettenkapitän Oscar Böcker, receives two hits. A searchlight, the command transmission system and a gun fail on "Stettin", a steam pipe is also hit, so that the escaping steam prevents any overview and Kommodore v. Reuter Forcing to turn off in order to pull the enemy onto his own battle cruiser. The other ships are also too staggered to be able to fire torpedoes.<sup>386</sup>

Only "Munich", which turns towards the enemy with "Frauenlob" at the same time, is able to shoot a torpedo. On "Hamburg", Fregattenkapitän v. Gaudecker, 10 men fell, the commander, navigation officer and some crews on the signal deck, the navigating bridge and the front guns were wounded, "Elbing", Fregattenkapitän Madlung, also received a hit that put the F. T. broadcasting room out of action. Four men are killed and fourteen are wounded. At that moment, however, a larger explosion drowned out the thunder of the guns and the crack of the impacting shells. Soon after the sighting of the German ships, "Southampton" had also shot a torpedo and, while the bridge and superstructures on the British flagship were swept away by the storm of German shells, this had run to the target and hit the cruiser "Frauenlob", Fregattenkapitän Georg Hoffmann, in the port auxiliary engine room. The electric light goes out, the ammunition haulers fail, and while the cruiser is thinking hard to port and the projectiles in the ammunition chambers are falling apart, grenades hitting the aft section set fire to the stern. But nothing can shake the heroism of the crew. Standing up to the body in the water, the operator of the IV. Gun fired under boatswain's mate Schmidt. Then flames and floods put an end to the fight. The cruiser capsizes, and with three cheers for Kaiser and Reich the commander, 11 officers and 308 men seal their loyalty to the fatherland with death.

"Stuttgart", Fregattenkapitän Hagedorn, only barely succeeds in exiting to starboard from the "Frauenlob" which is sinking in front of her. As a result, however, she loses contact with the IV Reconnaissance Group and, soon afterwards, when a meeting of the I Squadron comes into view on the starboard side, she attaches herself to it. "Hamburg" is also pushed aside, as she has to avoid a battle cruiser ("Moltke") that passes in front of her bow in the middle of the battle. and only "Elbing" and "Rostock" manage to find the connection to "Stettin" and "Munich" past "Hamburg". "Seydlitz" also lost the wake lantern of "Moltke" from view in this mess, and moreover can no longer maintain the high speed of the latter (22 nautical miles) and steers independently in front of the fleet and about 10 nautical miles east of its course line to Horns Reef.

Meanwhile, the II British Light Cruiser Squadron had come out of sight for all German armed forces. Fired from "Munich" alone with 92 10.5 cm shells, but this too had suffered badly. On "Southampton" the German shells had swept away searchlights and gun crews, 35 men were dead and 41 wounded.<sup>387</sup>

The ready-to-use ammunition crackled and exploded in new explosions, and it almost seemed as if the cruiser was about to blow up. Fires between the decks also raged on “Dublin”. A continuation of the fight was out of the question. Even before the sinking of the "Frauenlob", the British cruisers turned away and ran east until they encountered the V Battle Squadron. While the fires were being put out on “Southampton” and “Dublin”, they turned back on south course behind this one. But now “Dublin” was missing. The navigation officer on this ship had fallen and all maps had been destroyed, so that it was not connected to the II Light Cruiser Squadron until the following morning. For the leader of the latter, Commodore Goodenough, who had so far distinguished himself particularly through reliable reconnaissance reports, there was initially no longer any possibility of transmitting a radio message about the battle from his badly damaged flagship.

During these battles, “Seydlitz” and “Moltke”, steaming up between the IV Reconnaissance Group and the German main body, had separated and now drove forward individually to port and starboard from the tip of the latter to the south. But the IV Reconnaissance Group was still shooting when "Moltke", Kapitän zur See v. Karpf, about to get closer again, at 11:30 p.m. suddenly sighted four large enemy ships on port side, which seemed to be standing between the battlecruiser and his own main body and seemed to be keeping in touch with the latter. Without suspecting that these were the final ships of the II. Battle Squadron, the right wing column of the British battle fleet, "Moltke" turned away and had to finally give up further attempts to get back to its own main body, because they kept repeating, initially around 11:55 p.m., and then again at 12:20 a.m., encountered the same enemy ships. Unfortunately, each time this happened so suddenly that she could not bring the torpedo weapon to bear without staying too long in the fire area of the superior enemy. So it finally went south in order to avoid further dangerous situations and did not close until 1:30 a.m. to get closer to their own main body again. Also “Seydlitz”, Kapitän zur See Moritz v. Egidy, sighted three large enemy ships on a southerly course at 12:45 p.m. on port side at 1,500 m. The battle cruiser, already greatly reduced in combat power, then turned to the north using the English detection signal, but immediately had to dodge again to the east in front of three destroyers, which were initially mistaken for boats of its own II Flotilla.<sup>388</sup>

It was not until 1:12 a.m. that the battle cruiser was able to resume its course to Horns-Riff at a speed of 21 nm and, within the next hour, observe fights on the starboard side, in which the top German squadron was apparently involved. Already at 1:08 am he gave a radio message in which he reported the sighted enemy ships as battle cruisers, but further findings revealed that it must have been three ships of the "Malaya" class. "Moltke" succeeded, however, since the ship's FT station had already been put out of action during the daytime battle, only at 3:27 am, when the escort boat "G 39" sent a radio message to the fleet chief about her two encounters with heavy armed forces allow. Unfortunately, neither of these two reports reached the flotillas scheduled for the attack.

The German fleet chief only had reports of clashes with light forces until midnight. None of the deployed flotillas had yet encountered forces other than small cruisers and destroyers, and it was still in doubt where to look for the enemy battle fleet. Admiral Scheer could by no means assume that the battles reported were already fighting with the rear of the enemy battle fleet; on the contrary, everything seemed to indicate that the British leader, detached from the main body and supported by light armed forces, was going ahead as planned Attack against the German fleet. Admiral Scheer, however, saw all the less reason to evade these attacks when he was familiar with the training of his fleet in anti-destroyer defense, since everything still mattered to him to be at Horns-Riff when it got light; on the contrary, he continued his march in the direction he had once taken, unconcerned about the fighting that broke out in the port side cover, determined to defy everyone, even the strongest, counteraction. The head of the German battle fleet was therefore already soon after midnight at the point which the British had passed barely a quarter of an hour before, and now, without anyone on the English or German side having suspected this connection, began to slide between the latter and their rear cover. (Map 35.) Even now, however, the cruisers "Rostock", "Stuttgart", "Elbing" and "Hamburg" had still not managed to get free from their own main body, rather, they were still standing on the port side abeam of the top ships of the I. Squadron and thus formed a kind of side cover, which granted the ships of the line a certain protection, but at the same time had to endanger the cruisers considerably even in clashes with enemy armed forces.<sup>389</sup>

From the British side it was now the IV. Destroyer Flotilla, Captain Wintour, which, with the leader ship "Tipperary" at the helm, was closest to the German main body. About 7 nm east of this, Captain Farie marched with the cruiser "Champion" and seven destroyers of the XIII. and two destroyers of the X. Flotilla (1). The four "Harwich" destroyers of the IX were located on the port side close to "Champion" and his flotilla at the same height, and another destroyer of the X Flotilla (2). On the other hand, Captain Stirling stood with the XII Flotilla led by "Faulknor" (3) even further back to the NE, as Admiral Burney's liner division, which he was supposed to follow, could no longer maintain the marching speed of the fleet as a result of the damage to the "Marlborough" in the daytime battle and had gradually sunk further and further astern.

Such was the situation when, at about 12:30 a.m., Captain Wintour and the boats in front of the solo IV Flotilla on starboard sighted the shadowy outlines of a line of large ships on a south-easterly course, which the destroyers seemed to be overtaking. It was impossible to say whether one was facing an enemy or a friend, and so the flotilla remained on its previous course for a few minutes with the torpedo tubes swung out to starboard ready to fire. Everything remained calm on the ships, and it was only when they were already passing before the destroyers' course and approaching less than 1000 m that Captain Wintour on "Tipperary" dared to light up the detection signal. A raging rapid fire was the answer. At "Tipperary" the first volley hits the forecastle, a grenade hits the main steam pipe of the guide ship, this, "Spitfire" and the three following boats fire torpedoes, turning partly to port, at 9 hm. "Spitfire" tries to reload, but the torpedo davit is shot at three points at the same time while the operating personnel falls. Then "Broke", the pilot's ship of the 2nd half-flotilla, comes up and unleashes a torpedo, not yet detected by the headlights. Turning hard, he is almost rammed by the man behind him, "Achates", but "Tipperary", almost completely covered by the cascades of the impacting grenades that flash brightly in the headlights, now blazes up in flames and shines as a terrifying torch on the German fleet on their way, which should soon receive more companions. (Text sketch 10.)

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1) XIII. Flotilla: "Obdurate", "Moresby", "Nerissa", "Narborough", "Nicator", "Pelican", "Petard"; X. Flotilla: "Termagant", "Turbulent".

2) IX. Flotilla: "Lydiard", "Liberty", "Landrail", "Laurel"; X. Flotilla: "Morris". ("Moorsom" had been detached to its home port, as this destroyer had suffered an oil shortage as a result of a hit during the daytime battle)


3) Destroyers "Marksman", "Obedient", "Mindful", "Marvel", "Onslaught", "Maenad", "Narwhal", "Nessus", "Noble", "Opal", "Nonsuch", "Menace", "Munster", "Mary Rose".<sup>390</sup>



"Garland" wants to go alongside to provide assistance, but has to give up this attempt in the heaviest enemy fire and run to the east. The destroyers who were further back were still unsure whether the 1st Half Flotilla had attacked British ships when a German searchlight happened to brush their own line. This moment is enough to remove any doubt.

Text sketch 10.

Textskizze 10.



Erstes Gefecht mit der IV. Zerstörerflotille (12.30 Uhr Vm. 1. Juni 1916).

First battle with the IV Destroyer Flotilla (12:30 a.m. on June 1, 1916).

Walking past the sinking "Tipperary", "Ambuscade" fires two torpedoes, the destroyers standing behind her attack and, while "Unity" loses connection, explosions are seen on the third ship of the German line and gaps in the row of the destroyers so far directed headlights. The flotilla had not encountered the side cover, but the battle fleet itself and was therefore the first to face a possibility of attack that had never been granted to a German flotilla on any night of war. The British destroyers, however, were tactically unable to cope with such a situation, despite their bravery, while the defense presented no difficulties to the 1st Squadron, which had been prepared for it in long peace training.<sup>391</sup>



Page 371      12:30 a.m.      "Tipperary" on fire.

The first salvo fired by "Westfalen", Kapitän zur See Redlich, at 12:30 a.m. had swept away the cannon on the forecastle and the command bridge on "Tipperary". At the same time, "Westfalen" turned eight lines to starboard in front of the torpedoes fired by this ship and showered it on 18-14 hm in five minutes with 92 15 cm and 45 8.8 cm HE shells. At the bow of the same, the number "G 60" is clearly visible in the headlights, "Nassau", "Rhineland", "Rostock", "Elbing", "Hamburg" and the torpedo boat "S 32" driving behind "Rostock" arrive and take them also the following destroyers under fire, while "Stuttgart" is content with headlights and lateral observation of the excellent salvos of the ships of the line. "Tipperary" defends itself with creditable guts. The easily flammable light oil of the British ship already envelops it in fiery fire, while cartridge after cartridge explodes from the ready-to-use ammunition and hits hit after hit in the forecastle, but the stern gun fires to the last man, while the "Spitfire" is now approaching again and relieving it of the leader ship, perhaps together with other destroyers, aimed its guns at the headlights of the German ships. From 12:30 a.m. to 12:36 a.m., shells hit "Westfalen", "Nassau" and "Rheinland" one after the other in the front chimney and in the front group of headlights. which put the latter completely or partially out of action and, with their splintering effect, cause a relatively large loss of people. Two men fell on the signal bridge of the "Westfalen", one was heavy, seven, including the commander, were slightly wounded. On "Nassau", Kapitän zur See Klappenbach, an officer and ten men were killed by a grenade, on "Rheinland", Kapitän zur See, Rohardt, 10 men were also killed by a single hit, while 20 others were slightly and seriously wounded. A second shell also damaged two headlights of the aft group on "Nassau", while one on "Rheinland" shattered the citadel tank in the foredeck without any major effect. But ruin is already approaching for "Spitfire" as well. Blinded by the brightly glowing fire of its guide ship, the destroyer realizes too late that the three top German ships have turned back on their previous course. He was still standing on port ahead 400 m away from "Nassau" on the opposite course when she turned with hard rudder towards the destroyer. The latter tries to dodge to starboard, but is caught in the front port by the ramming stem of the capital ship. The ships collide at a speed of 20 meters per second. "Nassau" leans 5°–10° to starboard, so that the shells fired at the same time from the front turret, despite the deepest lowering of the guns, only pass through the bridge and the front funnel of the destroyer without detonating.<sup>392</sup>

The muzzle pressure alone is enough to tear away the headlight deck, bridge and front chimney. 32 men fell, three were seriously wounded, while the foredeck was pushed in by the ram over a length of 20 m to the second underwater bulkhead and caught fire. But in spite of this, the destroyer can, contrary to expectations, be kept afloat and after some time start the march home with the last three boilers still in operation. For "Nassau", however, leaving parts of its navigating bridge on the torpedo protection net, it disappeared into the darkness after two violent detonations and was therefore considered destroyed. In contrast, the capital ship itself had suffered little. The damage was limited, apart from the failure of a 15 cm gun, which had been torn out of the deck with the carriage, to a 3.5 m wide hole in the forecastle above the waterline and, before this was sealed, the ship could only run at 15 nm and tried in vain to take the place between "Westphalia" and "Rhineland" again.

Meanwhile the German cruisers standing between their own ships of the line and the enemy destroyers had gotten into a very difficult position. Forced to avoid the English torpedoes to starboard, they found the way there blocked by the I Squadron. "Rostock" succeeds in pushing itself between "Nassau" and "Rhineland", the latter giving room to starboard, but "Elbing", Kapitän zur See Madlung, has to be obstructed by "Stuttgart" before "Posen", Kapitän zur See Lange, break the line of the I. Squadron. In the chaos of the battle, the commander of the ship of the line recognizes the intention of the small cruiser too late and can only weaken the inevitable collision. "Elbing" is grabbed to starboard aft and then quickly comes out of sight. Although the collision was only light, the cruiser had received a leak through which both machines were soon full of water. Lights and steering machines as well as all command transmission systems failed. The ship was listed at 18°, and only after it had been raised again by counter-flooding could the port battery be made usable again. At first, however, the cruiser drifted astern on the starboard side of the German line, incapable of maneuvering or fighting. "S 32", Kapitänleutnant Froehlich, who had stood behind "Rostock", was also disabled by two direct hits, one of which tore the main steam pipe, the other detonated under the navigating bridge, and remained in the vicinity of a burning English ship which eight severe detonations were observed.<sup>393</sup>

Page 373      12:50 a.m.      "Broke" and "Sparrowhawk" incapacitated.

At 1:30 o'clock, however, the engines on "S 32" could be started again, so that, by feeding the boilers with sea water, an attempt was made to seek shelter under the coast by heading east.


In the meantime, Vice-Admiral Ehrhard Schmidt had withdrawn the ships of his squadron that were not in combat from the dangers of the destroyer attack by turning to W by S, but the top ships "Westfalen" and "Rheinland" had hardly turned back to their previous course when they had to open a violent defensive fire to port again. After the loss of the "Tipperary", Lieutenant Commander Allen found on "Broke" that there were still about half a dozen destroyers left - they were "Sparrowhawk", "Contest", "Achates", "Ambuscade", "Ardent", "Fortune" and "Porpoise" - followed and with them turned back on south course. Scarcely five minutes after the first attack, however, six lines to starboard he spotted again a large ship with two funnels and heavy boat cranes, which was about to cross the flotilla's course. The detection signal shown by "Broke" was immediately followed by the flash of a large number of searchlights and a hurricane of grenades.

This time it was the cruiser "Rostock", the 1000m port abeam of the head of the I Squadron as the first ship recognized the danger and the fire had opened at 12:40 p.m. at 16 hm to 14 hm. At 12:50 p.m., "Westphalia", then "Rhineland" came in. The former shoots thirteen 15 cm and thirteen 8.8 cm HE shells at 14 hm, the latter finally also takes a second destroyer under fire at 8 hm. Both ships turn at full speed before torpedo shots to the west, but before the ships further behind can also open fire, the force of the destroyer attack is already broken. After just 45 seconds, the forecastle and bridge burned on the enemy ship. "Broke" has to turn to port without a torpedo shot. From there, however, the destroyer "Sparrowhawk" comes towards them, "Broke" tries to dodge to starboard, but at this very moment a shell hits the lower navigating bridge, killing everyone there, the engine telegraph fails, the rudder is stuck on port side and "Sparrowhawk" has to realize to her horror that "Broke" does not come up with the rudder, but runs towards her at full speed. "Sparrowhawk" is just hit in front of the navigating bridge, the stern of the "Broke" penetrates to the middle of the ship, both destroyers get caught in each other and have to endure the enemy fire defenselessly, while 23 men of the "Sparrowhawk" jump over onto "Broke", some are thrown on board the latter in the first impact.<sup>394</sup>

Other destroyers only drive past "Sparrowhawk" by a hair's breadth, but one of them, "Contest", can no longer avoid the collision and cuts off two meters from the stern of the destroyer. Only then does "Broke", who suffers heavy losses, manage to break free and run north out of the enemy fire area with little speed, while "Sparrowhawk" drifts helplessly to the northwest.

Text sketch 11.

Textskizze 11.




Zweites Gefecht mit der IV. Zerstörerflottille (12.40 Uhr Vm. 1. Juni 1916).

### Second battle with the IV Destroyer Flotilla (12:40 a.m. on June 1, 1916).

The other destroyers can no longer overlook the situation in the headlights and the flashes and thunder of the German volleys. Only one thing seemed certain. The German top ship was of the "Westphalia" class, so it could hardly be doubted any longer that the flotilla had approached the top of the German battle fleet when the latter was about to make its way behind the wake of the British fleet To pave the way east. A torpedo explosion in the German line showed that the attack was not entirely without effect. But again, not a capital ship, only a small cruiser had been hit. On the point of breaking through to starboard between "Westphalia" and "Rhineland" in order not to mask the fire of the ships of the line, "Rostock" had received a torpedo shot in addition to two shell hits.<sup>395</sup>

The torpedo, luckily a surface runner, had hit the ship near the fourth boiler room. Steam pipes were torn, the lights went out, the steering gear failed, and the only way to avoid a collision with the battleships was that the latter also turned to starboard.

Text sketch 12.  
Textskizze 12.



Drittes Gefecht mit der IV. Zerstörerflottille (1.10 Uhr Vm. 1. Juni 1916).

Third battle with the IV Destroyer Flotilla (1:10 a.m. on June 1, 1916).

"Rostock" can bring itself to safety. The turbines have to stop, two boiler rooms, two wall passages and three upper bunkers are full of water. Some departments can be emptied immediately, but 930 t of water remain in the ship. It leans 5° to port and can only slowly follow the main body to the south, stopping again and again. (Text sketch 11.)

Meanwhile, after the collision of the "Broke" and "Sparrowhawk" Lieutenant Commander Hutchinson on "Achates" took over the leadership of the 2nd Half flotilla, followed by "Ambuscade", "Ardent", "Fortune", "Porpoise" and "Garland" to the east and swiveled back on a south course about 3 nm east of the point of collision, again on south course in order to regain connection with the own battle fleet.<sup>396</sup>

"Contest" also loses touch with a smashed Steven. The other destroyers, however, are now approaching the German top again very quickly.

At 1 o'clock, "Westfalen" changed detection signals with two cruisers of the IV Reconnaissance Group and had to evade in order to let them pass. Immediately afterwards, however, another enemy destroyer comes in sight, coming up from the port side. "Westfalen" makes a detection signal, opens fire and turns to starboard with extreme force. The number "30" can be seen on the enemy destroyer in the headlights. Already the first volley sweeps the bridge away, the mast tilts backwards, and after seven 15 cm and eight 8.8 cm HE shells, which are fired in 28 seconds, "Westphalia" can stop fire because the destroyer goes up in flames and is now being taken under fire by "Rheinland". This also turns away and has to stop fire when a small cruiser of its own comes into the line of fire. At 1:13 am, a torpedo passed 50m to the side of "Rhineland", while "Posen", "Oldenburg" and "Helgoland" were now also firing the three foremost destroyers at 16–8 hm. Even before these, when shot at the wreck, drive out burning astern or come out of sight, two torpedo runways run towards "Posen". This turns off, but at the same time a shell hits the front upper headlight of the "Oldenburg". Explosives wound the commander, Captain Höpfner, killed the head of the light artillery, Kapitänleutnant Rabius, the second searchlight and signal officer, as well as four men, wounded three other officers and nine men, including the helmsman and the one standing in the fire place of the command post Watch officer. Splinters penetrated the artillery control post through the viewing slit and wounded two people there as well. There is already the danger that "Oldenburg", having become a leader, collides with the man in front or behind, as Captain Höpfner, bleeding from many wounds, jumps to the helm and leads the ship back on course, while the artillery continues to fire undisturbed and the destroyer "No. 30" finally brings it down. (Text sketch 12.)

When the German defensive fire had started soon after 1 o'clock, "Achates" and "Ambuscade" immediately turned east, with the latter firing the third torpedo at ships that concentrated their guns on "Ardent". One of these was soon observed to flash red in the waterline while its headlights went out. "Garland" and "Ardent" also fired a torpedo each from the most favorable position 18 hm port ahead of the German top ship, while behind them "Fortune" and "Porpoise" lay in heavy fire from around four large ships.<sup>397</sup>



Page 377      1:15 a.m.      Downfall of the "Black Prince".


When "Ardent" turns to port and runs past "Fortune", it is already on fire, but defends itself in the bravest way with gunfire against the overpowering enemy. "Porpoise" is also hit by a grenade. A torpedo boiler explodes, the main steam pipe rips, the rudder and engine telegraph fail, but the destroyer finds cover behind the smoke and steam shrouded "Fortune" and finally runs out of the area of the German ships on N by W at slow speed. "Garland" also tries in vain to join the flotilla, which in reality had ceased to exist, and only finds the destroyer "Contest", which cannot run more than 20 nm.

Meanwhile, "Achates" and "Ambuscade" believed they were being followed by German cruisers and eventually headed north individually. What they believed to be the enemy, however, was likely no other ship than the Black Prince. Already in the daytime battle this armored cruiser had lost all contact with the I. and II. Cruiser Squadrons soon after the sinking of the "Defense" and, perhaps due to hits, was reduced in speed. It drove at a greater distance behind the battle fleet and got caught between the British destroyer flotillas after dark. When he suddenly saw himself to port abeam a line of large ships, he had probably mistaken them for his own fleet and had run towards them. Such an error should never avenge itself more grimly than in this case. The German leaders were still defending against the third attack by the IV Flotilla when "Nassau", which had sunk on port along the line astern, soon after 1 o'clock at the same time as "Thuringia" on port ahead, sighted a ship with four funnels, which did not answer the identification signal call, but turned hard to starboard. An enemy armored cruiser can be seen in the headlights at a distance of 10 hm. "Thuringia", Kapitän zur See Hans Küsel, opens fire immediately and with 10 rounds of heavy, 27 rounds of medium and 24 light artillery, almost everyone is a hit at the short range. The grenades shot forward from aft through the turning British ship, which did not return fire at all. Soon flames hit it up to the height of the mast. At 1:07 am, "Ostfriesland", Kapitän zur See v. Natzmer, at 1:10 a.m. also "Nassau Kapitän zur See Klappenbach, joined the fire. When "Friedrich der Große", Kapitän zur See Fuchs, also starts to fire at 1:15 am, the ship is just a glowing pyre, which, a gruesome and overwhelming sight, burning brightly, it drifts astern along the line until, after several detonations, it goes down with the entire crew in a huge explosion. (Text sketch 13.)<sup>398</sup>



Text sketch 13.

Zeichnung 13.



Vernichtung der „Black Prince“ und „Ardent“ (1.10–1.20 Uhr Vm. 1. Juni 1916).

Destruction of the “Black Prince” and “Ardent” (1:10–1:20 a.m. on June 1, 1916).<sup>399</sup>

At this moment, "Nassau", avoiding the wreck, runs onto the III. Squadron too. "Kaiserin" has to pull out, "Nassau" can barely avoid a collision with "Äußerste Kraft" back, but only regains connection to the line after "Hessen".

But now a second flare flares up from the point on the port side ahead. While searching for his division, "Ardent", the only combat-ready destroyer of the IV Flotilla, had seen clouds of smoke ahead of it soon after the last attack and ran towards them at about the same time as "Black Prince". It was only when it was too late to evade that the destroyer could see that it was approaching four German ships very quickly, which were passing in front of it from starboard at high speed. Quickly resolved, the destroyer attacked and, while the explosions on the "Black Prince" were still booming the German ships, fired a torpedo on the foremost ship. But "Westphalia" was on the lookout. At a distance of 800 m., she detected the destroyer with the searchlight, which was numbered "78" on the bow. This Morse [Code] the British identification signal in the light cone of the same. "Westfalen" turns and with the first volley, when the last torpedo on "Ardent" is just leaving the tube, sweeps away this bridge and forecastle. After a defensive fire of 4 minutes 20 seconds and ammunition expenditure of 22 15 cm and 18 8.8 cm HE grenades, the destroyer was put out of action. Boilers and steam pipes explode on "Ardent", and when the headlights go out and the ships disappear, the destroyer remains a helpless wreck.

Meanwhile, when a burning ship drove past "Regensburg", the final ship of the German line, at 1:10 a.m., Kommodore Heinrich detached the boats "S 53", "S 54" and "G 88" to the former. On the way there, "S 54", Kapitänleutnant Karlowa, was called by the severely damaged "Rostock" and stayed behind, while "S 53" and "G 88", Kapitänleutnants Götting and Scabell, came across the destroyer leader ship "Tipperary" that was in bright flames from bow to stern. "S 53" rescues nine Englishmen from a raft floating close to the wreck, then, about to return to its own main body, it sees a second vessel ahead portside that does not respond to detection signals. "S 53" is already about to fire torpedoes when the ship makes the morse code: "Over here" Elbing ", I'm helpless, please come alongside." But before the torpedo boat can carry out this command, a third ship comes into view on starboard Spotlight is recognized as an English destroyer with four funnels.<sup>400</sup>

A flat torpedo shot fired by "S 53" at 600 m or by "G 88" at 300 m goes under it, but artillery fire is only answered with isolated shots. What the two torpedo boats had sighted was the severely damaged destroyer leader ship "Broke". 42 of its crew had already fallen, 6 were missing, 14 were seriously and 20 were slightly wounded. But to the astonishment of the English, the German boats suddenly turned away after a few volleys, through which the destroyer received two more hits, so that "Broke", evading northwards, was able to evade the annihilation that had already been considered inevitable. The reason for this was that both boats believed the destroyer was already sinking; "S 53" also now considered it necessary to return to "Elbing" as quickly as possible. On the way there, the boat spotted a third destroyer, but it was apparently already abandoned by the crew. While "S 53" continued to run to "Elbing", "G 88" tried to completely sink the vessel last seen using shells. At that moment, however, it suddenly received fire from behind and found itself under fire by five destroyers who were steaming up in two groups on both sides of the boat. Since "G 88" no longer has any torpedoes and its speed is greatly reduced, it evades a battle and loses contact with "Elbing" and "S 53".

At the same time, "S 52", Kapitänleutnant Ehrentraut, also encountered destroyers at the end of the German line. This boat had stood with "V 28" and "S 51" in front of the Fleet flagship and at 11:50 p.m. together with them received an order from the fleet chief to go to the damaged battle cruiser "Lützow". But only "S 52" was still able to carry out this command. Then instead of the "Lützow", which was looking in vain to starboard astern to find its own main body, at 1:17 o'clock it saw two groups of destroyers under a guide ship, which were heading south on both sides of the boat. Taken under fire from the port group, however, the boat was able to evade the pursuit which was immediately started at full speed amid heavy smoke development, reported its encounter by radio message and then set out on the march to the Jutian coast (1).

1) According to Jutland Despatches on page 304, "Castor" sighted a torpedo boat to starboard at 1:15 am. As soon as this was recognized as hostile, "Castor" turned towards it to ram it and opened fire. But the boat was too fast with the counter maneuver, dodged, got the fire of all artillery at the shortest distance and was not seen again. Believing that it had sunk, "Castor" turned south again to follow his own fleet.<sup>401</sup>

What survived the storm of the last fighting from the IV. British Destroyer Flotilla was scattered to the winds and was no longer considered for further battles.

When the last destroyer of the IV Flotilla went down, the rearmost division of the battle fleet, led by "Marlborough", was not yet four miles south of the head of the German I. Squadron, since the top ship was slowing down the marching speed of the fleet as a result of the torpedo hit during the day's battle could no longer hold, and his division had gradually fallen back to within six nautical miles of the other column. The other British ships of the line, too, had observed the flashes of searchlights, shots and flares on the low cloud cover, first in the northwest, then, moving around in a curve behind them, but without realizing what these battles really meant. But at times they had been so close to the battles of their light armed forces that "Vanguard", the tailship of the IV. Squadron, once believed to recognize an attack on the British port II. Squadron, and "Thunderer", the final ship of the II, could have intervened several times even with artillery fire. However, the ship had refrained from doing so in order not to reveal the position of the battle fleet. Even closer to the enemy was the V Battle Squadron, which, followed by the small cruiser "Birmingham", had held starboard abeam of the "Marlborough" division, and so German ships had even fired long-range shots at times. However, only "Malaya", the final ship of this squadron, had the opportunity to recognize a ship of the "Westphalia" class in the flash of a torpedo explosion at 12:40, which apparently was steering the same course as the British battle fleet. However, "Malaya" failed to pass this important observation on to the fleet chief. As a result, Admiral Jellicoe was caught in the idea that the fighting observed from "Iron Duke" could only be attempts to break through by German torpedo boat flotillas, which, according to a message from the Admiralty, had been deployed against the British battle fleet since 10 pm. Even when, in response to an inquiry addressed to Commodore Hawksley on "Castor" shortly before midnight, he learned that he had been in combat not only with torpedo boats but also with cruisers, he continued to assume that the latter had only intervened to facilitate the expected breakthrough of the German flotillas through British rear cover.

Apparently the armed forces sighted by "G 88" and "S 52" were "Castor" and the XI. Flotilla. After their meeting with "Hamburg" and "Elbing", this seems to have taken the German battle fleet for its own and to have gone after it. In this way, the leader of the British destroyer flotilla, Commodore Hawksley, who was on "Castor", as well as the XI. Flotilla was disabled for all further night fighting.<sup>402</sup>

He did not realize that it had actually been a matter of fighting with the side cover of the German main body, and that these had even heralded the breakthrough of the entire German armed forces behind the rear of the British fleet. Since 10:41 he was in possession of an extremely important message from the Admiralty, which should actually have given him this thought. As early as 10:06 p.m., a radio message had been intercepted and deciphered in the British Admiralty, with which Admiral Scheer had requested airship reconnaissance at Horns-Riff. From this it was obvious that he wanted to stand there even at daybreak. After further observation of the German radio traffic, the Admiralty was also able to warn the British fleet commander at 10:55 p.m. that three German flotillas were being deployed against him. But it was even more important that a radio message intercepted at 10:14 p.m. already contained the precise information on the course and voyage which the German fleet intended to steer during the night. Then it was possible through further observations to determine the location of the final ship of the German battle fleet for 10 p.m. and, after this was transmitted to "Iron Duke" at 11:23 p.m., the Admiralty summarized all previous observations in a radio message to Admiral Jellicoe at 11:41 p.m. that the German fleet had received an order to march back at 10:14 p.m., course SSE  $\frac{3}{4}$  East, drive 16 nm, the battle cruisers at the end of the line. The Horns-Reef target was not mentioned in this notification, but it was readily apparent from the course and the location of the German ship's ship for 10 pm (1). But it was precisely this location,  $56^{\circ} 33' N$ ,  $5^{\circ} 30' E$ , that prompted Admiral Jellicoe rightly to cast considerable doubts on the Admiralty's communication. If this was correct, then the German fleet would have at 10 p.m. had to be standing 10 nautical miles southwest of the British vanguard when the latter turned south. From reports from his own armed forces, however, he knew that the enemy at the time was still to the northwest of "Iron Duke".

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1) This information was apparently based on the deciphering of the following radio message, which Commodore Heinrich at 10:13 o'clock to the II. and VI. Flotilla had directed: "10 o'clock pm. Own main ship 165  $\gamma$  bottom. Course south." This statement was based on the position of the "Regensburg". The real location of the final ship at the time, however, was 10 nautical miles further north, and this error was now also reflected in the information provided by the British Admiralty.<sup>403</sup>

But even if one proceeded from the location of the German final ship given by the Admiralty and continued to assume that Admiral Scheer had in the meantime acted according to the order he supposedly given at 10:14 p.m., then it was still inexplicable to the British leader that he had not yet received a single report on this from his own naval forces. But after the fighting had started with his own backing, he considered it quite impossible that Admiral Scheer would nevertheless stick to the course indicated by the Admiralty and sail his fleet into the middle of the British flotillas assembled there. If he did so, in the opinion of the British fleet chief he would have to suffer the heaviest losses. He therefore considered it much more likely that what he believed was only fighting between the light forces would force the German fleet to move north and west. In any case, not a single report indicated with sufficient clarity that German battleships had already intervened in these battles. So when Commodore Goodenough finally made it possible at 12:38 p.m. to report via the cruiser "Nottingham", whose FT station was still intact, that he had been in combat with enemy cruisers in WSW at 11:15 p.m., and a radio message from the cruiser "Birmingham" reported that he had sighted "battle cruisers, number unknown, probably hostile ones" in the northwest on a south course, from a position which was specified for longitude and latitude (56° 26' N, 5° 42' E), the British fleet commander saw in these reports only a further indication that the German fleet, at least at the time these radio messages were sent, must have been standing west of the British and could not have started the course to Horns-Riff in the meantime. Given the great reliability by which the reconnaissance reports of the II. Light Cruiser Squadron had so far distinguished themselves, he believed that he should also put more trust in the last two radio messages from the same than in the observations made by the Admiralty. No further reports were received. Rather, while rain squalls occasionally set in when the sky was overcast, it became strangely quiet after the fierce fighting of the last quarter of an hour, and for almost an hour nothing interrupted the quiet of the night. This only strengthened the British leader in the belief that the German fleet must still be west of him, and Admiral Beatty, who marched with his ships 15 nm to starboard ahead of "Iron Duke", seemed certain that the enemy was also safe had not yet dared to break through to the east. He therefore had the III. Light cruiser squadrons were ordered to keep a sharp lookout in a northwesterly direction.<sup>404</sup>

But even after the annihilation of the IV. British Flotilla, it would not have been too late for the British to stop the breakthrough of the German fleet, for the bulk of the other British destroyers were still to the east and south-east of the latter. But even these had already been affected by the previous fighting insofar as the volleys, which crossed the IV. Flotilla, partly with the neighboring XIII., partly even with the IX. and X. Flotilla. A better way of getting in touch with the German main body and then going over to a planned mass attack from both sides could hardly be offered to these flotillas. Instead, however, Captain Farie, who led the XIII flotilla from the cruiser "Champion", believed that his flotilla had already been discovered by the enemy and had been under fire; hindered in the attack by the IV flotilla standing on starboard, he therefore suddenly turned to port with "Champion", "Obdurate" and "Moresby". On the other hand, the movement initiated without a signal by the other destroyers of the XIII. Flotilla (1) was not recognized in time, so that they maintained their previous course and finally, without immediately becoming aware of the error, behind the destroyers of the IX. and X. Flotilla, which were led by Lieutenant Commander Goldsmith on "Lydiard" (2). Shortly before, "Unity" from the IV. Flotilla had caught up with "Laurel", so that Lieutenant Commander Goldsmith, without being able to see it in the dark, was now pulling behind him instead of 5 boats from his original 12th division. Unfortunately for the final ships of this stately armed force, however, the involuntary leader of the latter found himself again in a complete misunderstanding of the situation. When his destroyers had repeatedly received fire from a line of large ships on the starboard side at 12:30, the guide on "Lydiard" nevertheless believed that they were his own ships, probably from the V. Battle Squadron. He therefore turned with "Lydiard" and all of these destroyers that followed at 12:40 a.m. to the southeast in order to sit down in front of these ships in the direction of course, then to run over to the other side of them at 30 nm and then his position behind the eastern flank of the alleged one retake British battle fleet. This would have been completely successful if he had counted on the greater length of his originally short line.

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1) "Nerissa", "Termagant", "Nicator", "Narborough", "Pelican", "Petard" and "Turbulent".

2) IX. Flotilla: "Lydiard", "Liberty", "Landrail", "Laurel". X. Flotilla: "Moorsom", "Morris". The destroyers "Termagant" and "Turbulent" from this flotilla were temporarily detached to the XIII., "Moorsom" was already at 10:57 p.m. was released to the home port due to a lack of oil.<sup>405</sup>



Page 385      2:05 a.m.      "Turbulent" destroyed.


But as it was, the last four destroyers encountered the German spearhead while still breakthrough. "Pelican" and "Narborough" were already past this at 1:40 am when they sighted two ships to starboard astern, which they initially assumed to be their own, namely small cruisers, and called with an identification signal. At this moment, "Pelican" is already being touched by a searchlight, which immediately loses the destroyer, and is now holding onto "Petard" and "Turbulent", the last two destroyers. Nevertheless, "Pelican" and "Narborough" can no longer make up their minds to turn to starboard to attack in the passing battle. "Petard", however, sees the German top ship about six lines to starboard at a distance of 400 to 500 m, can only answer a call by showing the battle lights and thereby immediately reveals itself as a British destroyer. His position is still brilliant for the torpedo shot, but he has already fired all the torpedoes in the day's battle, has to turn away and comes free from the ram of the opponent just in time. Then flashing headlights reveal two German ships of the line that are shooting at him one after the other. (Text sketch 14.) The first hit puts the stern gun and the entire crew out of action, the second perforates the stern, the third destroys an oil pipeline so that a serious fire breaks out, and another hit the entire central ship with innumerable splinters. After the sixth hit, the destroyer manages to escape.

On the German side, "Rheinland" had sighted destroyers on starboard at 1:45 hrs, believed it had been attacked by them and turned to port. At 2:05 hrs, "Westfalen" also saw a suspicious cloud of smoke on starboard, but at the same time two destroyers of particularly large type on port ahead. Apparently attacked from both sides this time, the commandant, Kapitän zur See Redlich, had no choice but to drive right into them. The foremost, with the number 606 on the bow, managed to get past the stern of the "Westfalen", then received three salvos from the starboard battery with a total of thirteen 15 cm and six 8.8 cm HE shells, of which the same first go into the stern and seem to bring the engine to a standstill. Before anything else can be determined, the port battery begins on a second destroyer "No. 27" to fire. It turns, apparently out of fear of being rammed, on the same course as the battleship and runs close in front of the battleship, so that only one stroke needs to be turned to starboard to completely shoot it down. The first salvo sweeps the rear gun overboard again with all the controls, and after ammunition expenditure of 29 15 cm and 16 8.8 cm shells, the boilers explode on the destroyer.<sup>406</sup>

13. Skagerrak - Fourth phase. - The night.

Text sketch 14.

Textskizze 14.



Durchbruch der Zerstörer der IV., IX., X. und XIII. Flottille (1.45—2.00 Uhr Nm. 1. Juni 1916).

Breakthrough of the destroyers of the IV., IX., X. and XIII. Flotilla (1.45 a.m. - 2.00 a.m. on June 1, 1916).<sup>407</sup>

With his downfall - it was "Turbulent" - the clashes came to a temporary end.

The IV. Flotilla was wiped out, the XI. rejected, the IX. and X. and the greater part of the XIII. Flotillas had broken through to the west with losses and without success, but the XII flotilla, led by "Faulknor" and consisting of 15 destroyers, did not attack for the time being. When "Champion", "Obdurate" and "Moresby" turned east at 12:45 in front of the German defensive fire, "Faulknor" and his flotilla followed this movement. Then the flotilla was pushed back to the NE course by "Champion" and could not go south again until 1:20 am. At that moment, however, two German cruisers, "Frankfurt" and "Pillau", which had meanwhile moved away from their own main body to port, came across from starboard on "Menace" and "Nonsuch", the two penultimate boats of the flotilla. "Menace" had to put hard rudder to avoid being rammed, "Nonsuch" attempted to fire another torpedo under enemy fire, but then had to evade the threatened destruction with maximum speed (33 nm) to the east, and got so far pushed away so that she could no longer find the connection to her flotilla. In this way the strong eastern group of flotillas was also pushed out of their favorable position before they had an opportunity to attack. The way for the German fleet was clear. What Admiral Jellicoe had thought impossible had become a fact. Despite the mass accumulation of British destroyer flotillas behind the British battle fleet, Admiral Scheer had pushed right through the former and had not lost a single larger ship in the breakthrough. All the conditions of position, lighting and weather were the most favorable that one could imagine for a night attack by destroyers. With the ease with which these English attacks were repulsed, and with the small number of destroyers that actually got within sight of the fleet, Admiral Scheer could hardly have recognized the full extent of the danger which threatened the German leaders. Although the German coastal stations had also closely observed the enemy's radio traffic during the battle, deciphering and evaluating it took considerably longer than with the British Admiralty. Admiral Scheer learned, as well as other facts, of which he was aware of during the battle, that the British fleet chief had set up his entire flotilla as cover directly behind the battle fleet, and that the German top had repeatedly pushed into this wasp's nest would have been of utmost importance only after running in.<sup>408</sup>

The little success and the disproportionately high losses of the British destroyers, however, are all the more surprising when the facts are fully known. There was certainly no lack of personal bravery among the British flotilla chiefs and commanders; on the contrary, this was also fully recognized on the German side. However, as Kapitän zur See Redlich, the commander of the "Westfalen", who himself was an experienced specialist in this field, stated in his report, all attacks by the British destroyers had very little training in approach and in recognizing the situation and counter-maneuvers of the attacked ship proved. All attacks would have been carried out individually and in agitation, and, if it were not at all in accordance with the tactics of the British destroyers to shoot in agitation, the destroyers would always have been vaporized too close to them so that they could be spotted and seen ahead of time before they were approached for the battle through could be shot down. Kommodore Michelsen, the first leader of the torpedo boat forces, who had observed the attacks from the "Rostock", said that the attacks were carried out with recognizable cutting edge, but with an audacity that could only be achieved through ignorance of the correct form of attack wanted to seem explainable to him. The heavy losses suffered by the destroyers could be attributed to this. He had not seen an attack from the same from a previous position. The angle of intersection would have been mostly very acute, the night range of the British torpedoes apparently small, certainly not more than 1500 m. At "Rostock" several torpedoes would have appeared, which apparently would have run about this distance. According to several German commanders and the chief of the VI. Flotilla was probably also the British destroyers' undoing of the light oil used to fire the boilers, as it was observed several times that after the first hits, fires that could no longer be extinguished had broken out on them. On the English side, the reasons for the failure were traced back to the fact that too large a number of destroyers were combined into a flotilla. No attempt had been made at all to keep individual flotillas in touch so that the others could launch a mass attack to be carried out by both sides at the same time. But even in the imperfect manner in which they were carried out, these attacks by a navy less trained in night fighting like the Germans should have been fatal. Again the German artillery, the tactical skill, the presence of mind and seamanship of the German leaders and commanders had celebrated triumphs even in the difficult situations of the night battles.<sup>409</sup>

The skill, presence of mind and seamanship of the German leaders and commanders celebrated triumphs even in the difficult situations of the night battles. Searchlight discipline, flare grenade shooting and fire control of the top German ships of the 1st Squadron, which had gone through a long peace training, had stood at a remarkable height, and in particular the execution of the defensive shooting by Korvettenkapitän Hinsch, Kapitänleutnants Paul Wolff and Freudenberg, the artillery officers of the "Westphalia", was above all praise sublime. It was only thanks to these characteristics of the German fleet that Admiral Scheer's breakthrough was achieved with relatively few losses. In the course of the various night battles, four British destroyers were sunk, three put out of action, and everything that the flotillas could claim an immediate success, limited to the damage to the "Rostock", which it only fell victim to in the later course of the night march. The capital ships had remained intact.

While the British destroyer flotillas ran into brilliant attack positions against the German main body of their own accord, the German flotillas, having for the most part already had to endure heavy fighting in the day-to-day battle, first had to search for the British battle fleet. But since all contact with it had been lost with the breakup of the daytime battle, the flotillas could not be given the slightest clue as to the probable location of the latter. There was nothing left but to position them individually in sectors from ENE to SW, even without guidance from escort cruisers, and this had resulted in a considerable fragmentation of the torpedo boat forces from the start. Unfortunately, the II. Flotilla, consisting of the most powerful and fastest boats, which had hardly suffered in the daytime battle and was still in full possession of its torpedoes, was the worst sector ENE to ESE from the location of the German fleet for 9 p.m. so that it pushed completely into the air and soon after 1 am began the march back around Skagen. In the next sector, ESE to SE, to the south, only "V 69" and "V 46" from the 12th half-flotilla were left after the loss of "S 50" at 9:52 pm. Although they once observed night battles at a great distance on starboard at 11:42 p.m., they also no longer encountered enemy forces. The 11th half flotilla, whose boats each had only one torpedo, had left "Rostock" behind from right at the beginning of the night fighting with the guide boat of the VI Flotilla held in the gaps of the III squadron by boat.<sup>410</sup>

On the other hand, Kommodore Michelsen had the boats of the IX. Flotilla (1), which he had initially kept in reserve, was scheduled to report enemy forces at the top at 10:37 p.m. in the SSW to SW sector, while between these and the boats of the 12th Half-flotilla the V and VII. Flotilla advanced in the sectors SSW to S by E and S by E to SE. So it came about that the slowest boats, still equipped with pure coal-firing, were in the two most promising sectors. Of these, the VII. Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän v. Koch, who had already encountered the 4th British destroyer flotilla around 11 o'clock, had bypassed it and then continued the advance on course S by E½E. Then the 14th half-flotilla detached itself at 12:55 a.m. and went on SE by E course at 16 nm in order to enlarge the flotilla's search strip. When at 1 a.m. if a third group of three boats were to advance on a S by E½E course for the same purpose, own ships were spotted in action with enemy destroyers to starboard ahead, so that the rest of the flotilla stayed together to avoid getting caught in the middle of the fighting parties. Heavy gunfire was then observed several times at a great distance on the starboard side, followed several times by powerful explosions, but the majority of the enemy was nowhere seen.

On retrospective consideration, the V Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Heinecke, which had advanced into four groups on S½W from its own main body from 12 midnight onwards, undoubtedly had more favorable prospects of achieving this (2). As with the VII Flotilla, however, in order to drive with the heavily slagged coal fires, the advance speed could not be increased beyond 18 nautical miles, and so the advance of this flotilla also only made slow progress. In addition, like the other flotillas, had orders from Kommodore Michelsen to be back with their main body at 3 o'clock. There were also errors in determining the location and transmitting signals. The advance was therefore barely half an hour in progress when the groups "V 2", "V 4", "V 6" or "G 9" and "G 10" left their positions on the western wing of the reconnaissance line and turned to SE, while the other two groups stayed on the previous course at least until 1.30 a.m. In doing so, however, the boats had moved so little away from their own ships that during the attacks of the IV British Destroyer Flotilla they were in danger of being involved in these skirmishes several times.

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1) "V30", "S34", "S33", "V 26", "S36", plus "G42" from III. Flotilla.

2) "G11": 9th Half-flotilla; "V 1", "V4", "V6", "V2", "V3". 10. Half -flotilla: "G 8", "G 7", "V 5", "G 9", "G 10".<sup>411</sup>

Page 391      Unsuccessful attack attempts by the German flotillas.

At 12:53 a.m., a torpedo probably fired during these attacks passed under “G 11”. At 1:04 am, “G 9” and “G 10” sighted a small cruiser with 4 funnels three lines to port, which could just as easily be the “Rostock” as a hostile one, and even before this doubt was resolved, this ship came in a southerly direction from view, and finally at 1:20 a.m. the flotilla boat group was briefly shot at by its own cruiser. 20 minutes later the boats met together with those of the IX. Flotilla. These had advanced on SW by S from 10:37 p.m. under the leadership of Korvettenkapitän Tilleßen, but had also seen nothing of the enemy and at 1 a.m. started the march to Horns-Riff. In this way it was spared the British battle fleet, as a result of a chain of circumstances which were particularly favorable for it, from being put to the same severe test in night combat as the German. Neither the German battle squadrons nor the flotillas succeeded in getting to the enemy bulk during the night. The fact that the German squadrons did not have to shy away from such a meeting, and that this would have been desirable, especially given the nature of the night march formation chosen by the British, is confirmed by Admiral Jellicoe's recognition of the German superiority in night combat.<sup>412</sup>

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## 14. Skagerrak – Final phase. – June 1, 1916.

After the annihilation of the armored cruiser "Black Prince" and the destroyer "Ardent", the German line was quiet. Summer nights in these northern latitudes are short. The twilight could therefore not be long in coming and after the battles of the night that had just been overcome, everything looked forward with eager attention to the events that the dawning day would bring. When it got light around 3 a.m., however, the eastern horizon remained veiled by the huge billows of smoke from the marching fleet, drifting in this direction. At the same time, light rain set in and, for its part, limited the range of vision, while the now freshening SW wind increased the swell and began to hit the wrecked or sinking ships of both parties. Although "Ardent" and "Fortune" had already sunk, "Sparrowhawk" and "Tipperary" were drifting helplessly on the flood, just like further north "Wiesbaden", while "Lützow", "Elbing" and "Rostock" as well as "Porpoise" and "Spitfire" left the scene of the night fighting at slow speed, and the other British destroyers that had attacked, scattered to the winds, sought in vain to join their battle fleet.

Meanwhile, the commanders of the German capital ships, apart from those of the 1st Division, had hardly been able to gain an overview of what was going on at the top. In many cases they did not even know whether it was ship-to-ship battles or exclusively destroyer attacks. Vehicles that burned several times had probably driven past on the port side of the line, but even in these cases they could hardly decide whether these were their own or enemy vehicles. Nevertheless, thanks to their excellent seafaring skills, they had managed to avoid any danger in good time and, for the most part, to maintain their place in the line again and again. Only "Nassau" had to give up its original place in the line when it rammed the destroyer "Spitfire" and was ultimately cut between "Hesse" and "Pomerania". Likewise, when "Schlesien" and "Schleswig Holstein" had to give way to the unmaneuverable "Rostock" at 12:50, they came to the end of the line behind the battle cruisers "Derfflinger" and "von der Tann".<sup>413</sup>

Page 393      3:00 a.m.      Attack of the XII. Destroyer Flotilla.

But they too had been steaming up on the port side from 2 o'clock in order to take their old places again. Other than that, the order of the line was unshaken. As before, all units followed the top ship "Westfalen" at the ordered intervals, which very soon turned back to the general course SE by S in order to reach Horns-Riff, even after the last destroyer attack. (Map 35.) When it was light, the boats of the IX closed from the west after a futile advance against the British main body and V. Flotilla also approached again, and around 3 o'clock the group "V2", "V4", "V6" of the 9th Half Flotilla starboard abeam of "Westphalia" and "Rhineland" was already steaming to the top, while "Stuttgart" drove as starboard side cover. Other boats, especially those of the VII Flotilla, were to be expected from the port side. On the other hand, a further destroyer attack with increasing brightness could be considered more and more improbable. But the British XII destroyer flotilla was still standing, between the German fleet and its destination, Horns Reef. During the first attack of the IV. Flotilla, first pushed by the English cruiser "Champion", then by the German cruisers "Frankfurt" and "Elbing" to the east and north, it had already increased its distance from its own battle fleet to 30 nm when she swiveled back on a south course at 1:20 a.m., even further north and east, but already at 1:05 am, "Champion" also turned with the two destroyers of the XIII Flotilla still standing with him, "Obdurate" and "Moresby", on a southerly course, and all these vessels were now quickly approaching the German line. This was initially "Faulknor", the ship of the XII. Flotilla, under Captain Stirling. Behind him the 1st Half Flotilla followed in two columns side by side (1), then four destroyers of the 2nd Half Flotilla in the keel line under the leader ship "Marksman" (2). Not counting the two guide ships, Captain Stirling therefore had 12 of the newest and most powerful destroyers under his command, each equipped with 4 torpedo tubes with a speed of 34 nm (3).

At 2:45 a.m., just as the first streaks of dawn were lighting the dark horizon, Stirling spotted a line of large ships on the starboard side on a south-easterly course, and soon, walking closer, he could see them as German battleships.

1) 1st Division: "Obedient", "Mindful", "Marvel" and "Onslow" starboard aft; 2nd Division: "Maenad", "Narwhal", "Nessus" and "Noble" port eighth from the lead ship.

2) The destroyers "Opal", "Menace", "Munster" and "Mary Rose".

3) Of the other 4 destroyers in the flotilla, "Nonsuch" had lost touch, "Mischief" was with the armored cruisers from the start.<sup>414</sup>

Thereupon he immediately swiveled 25 nm on a parallel course and ordered the 1st division to attack. But no sooner had it set out to attack when the German ships apparently noticed this, turned away and came out of sight. However, the British flotilla commander was in no doubt that they would return to the old course very soon. He therefore had the 1st Division cut in again and sat down at the highest speed in the assumed direction of march of the enemy in front of the supposed head of the enemy. In the meantime he had found time to send the radio message at 2:56 am: "Enemy battle fleet is steering south-east, bearing south-west. My position 10 nm behind the I. Battle Squadron." But although he had this signal repeated immediately because of its extraordinary importance, he received no confirmation of receipt from either the fleet flagship or anyone else. At around 3 o'clock "Faulknor" swiveled 16 lines to starboard in order to attack from a position in front in the passing battle. He was only followed by "Obedient", "Marvel" and "Onslaught", while "Mindful" was left behind due to a boiler failure. The 2nd Division, too, initially held out its previous course, since "Maenad", the pilot's ship, had swiveled its pipes to starboard in the opinion that there should be fire if it run into trouble. It could only follow five minutes later with "Narwhal" together with the 1st Division in the attack.

In the meantime, "Faulknor" and the three destroyers that followed him had immediately sighted the enemy on port side again after the turn, which, as could now be clearly seen, consisted of 5 or 6 battleships of the "Kaiser" and "Deutschland" classes. The conditions for the attack, both in terms of the position of the flotilla and the lighting, were nothing short of excellent. On the one hand, it was already too bright for the ships to use the searchlights with any benefit; on the other hand, it was dark and hazy enough to allow the destroyers to launch a surprise attack. In addition, what the British were not aware of was that at the time German boats were also about to join their own line from starboard and port. In particular, the attention of the German top ships at the time was strongly diverted to the boats of the IX and V Flotilla approaching from the west, with which identification signals were exchanged. "König", the final ship of the III. Squadron, enemy destroyers sighted on port side for a moment at 2:47 a.m. and taken under fire, but these had quickly disappeared again in the haze, turning at full speed.<sup>415</sup>


Page 395      3:00 a.m.      Attack of the XII. Destroyer Flotilla.

But when "Margrave", Kapitän zur See Seiferling, standing further ahead, just after 3 o'clock on the port side astern, again spotted torpedo boats, the ship hesitated, if in doubt whether it was own or enemy ones, to open fire before the detection signal had been answered. Even "Kronprinz", the man behind, Kapitän zur See Feldt, could not yet clearly identify the boats as enemy destroyers up to 16 hm there were about six destroyers (four chimneys), which attacked tightly ranked at the highest speed in the keel line. "Großer Kurfürst" turns 6 lines to starboard and takes the second, third and fifth destroyer under fire. For "König" and "Deutschland", Kapitän zur See, Meurer, they are difficult to see in the smoke of the man in front, but they too turn away and start firing, too late, of course, to stop the attack in time. "Faulknor" has already fired a torpedo on the second and one on the third ship of the line. At 3:05 am, "Obedient" also fired a torpedo at a ship of the "Kaiser" class, while the destroyers were already hit with covering salvos. Between 3:05 am and 3:08 am, "Marvel" and "Onslow" each fire four torpedoes, some of which are, however, still set to the short night range. At the same time, "Mindful", still emerging, has also sighted the enemy, turns to attack, but then has to turn off before a torpedo shot has fallen so as not to get in the way of the destroyers running towards him at full speed. The latter observed at 3:10 a.m. how a torpedo detonated between the funnels of an enemy ship, which can be clearly seen in the flash of the explosion. At this moment, "Obedient" fires a second torpedo against an older ship of the line. Then all destroyers turn away under the protection of a thick smoke curtain.

Meanwhile the torpedoes had reached the German line. At "Großer Kurfürst" one runs past the bow, behind "Kronprinz" a second detonates in the wake about 100 m behind the stern. On "Markgraf", two torpedo trajectories are also observed in the directional telescope. The ship turns away, a torpedo runs about 30 m past it, another without detonating, passes under the ship and at 3:07 a.m. "Hessen", Kapitän zur See Bartels, at the same time opening fire, has to avoid a torpedo (Text sketch 15). At 3:10 am, however, "Pommern", Kapitän zur See Bölken, was hit by one or two torpedoes. Immediately afterwards, a series of individual detonations in quick succession occur on the ship, each time accompanied by the rising of high clouds of smoke.<sup>416</sup>

Text sketch 15.

Textskizze 15.



Angriff der XII. Zerstörerflottille (3.10–3.40 Uhr Vm. 1. Juni 1916).

Attack of the XII. Destroyer Flotilla (3:10-3:40 a.m. on June 1, 1916).<sup>417</sup>

Page 397      3:10 a.m.      Fall of the "Pomerania".

Apparently, as a result of the hits, part of the ship's own ammunition had exploded. Then flames spread from starboard across the entire ship, reaching up to mast height. "Pommern" breaks apart in the middle, ship debris whirls through the air, and when "Hannover", veering to starboard, passes the still floating stern of the ship, it too capsizes, so that the screws and rudder can be seen high in the air for a moment.

While "Hannover" is still evading, a torpedo suddenly runs towards the ship from port and passes close behind the stern. "Hanover" immediately turns to starboard with three "extreme force" and one or two minutes later feels a violent shock, as if a submarine had been overrun. Some of the ships behind the "Pommern" still believed that the sinking of the same was due to a mine or a submarine hit, as well as "Nassau", then "Schlesien" and "Schleswig-Holstein" on port side in the smoke and haze see the outlines of three or four destroyers, which are immediately put under fire, but quickly disappear. Recognizing the danger in good time, all ships turn eight lines to starboard, but already at "Nassau" one torpedo is already running close to the bow, another past the stern, the third and fourth torpedo that the ship would have had that night can be dangerous. "Schlesien", Kapitän zur See Friedrich Behncke, also had to avoid a torpedo and only when "Schleswig-Holstein", Kapitän zur See Varrentrapp, maintaining course, opened fire at 3:12 at 15 hm., did these destroyers turn away. But already the second volley fired at 10 hm is apparently with three hits in the last destroyer, which immediately starts to burn. Then all the boats disappear into the smoke of the ships blowing towards them.

In fact, around this time a shell hit the destroyer "Onslaught", smashed the chart house and the front bridge, killed the chief officer with other men, fatally wounded the commander, set ammunition on fire and destroyed almost all navigation equipment on the ship. Nevertheless it found connection to the destroyer "Mindful", and at 3:20 o'clock the division swung back to port on a south course to keep touch, but soon lost it because it believed it was being pursued by cruisers and turned away again in front of them. About 10 minutes after "Faulknor", "Maenad" and "Narwhal" were also approaching the attack and fired one or two torpedoes each at about 27 hm at around 3:20 am, whereupon "Maenad" was not satisfied with the success, although he believed he had observed a hit, turned up again, swung the tubes to starboard and fired his last two torpedoes at 37 hm.<sup>418</sup>

But these also went wrong, although the destroyer believed he had seen another huge explosion on the fourth ship of the German line.

It is difficult to say where the other destroyers remained during the attack of the 1st Division; at any rate none of the torpedoes had been fired by any of them. Apparently they had turned off prematurely in the increasingly violent defensive fire, believed they were being followed by individual German ships, and very soon contact between the "Marksman", the leader of the 3rd Division, and the destroyers behind him was broken.

In the meantime, however, the gunfire had also lured the cruiser "Champion" with the destroyers "Obdurate" and "Moresby", which was about 3 nm further to the east. These forces were therefore swiveled on a west course at 3:15 am, encountered "Marksman" and "Maenad" and turned back on a south course with these destroyers at 3:25 am. At that moment ships were clearly visible in the south, whereupon "Marksman" asked "Champion" whether he thought they were German or British. The answer was: "I think Germans", and for a while "Champion" kept walking towards them, but suddenly turned sharply to the east at 3:34 o'clock for no apparent reason. Only the last destroyer "Moresby", Lieutenant Alison, did not participate in this movement. At 3:35 a.m. he suddenly saw four large ships on a south-easterly course in the haze, which he took to be older ships of the line, gave a signal that the enemy was in the west and at the same time turned with the hard-port rudder to attack in the run-up. At 3:37 a.m., he fired a high-speed torpedo against the German ship. Immediately afterwards, "Schleswig-Holstein" spotted a few enemy destroyers on port side, but they turned before they could be taken under fire, and at 3:42 o'clock "von der Tann" avoided a torpedo, while "Moresby" was convinced having hit, returned to "Champion" (text sketch 15).

In the meantime, an incident had occurred at the top of Germany for which it is difficult to find an explanation. The cause of the fighting at the end of the line had not been apparent to the top squadron, as it did not see any destroyers itself. It had therefore maintained the previous course, with group "V 2", "V 4", "V 6" of the V Flotilla under Kapitänleutnant Hoefer just steaming up on the starboard side.<sup>419</sup>



He was standing about 200 m abeam between "Westphalia" and "Rhineland" when at 3:15 am, only five minutes after the explosion on "Pommern", suddenly on "V 4", Kapitänleutnant Barop, a violent detonation occurred. The foredeck was completely torn off up to the aft edge of the forecastle and immediately reappeared for a short time behind the stern of the boat. Since no enemy vehicle was sighted in the vicinity at the time, it was believed that the detonation could only be attributed to the fact that the boat had run into a mine or hit a submarine. "V2" immediately went alongside the stern of the sinking boat, which protruded high out of the water, and together with "V 6" took off the survivors and the wounded, a task that was not easy in the rough sea. 17 men were killed, 2 seriously wounded. Since at the same time the II. Squadron on port aft of the enemy forces opened fire, the still floating wreck was brought to sink by artillery fire and a torpedo fired by "V 6". It is still doubtful whether the first explosion on "V 4" was caused by a torpedo that happened to be drifting in the water, a mine or the detonation of one of the ship's own torpedoes. Only so much can be said with any degree of certainty that it was not due to a direct success of the attack by the XII. Flotilla. Moreover, this attack had shown what the other British flotillas could have achieved if they were led just as skillfully as the XII, attacked not in the run-up, but in the passing battle.

Admiral Jellicoe's hopes that the destroyer flotillas would operate at night could not, of course, be fulfilled by this attack either. Far from breaking up the German fleet or pushing it westward, they had not been able to prevent it from breaking through in the direction of Horns Reef, and were instead scattered in all directions. Although Captain Stirling, the Chief of the XII. Flotilla, while the attack was still attempting at 2:56 a.m. to notify the fleet chief by sending an urgent radio message that he had encountered enemy battleships 10 nm behind the 1st battle squadron (1), and reported soon after that he would attack and that the German ships had turned on SSW, but although these radio messages were given twice in succession for safety reasons, thanks to the good disruption work of the German FT stations, none of these important signals reached a ship other than "Marksman", let alone the British naval flagship.

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1) In reality, the distance between the leader ship "Faulknor" and its own battle fleet when this radio message was given was about 25 nm.<sup>420</sup>

But even if Admiral Jellicoe had received the reports from the XII Flotilla, this could not have changed the course of events, since the last chance to cut off the German fleet at Horns-Riff had now been missed. However, the British fleet commander did not yet know that the latter had already made the breakthrough there; rather, after everything he had learned so far, and without knowledge of the movements of the German fleet since 12:30 a.m., he had to assume that it was behind the British steering south. He had not received any reports from his cruisers and destroyers, or from the Admiralty about further observations of German radio messages, which would have been suitable to clear up the error in which he found himself. On the contrary, he still suspected that the German squadrons would definitely have to come into view soon after light. So at 3 a.m. he decided, if nothing of the enemy was seen for the next half hour, to turn around and run towards them on a north course. As a result, at 3:15 a.m. he gave an order by radio that the squadrons should go on the opposite course at 3:30 a.m. and then steer north in the Skirmish line. If Admiral Jellicoe believed that the German fleet was still north of the British at the time, Admiral Beatty took a different view. He had seen nothing of the night fighting in the rear of the British fleet. When the daytime battle was broken off, however, the German armed forces had stood west of the British battlecruisers. As a result, the leader of the latter now saw the main danger in the fact that the German fleet might succeed in gaining the domestic ports west and south around the battlecruisers at dawn. In order to prevent this, he was about to ask the high command whether he could investigate the SW when it got light, when at 3:22 a.m. he received the order to turn north and join the battle fleet. One guess was as inaccurate as the other.

The boldest decision of the German naval commander, however, to break through to Horns-Riff regardless of any armed forces standing between him and his marching goal, had not been taken into the circle of their calculations by any of the British leaders. While the latter assumed the German fleet was still in the north, west or south-west of the British, the former was actually at 3:30 a.m. only 16 nm west of Horns-Riff-Lightship, about 30 nm north-east of "Iron Duke". (Map 35.) On the other hand, the Admiral Burney's liner division, which was no less than 12 nm behind the other columns due to the reduced cruising speed of the "Marlborough" during the night, steered only 15 nm south-east of the German vanguard to the south.<sup>421</sup>

However, the remaining columns of the fleet had only noticed that this division was lagging behind at daybreak, after "Marlborough" had reported by radio at 2:56 am that the ship had to go 12 nm while the other ships in the division, "Revenge" , "Hercules" and "Agincourt" continued the march at 17 nm. At 3:39 am, however, according to the order that had been issued in the meantime, the bulk of the battle fleet, consisting of the II. and IV. Battle Squadrons and the 5th Division under the command of "King George V", swiveled northwards. At 3:44 a.m., the 5th Battle Squadron, a few miles north of the top ship of the fleet, also turned north, then the battle cruiser formation, which was about 15 nm WSW of the fleet, also took up this movement and finally at 3.55 h the three ships of the 6th Division that remained behind also turned on the opposite course again.

In the meantime, behind "Marlborough" at dawn, the cruiser "Fearless" had come into view, which had lost contact with the I Destroyer Flotilla due to insufficient speed during the day's battle, took Admiral Burney with his staff on board and brought it to "Revenge", so that the latter could take over the command of his division again from this ship at 4.35 o'clock. Immediately afterwards came the "Faulknor", the ship of the XII. Flotilla, with the destroyers "Obedient" and "Marvel" to these ships. Then Admiral Burney sent the cruiser "Fearless" back to the "Marlborough" on the orders of the fleet chief to accompany the latter to Rosyth or the Tyne, while he himself sought connection to the fleet with the rest of his division. Almost worse, however, was that, with the exception of the IV Light Cruiser Squadron, none of the cruisers and destroyers had yet reconnected with the fleet. When it got light, Admiral Jellicoe, to his unpleasant surprise, found himself deprived not only of an entire battleship division, but also of cruiser reconnaissance and destroyer security, and the latter in an area that he believed was completely dominated by German submarines. So even if during the march to the south he had intended to head for Horns Reef when it was light, if nothing had been seen by the enemy by then, he no longer considered himself strong enough to do so, but decided to go to the at least to remain on the north course until the previously missing armed forces, especially the destroyer flotillas, had rejoined.<sup>422</sup>

At the time, it was by no means clear to him that this decision meant the complete renunciation of the German fleet to fight again, but rather he still hoped to stand between this and its base. At any moment he expected to meet the enemy again. In spite of the danger of submarines and the lack of any destroyer protection, he had the squadrons march in a long keel line in order to be prepared against a surprising appearance of the German fleet with the limited visibility of only 3-4 nm. But neither of these appeared, nor did his own battle cruisers, the ships of the 6th Division, or cruisers and destroyer flotillas come into view (1).

For a while there had been hope that now at least Commodore Tyrwhitt would join the fleet with the "Harwich" forces and thus remedy the sudden shortage of destroyers and cruisers in the latter. However, he was still anchored in Harwich, very much against his will, since the Admiralty, not sure whether all German ocean-going forces had actually taken part in the battle, wanted to keep some reserves in hand, in the event that during the Battle other German forces would advance towards the Channel. But even if the Admiralty, less cautiously, had allowed the "Harwich" armed forces to sail the previous evening on the signal that a battle was imminent, this would no longer have had any influence on the course of events. Even in this case the cruisers and destroyers of Tyrwhitt would not have arrived before 6 a.m. at the battle fleet, if otherwise they did not want to exhaust their fuel supply prematurely by cruising too fast.

Meanwhile, minutes after minutes had passed for the British fleet commander after the squadron had turned on a north course without a signal about the location and movements of the German armed forces freeing him from the paralyzing uncertainty that oppressed him. In the increasing lack of visibility, the prospect of encountering the German fleet diminished, and finally nothing seemed to be left but perhaps to intercept one or the other wrecked ship of the enemy. A clue for this was given by a radio message from the Admiralty, which was delivered at 2:48 a.m. but only arrived at 4:00 a.m., according to which a wrecked German ship, probably "Lützow", should have been at 11 o'clock in the evening at 56° 26' N, 5° 41' East, heading south, 7 nm drive.

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1) The gathering of the British armed forces was made even more difficult by the increasing number of navigation errors. For example, "Hercules" determined by observing the sun that the difference between the plotted and the true ship location was almost 30 nm. See. Schoultz, With the "Grand Fleet" in the World War, page 191.<sup>423</sup>

Admiral Jellicoe therefore now ordered that this lookout be kept sharp. But he was only chasing after a phantom, as "Lützow" had meanwhile been abandoned and sunk by his crew about 60 nm NW of Horns-Riff. (Map 35.) At midnight there was still hope of bringing the heavily damaged battle cruiser into port, but gradually the pressure of the large masses of water that had penetrated the shot-down forecastle turned out to be too powerful for the heavily stressed bulkheads to withstand any longer. At 1 o'clock the bilge pumps were no longer able to keep the water away from the electrical machines in the foredeck. The crew had to work with emergency lighting. Soon afterwards the water washed around the foremost turret and penetrated into the foremost boiler room. A final attempt to steer the ship over the stern to relieve the bulkheads had to be given up when the propellers rose out of the water and the bow received a draft of 17 m. When there was finally, as far as a calculation was still possible, about 8000 t of water in the ship and it could overturn at any moment, the commander, Kapitän zur See Harder, decided with a heavy heart to leave the ship with the crew at 2:20 a.m. to save at least this. The machine received the order to "fire out", the crew stepped up on the quarterdeck, the torpedo boats "G 37", "G 38", "G 40" and "V 45", Kapitänleutnants v. Trotha, Metger, Beitzen and Lassmann, who had accompanied the ship since the day's battle broke off, came alongside. Then, after three cheers for His Majesty the Kaiser and "Lützow", the crew left in exemplary order and calm, the wounded first, the ship sinking. At 2:45 am it was already in the water up to the bridge, then two torpedoes fired by "G 38" on the orders of the commander of the "Lützow" gave her the end and two minutes later she had disappeared into the water. Immediately afterwards the torpedo boats, overcrowded with people, began the march to Horns-Reef. If anything could comfort the commander about the loss of his ship, it was, as he stated in the report, "the evidence of military virtue of the men under his command, which left in his heart the indelible pride of being able to lead them".

Amazingly, the "Wiesbaden", which was completely shot up wreck, was still able to hold on to the battlefield of the daytime battle.<sup>424</sup>

But now, almost at the same time as "Lützow", this ship slowly lay on its side and sank quickly into the depths. Only one man, the chief heater Zenne, survived the sinking of the unfortunate ship.

On the other hand, the crews of "Elbing" and "Rostock" continued to fight with the utmost effort to maintain the buoyancy of their ships and, if possible, to bring them to safety. Hit by the ram of the "Posen", "Elbing", Kapitän zur See, Madlung, had been lying about 30 nm south of the later sinking point of the "Lützow" since 12:30 a.m. The engine rooms were full of water and there was no way to get the turbines going again. When, therefore, soon after 2 a.m. "S 53", Kapitänleutnant Götting, came alongside, the commandant let the entire crew disembark with the exception of the chief officer, the torpedo officer, an explosive group and a cutter crew. At 2:25 am, "S 53", which already had nine prisoners from English destroyers on board, cast off the "Elbing" with 477 men and headed for the Danish coast at full speed. Meanwhile, Kapitän zur See Madlung and the people who remained on board made the greatest efforts to bring his ship under land after an emergency sail was raised, taking advantage of the favorable wind, where he hoped for further help from the local bases. At about 3 o'clock, however, he sighted a number of enemy destroyers in the south and gave the order to blow up the cruiser. At the time, the destroyer "Sparrowhawk", which was already sinking, was very close by and witnessed the sinking of the German cruiser. But other British ships could not have been far away either, because no sooner had Kapitän zur See Madlung left the sinking "Elbing" with the rest of the crew in the cutter than a cruiser or destroyer steaming up behind it fired several salvos on the ship. Then the cutter fished the completely exhausted doctor of the "Tipperary" out of the water. 100 m further on, the cutter came into an area in which around 100 English seafarers, some from a raft and some floating in the water, shouted loudly for help. It was the survivors of the "Tipperary", which only sank at 2:45 am. Although Kapitän zur See Madlung put himself and his people in great danger, he immediately set down a torch-fire to draw the attention of the British ship previously sighted to the people floating in the water. Five hours later, the crew of the German cutter was taken on board by a Dutch fish steamer, "Ijmuiden 125", and brought to Holland.<sup>425</sup>

Only "Rostock", Kapitän zur See Otto Feldmann, with Kommodore Michelsen, the first leader of the torpedo boat forces, was able to hold on longer than "Elbing" and "Lützow". After the ship had received a torpedo hit at 12:50 a.m., the commander had intended to head for the German Bight on a south course at a distance of about 50 nm west of Horns-Reef, but after a while the turbines had to cease to function because of the severe salinization of the stoppage of the boiler feed water. However, it was possible to get this going again and at times to make a speed of up to 10 nm in tow from "S54", which had stayed with "Rostock". At 3:25 am, "V 71" and "V 73", Oberleutnant zur See Ulrich and Kapitänleutnant Delbrück, who had meanwhile been dispatched to help by Kommodore Heinrich, joined this ship and secured the tow against destroyers and submarines.

Meanwhile, another torpedo boat, "S 32", Kapitänleutnant Froehlich, which had received two shell hits in the same battle as "Rostock" and was moving slowly, often stopping, sought shelter on an easterly course under land, at 1:45 a.m., sighted a cruiser from the "Aurora" -Type and several English destroyers at 2:55 a.m., but was able to evade them against all expectations and reached at around 4 a.m. the area 40 nm west of Lyngvig.

In contrast, the "G 40", "G 38", "G 37" and "V 45", with the crew of the "Lützow" on board, had to fight twice more. At 3:20 a.m. they first sighted two English destroyers 35 nm north-west of Horns-Riff-Lightship in the twilight, which came into view starboard ahead in SSE at high speed on a westerly course. It was probably the same ones that "S 32" had previously sighted, namely "Garland" and "Contest", who were looking for the other destroyers of the IV Flotilla. Although the German boats were severely hindered in the use of their weapons by the numerous crews of the "Lützow" (1), the leader of the same, Kapitänleutnant Richard Beitzen, decided to attack immediately and to destroy the destroyers with flat torpedo shots and unexpected rapid fire. The destroyers emigrated so quickly, although he turned immediately, that only "V45", Kapitänleutnant Laßmann, was able to fire a torpedo at 3:30 am at 30 hm, while at 12 to 40 hm at a passing speed of 60 kn. a lively artillery battle ensued, in the course of which the destroyers turned and quickly came out of sight.

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1) "G40" had 260 men, including 30 wounded, "G 38" the commander, 15 officers and 50 men, including 12 seriously wounded, "G 37" 500 men, "V 45" 215 men from the "Lützow".<sup>426</sup>



It was already light when the German boats at 4:20 a.m. 15 nm north-west of Horns-Riff 4 line to starboard again sighted enemy forces, this time an English cruiser and four destroyers, which were approaching on the opposite course in the keel line. It was "Champion", the cruiser of the XIII. Flotilla, followed by the destroyers "Obdurate", "Maenad", "Marksman" and "Moresby", which, in accordance with the movements of the British battle fleet, had turned around soon after the last attack from "Moresby" and headed north. Behind these believed "G37", Kapitänleutnant Wolf v. Trotha, seven to eight battleships to be recognized for a short time. The situation was now critical for the German boats. From S to SE the way was blocked by the enemy forces. But if the boats turned to NE to NW, they soon fell victim to the superior speed and numerical superiority of the enemy. For Kapitänleutnant Beitzen there was again only one decision: to forestall the enemy, who was now only 40 hm away, with a ruthless attack and thus fight their way to Horns-Riff. This was successful. As soon as the boats were turned under lively rapid fire, "G 40" and "V 45" each fired one or two torpedoes at 25-22 hm at around 4:30 a.m. and observed a large detonation on one of the destroyers when the enemy turned away and later did not dare to pursue them. "G 40" had also received a hit, namely in the rear turbine, but despite the great danger of steam, it was still able to travel 26 nm for 10 minutes until it had to stop and allow one of the other boats to tow it. A 1.5 m wide leak caused by the hit could be brought out of the water by heeling the boat to port and sealed. As a result of the swell, however, the tow broke seven times before the local waters were reached.

Even "Rostock" believed that it could still reach the port towed by "S54" when at 4:55 a.m. to the SW about 80 hm from two enemy small cruisers were sighted. Although these steamed off again very soon, the German cruiser received almost at the same time a message from the airship "L 11", according to which an enemy squadron was approaching the square in the middle of which was "Rostock". This sealed the fate of this ship as well. In order not to let the crew get captured or to sacrifice in a hopeless fight, Kommodore Michelsen called the torpedo boats alongside. It was possible to deceive the enemy with smoke curtains and the delivery of the English identification signal until all the people had stepped onto the torpedo boats and the prepared demolition of the ship could be carried out.<sup>427</sup>

Then "V71" and "V 73" fired torpedoes one after the other at the cruiser, which sank at 5.25 am, in order to accelerate the sinking, and both boats were able to evade pursuit in the direction of the German coast before the enemy had even fired a shot.

What they saw of the enemy appears to have been the vanguard of the British fleet. Shortly before, the latter's hopes of meeting German armed forces had been revived when around 4:40 a.m. in WSW the rapidly increasing thunder of cannons was heard. At first it was believed that this could have no other meaning than that Admiral Beatty, who had to stand in that direction with the battlecruisers, had again encountered the enemy. At 4:42 a.m., Admiral Jellicoe swiveled the battle fleet sharply in divisional columns towards the thunder of cannons, ready to resume the battle if the opportunity presented itself. However, he was faced with a new disappointment, because very soon it turned out that the gunfire had only been aimed at one airship, that of "Indomitable" and the ships of the III. Light Cruiser Squadron had been shot at and pushed aside. As a result, Admiral Jellicoe turned the battle fleet back on the previous course at 4:52 a.m. At the same time, the airship came into view of the battle fleet and was put under fire by almost all ships for about three minutes, only to disappear again in the clouds, apparently without being damaged.

It was now certain that Admiral Scheer would immediately find out from the airship the location and course of the British battle fleet, while the latter remained unclear about that of the German fleet. Although Captain Stirling was now with some destroyers of the XII. Flotilla joined Admiral Burney's division of the liner and reported that he was at 3 a.m. successfully attacked part of the German battle fleet, namely six "Kaiser" ships and three cruisers, and last saw it on a south-east course. The fleet chief himself was not yet in possession of this report when a radio message from the Admiralty at 5:15 a.m. shed light on the situation. This had already been sent at 4:29 am, but was only picked up by "Iron Duke" at 4:45 am, and contained the supposedly completely unexpected and astonishing message that the German main body at 3:30 am was still 17 nm away from Horns-Riff, course SE by S, journey 16 nm. With that, Admiral Jellicoe's last hope of getting back to the enemy disappeared.<sup>428</sup>

Unaware of this important news, Admiral Beatty still clung to his previous view that the German armed forces should be sought in the west or south-west. He therefore believed that the northern course of the British fleet would lead nowhere (1).

At 4:05 a.m., he asked again for permission to investigate in a south-westerly direction by means of a radio message that was disturbed several times by the German side (2). With the better knowledge of the situation which the Admiralty's announcement had given him, however, the British fleet chief could not agree to this proposal. But even when Admiral Beatty must have received the last information from the Admiralty regarding the location of the German fleet, he found it difficult to believe it and to admit that the German fleet had already made its breakthrough to Horns-Riff. So just in case he pushed the light cruisers westwards during the further march to the north in order to have them look out in that direction, and at 5:30 a.m. he was so little convinced of the change in the situation that he gave the signal to liven up the mood of his people:

"Losses yesterday were heavy on both sides. We hope to cut off and destroy the entire German fleet today. Every man has to do his best. "Lützow" is sinking and another German battle cruiser is said to have already sunk (3)."

Admiral Jellicoe could no longer share the hopes expressed here with such great certainty. Already now he recognized more clearly than the leader of the battlecruisers the bitter truth that the opportunity to revive the enormous numerical superiority of the British fleet in one surprising grab, once again, would not be missed. For the second time Admiral Scheer's bold decision to carry out what the enemy thought impossible had thrown all the calculations of the British leaders upside down. The breakthrough to Horns Reef had been successful, and the enemy had dared not follow. (Map 36.)

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1) Admiral Beatty, on the other hand, had received a radio message from the "Birmingham", according to which it had sighted enemy battlecruisers at 12:30 a.m. However, the radio message had erroneously read the same WSW instead of S, and this mistake had of course reinforced the former's idea that the British battlecruiser fleet must still stand between the enemy and his base.

2) "Lion" received the radio message from the Admiralty from "New Zealand" at 4:54 am. Beatty's radio message to Admiral Jellicoe had apparently already been set up at this time, even if it did not go off until 5:04 a.m.

3) Jutland Despatches, page 488.<sup>429</sup>

Admiral Jellicoe had learned from a radio message from the Admiralty at 4:20 that the latter had meanwhile decided to have Commodore Tyrwhitt join the fleet with 5 cruisers and 13 destroyers; but even if these had arrived at the fleet an hour earlier than they actually left port, this too would not have had any significant influence on the course of events. The British fleet commander already thought it would be pointless to maintain the skis line in view of the danger of submarines, and at 5.30 a.m. he had the squadrons march side by side in columns to form a marching formation. Now the battlecruisers were sighted from the western wing division, and at 5:40 a.m. Admiral Beatty received the signal from "Iron Duke":

"Enemy fleet has returned to the port, trying to find "Lützow"."

Taken literally, however, this latter statement prejudiced the actual course of things, because at 4 o'clock the German High Seas Forces had only been 15 nm west of Horns-Riff and were about to maneuver to the battle line, while Admiral Scheer left the incoming Messages sought to get a picture of the situation. The evening before, he had soon after 10 p.m. sent a radio message to the naval airship department that early reconnaissance was urgently required at Horns-Riff. However, this radio message probably did not reach his address due to severe interference from the English side. Korvettenkapitän Strasser had, however, taken measures without further ado and ordered that, when it got light, five airships should cross the North Sea up to the Skagerrak in the same reconnaissance and security positions as were originally planned for May 31 (1). More favorable than the day before, the weather situation allowed that according to this command "L 11", "L 13", "L 17", "L 22" and "L 24" soon after midnight and at 2:30 am also "L 13" rose. On this day, too, visibility remained so poor that the airships could again not be used to their full potential to support the naval forces. The two airships heading north, "L 24" and "L 22", saw between 1 and 2 o'clock am. 20 to 35 nm NW of Horns-Riff several headlights, gunfire and explosions, but were unable to gain insight into the tactical situation. (Map 35.) Then "L 22", Kapitänleutnant Max Dietrich, was forced to break off the reconnaissance about 70 nm WNW of Lyngvig around 3 o'clock due to strong south-westerly winds, which had already moved the airship considerably to the east, while "L 24", Kapitänleutnant Koch, had set course for the middle of the Ryvingen – Hanstholm line to cover his own fleet.

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1) See p. 215.<sup>430</sup>

While advancing to this position, the airship was shot at by several vehicles around 50 nm west of Bovbjerg at dawn at 2:38 a.m. and attacked again by numerous light forces at 3:05 a.m. Approaching in zigzag courses and looking for shelter in the clouds against excessive defensive fire at times, the airship launched a few bursts of 3 to 5 bombs of 50 kg each on vehicles that were particularly close together, but only recognized by the flash of the guns' muzzle flash. Apparently the enemy's intention was to push the airship away from the Danish coast, as it was fired at again after each emergence from the cloud cover. It therefore advanced to the Skagerrak and soon afterwards made an apparently extraordinarily important discovery. At 4 a.m. it sighted a ship formation of twelve large units and many cruisers from a height of 2200 m in Jammer Bay. (Map 36.) Approaching the S course to determine more details, the airship could only see that the formation, which had been in line abreast with cruisers advanced when it was first sighted, was now steaming at full speed to the south. At the same time, "L 24" was pushed aside by two cruisers and chased into the clouds on a NW course. While thick haze lay over the water and made recognizing the enemy armed forces difficult, the clouds in the higher layers now split up, so that "L 24" was immediately and violently fired at every attempt to get close to the enemy main body. Even fish steamer, which seemed to be lying harmlessly in front of their nets and who quickly raised the Danish flag as the airship approached, took part actively in the bombardment as soon as it had flown over them. When the cloud cover sank again to a depth of 800 m, contact with the supposed hostile main body had to be given up once and for all. In addition, the southerly wind had picked up strongly and forced them to march back. At 11 a.m. the airship was again over Tondern and landed in Hage at 6 p.m., as unfavorable wind conditions were encountered there.

To what extent the observations made by "L 24" were correct and what type of armed forces, in particular the armed forces sighted in Jammer Bay, were, has not yet been clarified. All that is admitted by the English is the statement that it may have been a convoy, but without giving any information about its composition and purpose (1).<sup>431</sup>

When Admiral Scheer, however, at 4:19 a.m. when the airship received the report that it had sighted numerous enemy forces, including twelve large units, in Jammer Bay, it had to see the solution to the riddle of where the British battle fleet would have stayed after the day's battle had ended. Now it no longer seemed strange that the German flotillas had found no opportunity to attack during the night and, to everyone's surprise, no English squadrons had come into sight of the German fleet at daybreak. Apparently the British battleships, or at least most of them, with their familiar fear of night torpedo boat attacks, had withdrawn northwards soon after dark and waited for the new day to come in the area east of Hanstholm.

Even before the report from "L 24" had arrived on the fleet flagship, Admiral Hipper had reported at 3:55 a.m. that "Derfflinger" and "von der Tann" only had two heavy artillery pieces each, "Moltke" has 1000 t of water in the ship, and "Seydlitz", which had arrived at the Horns-Riff-North buoy at 3:40 am, was also damaged. Accordingly, the 1st Reconnaissance Group was no longer an option for a serious battle and was therefore released into the port by the fleet chief, while he himself wanted to wait for the further development of the situation at Horns-Riff with the majority of the fleet. In order to immediately protect the fleet against surprises, "L 17", Kapitänleutnant Ehrlich, at the time was about 50 nm WSW to WNW of Horns-Riff, while "L 13", Kapitänleutnant of the reserve Prölß, crossed the area north and west of Terschelling, "L 11", Korvettenkapitän Victor Schütze, searched the area northwest of Heligoland for enemy forces. When it flew over Heligoland, the latter airship had seen nothing of the island in the heavy ground fog and also found frequent swaths of vapor in the higher layers, so that the visibility was limited to 2 to 4 nm. At 4 a.m. but it sighted clouds of smoke north of its course, headed for it and allegedly found 12 English capital ships with numerous light armed forces at 90 nm NW of Heligoland, heading NNE, high speed. It had come across the British battle cruiser fleet, although it overestimated the number of capital ships considerably and probably considered the armored cruisers of the 1st and 2nd cruiser squadrons to be such, in addition to the six battle cruisers. Korvettenkapitän Schütze immediately sent a radio message to the fleet chief and shadowed with his airship at an altitude of 1,100 to 1,200 m behind the armed forces that were sighted to keep in touch. (Map 36.)

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1) Corbett: Naval Operations, Volume III, page 416.<sup>432</sup>

Soon, however, he was fired at by these violently from all calibers and therefore had to make a few circles to the east. At 4:40 a.m., about 18 nm NNE from the first sighted ships, he encountered another squadron of six capital ships, also accompanied by light armed forces, which was now turning from north to west, presumably to seek connection with the other armed forces. What he saw were the final ships of the actual battle fleet. While he was now making contact, a third group came into view at 4:50 a.m., about 20 nm north of the location of the first sighted armed forces, which he estimated to be three battlecruisers and four light ships. In reality it was the ships of the line of the Admiral Burney's division, which, accompanied by "Faulknor", "Obedient" and "Marvel", had still not found connection to their own battle fleet. These swiveled around from the northeast after the airship, pushed themselves between it and the bulk of the British armed forces and, together with the latter, took "L 11" under heavy fire, so that it was at times shot at by 21 large and many smaller ships at the same time. Apparently the enemy had the airship moving at an altitude of 1,100 to 1,900 m in the glare of the rising sun almost constantly in its sights, but it could rarely see more than one formation at the same time in the fog and haze that lay over the water, while the betrayed others only by the lively muzzle flash. Even if the bombardment itself was unsuccessful, the heavy shells detonating near the airship caused such tremendous tremors that the commanding officer was finally forced to run away from the wind to NE, and at 5:20 a.m. all formations were out of sight. Although "L 11" crashed down again to 500 m at 5:35 am, it did not find a better overview in the deeper layers either, and therefore stayed out of sight of the opponent between this and its own main body. In this way the airship crossed until 7 a.m. in the Horns-Riff area, it then received a radio message from the fleet chief that the airship reconnaissance was no longer necessary and the commander's order for all airships to land.

The first report from the "L 11" about the 75 nm WSW sighted by its own main body "twelve English ships of the line and many light armed forces" reached Admiral Scheer at 4:30 am.<sup>433</sup>



Page 413      5.07 a.m.      Order to the German fleet to enter.

Shortly afterwards, "L 24" reported that the ships sighted in Jammer Bay had headed south at high speed. But the German fleet chief was of the opinion that the squadrons with which he had been in combat on the previous day had returned to the north and were identical to those reported by "L 24" at 4:19, that he was those of "L 11" sighted forces by no means believed for what they really were, namely the bulk of the British fleet. Rather, he believed that it must be new, perhaps the "Harwich" forces, which had only left the English ports on news of the battle to monitor the western exits of the German Bight. In this view, the relatively large number of twelve reported ships of the line did not make him puzzled, since type mix-ups in airship observations were very possible and also occurred several times due to the poor visibility on that day. It seemed more than questionable whether the ships reported by "L 11" would even accept a battle without prior association with the armed forces located far to the north. In any case, the appearance of these armed forces at such a great distance from the German main body could not be seen as a new challenge to the fight. In the latter itself, nothing had been sighted by the enemy at daybreak. But the weather was so invisible that the length of a squadron could hardly be overlooked. Of the fast small cruisers, only "Frankfurt", "Pillau" and "Regensburg" were still available, the aerial reconnaissance could fail at any moment in the unseen and uncertain weather. As tempting as the idea of getting to the armed forces reported by "L 11" was, for all these reasons it had to appear hopeless to actually be able to bring them into battle. The collision and its consequences would have been left to chance. But Admiral Scheer believed that he could no longer take responsibility for this without first adding ammunition and fuel and removing the most serious combat damage to his ships. Quite apart from the fact that almost all torpedo boats had fired most of their torpedoes and no longer had the necessary radius of action for an immediate second venture, at least the top ships of III. Squadron severely lost combat strength; The II. Squadron, however, with its outdated ships, was no longer allowed to be exposed to the effects of modern weapons after the experience of the battle and the night march ("Pomerania"). The German fleet chief therefore rightly refrained from further operations and ordered the II. Squadron to arrive at 4:45 a.m.<sup>434</sup>

Page 414      14. Skagerrak - Final phase. - June 1, 1916.

But he left the other armed forces, the III. Squadron and the II. Reconnaissance group as the most powerful to the enemy, the I. squadron and the IV. Reconnaissance group southeast of these, the torpedo boats for submarine protection, form anew battle line in order to be able to resume the fight at any time, in case enemy squadrons should appear at Horns Reef. What prompted him to stay longer at Horns-Riff in this formation was the fact that he had been without news from "Lützow" since 1:47 am. According to the last report, however, this ship must have been standing 70 nm northwest of Horns-Riff at the time, heading south, sailing 7 nm. Admiral Scheer didn't have to wait long for a further answer, because very soon "G 40", Kapitänleutnant Beitzen, reported in response to a request that "Lützow" had meanwhile been blown up and the crew had been rescued on torpedo boats. This removed the last reason to stay longer in an area in which the squadrons had to avoid alleged submarine attacks several times, because the claim of the battlefield itself, which is often so important in land wars, is in the Sea warfare completely irrelevant as soon as there is no longer any contact. At 5:07 am, the German fleet commander therefore gave the order to everyone: "Enter in formation", and only half an hour later he received the message that "L 11" had three enemy battlecruisers 70 nm southwest of Horns-Riff near the first sighted armed forces, and immediately afterwards sighted six more enemy capital ships. Even if caution was needed with regard to the number of reported large ships, since the airship could have seriously miscalculated in this respect given the prevailing lack of visibility, its last report undoubtedly showed that the armed forces north-west of Heligoland were considerable stronger than previously thought. The same report also revealed that the enemy ships had immediately turned on a westerly course when they sighted the airship. In this movement, however, Admiral Scheer could only see a confirmation of his previous view that the enemy would no longer accept a battle, at least before uniting with the armed forces reported in the north. Although "L 11" reported at 5:47 am that the forces he had sighted had gone north again, they then lost touch and reported that his own position was unsafe. But then the position of the enemy reported by the airship was all too uncertain to be able to fight it without extensive reconnaissance work and major operations. For this reason, the last two reports from the airship were not ready to change the German Leader's decisions.<sup>435</sup>

What Admiral Scheer had achieved was "fame enough to place him on a par with the great naval commanders of all times (1). The only hope of the British fleet to make up for the heavy losses it had suffered in the daytime battle was no longer based on the prospect of being able to renew the artillery battle, in which it had incidentally been defeated the day before, but solely on the submarine weapons of naval warfare.

The evening before, at 11:15 a.m., the mine-layer "Abdiel", Lieutenant Commander Curtis, had left the battle fleet on Admiral Jellicoe's orders, in order to advance at 31 nm on course SSE to Horns Reef-Lightship and 15 nm SW by W from Vyl-Lightship, To the west of a similar minefield that he laid out on May 4th, throwing a second hook-shaped barrier of 80 mines on the likely entry route of the German fleet, further proof of how safe Admiral Jellicoe was with Horns Reef as a marching target of the German fleet during the night. Unseen by the German armed forces, "Abdiel" reached the starting point of the barrier at 2:24 a.m. and laid it down until 3 a.m. The mines were set at 4.5 m below low tide, and only a space of about 10 nm remained free between the two barriers, so that at least there was the possibility that the German fleet would come across one of the two barriers on their return. Just as unnoticed as the English mine-layer had come, he withdrew from his area of activity and withdrew to the north with a 30 nm drive.

Almost at the same time as "Abdiel", the British submarines "E55", "E 26" and "D1" arrived at Horns-Riff. They had already left Harwich on May 30th to take waiting positions west of the Vyl lightship with distances of 8 nm from boat to boat in accordance with the British naval operation planned for May 28th. Another group, consisting of the destroyer "Talisman" and the submarines "G2", "G3", "G4" and "G5" had received orders to occupy a position on the 4th degree of longitude 80 nm NW of Borkum-Riff and had sailed there at noon on May 31. (Map 36.) When the advance of the German fleet had rendered the British plan of May 28 obsolete, it nevertheless seemed expedient to leave the orders for the submarines in place, since their positions could hardly be thought of more favorably from there to attack the incoming German fleet.

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1) Corbett: Naval Operations, Volume III, page 418.<sup>436</sup>

In doing so, however, it was overlooked that the order, originally intended for completely different purposes, contained the instruction that the submarines set up at Vyl-Feuerschiff should not show themselves until June 2nd, but should hold on the ground, and, having received no news of the sudden change in the situation, they acted according to the first directive. In addition, "E55" had already been pushed underwater at Horns-Riff around midnight by a low-moving airship and had preferred to remain there on the bottom. So it happened that the German fleet now drove over the positions of the submarines without them making the slightest attempt to attack. However, the idea that enemy submarines would have to be deployed in this area was so obvious that several of the German ships between Horns-Riff and Vyl-Feuerschiff believed that they were attacked several times by submarines, a concern of which the one shortly before took place and had contributed significantly to the sinking of "V4", which was traced back to a submarine attack. For a time the defensive fire of the II. Squadron against alleged submarines became so violent that individual cruisers of the IV. Reconnaissance Group, which now approached it from the east, believed themselves to be endangered and the fleet chief had to order the cessation of fire.

The guns had hardly stopped when the fleet approached the barriers laid out by "Abdiel" on May 4th. Minesweeping divisions that ran towards the squadrons had not reported anything suspicious. Individual, apparently floating mines that were sighted were so commonplace in this area that they could not be taken as a warning either. The cruisers of the IV. Reconnaissance Group and seven ships of the line from the I. Squadron had already passed the barrier, while the "Derfflinger" and "von der Tann" were steaming up on port side to catch up with the "Moltke" standing in front of the main body at 6:20 a.m., "Ostfriesland" ran into a mine immediately in front of the fleet flagship. The lever of the same and parts of the mine vessel flew on deck, so that the detonation could not, as was first assumed, come from a submarine torpedo. However, thanks to the excellent underwater division of the ship, the effect was extremely small. It is true that the protective bunker, rampart and double floor of four compartments on the starboard side were full of water, one man was also killed, two seriously and eight slightly injured, but the torpedo bulkhead was slightly torn in only one place, kept out any dangerous water ingress, so that the ship could soon increase the speed again to 15 nm and enter under its own steam.<sup>437</sup>

On the orders of the fleet chief, the ships behind "Ostfriesland" held their course and escaped any danger due to the small number of enemy mines, of which only ten came within 1 nm.

At 9:45 am, Commodore Heinrich turned around and came across with the cruiser "Regensburg" and three boats of the IX. Flotilla headed for the Graa Dyb lightship to pick up the "G 40" and the other boats that the "Lützow" crew had on board. At the same time, the chief of the 1st Half Flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Conrad Albrecht, went with "G 39", "V 73" and "V 88" through the Nordmands-Tief to Lyngvig in order to haul in "S 32", which was anchored there unable to maneuver. In the course of the afternoon it was possible to pick up all the boats and start the march back with them.

Around 7 a.m. also had "Seydlitz", Kapitän zur See v. Egidy, reconnected with the rest of the ships in the fleet. But even approaching the coast had not been easy for this battle cruiser. As a result of the large masses of water that had penetrated the forecastle, the loss of voyage was difficult to estimate, and the nautical charts were partly lost, partly damaged or illegible due to the blood of the wounded in the command post. The reserve maps, like one of the gyrocompass systems, were in rooms that were full of water. The other gyrocompass system had also suffered from moisture. With this restriction of all important means of navigation, it was not surprising that the battle cruiser missed the controlled lightship and instead at 3:40 a.m. ran aground east of the north buoy of Horns Reef. Fortunately, however, the ship came back into deep water by hitting the screws backwards and now, secured by six boats of the VII Flotilla, headed west and then, rounding the lightship, after the main body, which was sighted at 6:40 a.m. If the battle cruiser had been able to keep going well even at high speeds, the speed now had to be reduced to 10 and finally to 7 nm in order to relieve the heavily used bulkheads of the forecastle. Although the ship already had a draft of 13 m ahead, so that the forecastle was under water, he managed to pilot the shallow Amrum bank from the cruiser "Pillau", Fregattenkapitän Mommsen, and secured it against submarines by five minesweepers -Through this still to pass. But then it got stuck again at 10 a.m. abeam Hörnum and was only able to continue its voyage after the aft rooms had counter-flooded.<sup>438</sup>

At 3:30 p.m. the situation became critical. The forecasle was only floating on the torpedo broadside, and the list to port had also increased considerably. The ship had to be steered via the stern post, a tow attempt by the "Pillau" failed, and soon the ship was also very troubled by high seas with southwest winds up to strength 8. As a result, "Seydlitz", supported by two pump steamers, was only able to reach the Jade on June 2 when it was light, and even then it still required laborious sealing work and great efforts to get the battle cruiser into the lock. The rescue of the ship was only due to the excellent seafaring achievements of the commander, Kapitän zur See v. Egidy, 1st Officer, Korvettenkapitän v. Alvensleben, and its battle-hardened crew.

While "Seydlitz" was only standing south of the Amrum Bank on June 1st, all the other armed forces in the fleet, secured by airplanes against submarines, had already reached the estuaries in the course of the afternoon. Not until arriving, however, did Admiral Scheer receive reports that revealed the full extent of the enemy losses. "S 16" reported, Kapitänleutnant Walter Loeffler, that there were two prisoners on board who claimed to be the only survivors of the battle cruiser "Indefatigable". Another torpedo boat asked whether it was already known that the battle cruiser "Queen Mary" had also sunk, and a report by Admiral Hipper revealed that a third battle cruiser must have blown up in the second part of the battle. Likewise, the annihilation of a large number of destroyers became more and more certain, while reports of own losses were kept within moderate limits. At 10:16 a.m. the Neumünster F. T. station reported that the enemy main body had started the return march about 20 nm WSW from Horns-Riff-Lightship, heading north, travel 20 nm, and at 4 p.m. Admiral Scheer sent the following radio message to his armed forces: "In proud gratitude for the safe management of the units and the indulgent work of the crews, I express my warmest appreciation to the fleet, in which I remember the camera with a particularly loyal reception, who sacrificed their blood and life for the fatherland. Germany and our Kaiser above all!"

Five ships from the I Squadron ("Posen", "Nassau", "Westfalen", "Thuringia" and "Helgoland") immediately took over the outpost service on Schillig Roads, and also from III. Squadrons anchored four ships ("Kaiser", "Kaiserin", "Prinzregent Luitpold" and "Kronprinz") ready for action outside the locks on the Jade.<sup>439</sup>

The remaining capital ships, however, entered the port to begin immediately with the coal and ammunition replenishment. Even from the III. Squadrons, which together with the battlecruisers had to bear the whole gravity of the fight, only required "König", "Großer Kurfürst" and "Margrave" a lengthy repair, while the other ships were able to repair their damage occasionally during the scheduled rest periods and without restricting their operational readiness.

The report from the Neumünster F. T. station about the withdrawal of the British main body had been correct. Already at 5:30 a.m. Admiral Jellicoe had given up the combat formation in order to search the area of the night fighting for damaged own and enemy ships, and in particular to search for "Lützow", running in broad formation to the north. The formation change had not yet been carried out when the cruiser "Dublin", which had lost contact with the squadron of Commodore Goodenough during the night and was heading north alone, reported an enemy armored cruiser with two destroyers. The location he stated was 15 nautical miles east of "Iron Duke", but was imprecise because the cruiser's navigational officer had fallen in battle with the German IV. Reconnaissance Group and the maps had been destroyed. Admiral Jellicoe was not influenced by the report either, but continued the march northwards, while Admiral Beatty, who at 6:15 am with his ships finally came within sight of the "Iron Duke", asked again with the battle cruiser to the east and south to be allowed to advance in order to intercept the ship reported by "Dublin". In his opinion it could only be "Lützow". What "Dublin" had seen, however, was in reality the cruiser "Rostock" with the boats "V71" and "V 73", which was shortly afterwards abandoned and sunk by its crew about 50 nautical miles NW of Horns-Riff. The sinking of the ship was so cleverly concealed by artificial fog that the observing British cruiser did not notice it and, when Admiral Jellicoe asked again, only reported that the sighted cruiser had apparently come out of sight at high speed in the fog. The advance of the British battlecruisers to the south-east and south was naturally in vain. At 7 a.m. Admiral Jellicoe also advanced in a south-easterly direction with the battle fleet and shortly afterwards received a message from the Admiralty that a damaged enemy cruiser, which had already been reported to him at 5:30 a.m., abandoned by his crew, still floating on the current course of the battle fleet. But even this was not seen by any of the British ships.<sup>440</sup>



Admiral Beatty then wanted to scout in the direction of Horns Reef, but received orders to join up and take up position east of the battle fleet, which had turned back north at 8:16 a.m. At that time the eastern wing column of the same, the V. Battle Squadron, was about 30 nm WNW of Horns-Riff-Feuerschiff. Fifteen minutes later, Admiral Beatty turned NNE to take the commanded position east of the battle fleet. Apparently, however, due to a difference in position, he did not hold this course long enough and so when he got at 9 a.m. also turned north, some 30 nm behind "Iron Duke" into the wake of the battle fleet. The latter was now quickly approaching the area in which the breakthrough of the German fleet had taken place the night before through the rear cover of the British, and soon oil stains, ship debris, lifebuoys and floating corpses indicated the place where the heaviest night fighting had taken place. But again only new disappointments awaited the British fleet commander, for only now did the heavy losses which the IV. Destroyer Flotilla had suffered in this area become apparent. Nearby, the destroyer "Sparrowhawk" was drifting helplessly on the tide. About an hour after the sinking of the "Elbing" he believed he was attacked by a German submarine, and the last gun that was still ready for action had been manned for defense when it turned out that the supposed submarine was a raft with the last Survivors of the "Tipperary" who could only be rescued after great efforts. Soon afterwards the cruiser "Dublin" and the destroyer "Marksman" came into view. The latter had already at 6 a.m. together with "Obdurate" the commander and 2 men of the destroyer "Ardent" were fished out of the debris field of this ship in a completely exhausted condition, while "Maenad" rescued 10 men from the crew of the "Fortune". Then "Marksman" tried to take the destroyer "Sparrowhawk" in tow, but had to give up after hours of effort because the sea was getting stronger and stronger, and finally the ship was at 9:45 am on the orders of Admiral Burney, who was now approaching with his division, sunk by gunfire. Shortly before, the fleet chief himself, after having heard of the loss of the "Tipperary" through "Marksman", passed a field of rubble with the battle fleet, in which the destroyer "Oak" discovered a lifebuoy of the "Ardent". Elsewhere, one of the armored cruiser "Black Prince" was found. The destroyer "Acasta" went in tow from "Nonsuch" to Aberdeen, "Porpoise" was accompanied by "Garland" to the Tyne, "Spitfire" also took course there, the other destroyers, however, unless lack of fuel required their immediate detachment, now joined the fleet.<sup>441</sup>

After this had re-established the connection with the battle cruiser fleet by a short hook to SSW soon after 10 a.m., everything from the capital ships was there with the exception of the VI. Division, which only joined the fleet in the evening. But now it became clear that a further stay in this area would only have to conjure up new dangers for the "Grand Fleet". At 10.17 am Admiral Jellicoe received a radio message from the Admiralty, according to which German submarines had already received orders at 7.20 am to advance into the area north of Horns-Riff in order to search for the "Elbing", and just 10 to 20 minutes after receiving this warning, "Benbow" and "Colossus" believed themselves to be attacked by submarines and caused the other ships to take evasive maneuvers as well. Admiral Jellicoe therefore decided to finally give up the search for damaged German cruisers, especially since these could have sunk in the meantime. At 11 a.m. as a result, the British battle fleet swiveled about 50 nautical miles NW from Horns Reef to the N by W course. But to ensure that none of the damaged or missing British ships were left on the battlefield, he ordered that all ships of the battle and battlecruiser fleet on their return march should search the battlefield of May 31 in wide formation. In doing so, however, they ran the risk of encountering the wrecks of the "Invincible", "Queen Mary" and "Indefatigable". As a result, Admiral Beatty thought the moment had come to report to the Commander-in-Chief of the exact places where these ships were lost, both length and breadth. The radio message with which this happened had a completely unexpected effect on the fleet flagship. It was only when the chief of the fleet asked Admiral Beatty when the latter two ships had sunk that Admiral Jellicoe had not yet heard of the loss of the "Indefatigable" and "Queen Mary" and the answer was that the former battle cruiser had sunk at 5 p.m., the latter at 5:30 p.m. the previous day, "Iron Duke" was downright devastating. The British fleet commander had not been prepared for such heavy losses, and who knows whether earlier knowledge of the sinking of these two ships might not have induced him to step up his armed forces in the daytime battle, during the night and on the morning of June 1st to make up for these losses with those of the opponent. In any case, it was a fateful failure of the leader of the British battlecruiser fleet to only now report the sinking of the two ships to his fleet chief.<sup>442</sup>

Another concern for the latter was the uncertainty about the whereabouts of the missing destroyers of the IV Flotilla, and he did not yet know whether it would be possible to bring "Marlborough", "Warspite" and "Warrior" safely into port. Although everything in the Admiralty was burning to news of the outcome of the battle, the British fleet chief limited himself to announcing at 12:08 hours that the search for wrecked German cruisers had been unsuccessful in unsightly weather, that he would continue to search for wrecked ships of his own, and that he no longer needed the "Harwich" forces, with the exception of the destroyers requested to secure the "Marlborough" against submarines.

At 12:25 hours, Admiral Jellicoe radioed the chief of the battle cruiser fleet back to the sinking of the "Queen Mary" and "Indefatigable" and asked whether this was caused by mines, torpedoes or gunfire had been brought about, whereupon he learned that both would most likely have fallen victim to the German naval artillery. Then he asked the chief of the II. Cruiser Squadron if he knew anything about "Duke of Edinburgh" and "Black Prince", whereupon he received the answer that the former armored cruiser was with the squadron, but the latter was missing. No sooner had Admiral Jellicoe received this unfortunate news than, to top it off, "Marlborough" reported (12:44 hours) that it was being attacked by enemy submarines.

While one bad news followed another in this way, the British fleet chief tried in vain to receive reliable reports of German casualties. Not until 1 p.m. to his relief, he learned from the chief of the I. Squadron that at least one flotilla, the XII, had attacked successfully during the night and, as it erroneously assumed, had sunk a German battleship. Soon afterwards, Admiral Beatty reported that on the German side, besides the "Lützow", a second battle cruiser had probably sunk, a statement which, of course, could not be upheld later either. He also had to report the loss of "Nestor", "Onslow", "Nomad" and "Turbulent" at the same time. The hope still remained that at least the V. Battle Squadron would have achieved greater successes, but this, too, was not fulfilled. When asked to do so, Rear Admiral Evan Thomas reported that although a number of hits had been scored, apparently no German ship had had to leave the line. on the other hand, apart from "Warspite", "Malaya" and probably also "Barham", they had suffered such severe damage that it was necessary to allow all ships of the V. Battle Squadron to dock with the exception of the "Valiant".<sup>443</sup>

Soon afterwards (3:05 hours) Admiral Jellicoe learned from a radio message from the "Engadine" that the armored cruiser "Warrior" had been abandoned about 160 nm east of Aberdeen.

This ship had received 15 heavy and 6 light hits in the day battle in the same section of the battle that had been fatal to the armored cruiser "Defense" and was only able to evade complete annihilation as a result of the "Warspite" intervening by chance. Then the aircraft carrier "Engadine" towed the heavily damaged armored cruiser with 100 dead and wounded on board. During the night, however, bad weather had arisen, the water rose dangerously in both engine rooms, and at 8:45 a.m. the situation had become so critical during a heavy south-westerly storm that the ship could no longer be held. One had to be satisfied that "Engadine" managed to rescue the crew, including the wounded, in spite of heavy seas and not without danger for this ship as well. Then "Engadine" set course for the Firth of Forth, while the sea was already collapsing above the upper deck of the wreckage of the "Warrior". (Map 36.) When the II. Cruiser Squadron later appeared at the point at which the former was last reported, nothing more of the ship was seen.

From 12 noon onwards, Admiral Beatty searched the battlefield between the wreck sites of the "Invincible", "Indefatigable" and "Queen Mary" with his ships on a 30 nm wide front, while the battle fleet ran west of the battlecruisers to the north, but neither "Nestor", "Onslow", "Nomad" and "Turbulent" as well as the also missing destroyer leader "Broke" were sighted, and at 5:15 pm Admiral Beatty took about 50 nm SW of Lindesnes course on the Firth of Forth, where "Valiant" already at 4:39 pm. had been detached with some destroyers. At the same time the cruiser "Canterbury" was released to Harwich. Some of the ships buried their dead at sea, then the battle fleet with "Barham" and "Malaya" set off on a NW course at 8:05 pm to finally begin the march back to Scapa.

While all the other ships in the "Grand Fleet" have been in motion since 4 a.m. farther and farther away from the German Bight, "Marlborough", which after Admiral Burney's disembarkation also initially steered N course, had at 5:30 a.m. course changed to south 38 degrees west to run south of the Dogger Bank Lock to the Tyne or to Rosyth on the orders of the Fleet Commander.<sup>444</sup>

Although the destroyer division requested by Commodore Tyrwhitt to protect the ship could not have reached this yet and although the ship without destroyer protection was particularly exposed to the danger of German submarine attacks at its reduced speed, it was left to its own devices. Admiral Jellicoe endeavored to pull the remaining ships in his fleet out of the danger zone of the German submarines as quickly as possible. The German High Seas Forces had no submarines on the day of the battle, but in the course of May 31, "U 19", "U 22", "U 46" and "U 64" were on the Ems and "U 53" ready to use in Heligoland. Originally, these should be kept clear in order to be able to counter any English hand against the German North Sea coast during the absence of the High Seas Fleet. But after it became clear in the course of the afternoon (May 31) that apparently the entire armed forces of the English "Grand Fleet" had taken part in the battle of the Skagerrak, it seemed more correct to set these submarines to the north immediately in order to have them at hand at least the next morning in the event of uncertainty about the further development of the fighting. As a result, had already reached 9:45 p.m. on May 31. Fregattenkapitän Bauer, the leader of the submarines, from his flagship "Hamburg", which was with the IV. U-Half-Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Albert Gayer, directed the following radio message to Borkum-Roadstead: "U-boats ready for use and "U 67" advance north immediately, 6 am Report location."

On the Ems, where the events at sea had been followed with tension, as far as the incoming radio messages allowed, Korvettenkapitän Gayer had already considered in the course of the afternoon that the three boats lying in Borkum-Roadstead in a 45 nm long standing line to have the line set up roughly on the longitude of the Terschelling Bank lightship in order to relocate damaged armed forces, for example to the English southern ports. The F. T order of the commander of the submarines therefore found them already ready to go, and soon afterwards they advanced at corresponding distances over a point 40 nm north of Terschelling at maximum speed to the north. In contrast, "U 53", which had only arrived in Helgoland from the Baltic Sea around noon, and "U 67", which had laid aground in the thick fog near Terschelling after seeing two enemy submarines, remained without knowledge of the order of the Leader of the submarines.<sup>445</sup>

During the night the cruiser "Arcona", which had to maintain the F. T. connection with the submarines in the sea from the Ems, received numerous reports of violent battles north of Horns-Riff. At 4.30 a.m. (June 1st) "U 46", Kapitänleutnant Hillebrand, appeared after changing a periscope from Emden back to Borkum roadstead). The commander was informed in detail about the situation by the Half-flotilla chief, in particular about the fact that new enemy forces were apparently approaching the battlefield from the south-west, and soon afterwards left the Ems in his boat to also advance north. At that time the other boats, "U 19", "U 22" and "U 64", were already in the area 45 and 70 nm north of Terschelling, according to their F. T. reports, and at 7.30 am "U 22", Kapitänleutnant Hoppe, sighted an "M" -class destroyer, which however quickly came out of sight without any other armed forces following it. (Map 36.)

In the meantime, the fleet management had asked the leader of the submarines whether such a vehicle could be sent to the wrecked "Elbing", which was supposed to be about 50 nm WNW from Horns-Riff. However, since the F. T. transmitter on "Hamburg", the flagship of the latter, was unusable at the time due to combat disruptions, Fregattenkapitän Bauer asked to send the order to the 3rd U-Half-Flotilla directly via "Arcona". This received by him around 9 a.m. and was able to pass it on to "U 19" immediately, to "U 22" and "U 64" during the day, and "U 53", Kapitänleutnant Rose, now pushed north from Heligoland to look for the "Elbing".

No sooner had these orders been given than the main deciphering station in Neumünster reported (10:15 a.m.) that a wrecked English ship was about 100 nautical miles north of Terschelling, heading WSW. It was "Marlborough". This British ship of the line had already sighted a zeppelin at 5 o'clock, but fired at it in vain and had to be prepared for further counteraction from the German coast, reported by it. At 10:30 two submarines came into view in west 8 nm, which seemed to be heading for "Marlborough" with the tower over water (1). When they dived 5 minutes later, "Marlborough" turned and at 11:50 hrs walked around 70 nm north of Terschelling on south 56° west. Around the same time, Admiral Scheer ordered the 3rd U-Boat Half-Flotilla to deploy submarines against the ship reported by Neumünster.

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1) See p. 203.

2) What "Marlborough" saw here may have been "U 64", which however did not notice the presence of the British liner.<sup>446</sup>

The most favorable for this was "U 46", Kapitänleutnant Leo Hillebrand. Assuming that this submarine would be about 20 nm south of the English ship when receiving a corresponding FT command and that the latter was traveling about 7 nm, "U 46" had to go in the direction of the south-west flat of the Dogger Bank hold ready to meet this approximately in the eastern exit of the Silver Pit. The submarine had not yet received the corresponding instruction when it spotted two vessels to starboard at 11:30 hours 65 nm north of Terschelling, one of which soon afterwards was a destroyer with 4 funnels, in reality the cruiser "Fearless", Which other than a ship of the line of the "Iron Duke" class ("Marlborough") could be made out. It lay with its starboard list forwards deep in the water and steered at a speed of 10 to 12 nautical miles on a zigzag course on a general course south-west. The 4 bow tubes were made ready immediately, and at 12 o'clock the submarine was in the firing position at a distance of 3000 m, cutting angle 70°. "Marlborough" had hardly noticed the launch of the first torpedo at an oil spill 2 nm from the ship when she turned 6 to 8 lines to starboard so that the torpedo passed about 50 m to port. After this counter maneuver, the submarine commander seemed to think that further shots were pointless, but he also considered pursuing the enemy over water with little prospect in the increasing sea from the SW, although a further decrease in speed is very possible with the serious accident of the attacked ship and the security by a single destroyer or cruiser was by no means sufficient for effective defense against a submarine attack. The enormous tension on the boat and its crew during the long waiting time at Terschelling and the resulting overexertion may have influenced this decision. "U 46" continued the march north, and so a brilliant opportunity was lost, to harm the enemy even after the battle. Not until 2:45 p.m. "Marlborough" encountered the longed-for "Harwich" armed forces and received now a submarine protection of 8 destroyers.

Half an hour after the unsuccessful attack by "U 46", the "U19" further north, Kapitänleutnant Raimund Weißbach, also sighted a small cruiser with a destroyer on a SW course (probably destroyer of the IV Flotilla) about 20 nm east of the point indicated by Neumünster, but could no longer approach. At 2 p.m. "U 46" reported his unsuccessful attack by radio message, and only now could the cruiser "Arcona" transmit the aforementioned order to pursue the ship reported by Neumünster in the direction of the south-west flat of the Dogger Bank.<sup>447</sup>



Correctly assuming that it could only be the ship that had been sighted and already attacked, Kapitänleutnant Hillebrand immediately turned after the damaged ship of the line, but looked in vain when it began to rain and increased invisibility, first on SSW, then on SW by S course to regain touch.

In the meantime, the third boat, "U 67", Kapitänleutnant Nieland, with the chief of the 4th Half Flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Prause on board, had also maneuvered in vain onto the ship reported by Neumünster. Finally, on the basis of a calculation very similar to that of the chief of the 3rd half flotilla, it had advanced towards the east entrance of the Silver Pit, but with increasing SW wind and heavy seas it advanced just as slowly as "U 46" and did not sight any enemy forces again.

In the meantime the other submarines had searched in vain for "Elbing" and the missing part of the crew of this cruiser, 50 nm WNW from Horns-Riff, where the entire British battle fleet had crossed a few hours earlier. From 7:15 in the evening, "U 22" (Hoppe) passed oil stains of miles in extent, wreckage, corpses and life buoys and finally fished one with the inscription H.M.S. "Turbulent". An attempt to contact "U 19" (Weißbach) and "U 64" (Morath) was unsuccessful. In the meantime the chief of the 3rd U-Half Flotilla had received the extremely important news that the F. T. Neumünster station had received the enemy main body at 10:47 a.m. 20 nm WSW of Horns-Riff on north course and gave orders to the submarines crossing northwest of Horns-Riff in the direction of the large fishing bank ("U 64"), the Firth of Forth ("U 22") and Peterhead ("U 19") to advance in order to perhaps still grasp the hostile main body when it is expected to turn to the west. This happened. When it got light all three boats had to give up any further action because of bad weather, which gradually made progress and the use of weapons impossible. On the march back to the Lister Tief, however, "U 64" (Morath) was at 8 p.m. (June 2) attacked by an enemy submarine 3 nm west of the Vyl lightship. One of the fired torpedoes of the English submarine passed close behind the stern, the second 5 to 10 m alongside the boat, breaking through the surface and finally going into the ground 50 m in front of the bow of the submarine and detonating. It was not until noon on June 3 that the submarines cruising NW of Horns Reef were recalled.<sup>448</sup>

All their efforts to capture the withdrawing enemy from there had remained in vain, but the hopes that had been placed in the submarines immediately in front of the enemy ports were also not fulfilled. Since enemy forces had been expected to leave the southern ports of England during the operation, Korvettenkapitän Bartenbach, the head of the Flanders submarine flotilla, was with all available boats on the night of May 30th to 31st his flotilla set sail from Zeebrugge, primarily to contaminate the exits from Harwich and the Thames at Sunk-Lightship, Inner Gabbard and Galloper-Lightship with mines on the night of June 1st, including the submarine miners "UC 10", "UC 6" and "UC 1" were intended for the Oberleutnants zur See Alfred Nitzsche, Otto Ehrentraut and Ramien. , "UB 19", "UB 12", "UB 10" and "UB 6", Oberleutnants zur See Wenninger, Herbert Pustkuchen, Kapitänleutnants Walter Gustav Becker, Oberleutnants zur See Kiel, Saltzwedel and Karl Neumann, east of Lowestoft an 18 nm long stand line occupied around the approximately in the vicinity of the coast to the north to capture escaping enemy forces (map 36). At 8 am, the boats on the eastern wing should swivel south in order to take a second stand line perpendicular to line I at boat intervals of 5 nm and thus intercept the armed forces, who, on their return from their advance, would choose a more southerly course when heading for the Thames than when sailing out. If nothing happens by 9 p.m., all boats should advance eastwards, on June 2, 7 a.m. a third, about 30 nm long standing line, across the Hoofden between the sands of Smiths-Knoll and the Maas estuary, reach and from there to 5 pm in a fourth, on the 52nd degree of latitude, run back between Orfordneß and Meuse lightship. In this way, a uniform roaming of the area likely to be touched by the enemy by submarines was to be achieved. However, in order to determine those enemy armed forces that were perhaps already at sea and were ready to flank the German naval advance, the flotilla chief had personally embarked on "UB 18" from Oberleutnant zur See Otto Steinbrinck to talk to him and "UB 23", Oberleutnant zur See Voigt, - to clear up along the Dutch coast up to Terschelling and then to the southern wing of the Stand Line III. to attach.

Only one of the submarines could not leave, as it suffered a machine breakdown while insecting it. "UC 6" (Ehrentraut) got caught in an underwater net at Inner Gabbard, but came free and, like "UC 10" (Nietzsche), laid its mines at the ordered location at midnight (31./1 VI.).<sup>449</sup>

Of the other boats, only "UB 10" (Saltzwedel) saw stronger armed forces during the course of the operation, namely on June 1 at 9 am, about 20 nm east of Southwold, eight enemy destroyers on a southeast course past the submarine. All the others, however, apart from the usual guard vehicles and sea pilots, only met a few destroyers and submarines; that was all they saw of the movements of the "Harwich" forces. An attempt to detain the Flanders boats for a further 24 hours in Stand Line III, taking into account the events that had meanwhile occurred in the North Sea, failed because the F. T. connection could not be established. When the submarines started their march back on June 2 at 5 p.m. from the IV position as planned, they had no news of any major fighting in the North Sea.

From the outset, the greater chances of attack lay with the whole complex of the enterprise in the case of the submarines of the High Seas Forces that had been at sea for some time (Map 36). Of these, however, only "U 67" (Nieland), "UB 22" (Putzier), "U 70" (Wishes) and "U 32" (from Spiegel) had taken the keyword for the planned company, while the rest of the boats were quite unprepared. On the evening of the battle, however, "UB 21" (Hashagen) was shot against a destroyer in front of the Humber at around 7 o'clock in shallow water at 1200 to 1400 m. This remained, wrapped in a large cloud of smoke, hit while the submarine, in order to avoid the nearby outpost vehicles, ran into deeper water. Soon afterwards it began to march back.

The following night observed in the area in front of the Firth of Forth "U 52" (Walther), which crossed between Longstone and St. Abbs Head, at 3:18 am (1. VI.) Two dimmed vehicles, apparently small cruisers or destroyers, which entered the mine-contaminated area after the Firth of Forth. Soon after, an incompletely picked up radio message reported a battle in the North Sea. Since the reception on the net deflector antenna was uncertain, but both catchers on the F. T. masts were broken, the submarine immediately ran north in front of the stormy sea wind and heavy swell and tried to contact "U 24" and "U 70". At 6:20 a.m. "U 24" sighted it, but it had not received any radio messages, and then went back to its area.<sup>450</sup>

In the meantime, "U 32" (from Spiegel), which was also standing in front of the Firth of Forth, had gone as far outside as possible in its field of activity in view of the severe lack of vision and the increasingly bad weather and had at 9:15 am (1. VI.) Sighted a destroyer, at which it fired a torpedo at 1200 to 1500 m, in order to achieve success at least on the last day of the enterprise, which, however, passed under the unfavorable shooting conditions.

But now the heavily damaged "Warspite" was the first of the ships returning from the battle to enter the area of activity of the submarines lying in front of the Firth of Forth (Map 36). At 10:35 a.m. this ship was still about 100 nm east of May Island and was approaching the rescue harbor without any destroyer protection when suddenly two torpedoes passed in close proximity on both sides. In the rough seas, however, no trace of a submarine could be seen anywhere. The attack had originated from "U 51", Kapitänleutnant Walther Rumpel. Although the submarine was able to be held well at depth during the same, despite high swell and heavy swell, and was soon close to 600 m, but the periscope was cut under just before the bow shot. However, both bow tubes were loosened immediately afterwards, but only one torpedo left the tube, breached the surface and betrayed the attack, because the ship of the line turned immediately and ran away at high speed on a zigzag course to the northwest. After a radio message had been issued about the incident, heavy enemy F. T. traffic began, which he suspected of increased counteraction. However, the commandant believed he was no longer able to cope with such a situation. He was also not clear about the whole meaning of this encounter, since he did not consider the ship to be the "Warspite", but rather one of the "Canopus" class and had also noticed nothing of the combat damage it had suffered. Unfortunately, in view of the high speed of the enemy, he gave up the chase prematurely, drove to a depth of 22 m the following night and began the march back on June 2nd. However, the attack was enough to alert the entire coast guard to a radio message from the "Warspite". The first destroyers of the same came into view when "Warspite" made the periscope of another submarine at 12:42, which appeared close to the bow. The ship of the line immediately went to "extreme power" to ram the boat, but the transmission of the command for the rudder angle to the control point in the engine room, which was still operational on its own, took so long that the maneuver was no longer successful. What "Warspite" had seen was "U 63", Kapitänleutnant Otto Schultze.<sup>451</sup>

On May 31st and June 1st it had looked in vain for enemy warships between May Island, North Carr lightship and Bell Rock, and after the starboard engine had failed, it was already on the march back when at 12:30 p.m. 40 nm east of the Firth of Forth, in SE two to three larger vessels traveling at high speeds on a northerly course have been spotted. During the heavy swell, which considerably restricted the overview through the periscope, the "U 63" lost the ship in front several times and then discovered a cruiser abeam with the panorama starboard (in reality probably one of the destroyers that connected to "Warspite"). Although it had already passed them, it immediately turned to attack. But now strong screw noises were heard, and with the panorama the commandant suddenly looked astern at the navigating bridge of a three-chimney cruiser (apparently a confusion with "Warspite"), which was apparently about to ram the submarine and a shot from one the bridge's gun. The distance was only 50 to 100 m. Rapidly reaching depth, the submarine ran aground at 50 m, shot immediately afterwards to 7 m depth, was briskly under fire, but could, although hunted by guard steamer and with depth charges thrown at them, ran down to a depth of 27, then 35 m in time and then continued the march back.

Meanwhile, "U 52" (Walther) had returned to its actual area of activity under the coast near Berwick. There it had to dive twice in the course of the afternoon in front of a destroyer each and finally arrived at 5:28 a.m. on the rear destroyer of a gang to attack at about 600 m. When the submarine went to a depth of 30 m after the same, there was a violent detonation. So the torpedo had hit; but at that moment the rudder jammed. "U 52" could therefore no longer go to periscope depth to determine the success, but drove in circles at a depth of 40 m. Only after four hours of work was it possible to detach the rudder from its connections, but it was no longer usable. The commandant therefore had to make up his mind to steer with the screws and start the march back via Horns-Reef.

In the meantime the commander of the submarines, Fregattenkapitän Bauer, had made every possible effort to secure the submarines on the east coast of England and Scotland, which, according to plan, were only to be available until June 1st in the evening, to hold back one day longer from the enemy ports, since in his opinion, in particular, wrecked ships were hardly to be expected before them before June 2nd. It was also to be assumed that some of them would go not to the Firth of Forth but to the Tyne to relieve the shipyards in Rosyth.<sup>452</sup>

While the German fleet was arriving on June 1, from 9 am onwards, he sent the following radio message over Bruges and Nauen, repeated several times: "As the return of damaged ships from the Skagerrak is expected, if possible, extend the layover on the east coast by one day. "U 32" and "U 24" go just as long in front of Tyne." However, this order was initially only accepted by "U 24", whereupon it immediately began the march to the Tyne. Not until 5 p.m. "U 32" (v. Spiegel) also picked up the radio message after repairing the antenna that had been torn by the sea and now also headed for the Tyne. (Map 36.)

The neighboring boat "U 70" (Wünsche) had already noticed an increasing security guard on the morning of June 1st, which extended up to 60 nm outside of May Island and forced the submarine to dive frequently so that it could not pick up any radio messages. Without knowledge of the order to remain in position one day longer, it therefore began the march back soon afterwards. So it happened that all German submarines had already left the area in front of the Firth of Forth when the British battlecruisers headed for it from the NE on the morning of June 2nd. In particular, the most important sector, which "U 32" had been occupied the day before, had become vacant as a result of this boat's departure for the Tyne. The arrival of the British battle cruiser fleet was therefore without incident. At the same time the battle fleet was approaching the area off the Pentland Firth, which from the start had only been occupied by two submarines. Of these, "U 43" (Jirst) attacked two guard steamers at 300 m on June 1, but fell below the target and left him, pursued several times by submarine hunters, just a few hours before the battle fleet approached allocated sector. This submarine, too, had learned nothing of the events in the North Sea and the order to hold out for another day. On the other hand, the second of the boats set up in front of the Pentland Firth, "U 44" (Wagenführ), had at least seen from a radio message from Bruges, which was intercepted on the evening of June 1st, that enemy forces and wrecked ships were heading for the Firth of Forth. Soon afterwards there was brisk F.T. traffic between several English cruisers and a large number of destroyers, so that it could be assumed that enemy forces would also enter Scapa Flow. Since it was to be assumed that these would pass the submarine-endangered area only after dark, "U 44" went further out on the center line of its sector in order to intercept the expected ships, if possible, in daylight.<sup>453</sup>

However, the submarine soon had to go to a depth of 20 m due to severe invisibility. The commander had intended to remain in position on June 2nd, but when it was light it became clear that the submarine could not be held at the depth of the action in the heavy swell; In the heavy swell it also proved impossible to get close to four steamers, apparently auxiliary cruisers, which were sighted at a great distance in a north-westerly direction immediately after surfacing. With a NW wind, strength 9 to 10, this submarine therefore also started the march back, initially choosing a southerly course in order to reach the connecting line Firth of Forth – Skagen and to steer it to the east. In the meantime, the British battle fleet entered the port north of the two sectors of activity designated for "U 43" and "U 44" without any counteraction.

Almost at the same time, "Marlborough" approached the Dogger Bank in front of the south-west flat with a course for the Tyne of the English coast. The evening before, the WSW wind had gradually picked up to strength 6, and the sea, which was getting rougher and rougher, had given the ship a lot of trouble. When a few leak pumps clogged up, the water in the front boiler room rose again. The situation became critical, the ship could not run more than 10 nm and had to give up the march to the Tyne in order to get under the protection of the high coast at Flamborough Head as quickly as possible and from there to the Humber. Although "UB 21" (Hashagen) and "UB 22" (Putzier) had already left this area on the evening of June 1st after being deployed for weeks, "U 46" (Hillebrand) was now approaching Flamborough Head. After its unsuccessful attack on "Marlborough" on the afternoon of June 1, it had received orders that same evening to advance there in pursuit of this ship. As a result of the bad weather, however, the advance of the submarine was delayed so significantly that at 10:25 a.m. (2. VI.) Had only reached its destination 25 nautical miles from its destination, while "Marlborough" had already passed the entrance to the Humber two hours earlier. Instead, the submarine only sighted 5 small cruisers and 9 destroyers (probably the "Harwich" forces) on a westerly course, but they passed the bow of the submarine at a high speed of 100 km, so that there was no longer a shot. At 5:30 p.m. "U 46" turned close under land and headed for the Ems.

Meanwhile "U 24" (Schneider) and "U 32" (Frhr. V. Spiegel) crossed in front of the Tyne, but without seeing vehicles other than some destroyers. As after a radio message from Bruges at 4:26 p.m. (2. VI.) Received, no more wrecked ships were to be expected in this area, "U 24" and at 9 pm "U 32" also began their march back.<sup>454</sup>



"U 66" (v. Bothmer) and "U 70" (Wünsche) had also made another effort on that day to attack enemy forces returning from the battle. It is true that "U 66" also left his self-chosen waiting position in front of the Cromarty Firth on June 1st at 10 pm in order to be at Horns-Riff-Lightship the following day before dark, but that same night, at 3 am, it received a radio message, first from the fleet, later repeated from Bruges, that, according to certain reports, damaged enemy ships were returning to the Firth of Forth and Humber. It also picked up a radio message to the Flemish submarine flotilla, according to which the boats of the same should stay at sea 24 hours longer and await wrecked English ships. It was only from these two radio messages that the commander saw that an English naval operation, as he believed, must have taken place in the southern part of the North Sea. He was already on the march there when he received a radio message from the cruiser "Arcona" that wrecked ships were to be expected from the direction of the southern Skagerrak. Thereupon he decided to run towards them in front of the sea on the Firth of Forth – Skagerrak line. The intention was reported to the commander of the submarines by radio message, but was not approved by him. After the enemy radio messages intercepted on June 1 and in the meantime passed on to the submarines, several wrecked ships had set course for Rosyth, others for the Humber. A search of the eastern North Sea therefore seemed pointless. However, if the speed of some of the wrecked ships was only estimated at 4 nm and if further delays due to the bad weather were not ruled out, then on the evening of June 3 and even on the following day there were still opportunities for attack off the Firth of Forth. "U 66" therefore received orders, if at all possible, to patrol this area until the evening of June 4th. However, it was no longer possible to carry out this order, because very soon it emerged from further radio messages that the fleet management no longer reckoned with the possibility that damaged ships could still be encountered. The commander of "U 66" then broke off the operation. "U 70" (wishes) was already on the march back when it was on June 2nd at 7.30 am received the radio message that the submarines should, if possible, stay in position for another day.<sup>455</sup>

In a very similar attitude to the commander of "U 66", however, Kapitänleutnant Wünsche refrained from carrying out this order, since in heavy seas he would not have reached his old area of activity in time and because of the strong counteraction and short range of vision promised fewer chances of success than if he remained further out at sea and crossed on a baseline across the presumed return march of the enemy. The storm subsided in the course of the afternoon. But when nothing was in sight until 11 o'clock in the evening, "U 70" also continued the march back.

The longest, however, without any news about the events that have occurred, held out "U 47" (Metzger) at his position at Peterhead. There it saw a destroyer with 4 funnels at NW, strength 9, on June 2nd, but had to break off the attack because a flat torpedo had no chance of hitting in the prevailing swell. At 10 p.m. therefore, this submarine also left its area of activity in accordance with the order received on departure and entered the Ems on June 4. The majority of the submarines had already reached their home bases the day before. On the last part of the march back they had only met a few destroyers and submarines.

On June 1st, only "U 75", Lieutenant Curt Beitzen, stood on the battlefield at the same time as the "Grand Fleet". This boat returned from its mining operation west of the Orkney Islands at 8 p.m. on May 31st. Reached the area on the Norwegian coast off Utsire again and, without knowing anything about the great events that had occurred in the meantime, met a large field of debris floating beams, boards, hammocks, boat straps and side lanterns on June 1, 90 nm west of Hanstholm, while dead fish and seagulls covered the sea. At 3 p.m. a wreck ("Invincible") was sighted in 57° 3' N, 6° 0' E, near which an English destroyer was cruising. From now on the wind and swell increased more and more, and the following morning the storm was blowing in full force. In bright sunshine, mighty torrential lakes passed over the boat, which, however, proved to be an excellent sea craft. Large masses of water shot down through the hatch of the tower, the commandant and security personnel on the tower were often only hung in their seat belts. The air supply mast for the motors had to be closed and the air for them had to be sucked in through the tower hatch. Suddenly the latter struck while the diesel engines continued to run.<sup>456</sup>

The crew in the boat threatened to be cut off from any air supply. The commander tried in vain to tear open the tower hatch from the outside. In the meantime, however, the chief engineer, marine engineer Hans Schmidt, had recognized the danger in the boat, tore open the opening to the air mast just in time and at the same time with a powerful jet of water the air rushed into the boat as a savior. After "U 75" had avoided enemy submarines lying in wait around noon at Horns-Riff three times, it received the first news of the battle off the Skagerrak from an outpost steamer and ran into Heligoland on the 3rd.

Three days later, the mine barrier laid out by "U 75" on May 29 west of the Orkney Islands (Map 36) on the usual warship routes was supposed to come into effect. On June 5, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener and a staff of 6 officers met in Scapa, in order to continue from there on the armored cruiser "Hampshire" to Arkhangelsk. The purpose of this trip was to strengthen the Russian resistance on land and did not allow any delay. On the evening of the Field Marshal's arrival in Scapa, however, a violent storm from NE set in, so that the route east of the Orkney Islands, originally planned for "Hampshire", could not be searched for mines. It was therefore decided to let the armored cruiser go west of the islands just under land to the north, where it could probably be accompanied by destroyers because of the smaller sea. It seemed practically impossible that this route would meanwhile be contaminated by mines from an enemy surface ship. The German submarine miners, however, had hitherto restricted their activities to the areas south of the Firth of Forth, evidently because, as was believed, their radius of action was insufficient for larger undertakings, so that even these did not appear to pose any danger. The bad weather had to offer the best protection against attacks by other submarines, even if that was the reason why the warship routes on either side of the Orkney Islands had not been searched for three or four days.

In these considerations, however, it was overlooked that the drifter "Laurel Crown" had run into mines in this area and sank on June 2nd (1). The British fleet management should have already known about the lock designed by "U 75". That this disastrous route was nevertheless chosen for the armored cruiser "Hampshire" can only be explained by the fact that, under the crushing impression of the outcome of the battle just fought, the intelligence service was so heavily used by the latter that the English naval command of the had not yet learned of the sinking of the small fishing trawler.

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1) See the white book "Navy Losses" published by the Admiralty in 1919.<sup>457</sup>

Page 437      6. VI.    The sinking of the "Hampshire".

Without paying attention to this accident, the armored cruiser left on June 6th at 6:30 a.m. with Lord Kitchener on board, accompanied by two destroyers, at sea. But to make matters even worse, the wind changed to the northwest, so that the destroyers started at 8 a.m. had to be sent back because they could no longer keep the armored cruiser moving in the heavy seas. Half an hour later, "Hampshire" ran into a mine, just 1.5 nm from land, between Brough of Birsay and Marwick Head and sank within 15 minutes, as was observed from land. In the heavy seas, the armored cruiser could not bring boats into the water, the ship capsized, and only 12 men drifted ashore on a raft. The others, including the field marshal with his staff, died in the seas before destroyers and outpost boats dispatched to help reached the sinking site. In Kitchener, England lamented the loss of a man whom it had regarded as the cornerstone of the power and greatness of the empire, as a symbol of its national unity, as the obituaries testified.<sup>458</sup>

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## 15. Skagerrak. - Conclusion and Review.

With the return of the German submarines, the operations that had led to the battle of the Skagerrak came to an end.

Admiral Jellicoe had not sought, indeed avoided, the fight the morning after the battle, in spite of all the possibilities available to him. The fact that neither his flagship nor those of the other squadrons was victorious is clear from the signals and telegrams that were exchanged during the day between the British ships and detailed in the "Jutland Despatches". Wherever the Leader inquired of the formations, which had diverged considerably and were only gradually collecting on "Iron Duke", the reports of British casualties always outweighed the reports of those of the Germans. He had not yet made up his mind to wirelessly send a brief combat report to the Admiralty. This remained without any message and demanded 10:40 pm. (see VI.) urgent documents for the refutation of the first German reports, which, as it soon turned out, still lagged behind the actual English losses. It was not until twelve hours later, after all possibilities for ascertaining major enemy losses had been exhausted, that the Admiralty received the following reply:

"Vice Admiral of the Battlecruiser Fleet reports: "Queen Mary", "Indefatigable" blown up. Explosion in an ammunition chamber as a result of an enemy shell hit. "Invincible" blown up, probably for the same reason, but maybe also as a result of a mine or a submarine attack. Broke apart in two. "Defense" blown up in a similar way. "Black Prince" is missing and, what is feared, sunk. "Warrior" was completely incapacitated and abandoned by the crew after it was towed by "Engadine" to 57° 21' north and 3° 2' east. Assume she is still afloat (1). II. Squadron of cruisers is looking for her. "Tipperary" and the destroyers "Turbulent", "Fortune", "Sparrowhawk" and "Ardent" lost and 5 or 6 destroyers from the IV Flotilla missing. "Broke" badly damaged on the march to Scapa Flow.

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1) The ship had sunk in the meantime.<sup>459</sup>

Page 439      2nd VI.      First combat report by the British fleet chief.

They are supposed to take care of two small cruisers. Chief XII. Destroyer flotilla reports by signal that its flotilla sank a ship of the line of the "Kaiser" class (1) in a night attack."

"Vice Admiral of the Battlecruiser Fleet reports: It is believed that an enemy battlecruiser was sunk and another was badly damaged. Two small cruisers determined to be incapacitated. The enemy destroyers intervened, but it is not yet known how many have been sunk. The losses of our battle cruisers occurred during the battle cruiser engagement. Visibility was very poor, and as a result the battle fleet had great difficulty in maintaining contact with the enemy battle fleet, which was avoiding combat; but during the brief period of the engagement we did serious damage to some enemy ships of the line. "Marlborough" is the only ship of the line that was damaged by mine or torpedo during the battle of the battle fleet. "Warspite", "Barham" and "Malaya" were damaged before our battle fleet at 7:15 pm. came into action."

So ended the battle, at the beginning of which the signal had blown on the flagship of the 1st Squadron: "Remember the traditions of the *Glorious First of June - avenge Belgium* (2)!" With what cruel irony an essay in The Times must have acted on the initiates in the Admiralty, which wrote on the morning after the battle, and without the author knowing of the latter, he celebrated with proud words and hopeful outlook the memory of that glorious June 1st, on which 122 years ago Lord Howe had badly defeated the French in a sea battle. While the English readers were unsuspecting about this article, the British Admiralty, in their dismay, had already decided to withhold reports of the Skagerrak battle from the public and the House of Commons until after it was adjourned on June 2nd. The Admiralty's first announcement of the battle was therefore not made before the evening of June 2nd, and so devastating was the announcement of the British casualties contained therein, after a long perplexed silence, that the Admiralty issued a reassuring omission on June 4th in the press, in which it was asserted, in sharpest contradiction to the actual results of the battle, that the German losses were not only relatively, but also absolutely heavier than the British (3).

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1) In reality "Pomerania", not a capital ship, but an older ship of the line.

2) Be mindful of the traditions of June 1st! Avenge Belgium!

3) The German and British official reports, together with a compilation of the foreign press reviews, were printed in the Admiral's staff as early as 1916, and published by the news office of the Imperial Naval Office.<sup>460</sup>

The inaccuracy of this statement was trumped by a telegram from the British fleet chief to the Admiralty on the evening of that day. In this he asserted, certainly to the best of his knowledge, that after careful examination of eyewitnesses it was no longer in doubt that three German capital ships would certainly have been sunk in the day and night battles, and that two more were likely to sink. How uncertain all these findings were, however, was evident from the fact that the names of the supposedly sunk ships were repeatedly missing in all reports from the British naval command. In contrast, the German admiralty's staff was able to point out that of the majority of the British ships it had reported sunk, prisoners were in German hands as eyewitnesses and evidence. As a result, the British reports were little suited, even in England, to shaking the devastating judgment of the utterly dismayed public about the outcome of the battle. The criticism in the British press, which is otherwise so politically and intelligently managed, went so far that the British naval commander was compelled on June 6th to object to the nature of the reports on the battle in a telegram to the Admiralty. These would have to severely damage discipline and morality and discourage the officers and crews of the fleet. He saw no other way out than the toughest censorship measures to restore the prestige of the "Grand Fleet". This hint was enough to silence the outbursts of desperation, and soon the British press was again on the tried-and-tested path of propaganda skillfully geared towards the state of mind in Germany. Their efforts, which were now beginning to falsify the actual result of the battle retrospectively into a British victory, found welcome support in one circumstance of German reporting.

It is a principle that applies equally to land and sea warfare, with enemy and friend, not to reveal losses which the enemy himself could not determine, even through his own official reports, since it is of the greatest importance in the interests of further operations. Military importance is to keep the enemy in the dark for as long as possible about the shift in the balance of power caused by fighting. According to this generally sound military principle, the English had always acted - it is worth remembering the secrecy of the sinking of the first capital ship in the war, the "Audacious".<sup>461</sup>



For the same reason, the German admiralty's staff kept the loss of the "Lützow" and "Rostock" a secret, both of which were not lost in battle but only on the march back. Unfortunately, however, it soon became apparent that in view of the widespread lack of understanding of military requirements of this kind, this measure was also misinterpreted domestically, and so on June 7th the Admiral's staff felt compelled to announce the loss of those ships retrospectively, very much damage to the assessment of the overall result, especially in the neutral world. The argument about the actual losses incurred in battle on both sides is a thing of the past. Even after all the losses were announced, the outcome of the battle, measured by these alone, remained a German victory.

The total losses that occurred on both sides during the day fighting and the night march give the following picture:

	Large Combat Ships		Older liners and armored cruisers		Small cruisers & destroyers		Total tonnage of the sunk ships	Killed	Wounded	Captured
	#	%	#	%	#	%				
British	3	8.1	3	37.5	8	8.6	115,025	6094	674	177
German	1	4.8	1	16.6	9	11.8	61,180	2551	507	-

Although 37 British capital ships had thrown the full weight of their numerical superiority against 21 Germans into the scales, especially under circumstances which were particularly favorable for the former, the British losses were about twice as great as the Germans. Despite the greatest efforts of their crews, submarines and airships played no part in this German success, and mines were also not used by the German side. However, these figures are even more important if you consider that the Germans only lost the small cruiser "Wiesbaden" on the day battle on ships, while the British lost the battle cruiser "Indefatigable", "Queen Mary" and "Invincible" as well as the armored cruiser "Defense" and all major German losses only occurred during the energetic and purposeful breakthrough during the night march.

The superiority of the German artillery is evident from these facts alone. It is also admitted in full by the commander of the British fleet in a report to the Admiralty of June 18, 1916, which was hardly intended for the public, but precisely for that reason (1).

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1) Jutland Despatches, page 2.<sup>462</sup>

A reasonably reliable comparison of the artillery performances seems feasible only for the first part of the battle, the battle of the Hipper and Beatty forces, the result of which was indeed astonishing. "It is true that weaker squadrons had gained some advantages in a naval operation from time to time in previous wars. But the fact that a British squadron, superior to the enemy in both artillery and speed, could suffer such great losses in 53 minutes and be practically defeated was unprecedented in history (2). Admiral Jellicoe therefore rightly remains in his report this fight the longest and literally states the following in paragraph 6:

"The unsettling result of the battlecruiser action is the fact that 5 German battlecruisers in action against 6 British ships of this class, which were also supported after the first 20 minutes, albeit at great distances, by the fire of 4 liners of the "Queen Elizabeth" class were able to sink "Queen Mary" and "Indefatigable". It is true that the enemy later suffered very badly and that a ship, the "Lützow", was undoubtedly destroyed (3), but even then the result cannot be described as otherwise very unpalatable."

"The circumstances which contributed to the (mentioned) British losses were 1. the (indifferent) armor protection of our battlecruisers, which was negligently treated in the design, especially with regard to turret armor and armored deck, and 2. the disadvantage under which our ships were in relation to the lighting (sun, horizon) had to work. That's out of the question. But it is just as indubitable that the shooting of the German battlecruisers in the first stages (of the battle) was at a very high level. In almost every case they seem to have captured their target within less than 2 or 3 minutes after opening the fire and hit it, and that at the very great distance of 165 m."

And Jellicoe further states the following in paragraph 8 of this report:

"The fact that the shooting of the German battle fleet in battle with ours was not as accurate as ours must, in my opinion, in no way be interpreted as meaning that it is not at the same height as that their battlecruisers stand, rather I am inclined to believe that we had the advantage of better lighting on our side at the time, although it was very bad for both sides at the time."

2) Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1924, p. 96.

3) In this form an exaggeration, since the ship does not arrive until 3 a.m. sank, with two more torpedo shots from German torpedo boats were required to completely destroy it.<sup>463</sup>

For a more detailed assessment of the shooting performance, a comparison of the hits that occurred on both sides would be important. The attempt to employ one, however, runs into difficulties because the corresponding information for the British ships "Indefatigable", "Queen Mary" and "Invincible", "Defense" and "Black Prince" are not and also not available for all other ships involved in the battle are not sufficient to calculate hits per gun and minute, the only comparative figure useful for the expert, taking into account the respective and strongly changing observation conditions. The only thing that can be ascertained is the not-too-meaningful statement that the British ships, even with the most careful assessment of those destroyed by artillery, were hit by at least 120 German shells and 107 shells of medium and light caliber, while the German ships received only 100 heavy hits and 42 light hits. For this result the English used 4598, the Germans only 3597 grenades of heavy caliber. The number of medium-caliber shells fired is known only from the German side and amounted to 3952 rounds. The hit result in comparison to the number of shots fired was therefore 3.33 per cent for the German heavy artillery and for the British to 2.17 percent.

If one were to conclude from these figures, which is in itself inadmissible, that the superiority of German gunsmithing was not too great, one would at the same time have to admit that the effect of the individual German heavy bullet on the target is all the more so in comparison to that of the British was more amazing. While not a single German ship was immediately lost to enemy gunfire, three capital ships and two armored cruisers blew up on the English side after just a few salvos with catastrophic side effects and the almost complete loss of the crew; But the greater impact of the German grenade is also clearly reflected in the loss figures for the other ships. While this figure, including the wounded, only on three German ships (1) exceeded 10 percent of the crew strength, the English list has eight ships to show losses with more than 10 percent (2).

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1) "Seydlitz", "Derfflinger", "Hamburg".

2) "Malaya", "Lion", "Warrior", "Calliope", "Castor", "Chester", "Southampton", "Broke".<sup>464</sup>

Furthermore, the average rate of losses on English ships was 9.65 percent compared to such a figure of only 4.19 percent on the German side, and all in all the British loss was calculated at 11.59 percent, the German only to 6.82 percent of the total manning of the fleet in question. This effect is all the more remarkable as the caliber of the British heavy artillery was consistently greater than on the German side. A projectile weight of 85,844 kg for the entire broadside of the 38 German ships fired once (not including torpedo boats) was compared to a projectile weight of 201,096 kg for the 71 British ships, and the distribution of the projectiles fired among the individual calibers gives the following picture:

	38 cm	35.6 cm	34.3 cm	30.5 cm	28 cm
German	-	-	-	2424	1173
British	1239	42	1533	1784	-

The material, shape, filling and detonator played an even greater role in this superior effect of the German heavy grenade than the relatively lower resistance of the English armor plates; In addition, there was insufficient armor protection for important parts of British ships, especially the British battlecruisers. In contrast, the tremendous resilience of the German ships to the enemy was one of the most unpleasant surprises of the battle. No English ship has withstood the same number of severe hits at close range as the German ships of the "Feldherrn" - and "König" class, and if part of this phenomenon also the excellent training of the German crews in the Combating the damage to the ship caused by hits must be awarded, it was mainly of a technical nature. The weight saved in caliber had benefited other combat values. Side armor and armored decks were stronger and more resilient than on English capital ships of the same age; the strong and enormous torpedo protection to increase swimming safety was almost completely absent on the latter. These combat values re clearly expressed in the displacement. If one compares the water displacement of the English and German ships of the line involved in the battle, the English average figure of 23,127 t was compared to a German figure of 22,585 t despite the lower gun caliber.<sup>465</sup>

The battlecruisers even showed a slight superiority on the German side with 23,742 t against 21,880 t.

It was proven that all previous reservations about the timely deployment of the German fleet, insofar as they were asserted with reference to alleged technical defects, based on a complete misunderstanding of the enormous combat values, which were, however, not revealed to the layman, which were present in this fleet.

On the other hand, the British Admiralty itself had learned nothing from the results of the Dogger Bank battle and suffered bitterly for this omission in the Skagerrak battle. Only now were improvements on the British ships being tackled in feverish acceleration, some of which had already been urgently demanded by Admiral Beatty after the experience of the battle at Dogger Bank (1). According to a list of Admiral Jellicoe's (2), these primarily included facilities "to prevent flames from cordite cartridges which had been ignited by the explosion of a grenade in a gun turret or on the way between the turret and the ammunition room, reached the ammunition chamber itself." Probably the loss of one, if not two, of the British battlecruisers was due to this cause after the armor was penetrated." The cartridges of the medium and light artillery also had to be better protected against the risk of fire. It had also proven desirable to reinforce the armored decks on the large ships, "so that the grenades or explosives did not reach the ammunition chambers through them. This necessity was felt particularly on all older ships of the dreadnought type, since on these the side armor was not brought up to the upper deck. The great distances at which most of the modern sea battles take place, and the resulting large angles of incidence of the projectiles, make British ships very vulnerable in this regard." Almost more important, however, was the creation of an anti-tank shell of greater penetration with an improved detonator, as well as the development of better rangefinders and more effective methods of shooting in and staying on target.

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1) Filson Young, *With the Battle Cruisers*, 221.

2) Jellicoe: *The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916*, pages 418 and 419.<sup>466</sup>

In his own words, the high speed of the German ships was also a big surprise for the British fleet chief. In paragraph 4 of the above-mentioned secret report it says about this as follows:

“The operation showed that the ships of III. Squadron of the high seas have an unexpected excess speed, at least for a short time. The ships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class are nominally built for 25 knots. The official quarterly overview of British and foreign warships gives the "König" and "Kaiser" classes a test drive speed of 20.5 knots. I've always expected that this would reach maybe 22 knots over a short distance; but the fact that the V Battle Squadron was unable to increase its distance from the German ships despite the highest speed was an unpleasant surprise and will have a considerable influence on the conduct of further operations. It is quite clear that all German ships have a speed far greater than those for which they are nominally built."

On this point the British fleet commander, in an understandable search for reasons for his defeat, is likely to have exaggerated; but the violent charges which he brought against the Admiralty for the inferiority of his ships in terms of armor protection and the quality of the British heavy grenades and measuring instruments were fully correct and proved by the outcome of the battle (1).

The technical advantages of the German ships alone could not explain the astonishing fact that the British fleet, almost twice as strong, had to pay for the first and only encounter with the entire German High Seas with a heavy defeat. Even more than technical, tactical factors spoke for German superiority in battle. The great mobility of the German line at the height of the battle had allowed it to be tossed around three times in back-to-back turns. The British fleet, in its exaggerated clinging to the rigid and clumsy line of all the squadrons on the same course, had not been able to cope with such agility. Nor had a single leader of the British top or bottom columns able to adapt to the surprising tactical situation of his own accord, not even the chief of the independent V Battle Squadron.

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1) Admiral Jellicoe was responsible for some of these deficiencies as a result of his long service as III. and II. Sea Lord before the war, however, shared responsibility.<sup>467</sup>

One also had to admit this mistake and was therefore compelled to give the subordinates greater freedom of action than before by changing the tactical regulations accordingly. Furthermore, it turned out that the previous evasive maneuvers before torpedo shots loosened the connection of the line too much, and efforts were therefore made to find better forms for such a line (1). But even all of this is not enough to fully explain the failure of the British navy; on the contrary, it was primarily serious strategic inhibitions that prevented the British leader from making a decisive contribution to the numerical preponderance of his armed forces. As early as October 1914, in a memorandum to the Admiralty, he had committed himself to accepting a battle, if possible, only in waters that were closer to the British bases than the German ones (2). Although he had not succeeded in this, his position explains why he did not resume the battle with all the greater energy the next morning. In the same memorandum he stated that the danger of German submarine and torpedo boat attacks during combat could lead to the squadron not accepting the battle or breaking it off in good time, even at the risk of not being able to put the enemy into the decisive battle and not being able to beat them and having to pay for this with a great moral loss. The British leader adhered to this principle during the battle of the Skagerrak. History repeats itself, and so in the Skagerrak battle we have "the 20th century picture of the classic naval mistake of the 18th century" (3). It is true that this behavior did not correspond in any way to the tradition of the keenest aggressive spirit, which has been sanctified since Nelson, but the entire British naval forces had never been as concentrated in one hand as in the Admiral Jellicoe. The "Great Fleet" comprised all of England's capital ships as well as the majority of the small cruisers and destroyers, and there was no reserve to speak of, as at the time of the Battle of Trafalgar. Nelson had only a third of the British naval force under his command, and if he had been defeated an even stronger fleet would have taken his place.

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1) Jellicoe: The Grand Fleet, page 409.

2) The memorandum itself is contained in North Sea Volume 2, pages 324–329.

3) Rear Admiral W. Henderson, in Naval and Military Record, Jan. 26, 1921.<sup>468</sup>



Admiral Jellicoe, on the other hand, knew that the "Grand Fleet" was almost all that England possessed in terms of sea power. He was therefore fully aware of the responsibility placed in his hand in the face of such a mighty combat instrument as the German fleet meant in his opinion. As a result, even during the fight, in his own words (1), he never abandoned the consideration "not to be allowed to leave too much to the chance possibilities of a battle, because his fleet is the only and only factor which would have a vital importance for the existence of the Reich as well as the cause of the Allies". There was no reserve outside the battle fleet, which could in any way take its place in the event that an accident should happen to it or even the numerical superiority of the enemy should be taken away. The fear of defeat and its consequences had determined the behavior of the British leader from the outset. So it came about that even at the moment when Admiral Jellicoe, favored by pronounced luck in the battle, had firmly grasped the German fleet, at the moment when the English superiority had to come into play with tremendous effect despite the great losses at the beginning Attack by German battlecruisers and torpedo boats was enough to turn the ground around in the German favor, to force the enemy to turn away and to make him lose touch with the German squadrons.

"There is nothing in the long and glorious history of the British Navy that can in any way be compared with this tragedy (2)." How much the British navy was shaken by the battle is evident from the fact that it was in the following night lost the connection and, in spite of a favorable position and absolute certainty about the location of the German Fleet, did not dare to resume the fight the next morning. The blame for all these failures does not, however, lie so much with the British fleet commander personally as the basic attitude of the entire British Admiralty, which had made the reluctance of the fleet almost a system. That the annihilation of the German fleet must be the British's main aim, even at the risk of suffering heavy losses, seemed forgotten. In the Admiralty's program of operations, the pursuit of a decisive naval battle had become less and less important, and it was especially after the battle that there was no desire to return to the established traditions of Nelson.

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1) Jellicoe: The Grand Fleet, page 400.

2) Lord Sydenham of Combe, Battle of Jutland, English Review 1924.<sup>469</sup>

Rather, the teaching and experience of that day culminated for the English in the decision that another sea battle, on which the fate of England and the world would depend, could only be accepted, if at all, in the immediate vicinity of their own coast. The anxious question of the "Manchester Guardian" (28 October 1916): "Do we have to re-submit to the terrible danger from which we have only been saved by God's providence" became a complete one by the return of the English naval command Fleet reluctance answered, even as the submarine trade war threat re-threatened the security of the British Empire in a way unprecedented in its history.

Admiral Scheer, for his part, drew attention from the course of the battle in the immediate report sent on June 4th. His Majesty the Emperor concluded the following:

"The success achieved is thanks to the aggressive, purposeful leadership by the subordinates and the excellent performance of the crews, borne by an excellent warlike spirit."

"It was only possible thanks to the quality of our ships and their weapons, thanks to the purposeful peace training of the associations and thanks to the conscientious training of individual ships."

"The rich experience will be carefully utilized."

"The battle has shown that we have been guided by correct strategic and tactical views in the expansion of our fleet and the development of individual ship types, and that we must therefore continue to pursue the paths we have chosen."

"All weapons have their share in the success. The decisive factor, however, was directly and indirectly the long-range heavy artillery of the capital ships. It caused most of the previously known losses inflicted on the enemy and brought the torpedo boats flotilla to a successful attack on the bulk of the ships of the line. The merit of the torpedo boat flotillas for having finally enabled the capital ships to break free from the enemy through their attack is not diminished by this finding."

"The capital ship - ship of the line and cruiser - is and will therefore remain the cornerstone of naval power."

The victory was in fact primarily due to the resilience of the German capital ships, which exceeded all expectations, as well as the devastating effect of their high-explosive shells, as well as the good shooting training and the excellent tactical cooperation of all ship classes.<sup>470</sup>

Under these circumstances it was doubly regrettable that the poor visibility and the lack of a sufficient number of rapid reconnaissance forces had not enabled the German leader to take up a more favorable starting position and to break through the battle completely.

In strategic terms, the battle was the culmination of the work of the planned efforts of the German naval command under Admiral Scheer to lure the enemy out of his reticence through increasingly harsh operations and finally by bombarding the English coast, and he was granted the feasibility of this from his predecessors to prove already as hopelessly abandoned procedure by the success. In a short memorandum, "Thoughts on the Battle of the Skagerrak", dated June 17, 1916, he stated the following about the intentions for which he had consciously striven for the battle:

"The English plan was to be broken to strangle Germany economically without seriously exposing the fleet to German artillery. This operational endeavor was increased in our country by the fact that the end of the submarine trade war made it impossible for us to touch the lifeblood of England. We therefore had to try by all means to prove that the German High Seas Fleet would be willing and able to wrest the glory of Trafalgar from England and to secure national development in the world for Germany."

"The German idea embodied in the founding of the fleet had to assert itself in combat."

"The conduct of the battle is built on the basic idea that even the numerically weaker should not shy away from touching the superior crowd, if only the will to victory is based on dedicated personnel, trust in the material and conviction of the superiority of training."

"From an introductory cruiser battle of about two hours, which had already proven the superiority of our artillery, the clash with the vastly superior enemy main body developed."

"The skilful attempts of the English to embrace us and cut us off our way home have been turned into an English defeat by the fact that we managed to thrust twice into the middle of the hostile crowd with all our might, then to evade its intended embrace and facing the wider enclosure to force our way to the strategic point Horns Reef, which is important for the next morning."<sup>471</sup>

"The English superiority was broken because it was unable to hold on to us and that after the day's battle was over, it lost all common leadership. After a collision with our tip at the beginning of darkness, the English battle cruisers inexplicably lost touch with us for fear of our torpedo boats; they pushed into the empty North Sea. Most of the English have made their way partly south and partly north (1). Jellicoe was no longer able to keep his fleet together. After constant night fighting, which was devastating for the English, he no longer accepted us the next morning, although he still had the material power and the speed necessary for it."

"The result of the battle: we were able to prove to the world that the English fleet is not insurmountable, we were able to fight through the right of the German people to the open sea."

"What has been the guiding principle of our German popular development over the past 20 years is embodied in this victorious struggle."

"But the fight also showed us that building our navy as a High Seas Fleet was the right thing to do. The German national idea can only be carried into the world by a High Seas Fleet against England."

"In addition, however, the submarine must be fully used to grasp the English lifeblood if we are not to bleed to death materially in our current situation."

The reference in the last sentence to the decisive importance of the submarine trade war was already contained in an even stronger form in the immediate report on the battle. The enemy interpreted it to mean that Admiral Scheer drew the conclusion from the impressions of the battle that nothing could be achieved with the High Seas Fleet itself. However, about the final remarks of this report, that even the happiest outcome of an ocean battle could no longer force England to peace, and that a victorious end to the war in the foreseeable future could only be achieved by overthrowing English economic life, i.e. by using the submarine against English trade, what is to be achieved, to be able to appreciate its actual meaning, it is necessary to visualize the historical context. At that time, the chief of the admiralty's staff was about to deprive the fleet management of the right to dispose of the submarines because the latter had refused to continue the submarine trade war in the weakened form that seriously endangered the existence of the boats and their crew.

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1) However, this seems to be a mistake.<sup>472</sup>

As a result, nothing was more natural than that Admiral Scheer now threw the reputation of the victor into the balance in order to emphasize the type of submarine warfare he advocated in the foreground and to force the resumption of it by all means of persuasion. If he deliberately made the future prospects of success of the high seas armed forces appear less favorable, it was more the intention of attaining a specific purpose, the striving to strategically exploit the success achieved in high seas combat in other areas, as a final and negative critique of the strategic outcome of the battle itself.

The exploitation of the mentioned closing words of the media report in order to reduce the German success, however, were not the only efforts of the enemy to reinterpret the battle of the Skagerrak retrospectively as an English victory. When the High Seas Fleet also succumbed to the moral collapse of their homeland in 1918, the mutiny of the crews on the English side was attributed to the supposedly terrible moral impressions they would have been exposed to in the battle of the Skagerrak, a conclusion whose evidential value collapses on its own before a comparison of the German and British losses in the battle.

The Austro-Hungarian naval attaché in Berlin visited the German fleet immediately after their return from the battle and wrote the following in a report that was by no means intended for the public:

“The fleet is enthusiastic and in an absolute mood of victory. The severe nightmare, the worry that had weighed on everyone up to now that the war might end without a meeting between the two fleets, has disappeared. . . . The whole fleet, down to the last sailor, believes in its strength and looks forward to further clashes with confidence. ”

In fact, the aggressive spirit of the German fleet has never been more powerful than it was after this victorious battle. On August 19, 1916, she was ready to fight again close to the British coast at Sunderland, and it was not her fault that there was no new fight that day. Despite all attempts on the part of the British to restore the prestige that had been lost by questioning German bravery, they did not dare to recognize Admiral Jellicoe as the victor.<sup>473</sup>

It is in accordance with the English tradition to attach the nickname of the battle won to one of these. Jellicoe was not given the nickname "of Skagerrak" or "Jutland" as Viscount, but rather "of Scapa". It was not named after the battle, but after the base from which the British navy had safely carried out the hunger blockade for years.

Jellicoe was the man who was given command of the "Grand Fleet" when the war broke out, primarily because he understood how to wage war mainly by using indirect means, with the utmost sparing of the capital ships. The disruption of Europe as a result of the brutal economic war, however, has also proven extremely harmful to England herself. A decisive English victory in the naval battle would probably have prevented the subsequent conduct of the submarine trade war, which brought England to the edge of the abyss and made North America dependent on the help of the United States. In such a case it would also have been possible for England to gain naval dominance in the Baltic Sea and thus prevent the collapse of Russia. In this way, however, a decisive English victory in the Battle of the Skagerrak, together with the successful offensive of the Allies on all land fronts, would probably have decided the world war in 1916 in favor of the latter, and there is no doubt that such a decision in 1916 had an entirely different meaning for England's postwar position of power than that achieved in 1918. Indeed, "after a series of failures and disappointments in most theaters of war in 1916, nothing would have been more important to the Allies than an overwhelming and final victory at sea" (1). The German victory in front of the Skagerrak therefore means more than a brilliant act of arms, and the more the distance from the events increases, the more firmly this conviction will gain a foothold in the entire German people.

"The fatherland rejoices and thanks", with these words addressed to the victor of the Skagerrak, the Chancellor became the interpreter of the feelings that touched all hearts. In addition to the victor, the builder of the German fleet, Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz, his teacher, Grand Admiral v. Koester and His Majesty the Kaiser, who had always promoted the purposeful development of this fleet with the full commitment of his personality.

Only those angrily stood aside who had always fought the use of the navy, like any other activity of German naval warfare against England, for incomprehensible political reasons.

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1) Lord Sydenham, Battle of Jutland, see page 448.<sup>474</sup>

The German people as a whole now recognized that the navy, which was developed with great sacrifice, was not a mis-creation, but a powerful combat instrument which, if used correctly, in conjunction with the submarines, was the best weapon in the fight against the most powerful sea-going enemy. While in the German army in the period before the battle the bitter feeling was undoubtedly prevalent that it would have to bear the whole burden of the fight alone and that the fleet was apparently relatively unaffected by it in a safe harbor, the battle off the Skagerrak destroyed this idea and contributed to making the field army look forward with greater confidence than before to the enormous tasks that were to lie ahead of them in the course of this year. Whether the mistake could be made good, that the fight against English naval rule was taken up too late with full determination, could only be seen in the future, and it would soon have to be shown whether the prestige and influence of the victors before the Skagerrak were great enough to overcome the inhibitions of the political leadership and its followers in the strategic exploitation of this great success.<sup>475</sup>

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**Appendix 1.**

**Article in the Frankfurter Zeitung of February 9, 1916 on the sinking of the "L 19".**

**Humanity and hatred.**

The statements in the English press about the behavior of the English fishermen, who left the crew of the wrecked "L19" to their callous fate and death in the waves, indicate that reasons are being sought to somewhat excuse this shameful and cowardly behavior. In addition to the so often vaunted humanity and chivalry of England, it is not at all true that the Grimsby fishermen left helpless people, even if they are members of the enemy armed forces, to certain death. It is now reported in the English press that the English people approve of the behavior of the crew of the fishing boat, and the Bishop of London, who on earlier occasions has acted less as a preacher of Christian love than as a jingoistic hotspur, has it in a special address undertook to defend the people of "King Stephen". He gave the same reason that the leader of the fishing boat himself and, after him, the English press put together, namely that the people of the fishing boat should have feared being overpowered by the crew of the airship and dragged to Germany. The bishop then added that chivalry had been destroyed by Germany in this war.

It is a testament to the utter lack of self-criticism when such an accusation is uttered by a senior clergyman of the nation which began the war with the most disdainful robbery of enemy private property, which it in the most profane forms as a trade war less against the enemy state, when the individual citizens of the hostile country or even just of German descent, whose representatives in Cameroon abused helpless women and children in the most shameful manner, whose government evaded the prosecution of the "Baralong" murder, and who everywhere they believed that it would be of use to them to use their violence and the most dubious means to rape the weaker. But as far as the disgraceful act of the nine boatmen who accuse themselves of cowardice in order not to appear as cruel monsters, it does indeed seem to us that these fishermen, who probably do not live at a very high level of education and disposition, are not the main culprits. Beyond this incident, hatred claims our attention, from which it is to be explained.

Since the beginning of the war, most of the English press has endeavored to make the public in England and around the world believe that Germany is waging her war in disregard of all precepts of humanity, that German soldiers are murderers and are different from cannibals not significantly differentiated. Individual English papers never speak of the Germans differently than under the name "Huns". The English government systematically nourished this wild hatred through comedy-like investigations into alleged German atrocities and publications about it, partly to create the war mood among the people, which was almost completely lacking at the beginning of the war, and partly also, because it needed a glossing over for the shameful and cowardly use of wild Africans and Asians in the European theater of war.<sup>476</sup>

The passion was especially stoked against those parts of the German armed forces against which England found it difficult to defend herself. These were the airships and submarines, the crew of which one did not want to be treated as soldiers who, like any other fighter, do their duty at the risk of their lives and with increased exertion, but as criminals. The British government tried not to treat captured officers and crews from German submersibles like prisoners of war but to lock them in prison. She quickly had to give up this attempt when Germany took retaliatory measures, but the attitude has remained and has shown itself in all its hideousness in the "Baralong" case. This attitude has also been nourished by all sorts of lies, for example the assertion made in parliament by a member of the parliament that after the sinking of the "Lusitania" the flags were raised in Germany and school celebrations and processions were held. Sensible people such as Ramsay Macdonald, Lord Courtney of Penwith, E.D. Morel and others in the Labor Leader have turned against the atrocity. It was of little use, but the jingo press has thrown the charge against people like Morel that they are pro-Germans. One can wonder if the agitation carried on by an unscrupulous government and press leads to people, who in any case perhaps follow instinct rather than higher morality, face the distressed enemy, who has continued to be portrayed as a paragon of wickedness who no longer obey the commandments of humanity?

No one can deny that war can be the cause of heroic deeds, sacrifice and the noblest humanity, but that it also brings hardship, brutality and acts of violence with it. But one must seek to limit the bad to the least degree possible. In England one has tried to enlarge these evil phenomena through deliberate exaggeration and agitation, and has succeeded in doing so. The result is a popular mood as expressed in incidents of the kind mentioned above. For this guilt to England's public conscience, too, the leading men and the inflammatory press will one day have to assume responsibility before history.

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## **Appendix 2.**

### **Imperial handwritten note to Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz of March 17, 1916.**

"My dear Mr. Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz!

After I heard from your sick note and your note to me the 12th c.M. to my vivid regret that you are no longer able to conduct the business of the State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office, I hereby comply with your request and, with the removal of your offices as Minister of State and State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office, make you available with the statutory pension.

I feel the need to take this opportunity to express my Imperial thanks for the excellent service which you have rendered to the fatherland in your long career as a builder and organizer of the Navy.<sup>477</sup>

I would particularly like to emphasize here what was achieved by you during the war itself through the provision of new weapons in all areas of naval warfare and through the creation of the Marine Corps. In doing so, you have added a glory sheet from the difficult wartime to the story of your successful peace work. The German people joyfully acknowledge this with Me. I myself would like to give the expression by awarding the following star with swords to the Grand Commander of My Royal House Order of Hohenzollern and by decreeing that your name should continue to be included in the naval ranking list. With the most sincere wish for your further well-being, I always remain your benevolent.

Wilhelm  
I. R."

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### Appendix 3.

#### **Farewell speech by Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz in the Reich Marine Office on March 17, 1916.**

"In the two decades I was head of the Imperial Naval Office.

During my previous command in East Asia and on the return trip via America, I studied the world as much as possible and spoke to many friends about the world situation. At that time the world was under the impression of the well-known Kruger telegram, which had triggered the latent sensation of the English world. It was clear to me that England had become our mortal enemy. England faced a Germany that grew up to be a competitor. It had to become our mortal enemy according to the whole tradition of a state whose psyche has developed from a pirate state, in connection with a certain Puritanism, but which at this time had already changed into utilitarianism. This emerged clearly from the article in the Saturday Review, probably known to you all, which spoke of the fact that every Englishman would get richer when Germany was hit. We didn't have a fleet then. The article ended: *Ceterum censeo, Germaniam esse delendam*\*. This article was not a single symptom, but a deliberate act by the political clubs in London. It was also clear to me that the whole trust movement of a money-magical state like England was, mingled with America, was heading towards this goal and that a Germany whose prosperity was like property based on work must be a thorn in its side.

Gentlemen, Bismarck already said: We either have to export goods or people.

Imbued with this knowledge, I took over my office. I was aware that nothing in the world could oppose a crushing of Germany but power, a power that prevented England from achieving her goal.

According to this opinion of mine, which had developed from careful study of all foreign conditions and which I acted according to the intentions of His Majesty, the expansion of the navy took place as quickly as possible. At that time the documents were weak, we had neither officers nor civil servants, we did not have the construction equipment required, our shipyards were plumbing workshops, not much more. When I look back on this and on the work that we have done, I think I can say that we have produced almost the maximum possible sea power in these last 19 years.

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\*Latin: But I think that Germany must be wiped out<sup>478</sup>

I also believe that, on the whole, we did a good job of business. It goes without saying that mistakes are made in such a big task, gentlemen. It is also easy to construct errors later if you do not put yourself in the situation from which the individual measures had to be taken. I would like to take just one example from this matter. I am accused of having postponed the submarine weapon, which now played a prominent role in this war, and did not pick it up at times. In reality this is incorrect for anyone who knows the situation. For us, submarines that only defended the mouth of the river were of no value, only submarines that could be used offensively against our mortal enemy were useful to us. Nor was it possible to start earlier because, as any of the gentlemen who have dealt with it will overlook, you couldn't use gasoline engines with a lot of electricity in the boat, and the periscope needed a certain development. From the moment I saw that the submarines could also be used for offensive purposes - that was the moment when it was possible to build larger engines - I put all my energies into developing this weapon. We have struggled because the whole industry saw a better business in building automobiles than in such costly and risky trials. Even so, we were at the forefront of the nations when the war broke out in terms of offensive craft development, and I think we kept that lead. I just wanted to single out that one point. I will certainly be accused of many other mistakes in the near future.

Gentlemen, I have felt many times during this time that I have not been able to get into personal contact with all of you that I myself would have wanted, also for the benefit of the cause. But, gentlemen, for once this is not possible in and of itself in such a large authority as the Imperial Naval Office, and finally there was another circumstance that had to be decisive for me when I took over this office. First and foremost, I had to create a position with the other authorities, especially with ministers and embassies, in the navy, and to use my representational power in this direction to a predominant extent. What our navy lacked 20 years ago was a prestigious position in our entire state organism, and to create such a position, if the great work was to succeed, I had to strive first and foremost.

But now I have the urgent need to say my warm and heartfelt thanks for all the loyalty and cooperation that I have received from you over the past two decades. I know very well that the gentlemen did not work for me, but for the cause, and I can say with a clear conscience that I myself have always set the matter highest and that the matter has been the guideline for my actions is. Now the end is here for me, because I wanted to direct the thoughts of the gentlemen towards the future. Old Stosch once said that the soldier, and this also applies to every major authority, namely every military authority, should never look backwards, but forwards and, gentlemen, this is the very thought I wanted to suggest to you at this hour. The navy's development was not complete when the war broke out. Every year would have brought an advantage for Germany and for the Navy. I have always done mine to keep the peace longer; every fanfare was far removed from me. The navy in particular would have been more mature at the later outbreak of war, because we had had a surprising development, that was in the nature of things.<sup>479</sup>

The war will bring much new, and it will be very difficult for the Navy to find the right transition to peace. I can only wish this office that it has the elbow room it needs for the work ahead, because the development of the navy can only be really guided and advanced from here. Then further: unity! Disagreement inhibits the productive strength not only of the State Secretary, but of the whole authority. This is my wish that I have for you.

Gentlemen, the sea power, and the navy in particular, is not an end in itself, it is there to show our people the way across the sea into the world. I am penetrated by the conviction that if we do not succeed in upholding our industry after the war, in addition to promoting agriculture, also our trade and exports, then Germany will slowly dry up. We wouldn't even remain a strong European continental nation. We would not be able to wage such a war a second time. Without the excess work on exports and without a certain wealth it would not have been possible for us during this war to convert our entire industry to the needs of war and to satisfy the needs of an army of millions, as we have now experienced. I express the very definite hope that our brave people will succeed in turning the war around in such a way that, after all the losses we have suffered, we will again take up a position that will enable us to rise again work. Ultimately, the question is whether it is worth it that Germanness and the German essence should be preserved for world and world history, or whether we are crushed by an Anglo-American utilitarianism. I am convinced that Germanness must be preserved for the blessing of the world.”<sup>480</sup>

Appendix 4.

War Organization of the British "Grand Fleet"  
on May 30, 1916.

**In Scapa Flow.**

„Iron Duke“ **P**

Fleet flagship, **Flagge des Admirals Sir John A. Jellicoe,**  
**Chef des Stabes: Vizeadmiral Sir Charles E. Madden.**  
Assigned: Destroyer „**Dat**“, Flotilla command ship, und Mine  
Layer „**Abdiel**“, light cruiser „**Active**“, aircraft carrier  
„**Campania**“ (did not take part in the battle), tethered balloon  
ship „**Renelaus**“ (remained in port).

**I. Battle Squadron**

„Marlborough“ **P**

Squadron flagship, flag of Vice-Admiral and Second  
Admiral of the "Grand Fleet", **Sir Cecil Burney. Chef des**  
**Stabes: Kapitän zur See E. L. F. O. Grant.**  
Assigned: Light cruiser „**Bellona**“.

„**Revenge**“  
„**Percules**“  
„**Agincourt**“  
„**Colossus**“ **A**  
„**Collingwood**“  
„**Neptune**“  
„**St. Vincent**“  
„**Royal Sovereign**“

**Flagge des Kontreadmirals E. F. A. Gaunt.**

stayed in port.

**IV. Battle Squadron**

„Benbow“ **P**

Squadron flagship, **Flagge des Vizeadmirals Sir Doveton**  
**Sturdee.**  
Assigned: Light cruiser „**Blanche**“.

„**Bellerophon**“  
„**Temeraire**“  
„**Vanguard**“  
„**Royal Oak**“  
„**Superb**“ **A**  
„**Canada**“  
„**Emperor of India**“

**Flagge des Kontreadmirals A. L. Duff.**

actual second flagship, but in dock.

**III. Battlecruiser Squadron**

„Invincible“ **A**

Squadron flagship, **Flagge des Kontreadmirals The Hon. V.**  
**L. A. Hood.**  
Temporarily assigned: Light cruisers „**Chester**“ und „**Canter-**  
**bury**“.

„**Inflexible**“  
„**Indomitable**“

**II. Cruiser Squadron.**

„**Minotaur**“ **A**  
„**Dartmouth**“  
„**Cochrane**“  
„**Shannon**“  
„**Achilles**“

**Flagge des Kontreadmirals G. L. Heath.**

in the dock. „**Donegal**“ special assignment.



**IV. Light Cruiser Squadron.**  
**Kommodore E. E. Le Mesurier.**

„Calliope“ ▲  
 „Constance“  
 „Comus“  
 „Caroline“  
 „Royalist“.

**IV. Flotille.**

Flotilla Leader, Kapitän zur See E. J. Wintour (Captain D. IV.).

Flotilla Leader, Korvettenkapitän W. L. Allen.

Destroyers:

„Achates“	„Porpoise“	„Spitfire“	„Unity“	„Garland“
„Ambuscade“	„Ardent“	„Fortune“	„Sparrowhawk“	„Contest“
„Shart“	„Acasta“	„Christopher“	„Owl“	„Hardy“
„Ridge“	„Ophelia“	„Eodatrice“ (Shipyard)	„Paragon“ (Shipyard)	„Victor“

**XI. Flotille, ein Teil.**

Light Cruiser, Flagship of the commander of the destroyer flotillas (Kommodore F. Captain D. XI.). Kommodore J. R. P. Harvlesley.

Destroyers:

„Marne“ „Rangers“ „Michael“ „Mons“.

**XII. Flotille.**

Flotilla Leader, Kapitän zur See A. J. B. Stirling (Captain D. XII.).

Flotilla Leader, Korvettenkapitän R. A. Sullivan.

Destroyers:

„Obedient“	„Maenad“	„Opal“	„Mary Rose“	„Marvel“
„Renace“	„Reffus“	„Kartogal“	„Mindful“	„Onslaught“
„Runfiter“	„Konfuch“	„Noble“	„Rischief“	„Napier“ (Shipyard)
„Ramelute“ (Shipyard)				

**In Invergordon.**

**II. Battle Squadron.**

Squadron flagship, Flagge des Vizeadmirals Sir Martyn Jerram.

Assigned: Light cruiser, „Boadicea“.

„Ajax“  
 „Centurion“  
 „Erin“  
 „Orion“ ▲  
 „Ronarch“  
 „Conqueror“  
 „Thunderer“.

Flagge des Kontreadmirals A. E. Leveson.

**I. Cruiser Squadron.**

Flagge des Kontreadmirals Sir Robert Arbuthnot.

„Defence“ ▲  
 „Warrior“  
 „Duke of Edinburgh“  
 „Black Prince“.

**XI. Flotille, a part.**

Flotilla Leader, Korvettenkapitän D. E. Sullivan.

„Kempensfelt“ ▲					
„Offory“	„Ryftic“	„Morning Star“	„Magic“	„Mounsey“	
„Mandate“	„Minion“	„Martial“	„Milbrook“	„Moon“	
„Marmion“ (Shipyard)	„Musketeer“ (Shipyard)				



### In Kopsfth.

„Zion“ ▲

Flagship of the Battlecruiser Fleet, Flagge des Vizeadmirals Sir David Beatty, Chef des Stabes Kapitän zur See R. W. Bentind.

#### V. Battle Squadron.

„Barham“ ▲

Squadron flagship, Flagge des Kontreadmirals H. Evan Thomas.

„Valiant“

„Vaspit“

„Malaya“

„Queen Elizabeth“ (Shipyard)

#### I. Battlecruiser Squadron.

„Prince of Royal“ ▲

Flagge des Kontreadmirals D. de B. Brod.

„Queen Mary“

„Tiger“

#### II. Battlecruiser Squadron.

„New Zealand“ ▲

Flagge des Kontreadmirals W. C. Pakenham.

„Indefatigable“

„Australia“ (Shipyard)

#### I. Light Cruiser Squadron.

„Galatea“ ▲

Kommodore G. E. Alexander-Sinclair.

„Haeaton“

„Inconstant“

„Cordelia“.

#### II. Light Cruiser Squadron.

„Southampton“ ▲

Kommodore W. C. Goodenough.

„Birmingham“

„Nottingham“

„Dublin“.

#### III. Light Cruiser Squadron.

„Falmouth“ ▲

Flagge des Kontreadmirals L. D. W. Napier.

„Plymouth“

„Birkenhead“

„Gloucester“.

#### I. Flottille, a part.

„Fearless“ ▲

Light Cruiser, Kapitän zur See G. D. Roper (Captain D. I.).

#### Destroyer:

„Acheron“

„Ariel“

„Atlat“

„Hydra“

„Badger“

„Goshawk“

„Defender“

„Lizard“

„Lapwing“

„Botha“ (Shipyard)

„Jadai“ (Shipyard)

„Archer“ (Shipyard)

„Tigre“ (Shipyard)

„Phoenix“ (stayed in port).

### XIII. Flottille.

„Champion“ ▲

Light Cruiser, Kapitän zur See J. U. Farie (Captain D. XIII.).

#### Destroyer:

„Nestor“

„Nomad“

„Narborough“

„Obdurate“

„Petard“

„Pelican“

„Nerissa“

„Onslow“

„Norelby“

„Ricator“

„Negro“ (Shipyard)

„Nereus“ (Shipyard)

„Paladin“ (Shipyard)

„Penn“ (Shipyard)

„Pigeon“ (Shipyard)

„Peepan“ (stayed in port).

**IX. Flottille,** a part.

Destroyer:

„Lybiard“ „Liberty“ „Sandrail“ „Laurel“.

**X. Flottille,** a part.

Destroyer:

„Moorjom“ „Morris“ „Turbulent“ „Termagant“.

Aircraft carrier.

„Engadine“.

**In Harwich.**

Subordinate to the Admiralty but intended to interact with the Grand Fleet.

**V. Light Cruiser Squadron.**

Flagge des Kommodore Tyrwhitt.

„Carysfort“ ▲  
„Cleopatra“  
„Conquest“  
„Aurora“  
„Undaunted“.**IX. Flottille,** a part.

Flotilla leader

„Nimrod“ ▲ „Lance“ „Lysander“ „Loyal“  
„Laforey“ „Lawford“ „Laffoo“ „Lart“ „Leonidas“  
„Loofout“ „Laverock“ „Lucifer“ (Leave Humber on the 30th) „Lennox“ (under repair).**X. Flottille,** a part.

Flotilla leader

„Lightfoot“ ▲ „Ranly“ „Milne“ „Meteor“ (under repair).  
„Kentor“ „Rurray“ „Ryngs“  
„Miranda“**In Sheerness.****III. Battle Squadron.**

Squadron flagship, Flagge des Vizeadmirals Edward C. Bradford.

„Britannia“ ▲  
„Africa“  
„Commonwealth“  
„Hibernia“ ▲  
„Dominion“  
„Hindustan“  
„Zealandia“

Flagge des Kontreadmirals Dampier.

**III. Cruiser squadron.**

Flagge des Kontreadmirals W. Q. Grant.

„Antrim“ ▲  
„Argyll“  
„Devonshire“  
„Rogburgh“

Part of the "Harwich Flotillas".

„Hornet“ „Druid“ „Beaver“ „Rastiff“  
„Ferret“ „Sandfly“ „Hind“ „Ratchless“.

Structure and location of the Submarines cannot be specified.

## Appendix 5.

## Organization of the "Grand Fleet" on May 30, 1916.

Battle fleet.	
„Iron Duke" <b>P</b> (Fleet Flagship).	
Organization Nr. 2.	Organization Nr. 5.
II. Battle Squadron.	
1. Division	„King George V" <b>A</b>
	„Ajax"
	„Centurion"
	„Erin"
	„Orion" <b>A</b>
	„Monarch"
2. Division	„Conqueror"
	„Thunderer"
IV. Battle Squadron.	
2. Division	„Iron Duke" <b>P</b>
	„Royal Oak"
	„Superb" <b>A</b>
	„Canada"
	„Benbow" <b>R</b>
	„Vellerophon"
3. Division	„Temeraire"
	„Vanguard"
I. Battle Squadron.	
3. Division	„Marlborough" <b>R</b>
	„Revenge"
	„Hercules"
	„Agincourt"
	„Colossus" <b>A</b>
	„Collingwood"
5. Division	„Neptune"
	„St. Vincent"
Allocated Light Cruisers.	
	„Boadicea"
	„Blanche"
	„Bellona"
	„Active"
zugeteilt { „Da" (destroyer), „Abdiel" (minelayer).	
Battlecruiser.	
III. Battlecruiser Squadron.	
„Invincible" <b>R</b>	
„Inflexible"	
„Indomitable"	
Armored cruiser.	
I. Cruiser Squadron.	II. Cruiser Squadron.
„Defence" <b>A</b>	„Minotaur" <b>A</b>
„Warrior"	„Hampshire"
„Duke of Edinburgh"	„Cochrane"
„Black Prince"	„Shannon"
Light Cruisers.	
IV. Light Cruiser Squadron	
„Calliope" <b>A</b>	„Caroline"
„Constance"	„Royalist"
„Comus"	
Leichter Kreuzer: „Canterbury"	

## Destroyer flotillas

## XII. Flottille.

„Faulknor“ ▲  
 „Martsman“ ▲  
 „Obedient“  
 „Maenad“  
 „Opal“  
 „Mary Rose“  
 „Marvel“  
 „Menace“  
 „Reflux“  
 „Ramonah“  
 „Mindful“  
 „Onslaught“  
 „Munster“  
 „Konfuch“  
 „Noble“  
 „Mischief“.

## XI. Flottille.

„Castor“ ▲  
 „Kempfenfelt“ ▲  
 „Offort“  
 „Mystic“  
 „Moon“  
 „Morning Star“  
 „Magic“  
 „Mounsey“  
 „Mandate“  
 „Marne“  
 „Minion“  
 „Manners“  
 „Michael“  
 „Mons“  
 „Martial“  
 „Milbrook“.

## IV. Flottille.

„Tipperary“ ▲  
 „Broke“ ▲  
 „Achates“  
 „Porpoise“  
 „Spitfire“  
 „Unity“  
 „Garland“  
 „Ambuscade“  
 „Ardent“  
 „Fortune“  
 „Sparrowhawk“  
 „Contest“  
 „Shart“  
 „Acasta“  
 „Cynthia“  
 „Christopher“  
 „Drol“  
 „Hardy“  
 „Ridge“.

## Battlecruiser Fleet.

## Battlecruiser.

„Gion“ ▲ (Flagship of the Battlecruiser Fleet).

## I. Battlecruiser Squadron.

„Princeß Royal“ ▲  
 „Queen Mary“  
 „Tiger“.

## II. Battlecruiser Squadron.

„New Zealand“ ▲  
 „Indefatigable“.

## Battleships.

## V. Battle Squadron.

„Barham“ ▲  
 „Baltic“

„Barflete“  
 „Malaya“.

## Light Cruisers.

## I. Light Cruiser Squadron.

„Galatea“ ▲  
 „Phaeton“  
 „Inconstant“  
 „Cordelia“.

## II. Light Cruiser Squadron.

„Southampton“ ▲  
 „Birmingham“  
 „Nottingham“  
 „Dublin“.

## III. Light Cruiser Squadron.

„Falmouth“ ▲  
 „Harmouth“  
 „Birkenhead“  
 „Gloucester“  
 „Chester“.

## Destroyer flotillas

## I. Flottille.

„Fearless“ ▲  
 „Acheron“  
 „Ariel“  
 „Atlatl“  
 „Hydra“  
 „Badger“  
 „Goshawk“  
 „Defender“  
 „Vizard“  
 „Lapwing“.

## XIII. Flottille.

„Champion“ ▲  
 „Nestor“  
 „Komad“  
 „Kerborough“  
 „Obdurate“  
 „Petard“  
 „Pelican“  
 „Keriffa“  
 „Onslow“  
 „Moresby“  
 „Ricador“.

## IX. und X. Flottille.

„Lydiard“ ▲  
 „Liberty“  
 „Landrail“  
 „Laurel“  
 „Moorfom“  
 „Morris“  
 „Turbulent“  
 „Termagant“.

Aircraft carrier: „Engadine“.

## Appendix 6.

### War organization of the German High Seas Fleet on May 30, 1916.

Chief of the High Seas Forces: Vizeadmiral Scheer.

Chief of Staff: Kapitän zur See v. Trotha (Adolf).

Chief of Operations Department: Kapitän zur See v. Levetzow.

„Friedrich der Große“ *P*, Fleet Flagship.

Kommandant: Kapitän zur See Fuchs (Theodor).

Attached: „D 4“, „T 96“, „T 98“, „T 16“.

(Did not participate in the battle.)

#### I. Squadron.

Vizeadmiral Schmidt (Ehrhard).

1. Admiralstabsoffizier: Korvettenkapitän Wegener (Wolfgang).

2. Admiral: Kontreadmiral Engelhardt.

„Ostfriesland“ *A* Kapitän zur See v. Nagmer.

„Thüringen“ „ „ „ Küsel

„Helgoland“ „ „ „ (Hans).

„Oldenburg“ „ „ „ v. Ramecke.

„Posen“ *A* „ „ „ Höpfner.

„Rheinland“ „ „ „ Lange

„Saarland“ „ „ „ (Richard)

„Westfalen“ „ „ „ Kobardt.

„Nassau“ „ „ „ Klappenbach.

„Westfalen“ „ „ „ Redlich.

Attached: „Blitz“, „T 20“ (remained in port).

#### II. Squadron.

Kontreadmiral Raupe.

1. Admiralstabsoffizier: Korvettenkapitän

„Rahlert.“

2. Admiral: Kontreadmiral Frhr. v. Daltwig

zu Lichtensfeld.

„Deutschland“ *A* Kapitän zur See Meurer.

„Pommern“ „ „ „ Böllen.

„Schlesien“ „ „ „ Behnde

(Friedrich).

„Schleswig-Holstein“ „ „ „ Warren-

trapp.

„Hannover“ *A* „ „ „ Heine

(Wilhelm).

„Hessen“ „ „ „ Bartels

„Preußen“ \*) „ „ „ Frey.

Attached: „Pfeil“, „T 49“ (blieben im Hafen).

\*) Sound guard.

#### III. Squadron.

Kontreadmiral Behnde (Paul).

1. Admiralstabsoffizier: Korvettenkapitän Frhr. v. Sager.

2. Admiral: Kontreadmiral Nordmann.

„König“ *A* Kapitän zur See Bräuninghaus.

„Großer Kurfürst“ „ „ „ Goette.

„Markgraf“ „ „ „ Seiferling.

„Kronprinz“ „ „ „ Feldt (Konstanz).

„Kaiser“ *A* „ „ „ Frhr. v. Keyserlingf.

„König Albert“ \*) „ „ „ Thorbecke.

„Prinzregent Luitpold“ „ „ „ Heuser.

„Kaiserin“ „ „ „ Sievers.

„Bayern“ \*\*) „ „ „ Dahn (Max).

Attached: „T 89“ (blieb im Hafen).

\*) Was in the shipyard. -\*\*) Was in Kiel.



## I. Reconnaissance Group.

1. Commander, Reconnaissance Forces: **Vizeadmiral Hipper.**1. Admiral Staff Officer: **Korvettenkapitän Raeder (Erich).**

„Lützow“	▲	Kapitän zur See	Harder.
„Derfflinger“	“	“	“ Hartog.
„Seydlitz“	“	“	“ v. Egidy (Moriz).
„Kolff“	“	“	“ v. Karpf.
„von der Tann“	“	“	“ Zenker.

## II. Reconnaissance Group.

Leader: **Kontreadmiral Boedicker.**Admiralstabsoffizier: **Kapitänleutnant**  
**Stapenhorst.**

„Frankfurt“ ▲ Kapitän zur See v. Trotha  
(Thilo).  
„Villau“ Fregattenkapitän Mommsen (Konrad).  
„Elbing“ “ Madlung.  
„Wiesbaden“ Fregattenkapitän Reiß.  
„Graubenzung“\*) i. B. Kapitänleutnant Peucer.  
„Stralsund“\*\*) Kapitän zur See Weniger.

\*) Was in the Wilhelmshaven shipyard.

\*\*) Was in the shipyard in Kiel.

## IV. Reconnaissance Group.

Leader: **Kommodore v. Reuter.**Admiralstabsoffizier: **Korvettenkapitän**  
**Weber (Heinrich).**

„Stettin“ ▲ Fregattenkapitän Nebensburg  
(Friedrich).  
„München“ Korvettenkapitän Böcker (Oscar).  
„Frauenlob“ Fregattenkapitän Hoffmann  
(Georg).  
„Stuttgart“ “ Hagedorn.  
„Berlin“\*\*) “ Hildebrand.  
Attached: „Hamburg“ ▲ (Flagge des F. d. U.).

\*) Was in the Wilhelmshaven shipyard.

## Mineship.

„Brummer“ Kapitän zur See Schulz (Wilhelm).

(In Kiel. Ready for action since April 2nd, end of May; did not take part in the battle)

## Torpedobootsflottille.

I. Leader of the torpedo boats: **Kommodore Michelsen.**Admiralstabsoffizier: **Korvettenkapitän Juntermann.**

„Kostod“ ▲ Fregattenkapitän Feldmann (Otto).

## I. Torpedobootsflottille.

„G 39“ ▲ Chef i. B.: Kapitänleutnant Albrecht (Konrad).

## 1. Halbflootille.

Chef: Kapitänleutnant Albrecht (Konrad).

„G 39“ I Oberleutnant zur See Doefen.  
„G 40“ Kapitänleutnant Beizen (Richard).  
„G 88“ “ Meiger.  
„V 190“\*) “ d. Ref. Boy-Ed.  
„G 197“\*) “ Grelinger.  
„S 32“ “ Froehlich.

\*) Kiel shipyard.

## 2. Halbflootille.

Chef: Kapitänleutnant Kolbe (Hans).

„G 192“\*) I Oberleutnant zur See Retvis.  
„G 195“\*) Kapitänleutnant Widel.  
„G 198“\*) “ Frhr. v. Seld.  
„G 193“\*) “ Paul (Oswald).  
„S 165“\*) Oberleutnant zur See Schneider  
(Johannes-Penning).

\*) Kiel shipyard.

## II. Torpedobootsflottille.

„B 98“ ▲ Chef: Fregattenkapitän Schuur.

Kommandant: Kapitänleutnant Hengstenberg (Theodor).

## 3. Halbflootille.

Chef: Korvettenkapitän Voest.

„G 101“ I Kapitänleutnant Schulte (Rudolf).  
„G 102“ “ v. Barendorff.  
„B 112“ “ Claussen  
(August).  
„B 97“ “ Niedel (Leo).

## 4. Halbflootille.

Chef: Korvettenkapitän Dithmar.

„B 109“ I Kapitänleutnant Hahndorff (Victor).  
„B 110“ “ Vollheim.  
„B 111“ “ Schidhardt.  
„G 103“ “ Spieß (Fritz).  
„G 104“ “ v. Bartenwerffer.

**III. Torpedobootsflottille.**

„S 53“ **^** Chef: Korvettenkapitän Hollmann.  
Kommandant: Kapitänleutnant Götting (Friedrich).

**5. Halbflootille.**

Chef: Kapitänleutnant Gautier.  
„V 71“ **|** Oberleutnant zur See Ulrich  
(Friedrich).  
„V 78“ Kapitänleutnant Delbrück.  
„V 74“\*) „ Ehrlich (Günther).  
„G 88“ „ Scabell.  
„G 85“\*) „ Stobwasser.

\*) Kiel shipyard.

**6. Halbflootille.**

Chef i. V.: Kapitänleutnant Karlowa.  
„S 54“ **|** Kapitänleutnant Karlowa.  
„V 70“\*) „ Gemessen.  
„S 55“\*) „ Golscher.  
„V 48“ „ Eckoldt.  
„G 42“ „ v. Arnim (Bernd).  
\*) Kiel.

**V. Torpedobootsflottille.**

„G 11“ **^** Chef: Korvettenkapitän Heinicke.  
Kommandant: Kapitänleutnant Müller (Wolff).

**9. Halbflootille.**

Chef i. V.: Kapitänleutnant Hofer.  
„V 2“ **|** Kapitänleutnant Hofer.  
„V 4“ „ Barop.  
„V 6“ Oberleutnant zur See Berendt (Hans).  
„V 1“ „ „ Röhlig.  
„V 8“ Kapitänleutnant v. Kiliinger (Manfred).

**10. Halbflootille.**

Chef: Kapitänleutnant Klein (Friedrich).  
„G 8“ **|** Oberleutnant zur See Rodenberg.  
„G 7“ Kapitänleutnant Weinecke.  
„V 5“ Oberleutnant zur See Tils.  
„G 9“ Kapitänleutnant Anshütz.  
„G 10“ Oberleutnant zur See Haumann.

II. Führer der Torpedoboote: Kommodore Heinrich.  
Admiralstabsoffizier: Kapitänleutnant Mejer.  
„Regensburg“ **^** Fregattenkapitän Heuberger.

**VI. Torpedobootsflottille.**

„G 41“ **^** Chef: Korvettenkapitän Schulz (Max).  
Kommandant: Kapitänleutnant Boehm (Hermann).

**11. Halbflootille.**

Chef: Kapitänleutnant Rümmer (Wilhelm).  
„V 44“ **|** Kapitänleutnant Holleuffer.  
„S 49“\*) „ Bauhaedt.  
„V 48“\*) „ Carl.  
„G 87“ „ Karstens.  
„G 86“ „ Grimm.

\*) At shipyards; did not take part in the battle.

**12. Halbflootille.**

Chef: Kapitänleutnant Laß.  
„V 68“ **|** Kapitänleutnant Stecher.  
„V 45“ „ Laßmann.  
„V 46“ „ Krumhaar.  
„S 50“ „ Kede.  
„G 37“ „ v. Trotha (Wolff).

**VII. Torpedobootsflottille.**

„S 24“ **^** Chef: Korvettenkapitän v. Koch  
Kommandant: Kapitänleutnant Fint.

**13. Halbflootille.**

Chef: Kapitänleutnant v. Ziegewitz (Gerhard).  
„S 15“ **|** Oberleutnant zur See Schmidt  
(Christian).  
„S 17“ Kapitänleutnant v. Puttkamer.  
„S 20“ „ Benede.  
„S 18“ „ Loeffler (Walter).  
„S 18“ „ Haushalter.

**14. Halbflootille.**

Chef: Korvettenkapitän Cordes (Hermann).  
„S 19“ **|** Oberleutnant zur See Reimer.  
„S 23“ Kapitänleutnant v. Kiliinger (Arthur).  
„V 186“\*\*) „ v. Keyserling  
(Wedigo).  
„V 189“ Oberleutnant zur See Reil.  
„G 172“\*)

\*) Arrived on 31st V. i.e.: did not take part in the battle.

\*\*) Was sent back on the morning of May 31 due to capacitor damage.



**IX. Torpedobootsflottille.**

„V 28“ **A** Chef: Korvettenkapitän Goehle.  
Kommandant: Kapitänleutnant Benßen.

**17. Halbflootille.**

Chef: Kapitänleutnant Ehrhardt.

„V 27“ | Oberleutnant zur See Buddede.  
„V 28“ Kapitänleutnant Köhler (Hans).  
„S 38“ „Fischer (Franz).  
„S 51“ „Dette.  
„S 52“ „Ehrentraut  
(Wilhelm).

**18. Halbflootille.**

Chef: Korvettenkapitän Tilleßen (Werner).

„V 30“ | Oberleutnant zur See Wolf (Ernst).  
„S 34“ Kapitänleutnant Andersen.  
„S 33“ „v. Münch.  
„V 29“ „Steinbrind (Erich).  
„S 35“ „Ihn.

**Submarines of the High Seas Fleet.**

Führer: Fregattenkapitän Bauer (Hermann).  
Admiralstabsoffizier: Korvettenkapitän Lührow (Friedrich).

„Hamburg“ **A** Korvettenkapitän v. Gaudeder.

**1. U-Halbflootille.**

Chef: Kapitänleutnant Pasquay.

„U 159“ | Oberleutnant zur See Herrmann  
(Karl).  
„UB 20“ „Biebeg  
(Eastern Baltic Sea).  
„U 77“ Kapitänleutnant Günzel (Erich)  
(1. VI. Ready for action).  
„UB 28“ Oberleutnant zur See Rosenow  
(in acceptance).  
„U 74“ Kapitänleutnant Weisbach (Erwin).  
„U 71“ „Schmidt (Hugo)  
(2nd VI. Ready for use).  
„U 72“ Kapitänleutnant Krafft (Ernst).  
„UB 21“ „Hachagen (Ernst).  
„UB 22“ Oberleutnant zur See Puzier.  
„UB 27“ Kapitänleutnant Diedmann.  
„U 75“ „Beigen (Eurt).

**2. U-Halbflootille.**

Chef: Kapitänleutnant v. Rosenberg-  
Gruszczyński.

„T 99“ | Oberleutnant zur See Schaaf-  
hausen.  
„U 51“ Kapitänleutnant Kumpel.  
„U 52“ „Balthier (Hans).  
„U 53“) „Rose.

\*) On the march from Kiel to Helgoland.

**3. U-Halbflootille.**

Chef: Korvettenkapitän Gayer (Albert).

„G 137“ | Oberleutnant zur See Rhein.  
„T 71“ „  
„U 20“ Kapitänleutnant Schwieger  
(12. June ready for action).  
„U 47“ Kapitänleutnant Regger.  
„U 22“ „Hoppe  
(in testing).  
„U 19“ Kapitänleutnant Weisbach (Raimund)  
(4th VI operational).  
„U 24“ Kapitänleutnant Schneider (Rudolf).  
„U 43“ „Jüsst.  
„U 44“ „Wagenführ.  
„U 45“ „Sittenfeld  
(15. VI. Ready for use).  
„U 46“ Kapitänleutnant Hillebrand (Leo).  
„U 48“ „Buß  
(ready for use at the end of June).

**4. U-Halbflootille.**

Chef: Kapitänleutnant Prause.

„T 101“ | Leutnant zur See Kramsta.  
„T 38“ „  
„U 28“ Kapitänleutnant Frhr. v. Forstner  
(Georg Günther)  
(until 14 VI Wilhelmshaven shipyard).  
„U 64“ Kapitänleutnant Morah (Robert)  
(Kiel).  
„U 32“ Kapitänleutnant Frhr. Spiegel  
v. u. zu Bedelsheim.  
„U 67“ „Nieland.  
„U 63“ „Schulze (Otto).  
„U 66“ „v. Rothmer.  
„U 70“ „Bünßche.  
„U 69“ „Wilhelms  
(Ready for use on June 20).



## Organization of the High Seas Fleet on May 31, 1916.

## Main Body

„Friedrich der Große" **P** (Fleet Flagship).

## III. Squadron.

- |             |   |
|-------------|---|
| 5. Division | { „König" <b>A</b><br>„Großer Kurfürst"<br>„Markgraf"<br>„Kronprinz"                          |
| 6. Division | { „Kaiser" <b>A</b><br>„Prinzregent Luitpold"<br>„Kaiserin"<br>„Friedrich der Große" <b>P</b> |

## I. Squadron.

- |             |  |
|-------------|--|
| 1. Division | { „Ostfriesland" <b>A</b><br>„Thüringen"<br>„Helgoland"<br>„Oldenburg" |
| 2. Division | { „Posen" <b>A</b><br>„Rheinland"<br>„Rastau"<br>„Westfalen"           |

## II. Squadron.

- |             |   |
|-------------|---|
| 3. Division | { „Deutschland" <b>A</b><br>„Pommern"<br>„Schlesien"      |
| 4. Division | { „Hannover" <b>A</b><br>„Schleswig-Holstein"<br>„Hessen" |

## IV. Reconnaissance Group (Light Cruisers).

„Stettin" **A**  
 „München"  
 „Frauenlob"  
 „Stuttgart"  
 „Hamburg" **A** (zugeteilter F. d. U.-Kreuzer).

## Torpedoboots-Flottillen.

Kleiner Kreuzer „Rostock" **A** (I. F. d. L.-Kreuzer).

I. Torpedoboots-Flottille.		III. Torpedoboots-Flottille.	
„G 89" <b>A</b>		„S 58" <b>A</b>	
1. Halbflottille.	2. Halbflottille.	5. Halbflottille.	6. Halbflottille.
„G 89" <b>I</b>	—	„V 71" <b>I</b>	„S 54" <b>I</b>
„G 40"	—	„V 73"	„V 48"
„G 38"	—	„G 88"	„G 42"
„S 32"	—		

V. Torpedoboots-Flottille. „G 11“ ▲		VII. Torpedoboots-Flottille. „S 24“ ▲	
9. Halbflottille.	10. Halbflottille.	13. Halbflottille.	14. Halbflottille.
„V 2“ I	„G 8“ I	„S 15“ I	„S 19“ I
„V 4“	„G 7“	„S 17“	„S 23“
„V 6“	„V 5“	„S 20“	„V 186“ *)
„V 1“	„G 9“	„S 16“	„V 189“
„V 3“	„G 10“	„S 18“	

\*) On May 31 in the morning  
returned due to capacitor damage.

## The Reconnaissance Forces.

## I. Reconnaissance Group (Battlecruiser).

„Lützow“ ▲  
„Derfflinger“  
„Seydlitz“  
„Moltke“  
„von der Tann“.

## II. Reconnaissance Group (Light Cruisers).

„Frankfurt“ ▲  
„Bilau“  
„Elbing“  
„Wiesbaden“.

## Torpedoboots-Flottilien.

Light cruiser „Regensburg“ ▲ (II. F. d. L.-Kreuzer).

II. Torpedoboots-Flottille. „B 98“ ▲		VI. Torpedoboots-Flottille. „G 41“ ▲	
3. Halbflottille.	4. Halbflottille.	11. Halbflottille.	12. Halbflottille.
„G 101“ I	„B 109“ I	„V 44“ I	„V 69“ I
„G 102“	„B 110“	„G 87“	„V 45“
„B 112“	„B 111“	„G 86“	„V 46“
„B 97“	„G 103“		„S 50“
	„G 104“		„G 37“

## IX. Torpedoboots-Flottille.

„V 28“ ▲

17. Halbflottille.	18. Halbflottille.
„V 27“ I	„V 30“ I
„V 26“	„S 34“
„S 36“	„S 33“
„S 51“	„V 29“
„S 52“	„S 35“

## Appendix 8.

The heavy artillery and torpedo shells fired by the English side  
in the Battle of the Skagerrak.

Ship	38,1 cm	35,6 cm	34,3 cm Heavy	34,3 cm Light	30,5 cm	Tor- pedos	Remarks
"Lion" . . . . .	—	—	—	326	—	7	
"Prinzeß Royal" . . . .	—	—	—	230	—	1	
"Queen Mary" . . . . .	—	—	150 <sup>1)</sup>	—	—	—	1) Based on a conservative estimate.
"Tiger" . . . . .	—	—	308	—	—	—	
"New Zealand" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	420	—	
"Indefatigable" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	180 <sup>1)</sup>	—	
"Inflexible" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	88	—	
"Invincible" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	88 <sup>2)</sup>	—	2) Same figure as assumed for "Inflexible".
"Indomitable" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	175	—	
"Barham" . . . . .	337	—	—	—	—	—	
"Valiant" . . . . .	288	—	—	—	—	1	
"Barflete" . . . . .	259	—	—	—	—	—	
"Malaya" . . . . .	215	—	—	—	—	—	
"King George V" . . . .	—	—	9	—	—	—	
"Ajax" . . . . .	—	—	6	—	—	—	
"Centurion" . . . . .	—	—	19	—	—	—	
"Erin" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	
"Orion" . . . . .	—	—	—	51	—	—	
"Monarch" . . . . .	—	—	—	53	—	—	
"Conqueror" . . . . .	—	—	—	57	—	—	
"Thunderer" . . . . .	—	—	—	87	—	—	
"Iron Duke" . . . . .	—	—	90	—	—	—	
"Royal Oak" . . . . .	88	—	—	—	—	—	
"Superb" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	54	—	
"Canada" . . . . .	—	42	—	—	—	—	
"Benbow" . . . . .	—	—	40	—	—	—	
"Vellerofoon" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	62	—	
"Temeraire" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	72	—	
"Vanguard" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	80	—	
"Marlborough" . . . . .	—	—	162	—	—	2	
"Revenge" . . . . .	102	—	—	—	—	1	
"Hercules" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	98	—	
"Agincourt" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	144	—	
"Colossus" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	93	—	
"Collingwood" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	84	—	
"Neptune" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	48	—	
"St. Vincent" . . . . .	—	—	—	—	98	—	
						10 <sup>3)</sup>	3) From light cruisers,
						52 <sup>4)</sup>	4) fired from destroyers.
Sum . . .	1239	42	779	754	1784	74	

The data for the medium and light artillery and all data for the ships not listed here are missing.

Apart from that, the following results:

Total fired: 4598 heavy shells, including 1239-38.1 cm shells.

The heavy artillery scored 100 hits = 2.17%.



Artillery and torpedo ammunition fired by the German  
side in the Battle of the Skagerrak.

Ship	30,5 cm	28 cm	17 cm	15 cm	10,5 u. 8,8 cm	Tor- pedos	Remarks
„Rügen“ . . . . .	380	—	—	400	—	2	Approximate specification
„Derfflinger“ . . . . .	385	—	—	235	—	1	
„Seydlitz“ . . . . .	—	376	—	450	—	—	
„Moltke“ . . . . .	—	359	—	246	—	4	
„von der Tann“ . . . . .	—	170	—	98	—	—	1) Some M.A. Ammunition destroyed by a hit, therefore inaccurate.
„König“ . . . . .	167	—	—	137 <sup>1)</sup>	—	1	
„Großer Kurfürst“ . . . . .	135	—	—	216	2	—	
„Markgraf“ . . . . .	254	—	—	214	—	—	
„Kronprinz“ . . . . .	144	—	—	—	—	—	
„Kaiser“ . . . . .	224	—	—	41	—	—	
„Prinzregent Luitpold“ . . . . .	169	—	—	106	—	—	
„Kaiserin“ . . . . .	160	—	—	135	—	—	
„Friedrich der Große“ . . . . .	72	—	—	151	—	—	
„Ostfriesland“ . . . . .	111	—	—	101	1 Lg.	—	
„Thüringen“ . . . . .	107	—	—	115	20 u. 2 Lg.	—	Lg. = Flare grenade.
„Helgoland“ . . . . .	63	—	—	61	—	—	
„Oldenburg“ . . . . .	53	—	—	88	30	—	
„Posen“ . . . . .	—	53	—	64	29 u. 3 Lg.	—	
„Rheinland“ . . . . .	—	35	—	26	—	—	
„Rastau“ . . . . .	—	106	—	74 u. 1 Lg.	—	—	
„Westfalen“ . . . . .	—	51	—	176	106	—	
„Deutschland“ . . . . .	—	1	—	—	5	—	
„Schlesien“ . . . . .	—	9	20	—	6	—	
„Hessen“ . . . . .	—	5	34	—	24	—	
„Schleswig-Holstein“ . . . . .	—	—	20	—	—	—	
„Hannover“ . . . . .	—	8	21	—	44	—	
„Elbing“ . . . . .	—	—	—	230	—	1	
„Villau“ . . . . .	—	—	—	113	4	1	
Carryover:	2424	1173	95	3478	276	10	

## Anlagen.

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Schiff	30,5 cm	28 cm	17 cm	15 cm	10,5 u. 8,8 cm	Tor- pedos	Remarks
Carryover:	2424	1173	95	3478	276	10	
„Frankfurt“ . . . . .	—	—	—	379	2	2	
„Köln“ . . . . .	—	—	—	—	500	—	
„Regensburg“ . . . . .	—	—	—	—	372	—	
„Stettin“ . . . . .	—	—	—	—	81	—	
„München“ . . . . .	—	—	—	—	159	—	
					u. 2 1/2 g.		
„Stuttgart“ . . . . .	—	—	—	—	64	—	
„Hamburg“ . . . . .	—	—	—	—	92	—	
I. Lpbtz. Flottille .	—	—	—	—	784	8	
II. „ „ „	—	—	—	—	648	1	
III. „ „ „	—	—	—	—	267	22	
9. „ Halbflottille	—	—	—	—	239	1	
					u. 5 1/2 g.		
VI. „ Flottille .	—	—	—	—	222	29	
VII. „ „ „	—	—	—	—	—	5	
IX. „ „ „	—	—	—	—	1587 <sup>2)</sup>	31	2) Include the total ammunition of the 3 sunken boats.
Total . . .	2424	1173	95	3857	5300	109	

Total fired: Heavy artillery = 3597 shells, of which 3160 were anti-armor shells

Medium artillery = 3952 „  
 Light Artillery = 5300 „

The heavy artillery scored 120 hits 3.33%.

The medium and light artillery scored 107 hits.

Note: 1. I. and III. Squadrons together have 1904 shot S.A. fired,  
 an average of 119 rounds per ship, 10.9 rounds per barrel  
 with an ammunition equipment of 80 to 90 rounds per barrel.

2. The battlecruisers have 1670 rounds of S.A. fired, an average of  
 334 rounds per ship, 37.95 rounds per barrel with an ammunition  
 equipment of 80 to 90 rounds per barrel.

"Derfflinger" and "Moltke" used about half their ammunition, "Lützow" 47.5 shots  
 per barrel.



## Appendix 10.

## Number of hits received from English ships.

Ship	Hit by heavy artillery	Hit by medium and light artillery	Date of Recovery	Remarks
Ships of the line:				
"Barham" . . . . .	6	—	4. July	
"Malaya" . . . . .	8	—	24. June	
"Warspite" . . . . .	18	—	20. July	
"Marlborough" <sup>1)</sup> . . . . .	—	—	2. August	1) A torpedo hit.
"Coloffus" <sup>2)</sup> . . . . .	2	1	?	2) Further damage from a short shot.
Battle cruiser:				
"Lion" . . . . .	12	—	19. July	
"Tiger" . . . . .	17	4	2. July	
"Princeß Royal" . . . . .	9	—	15. July	
"Queen Mary" . . . . .	5 <sup>3)</sup>	—	Sunk	3) Based on a conservative estimate.
"Indefatigable" . . . . .	5 <sup>3)</sup>	—	Sunk	
"Invincible" . . . . .	5 <sup>3)</sup>	3	Sunk	
Armored cruiser:				
"Warrior" . . . . .	15	6	Sunk	
"Defence" . . . . .	7 <sup>4)</sup>	3 <sup>4)</sup>	Sunk	4) Half as assumed on "Warrior".
"Black Prince" . . . . .	15 <sup>5)</sup>	6 <sup>5)</sup>	Sunk	
Small cruisers:				
"Chester" . . . . .	—	17	25. July	5) The same number as assumed on "Warrior".
"Canterbury" . . . . .	—	1	?	
"Dublin" . . . . .	—	8	17. June	
"Southampton" . . . . .	—	18	20. June	
Flotilla Leader:				
"Castor" . . . . .	—	about 10 <sup>6)</sup>	?	6) According to Jutland, Dispatches, page 305.
"Broke" . . . . .	—	9	31. August	
"Tipperary" . . . . .	—	several	Sunk	
Destroyer:				
"Ardent" . . . . .	—	several	Sunk	
"Acasta" . . . . .	—	8	2. August	
"Turbulent" . . . . .	—	several	Sunk	
"Hector" . . . . .	—	several	Sunk	
"Defender" . . . . .	1	several	23. June	
"Moorfom" . . . . .	—	1	17. June	
"Fortune" . . . . .	—	?	Sunk	
"Onslaught" . . . . .	—	1	23. June	
"Onslow" . . . . .	—	5	8. August	
"Shart" . . . . .	—	several	Sunk	A torpedo hit
"Petard" . . . . .	—	6	27. June	
"Porpoise" . . . . .	—	2	23. June	
"Nomad" . . . . .	—	1	Sunk	A torpedo hit
"Spitfire" . . . . .	—	2	31. July	Also collision.
"Sparrowhawk" . . . . .	—	?	Sunk	
Total . . . . .	120	107		

## Appendix 11.

## Number of hits received by German ships.

	Schiff	Hit by heavy artillery	Hit by medium and light artillery	Date of ship Recovery	Remarks	
July	Ships of the line:					
	"König" . . . . .	10	—	21. July	Encountered a mine while returning	
	"Großer Kurfürst" . . . .	8	—	18. July		
	"Kartgraf" . . . . .	5	—	20. July		
	"Kaiser" . . . . .	2	—	—		
	"Ostfriesland" . . . . .	—	—	28. July		
	"Helgoland" . . . . .	1	—	18. June	Hit by a torpedo.	
	"Oldenburg" . . . . .	—	1	—		
	"Rastau" . . . . .	—	2	10. July		
	"Rheinland" . . . . .	—	1	10. June		
	"Westfalen" . . . . .	—	1	17. June		
	"Schleswig-Holstein" . . .	1	—	24. June		
	"Pommern" . . . . .	1	—	Sunk		
	Battle cruiser:					
	"Düppel" . . . . .	24	—	Sunk		Hit by a torpedo.
	"Derfflinger" . . . . .	17	9	15. Oct.		
	"Seydlitz" . . . . .	21	2	18. Sept.		
	"Roltke" . . . . .	4	—	30. July		
	"von der Tann" . . . . .	4	—	2. Augt.		
	Small cruisers:					
	"Frankfurt" . . . . .	—	8	8. July	Hit by a torpedo.	
	"Elbing" . . . . .	—	1	Sunk		
	"Bilau" . . . . .	1	—	17. July		
	"Wiesbaden" . . . . .	—	—	Sunk		
	"Rostock" . . . . .	—	—	Sunk		
	"Stettin" . . . . .	—	2	20. July		
	"München" . . . . .	—	5	29. July		
	"Frauenlob" . . . . .	—	—	Sunk		
	"Hamburg" . . . . .	—	4	15. June		
	Torpedo boats:					
	"S 50" . . . . .	—	1	—	Hit by a torpedo.	
	"B 98" . . . . .	—	1	20. June		
"G 40" . . . . .	—	1	15. June			
"S 92" . . . . .	—	3	31. July			
"S 51" . . . . .	—	1	19. June			
"V 27" . . . . .	—	2	Sunk			
"V 29" . . . . .	1	—	Sunk			
"S 85" . . . . .	—	—	Sunk			
"G 41" . . . . .	—	1	—			
"V 28" . . . . .	—	1	18. June			
"V 48" . . . . .	—	—	Sunk			
Total	100	42				

## Appendix 12

## Number of guns disabled on the German side

Ship	Heavy artillery	Medium artillery	Comment
„Derfflinger“ . . . . .	4	2	The sunken ships are not included
„Seydlitz“ . . . . .	4	2	
„Moltke“ . . . . .	—	2	
„von der Tann“ . . . . .	2	—	
„König“ . . . . .	—	2	
„Großer Kurfürst“ . . . . .	—	1	
„Markgraf“ . . . . .	—	1	
„Schleswig-Holstein“ . . . . .	—	1	
Total . . .	10	11	

## British casualties in the Battle of the Skagerrak.

Ship class and name	Dead	Wounded	Captured	Total	Crew strength	Loss sum in % of the crew strength
Ships of the line:						
"Barham" . . . . .	26	46	—	72	1124	6,45
"Buliant" . . . . .	—	1	—	1	1068	0,09
"Barpate" . . . . .	14	32	—	46	1048	4,38
"Malaya" . . . . .	68	68	—	181	1082	12,69
"Rarlborough" . . . . .	2	2	—	4	1119	0,36
"Coloffus" . . . . .	—	9	—	9	884	1,01
Battlecruiser:						
"Dion" . . . . .	99	51	—	150	1229	12,2
"Tiger" . . . . .	24	46	—	70	1281	5,15
"Princeß Royal" . . . . .	22	81	—	108	1202	8,31
"Queen Mary" . . . . .	1266	6	2	1274	Sunk	—
"Indefatigable" . . . . .	1017	—	2	1019	Sunk	—
"Invincible" . . . . .	1026	1	—	1027	Sunk	—
Armored Cruiser:						
"Defence" . . . . .	908	—	—	908	Sunk	—
"Warrior" . . . . .	71	36	—	107	(Sunk)	12,86
"Black Prince" . . . . .	857	—	—	857	Sunk	—
Light cruisers:						
"Calliope" . . . . .	10	29	—	39	363	10,74
"Caroline" . . . . .	2	—	—	2	338	0,59
"Castor" . . . . .	18	26	—	39	356	10,96
"Chester" . . . . .	29	49	—	78	424	18,40
"Dublin" . . . . .	8	27	—	30	460	6,52
"Southampton" . . . . .	29	60	—	89	498	17,87
Flotilla leaders:						
"Broke" . . . . .	47	36	—	83	200	41,50
"Tipperary" . . . . .	185	4	8	197	Sunk	—
Destroyer:						
"Acasta" . . . . .	6	1	—	7	—	—
"Ardent" . . . . .	78	1	—	79	Sunk	—
"Defender" . . . . .	1	2	—	3	—	—
"Fortune" . . . . .	67	2	—	69	Sunk	—
"Roorfom" . . . . .	—	1	—	1	—	—
Carry over:	5860	617	12	6489	—	—

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## Znlagen.

Ship class and name	Dead	Wounded	Captured	Total	Crew strength	Loss sum in % of the crew strength
Carry over:	5860	617	12	6489	—	—
„Neßus“ . . . . .	7	7	—	14	—	—
„Nestor“ . . . . .	6	8	80	94	Sunk	—
„Nomad“ . . . . .	8	4	72	84	Sunk	—
„Obdurate“ . . . . .	1	1	—	2	—	—
„Onslaught“ . . . . .	5	8	—	8	—	—
„Onslow“ . . . . .	2	8	—	5	—	—
„Petard“ . . . . .	9	6	—	15	—	—
„Sparrowhawk“ . . . . .	6	—	—	6	Sunk	—
„Spitfire“ . . . . .	6	20	—	26	—	—
„Spart“ . . . . .	86	8	—	89	Sunk	—
„Porpoise“ . . . . .	2	2	—	4	—	—
„Turbulent“ . . . . .	96	—	18	109	Sunk	—
Total .	6094	674	177	6945	—	—

Total strength of the crew of the "Grand Fleet" about 60,000

Total loss in % of total strength. . . . . 11.59%

The fleet lost officers. . . . . 363, including 2 rear admirals with their entire staff and 6 commanders

Men . . . . . 6 582

## The losses of the German crews in the Battle of the Skagerrak.

Ship class and name	Killed or drowned instantly	Wounded	Amount of loss	Crew strength on 31.5.16	Loss sum in % of the crew strength
Ships of the Line:					
„Ostfriesland“ . . . . .	1	10	11	1890	0,79
„Oldenburg“ . . . . .	8	14	22	1284	1,71
„Rheinland“ . . . . .	10	20	30	1128	2,66
„Raffau“ . . . . .	11	16	27	1139	2,37
„Westfalen“ . . . . .	2	8	10	1124	0,89
„Pommern“ . . . . .	844	—	844	Sunk	—
„Schlesien“ . . . . .	1	—	1	828	0,24
„Schleswig-Holstein“ . . . . .	3	9	12	865	1,39
„König“ . . . . .	45	27	72	1815	5,47
„Großer Kurfürst“ . . . . .	15	10	25	1284	1,95
„Karlgraf“ . . . . .	11	18	24	1286	1,87
„Kaiser“ . . . . .	—	1	1	1249	0,08
„Prinzregent Luitpold“ . . . . .	—	11	11	1278	0,86
Battlecruiser:					
„Lützow“ . . . . .	115	50	165	Sunk	—
„Derfflinger“ . . . . .	157	26	183	1891	13,16
„Seeadler“ . . . . .	98	55	153	1425	10,74
„Moltke“ . . . . .	17	23	40	1855	2,95
„von der Tann“ . . . . .	11	35	46	1174	8,92
Small cruisers:					
„Pillau“ . . . . .	4	19	23	492	4,67
„Elbing“ . . . . .	4	12	16	Sunk	—
„Frankfurt“ . . . . .	8	18	21	562	3,74
„Wiesbaden“ . . . . .	589	—	589	Sunk	—
„Rostock“ . . . . .	14	6	20	Sunk	—
„Stettin“ . . . . .	8	28	36	400	9,0
„München“ . . . . .	8	20	28	365	7,67
„Frauenlob“ . . . . .	920	1	921	Sunk	—
„Hamburg“ . . . . .	14	25	39	826	11,96
Torpedo boats:					
„G 40“ . . . . .	1	2	3	—	—
„S 32“ . . . . .	3	1	4	—	—
„B 98“ . . . . .	2	11	13	—	—
„V 48“ . . . . .	90	—	90	Sunk	—
„V 4“ . . . . .	18	4	22	Sunk	—
„G 87“ . . . . .	1	5	6	—	—
„G 86“ . . . . .	1	7	8	—	—
„G 41“ . . . . .	—	5	5	—	—
Carry over:	2429	492	2921		



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**Anlagen.**

Ship class and name	Killed or drowned instantly	Wounded	Amount of loss	Crew strength from 31.5.16	Loss sum in % of the crew strength
Carry over:	2429	492	2921		
„V 27“ . . . . .	—	8	8	Sunk	—
„S 52“ . . . . .	1	1	2	—	—
„S 51“ . . . . .	—	8	8	—	—
„S 86“ . . . . .	—	4	4	—	—
„V 29“ . . . . .	88	4	87	Sunk	—
„S 85“ . . . . .	88	—	88	Sunk	—
Total . . .	2551	507	3058		

Total crew strength of the High Seas Fleet about . . . . . 45,000

Total loss in % of total strength . . . . . 6.79.

The total includes the machine personnel (engineers, machinists, machinist's mates and stokers) with 1048 included.

The losses are broken down as follows:

Naval officers . . . . . 89	Naval Officials. . . . . 5
Ensigns. . . . . 25	Deck Officers. . . . . 89
Naval Engineers. . . . . 14	NCOs. . . . . 572
Naval Medical Officers. 11	Crewmen . . . . . 2253

Appendix 15**Liste der verlorengegangenen Schiffe.**

	British		German	
	Ship	Water displacement in tons	Ship	Water displacement in tons
Battlecruiser . . . . .	„Indefatigable“ „Queen Mary“ „Invincible“	19 050 27 480 17 580	„Süßow“ — —	28 700 — —
Battleships . . . . .	—	—	—	—
Older ships of the . . . .	—	—	„Pommern“	18 200
Armored cruiser . . . . .	„Defence“ „Blad Prince“ „Warrior“	14 800 18 750 18 750	— — —	— — —
Kleine Kreuzer und Flottillenführerschiffe	„Tipperary“ — — —	1 900 — — —	„Wiesbaden“ „Frauenlob“ „Elbing“ „Rostock“	5 600 2 700 4 400 4 900
Small cruisers and flotilla leaders	„Ardent“ „Fortune“ „Restor“ „Romab“ „Scharf“ „Sparrowham“ „Turbulent“	950 965 1 000 1 000 950 950 1 000	„S 85“ „V 27“ „V 29“ „V 48“ „V 4“ — —	650 650 650 1 160 570 — —
Total . . .	—	115 025	—	61 180



Appendix 16.

Compilation of the most important English radio messages and signals for the battle in front of the Skagerrak.

(Excerpt and translation from the Jutland Despatsches)

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
30 May					
Admiralty	Vice Admiral Dover	1258	12:58 noon	L / T.	Harwich destroyer return there immediately. Temporarily recall Belgian coastal patrol.
Admiralty	Rear Admiral East Coast	0105	1:05 pm.	L/T.	Call minesweeper back.
Admiralty	III. Battle squadron, III. Cruiser squadron	0117	1:17 pm.	L/T.	Open steam on short notice tomorrow when it gets light. Move III cruiser squadron to the "Swin" today.
Minesweeping division	Commander-in-Chief "Grand Fleet"	0130	1:33 pm.	F. T.	Position 58 ° 45 N, 2 ° 15 W, torpedo fired at "Gentian" has passed.
Admiralty	Captain S. "Maidstone".	0137	1:37 pm.	L/T.	All submarines increased readiness.
"Owl"	Commander-in-Chief	1800	6:35 pm.	F. T.	Urgent: Trawler "Dunpedril" reports 4:45 pm from submarine. 58° 35' N, 2° 35' W.
II. Battle squadron	All	-	6:40 pm.	Flags	Clear to sail from Cromarty.
Commander-in-Chief	All	1835	6:40 pm.	Flags	Clear to sail from Scapa, with exception of "Royal Sovereign" and "Menelaus".
Chief battle cruiser fleet	Battlecruiser Fleet, V. Battle Squadron, I. IX., XIII. Fl.	-	6:45 pm.	Flags	Steam up for 22kn. Report if clear.,
Commander in chief	Battlecruiser fleet	1640	6:49 pm.	L / T.	Urgent: open steam.

1) Time groups and departure times are reduced to Central European time.

2) L/T. means land telegram, F. T. means radio message, Schw. means signal light.<sup>481</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	-	6:55 pm.	L/T.	III. Battle Squadron, III. Cruiser Squadron, V. Light Cruiser Squadron and Harwich Destroyer are not scheduled until further information is known.
Commander in Chief	Minesweeping Division	1850	7:11 pm.	F. T.	Mine sweepers stay out tonight and Tuesday. Fleet may go to sea.
Admiralty	V. Battle Squadron	-	7:30 pm.	L/T.	Very urgent! Open up the steam.
Admiralty	Captain S. "Maidstone"	-	7.35 Pm	L/T.	Urgently! 3 U-boats take the positions given by the Commander-in-Chief and keep them occupied until the night of June 3rd.
Admiralty	Commander in Chief, Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	1944	7:44 pm.	L/T.	3 Harwich submarines for area at Vyl, lightship advance tonight instead of tomorrow morning.
Admiralty	Commander East Coast	2003	8:03 pm.	L/T.	If the weather permits, flight reconnaissance to see tomorrow when it is light.
Commander in Chief	II. Battle Squadron	2030	8:30 pm.	L/T.	As soon as clear, go to sea. Departing over 58° 15' N, 2° 0' E. Meet me tomorrow at 3.31 Nm. at 57° 45' N, 4° 15' E. Several enemy submarines reported in the North Sea.
Commander in Chief	All	-	9:07 pm.	Flags	Fleet will leave port according to D. T. 3 method at 10.30 Nm. with the exception of "Royal Sovereign" and "Menelaus".
Commander in Chief	Battlecruiser Fleet	2037	9:15 pm.	L/T.	Admiralty Telegram 1840. Ships of the battle cruiser fleet, the 5th battle squadron and destroyers including Harwich destroyers in good working order advance to about 56° 40' N, 5° E. Destroyers use fuel sparingly. Assume that you will be waiting for you tomorrow, Wednesday, May 31, at 3 p.m. will be there. I'll be at 3 p.m. are about 57° 45' N, 4° 15' E, if not stopped by fog. III. Battlecruiser Squadrons, Chester and Canterbury will be leaving with me. If by 3 p.m. no messages, hold on to get in sight. I will steer from 57° 45' N, 4° 15 E to Horns Reef. Repeat the meeting point.
Harwich	Admiralty	-	9:27 pm.	L/T.	Submarines "D1", "D6", "E26", "E31", "E53", "E55" set sail. <sup>482</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Battle cruiser Fleet	Commander in Chief	2130	9:39 pm	L/T.	Received and understood your Telegram 2037. My meeting point 3 p.m. 31. May. 56° 40' N, 5° E. Your meeting point 57° 45' N, 4° 15' E.
Commander in Chief	Minesweeper	2138	9:52 pm.	F. T.	Fleet goes to sea between 10:30 and 11:30 p.m., course 84° from Pentland Skerries. Get out of the way.
Long Hope	Commander in Chief	2125	9:53 pm.	F. T.	"Duke of Clarence" to Commander-in-Chief and "Dundee". Drifter reports: surfaced submarine sighted 6 p.m. Pentland Skerries SE by S, appeared when Drifter approached.
"Nottingham"	Commander in Chief, Battlecruiser Fleet	2220	10:31 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! "Trident" reports attacked by submarine in 56° N, 1° 31' W at 7:45 pm.
Commander-in-Chief	Subordinate Ships	2300	11:00 pm.	F. T.	F. T. Silence, except when sighting the enemy or in response to radio messages from the admiral.
31. May.					
Commander in Chief	Admiralty	2345	12:20 am.	F. T.	XI. Submarine flotilla clear to sea, suggest that Admiralty give it further orders as the situation develops.
Commander-in-Chief	., IV. Battle Squadron Commodore F. IV., XI., XII. Flotilla	0056	2:15 am.	F. T.	When it gets light, form the battle fleet division columns, distance 8 cable lengths, organization 5.
Commander in Chief	Admiralty	0222	2:22 am.	F.T.	Battle fleet pushes forward to 57° 45' N, 4° 15' E, battle cruiser fleet to 56° 40' N, 5° 0' E, both there at 3 p.m., tomorrow May 31.
Commodore T.	Admiralty	0550	5:50 am.	L/T.	Urgently! Orders not yet received for - Harwich Forces. Answer: The order is one hour readiness in port.
Commander in Chief	"St. Vincent "	1018	10:12 am.	Schw.	Did you hear phone signals between 7 and 9 a.m.? Answer: no.
Commander in Chief	Armored Cruiser	-	11:05 am.	Flags	Take line # 1. In the middle of the line, advanced 10 nm in front of the battle fleet.
Commander in Chief	"St. Vincent "	1135	11:40 am.	Schw.	Pay close attention to radio signals for the next half hour. <sup>483</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
"St. Vincent"	Commander in Chief	1256	12:58 pm	Schw.	Germans received encrypted radio message at noon hold from J. Z. to J. B. Strength 3, wavelength 2100 feet, Telefunken, German naval procedure applied.
Commander in Chief	Armored Cruiser	1315	1:20 pm.	Schw.	Battlecruiser fleet will likely be sighted later and should be reported upon arrival.
Admiralty	All ships	1440	3:05 pm.	F. T.	Area just east of Corton Light ship suspected of being mined. Avoid near it until it is searched.
"Galatea"	battle cruiser fleet	1510	3:10 pm.	Black	two-chimney ship has stopped the steamship in ESE, 8 nm, seek contact.
Chief of battlecruiser Fleet	subordinates	1451	3:15 pm.	Schw.	Change of course in columns to N by E.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	V. Battle Squadron	1512	3:15 pm.	Schw.	If we turn to N, keep an eye out for advanced cruisers of the "Great Fleet".
"Galatea"	All	-	3:20 pm.	Flags	Comment: Enemy in sight! Two enemy cruisers sighted to the east.
"Galatea"	chief battle cruiser fleet	1520	3:20 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! 2 cruisers, probably enemy ones, in sight in ESE. Course questionable. My position 56° N, 49' N 5° 21' E.
"Cyclops"	Aberdeen	1500	3:23 pm.	F. T.	For commanders in chief of news place Blyth. "Talisman" and submarines "G 2, 3, 4, 5" set sail at noon to 54° 30' N, 4° 0' E according to the orders of the Admiralty.
"St. Vincent "	Commander in Chief	1515	3:28 pm.	optical	German encrypted radio message on captured. From B. Z. to G. R. Strength 9. Wavelength 2600 feet. Telefunken.
"Galatea"	chief battle cruiser fleet	1522	3:30 pm.	F. T.	Urgent! To 1520 cruiser stopped.
Chief Battle cruiser fleet	All	-	3:32 pm.	Flags	Change of course in columns to SSE. Admiral intends to run 22 kn. Open up steam for extreme strength and report when it is clear.
"Galatea"	Chief Battle cruiser fleet	1530	3:34 pm.		F. T. Urgent! The enemy ships reported in 1520 are destroyers, hunt them down. <sup>484</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
"Galatea"	chief battle cruiser fleet	1530	3:34 pm.	F. T.	Urgent! A cruiser, probably - more hostile, in E, steers SSE. My position 56° 50' N, 5° 19' E.
Commander in Chief	All	-	3:35 pm.	Flags	Steam up for utmost strength and report when clear.
"Galatea"	chief battle cruiser fleet	1535	3:39 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! Have seen strong clouds of battle smoke like from a cruiser fleet in ENE. My location 56° 50' N, 5° 19' E.
"Galatea"	chief battle cruiser fleet	1545	3:46 pm.	Schw.	The enemy has apparently turned to the north.
chief battle cruiser fleet	"Engadine"	1545	3:47 pm.	Schw.	Aircraft should clear up after NNE. - send you two destroyers.
"Galatea"	chief battle cruiser fleet	1545	3:51 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! To 1535. Rauch seems to belong to 7 ships besides destroyers and cruisers. You turned north. My position is 56° 52' N, 5° 33' E
"St. Vincent "	Commander in Chief	1545	3:52 pm.	Schw.	Germans receive encrypted radio message. 2300 feet wavelength. Strength 10. Telefunken.
I. Light Cruiser Squadron	Chief Battle Cruiser Fleet	1550	3:52 pm.	Schw.	I'm in combat.
Chief Battlecruiser fleet	All	-	3:52 pm.	Flags	Change of course in columns to SE.
Chief Battlecruiser fleet	II. Light Cruiser Squadron	-	4:00 pm.	Schw.	Attack enemy vanguard.
Chief Battlecruiser fleet	all	-	4:01 pm.	Flags	Columns of course change to the east.
"Galatea"	Chief Battlecruiser fleet	1605	4:05 pm.	Schw.	Several cruisers and destroyers take bearings on the east, steer different courses. My position: 56° 54' N, 5° 21' E. Keep in touch. Course N, 25 kn. Enemy cruisers have changed course to NW.
"Falmouth"	Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet Commander in Chief	1600	4:05 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! 3 cruisers, probably enemy ones, in sight, bearing east, heading N. My position: 56° 59' N, 5° 31' E.
"Galatea"		1607	4:08 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! The reported enemy ships have changed course to NW, my course is NNW. My location 56° 59' N, 5° 27.5' E <sup>485</sup> .

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Commander in Chief	Armored Cruiser	-	4:10 pm.	Schw.	Form reconnaissance line no. 1, in the middle 16 nm ahead of the battle fleet. Advance speed 18 kn. Expect full combat readiness.
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	1610	4:10 pm.	F. T.	According to F. T. - bearing at 3:31 am location of enemy light cruiser 56° 57' N, 6° 9' E and enemy destroyer 56° 57' N, 5° 43' E (4:29 hours on "Lion" received).
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	4:12 pm.	Flags	Admiral intends to advance at 23 knots. Change of course in columns to NE.
"New Zealand"	-	-	4:15 pm.	-	Comment: 5 enemy ships "sighted to starboard.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	Commander in Chief	1610	4:15 pm.	Schw.	Priority: My course ESE, 22 kn.
Commander in Chief	All	-	4:16 pm.	Flags	Column spacing 1 nm, Admiral intends to run 19 knots.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	4:20 pm.	Flags	Admiral intends to run at 24 knots.
Chief of battlecruiser Fleet	subordinates Ships	1615	4:21 pm.	F. T.	My position: 56° 48' N, 5° 17' E. heading NE. Travel 23 kn.
"Galatea"	chief battle cruiser fleet	1620	4:22 pm.	F. T. Schw.	Urgently! Pull enemy after me to NW, seems to follow. My position is 57° 02' N, 5° 23' E.
"Princeß Royal"	chief battle cruiser fleet	-	4:23 pm.	Flags	Draw attention to the direction of E by N.
Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	Commander in Chief	1650	4:56 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! I'm in combat. My location is 56 ° 53 'N, 5 ° 31' E.
"Galatea"	chief battle cruiser fleet	1655	4:59 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! Enemy is aiming ESE, course ESE. My position Course and speed 57° 3' N, 5° 27' E, ESE, 28 kn.
Commander in Chief	All	-	4:59 pm.	Flags	Admiral intends to run at 20 knots.
Squadron Chief	III. Battlecruiser Squadron	-	5:00 pm.	Flags	Admiral intends to run at 24 knots.
"Warspite"	-	-	5:00 pm.	-	Comment: Fire started. <sup>486</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
"Lion"	-	-	5:01 pm.	-	Comment: "Indefatigable" Explodes
Commander in Chief	III. Battlecruiser Squadron	1704	5:04 pm.	F. T.	Advance immediately to support the battle cruiser fleet, whose position is 56° 53'N, 5° 31' E. Course S 55° E at 4:50 pm.
Chief battle cruiser fleet	"Champion" over "Princess Royal"	1702	5:09 pm.	F. T.	Attack enemy with torpedoes. ("Champion" didn't respond until 6:16 p.m.)
Chief of the battle cruiser fleet	"Princess Royal"	1705	5:10 pm.	F. T.	Main F. T. (on "Lion") out of action.
"Lion"	-	-	5:11 pm.	F. T.	Comment: "Nottingham" reports submarine to starboard.
Chef III. Battlecruiser Squadron	Commander in Chief	1706	5:15 pm.	F. T.	My position, course and speed: - 57° 39' N, 5° 35' E. SSE, 25 kn.
Commander in Chief	V. Battle Squadron	1715	5:17 pm.	F. T.	Are you in the battlecruiser fleet? Answer: Yes, I am in combat.
"Lion"	-	-	5:20 pm.	-	Comment: "Queen Mary" Blew up.
"Southampton"	Commander in Chief chief battle cruiser fleet	1730	5:30 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! An enemy cruiser ", in SE, steers NE. My location is 56° 38' N, 6° 7' E.
"Nottingham"	II. Light Cruiser Squadron	-	5:30 pm.	optically	Two cruisers to SSE.
"Birmingham"	II. Light Cruiser Squadron	1704	5:32 pm.	optically	A four-chimney cruiser (in sight).
"Southampton"	Chief Battle cruiser fleet	-	5:33 pm.	Schw.	Black battleships in SO.
"Southampton"	chief battle cruiser fleet commander in chief	1738	5:38 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! Priority: Have sighted enemy battle fleets around SE. Course N. My position 56° 34' N, 6° 20' E.
"Champion"	chief battle cruiser fleet	1730	5:38 pm.	F. T.	The enemy battle fleet is heading ENE, keel line. Vanguard capital ships, bearing in the middle of the line, My position is 56° 51' N, 5° 46' E. <sup>487</sup>



Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	5:40 pm.	Flags	Pivoting 16 lines to starboard.
"Lion"	-	-	5:42 pm.	-	Comment: Enemy battle fleet ahead in sight.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	Destroyers	-	5:43 pm.	Flags	To return.
Chief battle cruiser fleet	"Princess Royal"	-	5:45 pm.	Beckoning.	Report enemy battleships in SE to Commander in Chief.
Chief of battle cruiser fleet	Commander in chief from "Princess Royal"	1745	5:45 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! Priority: Spotted enemy battle fleet in SE. My location 56° 36' N, 6° 4' E. (Received by Commander-in-Chief as 36–30 battleships, probably enemy ones, bearing SSE and steering SE.)
Commodore T.	Admiralty	1745	5:45 pm.	L / T.	Do you have any orders?
Commander in Chief	All	1745	5:47 pm.	optical	Enemy battle fleet is coming north.
"Southampton"	Chief Battlecruiser Fleet Commander in Chief	1746	5:48 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! Priority: The enemy battle fleet is heading N. – Kiel line. Vanguard consists of "Kaiser" ships, center is bearing E. Destroyer on both wings and ahead. Enemy battle cruisers are approaching the battle fleet from N. My position is 56° 29' N, 6° 14' E.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	V. Battle Squadron	-	5:48 pm.	Flags	Pivoting 16 lines to starboard.
"Lion"	-	-	5:50 pm.	-	Comment: V. Battle Squadron on - opposite course passed.
Commander in Chief	Admiralty	1750	5:51 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! Fleet action is imminent.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	5:52 pm.	Flags	Admiral intends to run at 25 knots.
Admiralty	Commander-in-Chief	1800	6:00 pm.	F. T.	Around 5:09 pm. enemy battle fleet at 56° 27' N, 6° 18' E, heading NW 15 kn.
"Southampton"	Commander in Chief	1800	6:00 pm.	F. T.	Enemy battle fleet steers N, takes a bearing from here E, 10 to 11 nm. Location: 56° 33' N, 6° 0' E. <sup>488</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	V. Battle Squadron	-	6:01 pm.	Flags	Extend the line astern (from the battlecruisers).
Admiralty	Commodore T.	1815	6:15 pm.	L/T.	Proceed to fuel addition. You may later have to relieve the small cruisers and destroyers in the battle cruiser fleet.
Commodore T.	Admiralty	1810	6:15 pm.	L / T.	Priority! Urgently. I'm going to sea.
Commander in Chief	Chief Battle Cruiser Fleet	1813	6:16 pm.	F. T.	My position is 57° 25' N, 5° 12' E. Steer SE by S, drive 20 kn.
"Tiger"	I. Battlecruiser Squadron	1825	6:22 pm.	optical	Aft 15.2 cm ammunition chamber flooded, 2 guns out of action.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	6:25 pm.	Flags	Stand by to resume battle.
"Indomitable"	-	-	6:34 pm.	-	Comment: "Invincible" fire started.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	6:35 pm.	Schw.	Course change to NNE.
Admiralty	Commodore T.	1825	6:35 pm.	F. T.	Return immediately and await the command.
"Falmouth"	"Black Prince"	1835	6:35 pm.	Schw.	Battle cruiser in battle SSW from me.
"Orion"	-	-	6:40 pm	-	Comment: Middle ship of the 1st Cruiser Squadron opened fire.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	6:40 pm.	Flags	Open fire and resume the fight.
"Minotaur"	Commander in Chief	-	6:40 pm.	Schw.	Heard gun thunder in the south.
"Galatea"	chief battle cruiser fleet	1840	6:40 pm.	F. T.	Enemy battlecruisers change course to starboard.
"Southampton"	Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	1840	6:40 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! Priority: the enemy battle fleet has changed course to NNW. My location 56° 46' N, 5° 40' E.
"Black Prince"	Commander in Chief II. Cruiser Squadron	1840	6:42 pm.	F. T.	Enemy battlecruisers in S, 5 nm from. My location 56° 59' N, 5° 24' E.
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	1845	6:45 pm.	F. T.	Enemy main body at 5:30 pm. in 56° 31' N, 6° 5' E, steers N, 15 kn. (Received on "Iron Duke" at 6:53 hours.) <sup>489</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
I. Cruiser Squadron	II. Cruiser Squadron, Commander in Chief	1845	6:46 pm.	F. T. Schw	Ships in battle in SSW, steer NE. My position is 57° 7' N, 5° 38' E.
Chief battle cruiser fleet	light cruisers	—	6:47 pm.	Flags	Attack enemy with torpedoes.
"Calliope"	Commander in Chief	-	6:50 pm.	Schw.	Saw gun flashes in SSW.
I. Battle Squadron	Commander in Chief	-	6:50 pm.	optical	Gunfire to starboard.
"Southampton"	Commander-in-Chief, Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	1850	6:50 pm.	F. T.	Urgent, priority: Enemy battle fleet has changed course to N. Enemy battle cruisers are targeting SW of enemy battle fleet. My location 56° 50' N, 5° 44' E.
Commander-in-Chief	"Marlborough"	1900	6:55 pm	Schw.	What can you see? Answer: Our battle cruiser in SSW, steers E, "Lion" leads. Further answer: V. Battle Squadron - in SW.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	6:56 pm.	Flags	Change of course to NE by E. Drive 25kn.
"Indomitable"	-	-	6:56 pm.	-	Comment: Inflexible and Indomitable Fire opened.
Chief 1st Battle Squadron	5th Division	-	7:00 pm.	optical	Remember the lore of the glorious June 1st and avenge Belgium!
"Warspite"	-	-	7:00 pm.	-	Comment: The signal is "unable to maneuver".
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	7:00 pm.	Flags	Change of course to E.
Commander in Chief	Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	-	7:01 pm.	Schw.	Where is the enemy battle fleet? (Repeated at 7:10 hours.) Answer: Have sighted enemy battle fleets in SSW. (Received by "Iron Duke" at 7.14 pm.)
Commander in Chief	All	-	7:02 pm.	Flags	Course change in columns to S, speed 18 kn.
"Southampton"	Commander in Chief, Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	1900	7:03 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! Lost enemy battle fleet out of sight. I'm in combat with enemy battlecruisers. My position is 56° 57' N, 5° 43' E. Course NNE, speed of 26 kn. <sup>490</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Commander in Chief	All	-	7:06 pm.	Flags	Change course in columns to SE.
"Lion"	Commander in Chief	-	7:06 pm.	Schw.	Enemy battlecruisers are aiming SE.
Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	III. Battlecruiser Squadron	1095	7:06 pm.	F. T.	My position 55 ° 58 N, 5 ° 37 'E. - Course E. Travel 25 kn.
"New Zealand"	-	-	7:08 pm.	-	Comment: "Grand fleet" sighted on port side.
Commander in Chief	Destroyer	-	7:08 pm.	Flags	Set up according to destroyer distribution No. 1.
"Barham"	Commander in Chief	-	7:10 pm.	Flags	Enemy battle fleet in SSE.
Commander in Chief	All	-	7:15 pm.	Flags	Swivel the columns closest to SE by E on this course. The remaining column-wise change of course in the wake of the former while maintaining the speed of the fleet.
Chief V. Battle Squadron	V. Battle Squadron	-	7:18 pm.	Flags	Course change 16 line to port.
Commander-in-Chief	Subordinate associations	1915	7:19 pm.	F. T.	Priority: The current course of the fleet is SE by E.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	7:21 pm.	Flags	Admiral intends to sail 26 knots.
"Southampton"	Commander in Chief, chief battle cruiser fleet	1920	7:24 pm.	F. T.	Enemy battle fleet plot 10 to 11 nm in SSE. The enemy battle fleet is heading NE. My location is 56° 58' N, 5° 51' E.
Chief IV. Battle Squadron.	4th Division	-	7:24 pm.	Flags	Open fire and fight.
Commander in Chief	Battle Fleet	-	7:26 pm.	F. T.	Admiral intends to run 14 kn.
"Lion"	Commander in Chief for the top ship of the battle fleet	1918	7:27 pm.	Schw.	Enemy battle fleet in sight in S, distance from the next ship of the same is 7 nm. <sup>491</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Commander-in-chief	Battle fleet and assigned cruisers	-	7:29 pm.	F. T. & Flags	Divisional change of course to SSE. (Withdraw.)
Chief of the 1st Battle Squadron	5th Division	-	7:30 pm.	Flags	Open fire and fight.
"Inflexible"	-	-	7:30 pm.	-	Comment: "Invincible" blown up.
Commander in Chief	All	-	7:33 pm.	Flags	Admiral intends to run at 17 knots.
Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	III. Light cruiser squadron	1945	7:40 pm.	Schw.	How do enemy battlecruisers take their bearings? Answer: Last in sight at 7:20 pm., changed course in the battle with the III. Battle cruiser squadron on W.
"Indomitable"	chief battle cruiser fleet	-	7:41 pm.	Schw.	Invincible" has sunk.
" Commander-in-Chief	Battle Fleet and Assigned Cruisers	-	7:44 pm.	F. T., Flags	Divisional change of course to SE.
"Marlborough"	-	-	7:50 pm.	-	Comment: "Marlborough" hit on starboard.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	7:50 pm.	F. T., Schw.	III. battlecruiser squadron Attach
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	7:53 pm.	Flags	Admiral intends to sail 18 knots.
Commander in Chief	Chief Battle Cruiser Fleet	1954	7:54 pm.	F. T.	Current course of the fleet is S.
Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	Commander in Chief	1945	7:54 pm.	F. T.	U-boat in sight at 57° 2' N, 6° 24' E.
Commander-in-Chief	Battleship and assigned cruisers	-	7:55 pm.	F. T., Flags	Divisional change of course to S.
Commander in Chief	Chief I. Battle Squadron	1950	7:55 pm.	Schw.	Can you see any enemy battleships? Answer: no.
"Marlborough"	Commander in Chief	1957	7:58 pm.	F. T.	Urgent! Got hit by torpedo.
"King George V."	Commander in Chief	1959	8:00 pm.	Schw.	boat is right ahead of you. <sup>492</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	Commander in Chief	1855	8:06 pm.	Schw.	The enemy is in the west.
"Benbow"	-	-	8:00 pm.	-	Comment: Wreck "Invincible" passed. Destroyer recovers survivors.
Commander in Chief	Destroyer "Badger"	-	8:03 pm.	Schw.	Is wreck one of our ships? Answer: Yes, "Invincible".
"Southampton"	Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	2000	8:04 pm.	F. T	Urgent! Priority: Enemy battle fleet steers ESE. Enemy is aiming from me SSW. Number unsure. My location is 57° 2' N, 6° 7' E.
Commander-in-Chief	Battle Fleet and Assigned Cruisers	-	8:05 pm.	F. T.	3-line turn to starboard.
Commander-in-Chief	Battleship and assigned cruisers	-	8:09 pm.	F. T. & Flags	3-line turn to port.
"Benbow"	Commander in Chief	2008	8:09 pm.	optical	Enemy destroyers in SW. (Addressed to "Iron Duke" at 8:16 am.)
Commander-in-Chief	Battleship and assigned cruisers	-	8:09 pm.	F. T., flags	Turn to S.
Commander in Chief	I. Battle Squadron	-	8:12 pm.	Schw.	Cut in behind IV. Battle Squadron.
Chief IV. Battle Squadron	4th Division	-	8:13 pm.	Flags	Accurate turn 2 lines from the enemy.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	8:15 pm.	Flags	Admiral intends to sail 22 knots.
Commander in Chief	Chief. II. Battle Squadron	-	8:16 pm.	Schw.	II. battle squadrons Advance
Commander-in-Chief	Battle Fleet and Assigned Cruisers	-	8:20 pm.	F. T., Flags	Admiral intends to run 15 knots.
Commander in Chief	II. Battle Squadron	-	8:21 pm.	Flags	Turn 4 points to port.
Commander-in-Chief	Battle Fleet and Assigned Cruisers	-	8:22 pm.	F. T., Flags	Accurate turn 2 lines from the enemy.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	8:22 pm.	Flags	Admiral intends to run at 24 knots. <sup>493</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Commander in Chief	Chief IV. Light Cruiser Squadron	-	8:22 pm.	-	IV. Light cruiser squadron ready to attack the enemy torpedo boats. Push forward with the utmost vigor.
Commander-in-Chief	Battle Fleet and Assigned Cruisers	-	8:25 pm.	Flags	Accurate turn 2 lines from the enemy.
"Marlborough"	Commander in Chief	2032	8:31 pm.	F. T.	Can only run 17 knots.
Commander-in-Chief	Battle Fleet and Assigned Cruisers	-	8:35 pm.	F. T. and flags	Column-wise change of course to S by W
Commander-in-Chief	Battleship and assigned cruisers	2036	8:36 pm.	F. T.	Kiel line form in order of tactical numbers.
"Inflexible"	Chief battle cruiser fleet	-	8:40 pm.	Flags	Submarine to starboard.
Commander in Chief	Chief. II. Battle Squadron	-	8:40 pm.	Schw.	My course is SW
Commander in Chief	Destroyer	-	8:40 pm.	Schw.	Return.
"Lion"	Commander in Chief	2030	8:40 pm.	F. T.	Enemy is aiming from here NW by W 10 to 11 nm. My location 56° 56' N, 6° 16' E. Course SW, speed 18 kn.
Commander in Chief	3rd and 4th Divisions	-	8:42 pm.	Flags	Form keel lines in order of tactical numbers. Course SW
"Southampton"	Commander in Chief	2045	8.45 pm.	F. T.	Urgent! Enemy has detached an uncertain number of ships of undetectable type which will steer at 8:15 pm. NW. My location is 56° 50' N, 6° 27' E.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	Chief II. Cruiser Squadron	2045	8:45 pm.	Schw.	Passed on to the top ship of the battle fleet: The top ship of the enemy battle fleet is aiming NW by W, course approximately SW. (by "King George V" to "Iron Duke", the latter only received at 8:59 pm.)
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	Commander in Chief	2050	8:47 pm.		F. T. Urgent! Suggest that the battleship vanguard follow battlecruisers. We can then cut off the entire enemy battle fleet. (Addressed "Iron Duke" at 8:54 pm.) <sup>494</sup>



Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	Battlecruiser	2045	8:50 pm.	optically & F. T.	The combat strength
	of the ships is reported as follows: 1. maximum speed available, 2. number of combat-ready heavy artillery pieces, 3. remaining ammunition in tenths of the original equipment. Answer: "Princess Royal", 1. full speed, 2. 6 guns, 3. 8/10. "Inflexible", 1. 25 kn, 2. 7 guns, 3. 9/10. "Indomitable", 1. full speed, 2. all guns, 3. 9/10. "Lion", Q-turret out of action, A-turret one gun clear, 1 for loading on manual operation. B tower clear. X-turret one gun clear and one gun temporarily out of action. 100 rounds per tower still available.				
"Tiger"	Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	2050	8:55 pm.	optical	Q-ammunition chamber is flooded and I cannot right the ship at the moment. I take on considerable amounts of water every time I turn the rudder.
Chief battle cruiser fleet	small cruisers	2100	9:00 pm.	Schw.	Scout to the west and find the tip of the enemy line before dark.
Chef III. Light Cruiser Squadron	III. Light Cruiser Squadron	-	9:00 pm.	Flags	Small cruisers take reconnaissance line, line bearing S, course W.
Commander in Chief	All	-	9:00 pm.	F. T. and flags	In columns, turn to W, speed of 17 kn.
Commander in Chief	Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	2100	9:00 pm.	F. T.	The current course of the fleet is W.
"Marlborough"	Commander in Chief	2105	9:07 pm.	Schw. & F. T.	A-boiler room, dynamo room, starboard hydraulic pump room under water. Slight leak in the front 15.2 cm ammunition chamber. Maximum speed 17 kn. Right gun from A-turret out of action.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	9:10 pm.	Flags	Open fire.
"Princess Royal"	chief battle cruiser fleet	-	9:10 pm.	optical	"Tiger" reports: 2 guns out of action.
Commodore F.	1st half flotilla	-	9:11 pm.	Flags	Destroyers attack in NW.
Commander in Chief	Chief II. Battle Squadron	2110	9:14 pm.	Schw.	II. Battle squadrons follow our battle cruisers. (Entered on "King George V." entrance for 9:07 a.m.)
Commodore F.	Chief II. Battle Squadron	-	9:14 pm.	Flags	Enemy destroyers are aiming NW. (Sent to Commander-in-Chief at 9.26 a.m.)
"Princess Royal"	chief battle cruiser fleet	-	9:15 pm.	optically	I think "Princess Royal" must have run over a submarine. Ship doesn't make water. The shock was very violent. <sup>495</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Commodore F.	IV. Light cruiser squadron and "Kempenfelt"	-	9:15 pm.	Schw.	12 enemy destroyers in NW.
Chief of the battlecruiser fleet	"Minotaur"	21.10	9:15 pm.	Schw.	How does the top ship of our battle fleet take a bearing? Answer: NNE, 5 nautical miles from "King George V".
Chief battle cruiser fleet	battle cruiser	-	9:17 pm.	Flags	Course change to W. Admiral intends to sail 17 knots.
"Falmouth"	-	-	9:17 pm.	-	Comment: fire started. 9:19 p.m. Zeppelin in sight to port. (Unsure.)
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	Chief II. Light Cruiser Squadron	2115	9:20 pm.	F. T.	What is your location, course, and driving? Are you in touch with the enemy?
Chief . III. Light Cruiser Squadron	III. Light cruiser squadron	-	9:20 pm.	Flags	open fire and fight
"Inflexible"	-	-	9:20 pm.	-	Comment: fire started.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	9:21 pm.	Flags	Change of course to WSW.
Commander-in-Chief	Battle Fleet & Assigned - Cruisers	-	9:21 pm.	F. T.	Column turns to WSW.
Commander-in-chief	battle fleet and assigned cruisers	-	9:25 pm.	F. T. and flags	in columns, turn to W.
Commander in Chief	Battle Fleet & assigned cruisers	-	9:28 pm.	F. T. and flags	in columns, turn to SW.
"Falmouth"	Commander-in-Chief, Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	2122	9:28 pm.	F. T.	Urgent! I'm in combat with enemy cruisers. My position: 56° 47' N, 5° 46' E.
Chef III. Light cruiser squadron	chief battle cruiser fleet	2125	9:30 pm.	F. T.	My position: 56° 46' N, 6° 25' E. Course WSW, speed 20 kn. Stand with battle fleet, have no contact with the enemy.
"Inconstant"	chief battle cruiser fleet	2130	9:33 pm.	F. T.	U-Boot 56° 56' N, 6° 6' E.
"Warrior" via "Engadine"	Commander in Chief	2203	9:37 pm.	F. T.	Both planes out of action. "Warrior" in tow from "Engadine". 57° 10' N, 5° 37' E. <sup>496</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Commander in Chief	"Comus"	-	9:38 pm.	Schw.	Who are you firing at? Answer: Enemy battle fleet is targeting W.
"Tiger"	chief battle cruiser fleet	2135	9:40 pm.	F. T.	Main F.T station only ready to receive.
Chief II. Battle Squadron	Commander in Chief	2144	9:45 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! Our battlecruisers are not in sight.
Commander in Chief	Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	2146	9:46 pm.	F. T.	Specify the enemy bearing.
"Falmouth"	Commander in Chief, Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	2145	9:46 pm.	F. T.	(Position of) battle cruisers unknown. Bearing of the enemy is N. Course of the enemy WSW. Position of the reporting ship 56° 42' N, 5° 37' E.
"Warspite"	Chief V. Battle Squadron	2135	9:50 pm.	F. T.	"Warspite" has 2 large holes at the level of the engine room. "Warspite" can run 16 knots. Please location of the battle fleet.
Chief II. Light Cruiser Squadron	Commander in Chief	-	9:50 pm.	Schw.	Enemy destroyers attack from W.
Chief of Battle Cruiser Fleet	Chief of II. Cruiser Squadron	-	9:55 pm.	Schw.	Please give me the location of the II. Battle Squadron. Answer: Not in sight, when last seen, this NNE measured 5 nautical miles from 9:10 pm.
"Southampton"	Commander in Chief	2135	9:57 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! I'm in combat with enemy destroyers. Enemy ships take my bearings. Number unknown. My location is 56° 38' N, 6° 9' E.
"Lion"	Commander in Chief	2140	9:59 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! Enemy battle cruisers and older ships of the line aim from me at N 34° W, 10 to 11 nautical miles, steer SW. My position: 56° 40' N, 5° 50' E course SW. 17 kn.
"Caroline"	Chief II. Battle Squadron	2155	10:00 pm.	Schw.	3 ships are targeting NW, 7300 m, could attack with torpedoes. Apparently older ships of the line. (Not recorded as received on "King George V".)
Commander in Chief	Battle Fleet	-	10:01 pm	F. T. and flags	Column-wise turn on S. <sup>497</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	Chief II. Battle Squadron	2140	10:01 pm	F. T.	My position now 56° 40' N, 5° 50' E. Course S 50° W, speed 17 kn.
"Caroline"	"Royalist"	-	10:05 pm.	Schw.	Did you fire a torpedo? Answer: Yes, one.
Chief of the 1st Battle Squadron	Commander in Chief	2201	10:05 pm.	F. T.	Urgently! Enemy destroyers attack small cruisers from W.
Chief II. Battle Squadron	"Caroline"	-	10:06 pm.	Schw.	Don't attack! These ships are our battle cruisers.
"Caroline"	Chief II. Battle Squadron	-	10:06 pm.	Schw.	These ships are apparently hostile.
Chief II. Battle Squadron	"Caroline"	-	10:06 pm.	Schw.	If you are absolutely sure, attack.
Chief of the V. Battle Squadron	"Warspite"	2205	10:07 pm.	F. T.	"Warspite" to return to Rosyth.
Chief II. Battle Squadron	Commander in Chief	2205	10:07 pm.	F. T.	Urgent! Our battle cruisers in sight, sighting WNW, steering SW.
"Southampton"	Commander in Chief	2212	10:10 pm.	F. T.	The enemy reported as 2155 has been pushed to the NW. My position 56° 35' N, 6° 9' E.
Commander in Chief	All	-	10:17 pm.	F. T. and flag	Organization II take. Divisions arranged next to each other on the right. Column spacing one nautical mile.
"Duke of Edinburgh"	"Shannon"	-	10:17 pm.	Folding lantern	Your masthead lantern is burning.
Commander-in-Chief	All subordinate units	2215	10:27 pm.	F. T.	Destroyer line up 5 nautical miles behind the battle fleet.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	10.30 pm.	Flags	Change of course on S.
Commander in Chief	"Abdiel"	2232	10:32 pm.	F. T.	If there is enough time, before light, lay mines at the location ordered by Operation M, and then return to Rosyth via the south side of Area 1. <sup>498</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	Commander in Chief	2200	10:38 pm.	F. T.	My current location is 56° 32' N, 5° 41' E. Course SW. Travel 17 kn. Enemy takes aim N by W, controls WSW.
Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	Chief I. Light Cruiser Squadron	2207	10:41 pm.	F. T.	Take up light cruiser squadron position W by S, 4 nautical miles (from the flagship). Pay close attention to the movements of the enemy who are aiming for N by W.
Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	Commander in Chief	2235	10:43 pm.	F. T.	My position 56° 28' N, 5° 38' E. Course S. Travel 17 kn.
Commander-in-Chief	Subordinate Formations	2245	10:48 pm.	F. T.	My corresponding location 10:45 pm. is 56° 26' N, 5° 47' E, course S, speed 17 kn.
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	2205	10:55 pm.	F. T.	3 destroyer flotillas have been ordered to attack you during the night.
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	2258	10:58 pm.	F. T.	At 10 pm. Final ship of the enemy battle fleet at 56° 33' N, 5° 30' E, on a southerly course. (Addressed to "Iron Duke" at 11:23 pm.)
"Contest"	leader of the IV Flotilla	2300	11:00 pm.	Folding lantern	German destroyers steers SE.
Chief V. Battle Squadron	V. Battle Squadron	-	11:03 pm.	Folding lantern	pivoting 16 lines to starboard.
"Garland"	leader of the IV. Flotilla	2300	11.03 pm.	F. T.	German submarines Aft.
"Princess Royal"	-	-	11:05 pm.	-	Note: Open fire on starboard cruiser. 11:20 pm. fire stopped.
Chief V. Battle Squadron	V. Battle Squadron	-	11:07 pm.	Folding lantern	Pivoting 16 lines to starboard.
"Chester"	"Minotaur"	2310	11:10 pm.	Folding lantern	I am the last ship in your line and have
	23 dead and 25 seriously wounded, 3 guns out of action. Electrical circuits partially destroyed and fire control completely destroyed. Have no holes below the waterline and 4 holes above it. Can only be used on main F. T. Station received. The condition of the oil bunker is doubtful. Can be until 4 a.m. Make 24 kn. I will report back on the condition of the oil bunkers later.				
"Benbow"	-	-	11:12 pm.	-	Comment: Artillery fire re-established on starboard. <sup>499</sup>

Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
"Canada"	Commander in Chief	-	11:30 pm.	Folding lantern	"Contest" to Captain D urgently! German torpedo boats steer NE.
"Boadicea"	"Thunderer"	-	11:40 pm.	Folding lantern	Enemy ships to starboard.
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	2341	11:41 pm.	F. T.	At 11:41 pm. the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy had apparently started the march back to his base, since his course was SSE $\frac{3}{4}$ E at 16 knots.
"Benbow"	-	-	11:45 pm.	-	Comment: Heavy artillery fire on starboard.
Commander in Chief	Commodore F	2343	11:46 pm.	F. T.	Urgent: Are you in combat with enemy destroyers? Answer: no.
"Contest"	leader of the IV Flotilla	-	11:48 pm.	F. T.	Destroyer to starboard, steer E.
Commodore F.	Commander in Chief	2340	11:50 pm.	F. T.	My location, course and speed S, 17 kn. Was in combat with enemy cruisers.
"Porpoise"	leader of the IV Flotilla	2350	11:55 pm.	F. T.	German destroyers astern, steer E.
June 1st.					
Chief II. Light Cruiser Squadron	"Nottingham"	-	12:30 Am.	Folding lantern	My F. T. is shot away, answer calls for me and report the battle.
"Birmingham"	Commander in Chief, Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	2430	12:30 Am.	F. T.	Urgent! Priority: battle cruiser, number unknown, probably enemy in sight to NE, course S. My location 56° 26' N, 5° 42' E.
"Benbow"	-	-	12:34 Am.	-	Note: Artillery fire reported astern and to port.
Chief II. Light Cruiser Squadron via "Nottingham"	Commander in Chief, Chief Battle Cruiser Fleet	2340	12:38 Am.	F. T.	Urgent! Was in a battle with enemy cruisers at 11:15 pm, these took bearings from the WSW. (Received on "Iron Duke" at 12:38 am.)
"Ambuscade"	Leader of the IV flotilla	2442	12:47 Am.	F. T.	Fired 2 torpedoes and heard an explosion. <sup>500</sup>





Radio message		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	System (2)	Contents
from	to				
Leader of the XII. Flotilla	Commander in Chief	0312	3:13 a.m.	F. T.	Urgently! The enemy's course is SSW. (Apparently only "Marksman" received it, no entry on any of the other ships.)
Commander in Chief	All	0300	3:15 a.m.	Folding lantern	At 3:30 a.m. II. Battle squadron change course to starboard to N. IV. Swivel battle squadron behind the II. Battle fleet will form keel line according to Organization V.
Chief of the I. Battle Squadron	"Revenge"	0315	3:17 a.m.	Folding lantern	I will come on board with you from "Fearless".
Leader of the XIII. Flotilla	"Marksman"	-	3:10 a.m.	Folding lantern	where are enemy ships? Answer: Suspicious ships in the south. Comment: Enemy destroyers and small cruisers attacked (4 destroyers and 2 cruisers).
Commander-in-Chief	All subordinate units	0312	3:22 a.m.	F. T.	Priority: My location at 3:30 a.m. 55° 7' N, 6° 21' E. Change course to N. Connect.
Commodore F.	XI. Flotilla	-	3:29 a.m.	Folding lantern	Change of course 16 line outwards.
Chief II. Cruiser Squadron	"Chester"	0328	3:30 a.m.	Wink	Try to run in after the Humber.
"Marksman"	Leader of the XIII. Flotilla	-	3:30 a.m.	Folding lantern	What kind of ships are they in the south? Answer: I think Germans.
2. Admiral I. Battle Squadron	Commander in Chief	0330	3:30 a.m.	Folding lantern	Marlborough Division is not - in sight.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	3:36 a.m.	Flags	Course change 16 line to starboard.
"Onslaught"	Leader XII. Flotilla	0330	3:36 a.m.	F. T.	I. Officer dead, Commander seriously wounded. Front bridge torn away.
Chief of Battle Cruiser Fleet	Chief of II. Cruiser Squadron	-	3:43 a.m.	Schw.	Change course to N. Do you have the battle fleet in sight? Answer: no. We assume our battle fleet to be at N 38° E, 16 nautical miles from us.
Chief V. Battle Squadron	V. Battle Squadron	-	3:44 a.m.	Flags	Course change 16 line to starboard. Admiral intends to run at 19 knots. <sup>502</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	System	Contents
from	to				
Chief V. Battle Squadron	Chief II. Battle Squadron	-	3:50 a.m.	Folding lantern	Request for bearings on the battlecruisers. Answer: I don't know where the battlecruisers are.
Admiralty	Commodore T.	0352	3:52 a.m.	L / T.	V. Light Cruiser Squadron, IX. and X, Flotilla are to join the Commander-in-Chief to replace squadrons or flotillas that are short of fuel. Push ahead after 55° 30' N, 6° 0' E until you receive further orders from the Commander in Chief.
"Abdiel"	Commander in Chief	0345	3:54 a.m.	F. T.	Minefield is laid out exactly according to the orders.
Commander in Chief	"Canada"	-	3:57 a.m.	F. T.	Priority: Are you in F. T. connection with the leader of the 4th Flotilla? Answer: no.
Chief II. Light Cruiser Squadron	Chief I. Light Cruiser Squadron	0300	3:58 a.m.	Schw.	Do you know where the battlecruisers are? Answer: no. Haven't seen her since last night as my speed was reduced.
Chief V. Battle Squadron	"Malaya"	0410	4:10 a.m.	optical	Report combat damage.
	Answer: 2, - if not 3 shell holes below the waterline on starboard and torpedo room under water, as well as deck officer's bathing room and artillery Hell gate, and this, I believe, caused a leak in two oil bunkers. Gun turret hit on the ceiling, loading only possible with aids as the rammer jams. One 15.2 cm gun completely incapacitated, 3 others can be fired in an emergency. Heavy artillery failures, all damage to starboard.				
"Gloucester"	Chief III. Light Cruiser Squadron	-	4:10 a.m.	Schw.	Zeppelin in sight in SE.
Commander in Chief	Chief I. Battle Squadron	0328	4:11 a.m.	F. T.	"Marlborough" to the Tyne or - to Rosyth via the M-Channel. Destroyers will be dispatched if available. Call in coastal defense destroyers for escort. 4 of our submarines are located south of Area No. 1.
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	0412	4:12 a.m.	F. T.	German small cruiser in 55 ° 45' N, 6° 25' E. Damaged, crew removed from board, destroyer at the cruiser at 4 o'clock.
Chief II. Cruiser Squadron	Chief Battle Cruiser Fleet	-	4:14 a.m.	Schw.	Airship in sight in SSE and S. <sup>503</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	System	Contents
from	to				
Commander in Chief	"Marlborough"	0402	4:14 am.	F. T.	Send your division to me and keep a ship with you for escort if necessary. What is your location, course and drive?
"New Zealand"	-	-	4:15 am.	-	Comment: Zeppelin sighted to starboard.
Chief I. Battle Squadron	Commander in Chief	0414	4:15 am.	F. T.	I am now switching to "Revenge". What is your position, course and speed?
Commander in Chief	"Revenge"	0407	4:20 am.	F. T.	My course at 3:30 am. N 16 kn. Connect.
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	0420	4:20 am.	F. T.	5 small cruisers, 13 destroyers are under orders to advance from Harwich to 55 ° 30 N, 69 0 E to join them and replace ships that are short of fuel.
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	0429	4:29 am.	F. T.	Urgently! At 3:30 am. German bulk in 55° 33' N, 6° 50' E, course SE by S, 16 kn.
Commander in Chief	Chief Battle Cruiser Fleet	0426	4:35 am.	F. T.	Did you receive telegram from Admiralty 0248?
Commander in Chief	Chief II. Battle Squadron	0430	4:36 am.	Schw.	Look out for wrecked enemy battlecruisers ahead or on port or starboard, probably large numbers of destroyers on this one.
Chef III. Light cruiser squadron	chief battle cruiser fleet, commander in chief	0435	4:42 am.	F. T.	Priority: I'm in combat with an enemy zeppelin. My location 55° 17' N, 6° 8' E.
Commander in Chief	All	-	4:42 am.	Flags	Change of course in columns to W. Admiral intends to run 15 knots.
Leader of the XII. Flotilla	Chief I. Battle Squadron	0340	4:50 am.	optical	Flotilla attacked battle fleet,
	6 "Kaiser" class and 3 cruisers, around 3:00 am. This steered, when - it was last seen, SE. A battleship blown. Answer: I congratulate you on the outcome of your attack last night. Has the report been sent to the Commander-in-Chief? If not I will.				
Commander in Chief	All	-	4:52 am.	Flags	Change of course in columns to N. Admiral intends to run 17 knots.
"Collingwood"	Commander in Chief	0450	4:52 am.	F. T.	Urgent! Enemy airship in SSE. <sup>504</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	System	Contents
from	to				
Commander in Chief	All	-	4:55 am.	Flags	Take up battle with the enemy airship.
Commander in Chief	All	-	4:58 am	flags	To cease fire.
Commodore F.	"Opal"	-	5:02 am.	Schw.	Did you see anything of the battle fleet or the cruisers? Answer: no.
Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	Commander in Chief	0450	5:04 am.	F. T.	When the enemy was last seen, he was in W, steered SW and made little speed. Airship passed astern of me, steered W., suggesting that I may scout to the SW to determine the enemy.
Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	Commander in Chief	0500	5:04 am.	F. T.	My location 55° 26' N, 6° 14' E, course N by E, 20 kn.
Commander in Chief	All	-	5:13 am.	Flags	Line up in columns next to each other in the division keel line.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	5:14 am.	Flags	Change of course to NNW. Close up columns.
"Marne"	Commodore F.	-	5:16 am.	Schw.	No sign of the battle squadron, should I return?
"Marksman"	"Maenad"	-	5:20 am.	Schw.	Unlock, it's getting heavy.
Commander in Chief	V. Battle Squadron	0521	5:23 am.	Schw.	Stay in sight.
Chief of the battle cruiser fleet	all				change course in columns to N½ E.
Commander in Chief	"Marlborough"	0527 0530	5:27 am.	F. T.	What is your position, course and speed? Answer: My position 55° 29' N, 6° 03' E, course SW, speed 14 kn.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	Battlecruisers	-	5:30 am.	Schw.	Losses yesterday were heavy on both sides. Today we hope to cut off and destroy the entire German fleet. Every man must do his utmost. "Lützow" is sinking and another German battle cruiser is also assumed to have sunk.
"Dublin"	Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet, Commander in Chief	0530	5:31 am.	F. T.	Urgent! A cruiser and two destroyers, probably enemy ones, in sight. Bearing E, course S. My position 55° 30' N, 6° 33' E. <sup>505</sup>



Radio message		Time group	Out going	System	Contents
from	to				
Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	Commander in Chief	0755	8:00 am.	F. T.	If nothing is in sight by 8:30 a.m., suggest that I look in a northeasterly direction. Answer: I agree.
Commander in Chief	Chief 1st Battle Squadron	0738	8:04 am.	F. T.	Close at 9.15 a.m. in - 55° 56' N, 6° 13' E. Answer: Can only reach the meeting point at 9:45 a.m.
Commander in Chief	All	-	8:16 am.	Flags.	Change of course in columns to N.
Commander in Chief	"Warrior"	0803	8:20 am.	F. T.	What is your position, course and speed? Answer from "Warspite": 56° 32' N, 0° 44' E, course W, speed over the ground 16 kn.
Chief battle cruiser fleet	all	0826	8.25 am.	Flags. & F. T.	Change of course to NNE.
Chief II. Battle Squadron	Commander in Chief	0831	8:32 am.	-	I. battle squadron in sight in N.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	Battlecruisers	-	8:45 am.		Report combat damage. Answer (only in excerpt):
	<p>"Princeß Royal": Hole in reserve bunker 66 to 82 on port in the waterline, bunker under water, as well as an upper bunker. Hole in the admiral's cabin to port. Tower ceiling of tower B moved. Hole in the canteen pantry. Hole in the X-tower level with the deck. Several holes in the upper deck. All departments through which bullets passed were severely torn. In front of the X-turret, a large piece was torn out of the structure, the armor moved and the turret clamped. One turret left tube incapacitated. Several headlights destroyed. "Tiger": The main damage is as follows: Main steam pipe in the port turbine room damaged. Right gun of turret A, left gun of turret Q damaged and use in question. Port cartridge chamber of tower Q, port 15.2 cm cartridge chamber and floor space flooded. Serious damage to the foredeck, 2 large holes just above the waterline to port. "New Zealand": Insignificant damage to the substructure of Tower X, combat values in no way reduced. "Inflexible": No damage, "Indomitable": No damage.</p>				
Commander in Chief	"Dublin"	0855	9:00 am.	Schw.	Where are the cruisers and the two torpedo boats that you reported with 0530? Answer: The German armored cruiser was lost in the fog from sight at approx. 55° 28' N, 6° 32' E. This information is only approximate, as the navigational officer fell. Request for a location for 9 am.
Commander in Chief	"Dublin"	0915	-	Schw.	Was the cruiser unable to maneuver or still sailing? Answer: As far as I could see, he was still making a lot of speed. <sup>507</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	System	Contents
from	to				
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	-	9:00 am.	Flags	change course to N.
"Engadine"	Commander in Chief	0600	9:02 am.	F. T.	"Warrior" completely unable to maneuver in tow from "Engadine". My course and drive NW, 7 kn. Tug is urgently requested. 57° 18' N, 3° 45' E.
"Marksman"	Commander-in-Chief	1015	-	F. T.	"Sparrowhawk" was sunk according to the orders of the Chief of the 1st Battle Squadron
Chief battle cruiser fleet	Chief I. Battle cruiser squadron	0909	9:10 am.	Wink	Can you give any information about the destruction of the "Queen Mary"? Answer: It appeared to be an explosion in the cartridge room of the "Queen Mary" after a volley had hit.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	Chief II. Battlecruiser Squadron	0910	9:12 am.	Wink	can you give any information about the destruction of the "indefatigable"? Answer: Salve struck in the aft ship and an explosion apparently reached the cartridge room.
"Warspite"	Chief V. Battle Squadron	0710	9:20 am.	F. T.	Location: 56° 39' N, 1° 43' E. Course W. Drive over the bottom, 16 kn. Condition of the ship: Many holes from grenades, several through armor and below the waterline. Bulkhead secured, several compartments full of water, ship on a level keel, is controlled from the engine room.
"Engadine"	-	-	9:25 am.	-	Comment: Leave "Warrior" and march back.
Commander in Chief	"Oak"	0920	9:30 am.	Schw.	Turn 16 points to port. Examine wreckage in the oil spill we just passed and try to identify the ship's name. Answer: Wreckage is from the destroyer "Ardent".
Commander in Chief	All	-	9:52 am.	Flags	Change course in columns to SSW.
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	1017	10:17 am.	F. T.	At 7:20 am, enemy submarines received orders to approach "Elbing". Location is given as 55° 51' N, 5° 55' E. <sup>508</sup>





Radio message		Time group	Out going	System	Contents
from	to				
Commander-in-Chief	"Cyclops" for Admiralty	1144	12:08 p.m.	F. T.	Priority: "Harwich" forces are no longer needed, with the exception of the destroyers who are to escort "Marlborough". Weather very invisible. Make sure no wrecked ships are left behind and return to base. Searched the whole sea area for damaged enemy cruisers without success.
"Marlborough".	-	-	12:10 p.m.	-	Note: Torpedo runaway passed port astern of "Marlborough" at noon at 20 to 30 m
Commander-in-Chief	Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	1200	12:20 p.m.	F. T.	Avoid the wreck sites with heavy ships, provided you are not sure that losses were not due to mines.
Commander-in-Chief	Chief of the battle cruiser fleet	-	12:25 noon	F. T.	Re. No. 1056: Was the reason for the sinking, mines, torpedoes or artillery fire? At what time did "Queen Mary" and "Indefatigable" sink?
"Warspite"	-	-	12:27 pm	-	Comment: 4 shots fired at the submarine.
Admiralty	All ships	1220	12:38 p.m.	F. T.	Passage at Sunk lightship blocked due to the danger of mines until after search.
Commander in Chief	Chief II. Cruiser Squadron	1230	12:31 pm	Schw.	Do you know anything about "Duke of Edinburgh" and "Black Prince?" Answer: "Duke of Edinburgh" is with me. I don't know about "Black Prince".
"Warspite"	-	-	12.40 noon	-	Note: Periscope sighted right ahead.
"Marlborough"	Commander in Chief	1201	12:44 noon	F. T.	54° 23' N, 5° 7' E. Enemy submarine fired a torpedo at "Marlborough", the torpedo passed behind the ship. My course is W at 13 knots.
Chief of the 1st Battle Squadron	Commander in Chief	1230	12:55 pm	F. T.	Leader of the XII. Flotilla reports that this enemy battle fleet attacked, 6 "Kaiser" -class and 3 cruisers at 3 a.m., A battleship blown up.
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	All	1310	1:12 pm.	F. T. and flags	Columns of course change to NE. <sup>510</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	System	Contents
from	to				
Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	Commander in Chief	1248	1:50 pm.	F. T.	For 1007: "New Zealand" is here.
	<p>"Indefatigable" sank 10 minutes after the start of the battle from a shell hit, which caused ammunition to explode. "Queen Mary" sank for the same reason. "Invincible" sank probably for the same reason, but maybe also by torpedo. The whereabouts of all light cruisers determined, the whereabouts of all destroyers not yet certain. "Nestor", "Onslow", "Nomad" and "Turbulent" are missing. The damage done to the enemy consists of heavy hits and a reduction in speed for all ships. A battle cruiser seemed to blow up as it disappeared in the smoke, incapable of maneuvering. Another, undoubtedly "Lützow", was seen in a very difficult position. When he was last in sight, he joined the enemy battle fleet. Information is very imperfect as I have not yet been able to collect enough reports.</p>				
Commander in chief	Chief of the battle cruiser fleet	1400	2:03 pm.	F. T.	Do you have enough destroyers to escort V battle squadrons and battle cruisers to Rosyth? When can squadrons join you? Answer: I now have 9 destroyers, 4 of which I have at 6 pm. must send back to the base. I hope "Champion" and 3 other destroyers will join later.
Chief battle cruiser fleet	commander in chief	1327	2:03 pm.	F. T.	For 1204: "Indefatigable" sank at 5 pm., "Queen Mary" around 5:30 pm. Do not assume that mines or torpedoes were the cause, since both explosions were the direct result of impacting volleys.
Admiral Rosyth	"Warspite"	-	2:25 pm.	Schw.	Please tell me if I can be of any help to you or to other ships. I hope you have good news. Answer: We were attacked by 3 submarines today, Thursday. Apparently these are lurking in front of the harbor.
Commander-in-Chief	Chief V. Battle Squadron	1410	2:30 pm.	F. T.	Can you tell me whether
	<p>V. Battle Squadron did a lot of damage to the enemy. Answer: A good number of hits were scored, but no ship was left incapacitated from the line, although one appeared to be slowing down when the battle fleet approached. The enemy was in thick haze, while the V Battle Squadron stood out clearly against the clear horizon. During a major part of the battle the enemy could only be recognized by the flash of their artillery pieces. V. battle squadron came into action much later than the battle cruiser.<sup>511</sup></p>				

Radio message		Time group	Out going	System	Contents
from	to				
Commander-in-Chief	Chief V. Battle Squadron	1140	2:41 pm.	F. T.	Which ships in your squadron need to dock? Answer: "Warspite", "Malaya" and probably also "Barham".
Commander in chief	Chief of the battle cruiser fleet	1458	3:00 pm.	F. T.	Do any of your ships need to dock? Answer: It will only be necessary to repair "Tiger" and "Princess Royal" in the harbor basin with a list. "Lion" does not need to go into the dock. "Southampton" will have to go to dock to carry out repairs, but not necessarily immediately upon arrival.
Aberdeen	Rear admiral Invergordon	1435	3:02 pm.	F. T.	For Commander-in-Chief of Rosyth: Two submarines surfaced from outposts reported in 55° 45' N, 1° 25' W and 56° 25' N, 1° 45' W. Both around noon.
"Engadine"	Commander in Chief	0930	3:05 pm.	F. T.	"Warrior" abandoned, crew disembarked at 57° 21' N, 3° 2' E, 3 chain lengths and 15 cm tow line overboard, go to Queensferry. "Engadine's" location at 12 noon 57° 10' N, 2° 17' E. Travel 10.5 kn.
Commander in Chief	Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	1544	3:44 pm.	F. T.	I am releasing "Valiant" to Rosyth. It is undamaged. Suggest that "Malaya" and "Barham" repair in Invergordon. "Warspite" went to Rosyth. I warned "Valiant" about submarines in 56° 45' N, 0° 12' W and 56° 25' N, 1° 45' W.
Commodore T.	Commander in Chief	1545	4:02 pm.	F. T.	My position 3:30 pm. 54° 32' N, 4° 16' E, course E by N, 20 kn. Have sighted "Marlborough" and sent escorts to her. Do you have any other orders?
Commander in Chief	Commodore T.	1708	5:08 pm.	F. T.	I informed the Admiralty that you were no longer needed. There is nothing left to do. Reinforce the escort for "Marlborough" with 2 more destroyers.
"Birmingham"	Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Battlecruiser Fleet	1640	5:08 pm.	F. T.	Urgent! U-boat periscope at 57° 19' N, 5° 59' E. <sup>512</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	System	Contents
from	to				
Commander in Chief	Chief II. Cruiser Squadron	2240	5:15 pm.	Schw. & F.T.	Priority: "Warrior" abandoned in 57° 10' N, 2° 17' E with towline and cable outboard. Look for the ship with your cruisers and sink it if it cannot be salvaged.
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	2240	10:40 pm.	F. T.	Enemy claims to have destroyed "Warspite", "Queen Mary", "Indefatigable", two armored cruisers with 4 funnels, 2 small cruisers and 10 destroyers. False reports will be circulating shortly. Require immediate rejection. Report which ships are certain to be lost and which are missing.
2nd of June.					
Kontreadmiral Scapa	Kontreadmiral Invergordon	1931	12:35 am.	F. T.	For Commander-in-Chief: Rosyth reports: In 55° 50' N, 0° 55' W was around 3:30 pm. a torpedo fired at "Nicator".
"Marlborough"	Commander in Chief	0100	1:28 am.	F. T.	Urgent! Location 54° 40' N, 0° 53' E. As a result of bad weather, water in the ship increases. Head for Flamborough Head at 10 kn.
"Marlborough"	"Fearless" and destroyer	0140	1:47 am.	Schw.	Make it clear to come lengthways to port and disembark the ship's crew.
Chief of battle cruiser fleet	Subordinate units	0134	2:35 am.	F. T.	Enter the port in the following order. I. Light Cruiser Squadron, 1st Division, 2nd Division of Battlecruisers, III. Light Cruiser Squadron, II. Light Cruiser Squadron. Pointed ship is in the fire area of Inchkeith at 7:45 am.
Chief of the I. Battle Squadron	Chief Battle Cruiser Fleet	0435	4:55 am.	Schw.	Received the following message from "Tiger": Damage seems to be more severe than I reported yesterday. I do not think it advisable to coal before the ship is empty and further determinations can be made. Answer: I agree.
"Marlborough"	Commander-in-Chief	0510	5:46 am.	F. T.	My location 5 a.m. 54° 10' N, 0° 2' E. Course S, 11 kn. Water penetration can be kept present. Hope at 9:30 am. to run into the Humber. <sup>513</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	System	Contents
from	to				
Commander in Chief	"Cyclops" Intelligence Officer Scapa	0805	8:06 am.	F. T.	Ready to enter Scapa Flow - through Hoxa Sound. The top ship is expected to be at 9 a.m. arrive.
Commander in Chief	Admiralty	1000	11:35 am.	F. T.	Vice Admiral Battlecruiser Fleet reports:
	<p>"Queen Mary", "Indefatigable" blown up as a result of enemy shells that exploded in the cartridge room. "Invincible" blown up, probably the same cause, but could also be traced back to mine or submarine. "Defense" blown up in the same way. "Black Prince" is missing and, fearfully, sunk. "Warrior" completely out of action and abandoned after being towed by "Engadine" to 57° 21' N, 3° 2' E. It is believed that the ship is still floating. II. Cruiser Squadron is looking for him. "Tipperary" and destroyers "Turbulent", "Fortune", "Sparrowhawk" and "Ardent" lost and 5 or 6 of the IV Destroyer Flotilla went missing. "Broke" badly damaged, is on the way to Scapa Flow. Two light cruisers search for the ship. Leader of the XII. Flotilla reports by signal that its flotilla sank a ship of the "Kaiser" class in the night attack.</p> <p>Vice Admiral of the Battle Fleet reports that he believes one battle cruiser has been sunk and another badly damaged. Two light cruisers are assumed to be incapacitated. The enemy destroyers were shot at, but it is not yet known how many were sunk. Our battlecruiser losses occurred during the battle of the battlecruisers. Visibility was very poor and, as a result, the battle fleet had great difficulty in keeping touch with the enemy battle fleet which was evading the fight, but during the brief period of the engagement we evidently did serious damage to some enemy battleships. "Marlborough" is the only battleship that was damaged during the battle of the battle fleet, the damage can be traced back to mine or torpedo. "Warspite", "Barham" and "Malaya" were damaged before our battle fleet intervened at 7:15 am.</p>				
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	1620	4:20 pm.	F. T.	I asked Vice Admiral of the battlecruiser fleet for a short battle report, as some announcement by this evening is also required by the chief of the V Battle Squadron. Is there anything else you can add to your report? <sup>514</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	System	Contents
from	to				
Commander in Chief	Admiralty	-	8:10 pm.	L / T.	Our losses:
	"Queen Mary", "Indefatigable", "Invincible", "Defense", "Black Prince", "Sparrowhawk", "Ardent", "Fortune", "Tipperary", "Turbulent". Also missing now: "Shark", "Nestor", "Nomad". Badly damaged: "Acasta", "Warrior", "Broke", "Marlborough", "Malaya", "Warspite". Damaged: "Barham". Some battlecruisers, light cruisers and destroyers damaged but ready for action. Enemy losses, as far as known: A battleship of the "Kaiser" class blown up in a destroyer attack. It is believed that a "Kaiser" class battleship was sunk by gunfire. It was seen that a battle cruiser, probably the "Derfflinger", was severely shot at by the battle fleet, was unable to maneuver and had to stop. "Lützow" seemed badly damaged. According to the Vice Admiral of the Battlecruisers, a battlecruiser was blown up. Details are missing. One small cruiser, 6 destroyers, was seen sank. At least two other small cruisers appeared to have been disabled. Three other battleships that were fired on received repeated hits as observed. Rammed a submarine and sunk. A detailed report will follow.				
3rd of June.					
Commander in Chief	Admiralty	-	12:05 am.	L.T.	Submarine sunk by gunfire by "Minotaur" in 58° 32' N, 0° 20' E, at 10:35 pm. 2nd of June. After further research I am convinced that the submarine was "E 30". It was not damaged and arrived in Blyth.
Admiralty	Commander in Chief	-	5:56 am.	L / T.	Here are some of the following from His Majesty the King:
	I am deeply touched by the message you have sent me regarding the "Grand Fleet". It reaches me the morning after a battle, which in turn has shown the brilliant bravery of the officers and men under your command. I mourn the loss of brave men, many of whom have been my personal friends. They fell for the cause of their country. But I regret even more that, in spite of their heavy losses from the unseen weather, the German deep-sea fleet was able to avoid the full consequences of a fight which it always pretended to want, but for which, when the opportunity arose, it didn't Showed inclination. Although the withdrawal of the enemy immediately after the opening of general combat deprived us of the possibility of a decisive victory, the events of last Wednesday fully justify my confidence in the strength and combat readiness of the fleets under your command.				
Commander in Chief	Chief Battlecruiser Fleet	2405	12:20 p.m.	L / T.	Which battlecruisers are currently ready for action? Answer: Ready for action immediately "New Zealand", "Indomitable", "Inflexible". Ships whose combat values and seaworthiness are incomplete: "Lion", "Princess Royal", "Tiger". They could only fight in an emergency. <sup>515</sup>



Radio message		Time group	Out going	System	Contents
from	to				
Commander in Chief	Admiralty	-	4:20 pm.	L / T.	Priority: Urgent! I propose that the German claim to victory should be refuted by the immediate publication in the press that the British fleet remained on and south of the battlefield for the greater part of June 1 to look for the enemy.
Commander in Chief	Admiralty	2348	11:50 Pm.	L / T.	Priority: Urgent! After careful examination of testimonies from the battle fleet, I report that the following German ships were killed during the daytime battle on May 31st and the destroyer attacks on the night of May 31st / May 1st. June were sunk: battleships and battlecruisers 3 safe, 1 of the "Kaiser" class, probably 2 more. Small cruisers, 5 safe. Destroyer, 6 sure. Submarines, 1 sure.
Commander in Chief	Admiralty	-	3:00 pm.	L / T.	I urge you to take immediate steps to prevent the publication of statements, such as those in articles in the Weekly: Despatch dated June 4th entitled, "The Doctrine of Everything." Such articles are extremely detrimental to discipline and morality and must be discourage the officers and men of the fleet. Other newspapers openly state the time at which the fleet set sail, as well as their bases. It is not possible to successfully perform operations under such conditions. Censorship, as practiced by the "War Office" on messages from the land front, should be introduced immediately. <sup>516</sup>

**Appendix 17****Compilation of the most important German radio messages and signals for the battle in front of the Skagerrak.**

Radio message (3)		Time group (1)	Out going (1)	Contents(2)
from	to			
<b>30th May.</b>				
Bruges	All submarines	-	-	Expect the departure of hostile forces 31 V. and 1. VI.
High Seas Chief	All	1048	-	By 8 p.m. at the latest be gathered on outer roads.
Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces	Outpost Boats	1137	-	30. V. pm. and 31st V. am. Search for submarines.
Commander of the reconnaissance forces	planes	1137	-	31. V. U-boats search west of Helgoland and Amrum-Bank and west of List.
Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces	I. Mine Search Division	1231	-	way west of Helgoland and Amrum Bank on the 30th V. pm. search. 31. V. am. from dawn look for submarines there.
High Seas Chief	All	1640	-	"31. Gg. 2490. "
High Seas Chief	All	1841	-	Chief of the III. Squadron passes war light ship A of the Jade at 4.30 am. II. Squadron participates in the venture from the start, then joins I. Squadron. Management of F. T. traffic in the German Bight by III. Entrance.
Helgoland	High Seas Chief	1650	4:59 pm.	Air reconnaissance temporarily not possible due to weather conditions.
"Arcona"	"Ostfriesland"	2002	-	leader of the submarines, chief of the oceans. "U46" has sighted enemy submarines 6 times in all, 150 y and the surrounding area of Terschelling lightship. It was shot at once with a cannon and once with a torpedo. When surfaced, it is hardly possible to drive in this area during the day due to the danger of submarines. There are also numerous floating mines there. "U 46" after periscope change ready for use for the southern North Sea. "U 22" fully ready for use. 3rd U-half flotilla.

1) All times are reduced from summer time to Central European time, but cannot claim absolute accuracy.

2) For details of the ship's location in numbers, such as 150 γ {150 gamma} etc., see square map in North Sea Volume I.

3) Signals that were not transmitted by radio are specially marked in the time column.<sup>517</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
Nordholz	"Ostfriesland"	2105	9:12 pm.	To chief High Seas. Tomorrow aerial reconnaissance planned. Marine Airship Dept.
"Arcona"	"Ostfriesland"	2120	9:48 pm.	To leaders of the submarines. Crosses between Terschelling Bank Lightship and 121 γ. "U 67".
Schillig		-	10:20 pm.	For Chief High Seas and the commanders of the reconnaissance forces. 1st steamer report: May 27, about 6 hours after passing the Spurn Point lightship (on course Hull – Rotterdam) a squadron of 8 large warships, 12 torpedo boats sighted at a great distance heading SW. 2. Statements by a pilot returned to Helder: Heard from the English captain that there are many cruisers and torpedo boats between Hull and Ijmuiden. (Without a date.) Admiralty staff.
Schillig	Chief High Seas	-	10:45 pm.	Morning forecast changed. Coastal areas on the ground predominantly northerly winds, turning eastwards tomorrow. Seldom exceeding a thickness of 5 up to 1000m. Cloudy, sighted. Northwestern North Sea probably freshening southwest wind. Uncertain forecast. Navy Air Weather Service.
<b>31. May.</b>				
Nordholz	III. Entrance	0135	1:40 am.	To Chief the High Seas. Airship reconnaissance temporarily excluded due to weather conditions. Naval Airship Dept.
Schillig	Chief High Seas	-	2:22 am.	Steamer message: 29th V. 6 o'clock pm. 5 nautical miles NE Hanstholm lighthouse a submarine. Nationality unknown. Course for Skagen.
Heligoland Island	III. Entrance	0405	4:06 am.	To the fleet: aerial reconnaissance due to weather conditions temporarily not possible. Helgoland flight station.
List	III. Entrance	0415	4:18 am.	Fleet. Aircraft reconnaissance temporarily not possible due to unfavorable weather conditions.
Chief High Seas	leader of the hospital ships	-	-	Auxiliary hospital ships tightened readiness on berths.
"Arcona"	III. Entrance	0650	6:37 am.	Fleet. 2 capital ships, 2 cruisers, several torpedo boats 099γ III heading south. "U 32".
Chief High Seas	Marschsicherung	0652	-	Main Body will steer from square 100 α VII to 046 ε IV.
Neumünster	III. Entrance	0700	7:40 am.	Chief High Seas. 2 large warships or formations with destroyers left Scapa Flow. <sup>518</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"Arcona"	III. Entrance	0744	7:48 am.	From "U 66" to Chief High Seas: 8 enemy capital ships in sight, small cruisers, torpedo boats heading north in 132 β additional number III.
Leader of II. Reconnaissance Group	II. Reconnaissance Group, II., VI. Flottille	Optical	8:50 am.	II. Reconnaissance group, II, IV. Reconnaissance flotilla in the direction NW to NE in the order "Elbing", "Pillau", "Frankfurt", "Wiesbaden", "Regensburg".
High Seas Chief	march security	0950	-	march safety 5 pm. connect further on flag signal.
"Hamburg"	Fleet	1035	-	"U 72" has 3 small cruisers, "Cordelia" class, with 2 submarines in front of the Skagerrak with an easterly course and on Thursday evening a small cruiser, "Calliope" class, on the height sighted from Utsire with west course. - leaders of the submarines.
Nordholz	III. Entrance	1115	11:32 am	To High Seas Chief. Aerial reconnaissance is attempted. Naval Airship Dept.
"Arcona"	III. Entrance	1150	12:26 pm.	To leaders of the submarines. Two enemy submarines in 138 γ, heading north. "U 67".
"L9"	III. Entrance	1225	12:49 pm.	To High Seas Chief. Ascended course WNW.
Neumünster	III. Entrance	1118	12:55 pm.	To High Seas Chief, Firth of Forth weather report: Wind: W 1, rain, hazy. Barometer: 767. Such reports generally only observed when the fleet was at sea.
High Seas Chief	All	optically	12:53 pm.	Course N.
"L 16"	III. Entrance	1230	1:04 pm.	To High Seas Chief. Ascended, course W by N.
"L 21"	III. Entrance	1235	1:10 pm.	High Seas Chief. Ascended with course to 092 ε III for reconnaissance.
"L23"	III. Entrance	1300	1:16 pm.	Ascended with course N by W.
Air station List	Fleet Flagship	1315	1:19 pm.	Ascent: Airplane "559" F. T. 533 at 1.15 Nm. from List. Task: Reconnaissance after W. Landing: 2:11 pm. Airplane "559" F. T., 533 at 1:50 Nm. in list. Result: Enlightened about 159 β, returned because of very low clouds. Visibility is 1 to 2 nautical miles. <sup>519</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"Arcona"	III. Entrance	1316	1:20 pm.	To all: In F. T. 0650 of "U 32" group must probably read: additional number V, not III.
"L 14"	III. Entrance	1330	1:46 pm.	High Seas Chief. Ascended with a course for - Horns Reef.
"L 23"	III. Entrance	1500?	2:17 pm.	High Seas Chief. Location 129 β. Visibility ½ nautical mile.
"L 16"	III. Entrance	1500	2:20 pm.	High Seas Chief. Location 64 ε; very hazy. Visibility 4 nautical miles. Course WNW.
"L 21"	III. Entrance	1500	3:20 pm.	High Seas Chief. 104 β. Visibility 6 nautical miles, wind W by N 3, cloud height 300 m.
"Elbing"	High Seas Chief	1531	3:27 pm.	Enemy armored cruisers in sight in W by N.
"Lützow"	1st reconnaissance group	optically	3:27 pm.	Turn to port on WSW.
"B109"	"Regensburg"	1525	3:28 pm.	To II. Leader of the torpedo boats. 164γ IV single enemy forces. Half-flotilla chief of the 4th half-flotilla.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	3:29 pm.	Travel 18 nautical miles.
"Lützow"	1st reconnaissance group	optically	3:30 pm.	Follow the leader.
"Frankfurt"	"Regensburg", "Wiesbaden"	-	3:30 pm.	Connect.
"Lützow"	1st reconnaissance group	optically	3:32 pm.	Travel 21 nautical miles
"B109"	"Regensburg"	-	3:32 pm.	II. Leader of the torpedo boats. The reported enemy forces control the 4th half flotilla.
"Elbing"	High Seas Chief	1534	3:33 pm.	Getting shot at.
"Lützow"	1st reconnaissance group	optically	3:34 pm.	Clear ship for battle.
"Lützow"	High Seas Chief	1527	3:35 pm.	Several clouds of smoke from enemy forces in sight in 164 γ. Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	3:36 pm.	All drive.
"B 109"	"Regensburg"	1535	3:38 pm.	The detection signal of the enemy is "PL". 4. half-flotilla.
"Lützow"	High Seas Chief	1536	3:43 pm.	. Reconnaissance Group 031 ε; SSW course.
"L9"	III. Entrance	1540	3:43 pm.	High Seas Chief. Location 020 β. Visibility two nautical miles; Course NW by W. <sup>520</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"Lützow"	I. reconnaissance group	optically	3:43 pm.	Turn to starboard on WSW
"Lützow"	I. reconnaissance group	optically	3:44 pm.	Travel 18 nautical miles.
"Lützow"	I. reconnaissance group	optically	3:47 pm.	Turn to starboard, course W.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	3:49 pm.	Travel 21 nautical miles.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	3:50 pm.	Battle signals follow. Occupy battle signal points.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	3:52 pm.	Turn of action on NNW.
High Seas chief	Commander of the reconnaissance forces	1548	3:55 pm.	Own Main Body is 3:45 pm. 065 ε additional number IV.
"Frankfurt"	High Seas chief	1550	3:55 pm.	047δ not an armored cruiser, but 4 cruisers of the "Calliope" class with a north-westerly course. Leader of the II Reconnaissance Group.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	3:57 pm.	Follow in order of tactical numbers.
"Elbing"	"Lützow"	1526	3:59 pm.	4 enemy cruisers of the "Arethusa" class in sight.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	3:59 pm.	Course NNW.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	4:00 pm.	Travel 23 nautical miles.
High Seas chief	I., II. Squadron	1704	-	catching up.
High Seas chief	All	Optical 1706	4:10 pm.	Clear ship to battle. All drive, course N.
"Elbing"	-	optically	4:12 pm.	4 enemy modern cruisers in sight in the west, the 5th and 6th come in sight, distance 163 m.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	4:15 pm.	Course NW.
"Lützow"	High Seas chief	1620	4:13 pm.	Only 4 enemy small cruisers in sight. Site I. Reconnaissance group. 022 ε, course NNW.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	Optical	4:15 pm.	Travel 25 nautical miles.
"Elbing"	flagship	1615	-	Fleet chief. Individual enemy forces 152 y additional number IV.
"Elbing"	High Seas chief	1612	4:15 pm.	the reported enemy forces steer NNW; 152 y additional number IV. <sup>521</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
List	High Seas chief	1600	4:21 pm.	F. T. plane "561" ascended on a course NNW. List, flight station.
"Frankfurt"	High Seas Chief	1614	4:24 pm.	Opened fire on enemy small cruisers.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	4:24 pm.	Travel 18 nautical miles.
„Friedrich der Große“	Fleet	-	4:25 pm.	Distance to ship 7 hm.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	4:26 pm.	Course NW by N.
"L 9"	III. Entrance	1550	4:26 pm.	To High Seas chief. Location 005 $\beta$ . I turned around; Starboard propeller shaft sheared off.
"Lützow"	All	1629	4:30 pm.	II. Reconnaissance group gather on I. Reconnaissance group. Heavy enemy forces in sight in 151 $\gamma$ .
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optical	4:29 pm.	Spread fire from the right.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	4:32 pm.	Travel 18 nautical miles.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	4:35 pm.	Course SE.
"Lützow"	All	1629	4:35 pm.	Enemy bulk in sight in 151 $\gamma$ ; Enemy bulk is 6 ships strong, controls N.
"Frankfurt"	Fleet	-	4:37 pm.	Single enemy forces 159 $\gamma$ . Follow as soon as possible. Leader of the II Reconnaissance Group.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	4:39 pm.	Spread fire from the left.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optical	4:40 pm.	Travel 18 nautical miles.
"Frankfurt"	"Lützow"	1633	4:40 pm.	Enemy aviator 159 $\gamma$ . Leader of the II reconnaissance group
„Friedrich der Große“	All	optically	4:40 pm.	All drive.
"Frankfurt"	High Seas chief	1628	4:41 pm.	The enemy small cruisers have turned off. Ceased fire.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	4:42 pm.	Distance to ship 5 hm.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	4:45 pm.	Turn of battle on SSE.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	4:48 pm.	Open fire. <sup>522</sup>



Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"Lützow"	All	1632	4:49 pm.	I. Reconnaissance group. Location 004 ε, SE. Travel is 21 nautical miles.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group.	optically	4:53 pm.	Increase speed.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	4:54 pm.	Leadership in front.
"Lützow"	All	1646	4:54 pm.	6 enemy battlecruisers, enemy light forces in 151 γ, heading SE. I. Reconnaissance group in 004 ε, course SSE, 18 nautical miles. I'm in combat with 6 battlecruisers. Report your own main body location. Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	5:00 pm.	Turn of battle on SE by S.
II. Leader of the Torpedo Boats	IX. Flotilla	optical	5:03 pm.	Line spacing 155hm.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	5:04 pm.	Turn of battle on S by E.
High Seas chief	All	-	5:05 pm.	Course NW.
High Seas chief	Fleet Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces	1709	5:05 pm.	Own main body location 5 o'clock pm. 043 ε center, course NW. Travel is 15 nautical miles.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	5:07 pm.	Turn of battle on S by W.
„Friedrich der Große“	All	optically	5:11 pm.	Distance to ship 5 hm.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	5:12 pm.	Travel 23 nautical miles
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	5:14 pm.	Torpedo boats to attack.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	5:18 pm.	Leadership in front.
High Seas chief	All	-	5:20 pm.	Course W.
High Seas chief	"Rostock"	1721	5:20 pm.	I. Guide of the torpedo boats. Collect torpedo boats of your own.
"Frankfurt"	"Lützow"	1712	5:20 pm.	Enemy main body in 151 γ, English II. Battleship squadron, 5 ships. Reported enemy forces steer SE.
„Friedrich der Große“	All	optical	5:21 pm.	Course N.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optical	5:25 pm.	Run less speed.
II. Leader of torpedo boats	IX. Flotilla	optical	5:26 pm.	Line spacing 100 hm. IX. Flotilla ran! <sup>523</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
IX. Flotilla ("V 29")	Boats of the IX. Flotilla	optical	5:26 pm.	Torpedo boats to attack.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance group	optically	5:27 pm.	Turn of battle on SE.
"Stettin"	fleet	optically	5:28 pm.	NNW½ W shooting, distance about 4 nautical miles.
High Seas chief	"Lützow"	1731	5:30 pm.	To the commander of the reconnaissance forces: Own main body 035 ε, steers N. Travel is 15 nautical miles.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	5:34 pm.	Turn of battle on ESE.
„Friedrich der Große“	All flotillas	optical	5:35 pm.	To starboard.
„Friedrich der Große“	All	optically	5:36 pm.	Increase speed.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	5:36 pm.	Turn of battle on E.
"Stettin"	„Friedrich der Große“	optically	5:36 pm.	II. Reconnaissance group in sight in NNW¼W.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	5:38 pm.	Turn of battle on SSE.
"L 14"	III. Entrance	1715	5:40 pm.	To High Seas chief. Location 140 α VII with course 151 γ IV; Visibility 3 nautical miles.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	5:41 pm.	Turn of battle on SSW.
„Friedrich der Große“	All	optically	5:42 pm.	Divisional battle swing 2 line to port.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	5:44 pm.	I. Reconnaissance group: take ships of the line under fire.
„Friedrich der Große“	All	optically	5:45 pm.	Spread fire from the right, ship against ship.
„Friedrich der Große“	All	optically	5:46 pm.	Open fire.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	5:46 pm.	Turn of battle on SE.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	5:49 pm.	Leadership in front.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	5:51 pm.	Course N.
„Friedrich der Große“	fleet	optically	5:51 pm.	Operate on the enemy final ships.
„Friedrich der Große“	fleet	optically	5:53 pm.	The last signal is revoked. <sup>524</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
High Seas chief	All	-	5:54 pm.	Increase speed.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	5:55 pm.	Course N.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	5:57 pm.	Spread fire from the right, ship against ship.
High Seas chief	All	-	5:58 pm.	Divisional battle turn 2 lines to port. Course NW, Ultimate Force.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	6:02 pm.	All large cruisers run at low speed.
High Seas chief	All	-	6:05 pm.	Divisional battle turn 2 lines to starboard. Course NNW
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	6:06 pm.	All Large cruisers Increase speed.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	6:10 pm.	All large cruisers turn to N by W.
Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces	II. Leader of the torpedo boats	optical	6:10 pm.	Please close torpedo boats on the starboard front.
"Frankfurt"	High Seas chief	1737	6:10 pm.	All tip of enemy armored cruiser 006 ε top right, only 4 ships strong. Reported enemy forces control SE. Leader of the II Reconnaissance Group.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	6:13 pm.	All large cruisers turn to NNW
High Seas chief	All	-	6:15 pm.	Divisional battle turn 2 lines to port.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	6:17 pm.	All large cruisers run at low speed.
High Seas chief	"Lützow"	1821	6:19 pm.	Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces. Take chase.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	6:23 pm.	All large cruisers increase their voyage.
High Seas chief	All	-	6:25 pm.	Increase speed.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	6:26 pm.	All large cruisers turn to NW.
"L 14"	III. Entrance	1810	6:27 pm.	High Seas chief. Location 091 ε IV, course N by O.
„Friedrich der Große“	All	optical	6:30 pm.	Division battle turn 2 lines starboard.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	6:39 pm.	All big cruisers. Leadership in front.
"L 21"	High Seas chief	1830	6:40 pm.	4068 γ. Visibility 6 nautical miles.
"Lützow"	"Moltke"	optically	6:40 pm.	Transfer to ships of the line with heavy artillery. <sup>525</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
High Seas chief	All	-	6:44 pm.	Leadership in front. Division battle turn to N.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	6:44 pm.	All large cruisers turn to NNE.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	6:50 pm.	All large cruisers turn to N.
High Seas chief	All	-	6:51 pm.	Run less drive.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optically	6:53 pm.	All big cruisers. Leadership in front.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	6:55 pm.	All large cruisers turn to battle on E.
High Seas chief	All	-	6:55 pm.	Increase speed.
"Wiesbaden"	12th half-flotilla	-	6:58 pm.	Turning off; Ultimate strength.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	6:58 pm.	Torpedo boats to attack.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	6:59 pm.	Turn the battle to starboard until the wake is created in the opposite direction.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	7:00 pm.	Run less speed.
"Frankfurt"	Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces	-	7:00 pm.	Getting shot at by enemy ships of the line.
"Wiesbaden"	leader of the II reconnaissance group	-	7:01 pm.	Both machines damaged; am incapable of maneuverable.
II. Leader of the torpedo boats	II., VI., IX. Flotilla	-	7:02 pm.	Right ahead of the leader's ship.
"Frankfurt"	"Derfflinger"	1701	7:02 pm.	Commander of the reconnaissance forces, High Seas chief. Am shot at by enemy ships of the line. Leader of the II Reconnaissance Group.
"Frankfurt"	High Seas chief	1906	7:10 pm.	Enemy ships of the line are 025 ε. Leader of the II Reconnaissance Group.
"Frankfurt"	High Seas chief	1921	7:10 pm.	"Wiesbaden" unable to maneuver 024 ε. Leader of the II Reconnaissance Group.
"Lützow"	I. Reconnaissance Group	optical	7:10 pm.	Turn the battle to starboard until the wake is made in the opposite direction.
Leader of the II reconnaissance group	"Regensburg"	-	7:14 pm.	Send a torpedo boat to "Wiesbaden". - Take it in tow.
Leader of the II Reconnaissance Group	Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces	-	7:15 pm.	"Wiesbaden" is unable to maneuver, is starboard aft. <sup>526</sup>









Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
II. Guide of the torpedo boats	II. Flotilla	-	-	Enemy is aiming SSE, pulls past "Lützow" on port side; 6 armored cruisers strong.
"Seydlitz"	High Seas chief	2050	9:06 pm.	"Derfflinger" only two tubes clear.
-	-	-	-	Port engine failed. "Margrave".
II. leader Torpedo boat	II. Flotilla	-	9:08 pm.	II. Flotilla is 9:45 pm. released for a night attack on the enemy main body. Enemy is suspected to be in Sector E to NE. Starting square for 9:30 pm. will follow. Return of the flotilla around Skagen to Kiel, if marching back to the German Bight is not advisable. To the south of them further flotillas are deployed in sectors. I will radio my location at 1 a.m.
"Hamburg"	"Arcona"	2050	9:10 pm.	3. U-Half Flotilla, "U 53", "U 67". Ready-to-use submarines and "U 67" advance north immediately. 6 a.m. Report location. Leaders of the submarines.
II. leader Torpedo boat	II. Flotilla	-	9:10 pm.	The commanded sector is moved to ENE to ESE.
High Seas chief	I. Leader Torpedo Boat, II. Leader Torpedo Boat	2112	9:15 pm.	Prepare all torpedo boats for the night. Command I. leader Torpedo boats.
II. Leader of the torpedo boats	II. Flotilla, 12. Half-flotilla	-	9:15 pm.	II flotilla, 12th half-flotilla released.
II. Leader of the torpedo boats	VI. Flotilla, 12th half-flotilla	-	9:15 pm.	9:45 pm. advance against the enemy in sectors ESE to SE. Location 9:30 pm. 161 γ.
"Frankfurt"	High Seas chief	2119	9:19 pm.	162 γ middle right two "Chatham" class. 008 ε enemy armored cruisers, steer SW. Leader of the II Reconnaissance Group.
"Stettin"	High Seas chief	2121	9:21 pm.	4 enemy small cruisers in 007 ε Leader of the IV Reconnaissance Group.
			9:25 pm.	If IV. Reconnaissance Group is requested by the chief of II. Squadron to sit in front of the main body.
"Regensburg"	High Seas chief, I. leader of the torpedo boats	2126	9:30 pm.	From 161 γ 9:30 pm. II. Flotilla advances sector ENE to ESE. 12. Half-flotilla ESE to SE. Flotillas scheduled before 2112. II. Leader of the torpedo boats.
"Rostock"	High Seas chief	2131	9:35 pm.	II. Leaders of the torpedo boats independently prepare assigned flotillas. I. Leader of the torpedo boats.
High Seas chief	Fleet	-	9:36 pm.	Course S. <sup>530</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"L 14"	High Seas chief	2100	9:41 pm.	Location 4023 ε; SSE course, visibility 1 nautical mile.
"S 53" (Flotilla boat III. Flotilla)	"Regensburg"	-	9:45 pm.	5 boats of the III. Flotilla on the spot. Request for orders and position.
"Regensburg"	III. Flotilla	-	9:45 pm.	Stay here.
High Seas chief	All	-	9:52 pm.	Course S.
"Rostock"	High Seas chief	2150	9:57 pm.	III. flotilla Report location. I. Leader of the torpedo boats.
High Seas chief	"von der Tann"	continues through the line	10.00 pm.	armored cruiser attach.
"G39"	"Moltke"	optically	10:00 pm.	Report the condition of the weapons. 1. Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces.
"Moltke"	"G39"	optical	10:00 pm.	Heavy artillery clear. Medium artillery for the most part clear. Z. station and WWO clear. 300 tons of water in the ship.
"Rostock"	High Seas chief	2156	10:02 pm.	V. and VII. Flotilla. VII. Flotilla advance from 165 γ sector SE to S by E. V. Flotilla sector S by E to SSW. I. Leader of the torpedo boats.
High Seas chief	Navy Airship Department	2206	-	Early reconnaissance at Horns Reef urgently required.
"Regensburg"	High Seas chief	2203	10:08 pm.	II. and VI. Flotilla. 10 pm. own main ship 165 γ below, course S.
"Rostock"	High Seas chief	2158	10:09 pm.	I. Leader of the torpedo boats to 2150: 5 boats 165 γ with II. Leader of the torpedo boats. III. Flotilla.
High Seas chief	All	2214	10:10 pm.	Most of the SSE¼E course. Travel 16 nautical miles. Attach large cruisers. II. Squadron at the end.
"König"	High Seas chief	2205	10:15 pm.	"Lützow" in 007 ε came from view with course S and slow speed. Chief of the III. Squadron.
High Seas chief	All	2229	-	II. Squadron behind III Squadron. Large cruisers at the end. II. Reconnaissance group ahead, IV. Reconnaissance group to starboard.
"Hanover"	High Seas chief	2217	10:30 pm.	Enemy in sight, 4 ships, 166 γ. 2nd Admiral of the 2nd Squadron.
"G39"	"Moltke"	optically	10:30 pm.	Please veer to port and stop. I. Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces.
"Rostock"	High Seas chief	2239	10:40 pm.	On the 18th half flotilla. To 2217 (from "Hannover"): attack enemy. 1. Leader of the torpedo boats. <sup>531</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
High Seas chief	Fleet	2246	10:45 pm.	Own course SSE $\frac{3}{4}$ E.
"B 98"	"Rostock"	2150	10:48 pm.	To all. 020 ε 5 enemy small cruisers, many destroyers; get pushed away; I steer NW. II. Flotilla.
-	-	-	10:50 pm.	II. Squadron by turning around to port and U-turn to port "König" is attached.
"G 39"	"Moltke"	optically	10:50 pm.	Commander of the reconnaissance forces comes to "Moltke".
"Moltke"	"G39"	optically	10:55 pm.	"Moltke" has stopped.
"Rostock"	High Seas chief	2248	10:55 pm.	18. Half-flotilla. At 2239 (concerns attacking the enemy): Sector SSW to SW. I. Leader of the torpedo boats.
"Frankfurt"	High Seas chief	2258	10:55 pm.	5 enemy cruisers heading ENE in 017 ε. Leader of the II Reconnaissance Group.
"G40"	"Rostock"	2250	11:12 pm.	Fleet, "König", "Lützow" 11:30 pm. with 4 boats in 018 ε middle, course SSW, 13 nautical miles.
High Seas chief	"G42"	2315	11:15 pm.	A group of torpedo boats are looking for a connection at "Lützow". "Lützow" is around 9:30 pm. in 007 ε came from view with course S and slow speed. Report numbers of boats.
"Elbing"	High Seas chief	2319	11:22 pm.	Fleet. The enemy's detection signal is from 11 o'clock onwards: "ü".
"Rostock"	High Seas chief	2321	11:38 pm.	Shot enemy small cruisers with destroyers on a southern course in 012 ε. I. Leader of the torpedo boats.
High Seas chief	Fleet	2332	11:34 pm.	Own main course SE by S.
"Rostock"	High Seas chief	2332	11:36 pm.	All flotillas. 4 a.m. be collected at your own main body Horns reef or the way around Skagen. I. Leader of the torpedo boats.
"Frankfurt"	High Seas chief	2333	11:45 pm.	Fleet. Call detection signal of the enemy is: "u a" (not "ü"). Leader of the II Reconnaissance Group.
"S 24"	"Rostock"	2320	11:45 pm.	Fleet. 054 α VII destroyer, course S, running at high speed. VII. Flotilla.
"Frankfurt"	High Seas chief	2302	11:46 pm.	I'm in combat with an enemy small cruiser. Leader of the II Reconnaissance Group.
"König"	High Seas chief	2230	11:53 pm.	Location 007 ε, course S by W, 11 nautical miles. Where can the enemy be expected from? "Lützow". <sup>532</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
June 1st.				
"SL4"	High Seas chief	2400	-	Location 158 α VII. arrive.
High Seas chief	"Westphalia"	0002	-	SE¾S course on Horns Reef Fire Ship.
High Seas chief	All	0006	-	Location own Main Body 12 pm. 012 ε. Course SE¾S.
"S 52"	"Rostock"	0003	12:15 am.	To the High Seas chief, I. Torpedo boat leader. Please give exact location. "Lützow".
"L14"	III. Entrance	-	12:33 am.	To High Seas chief. Location 158 α VII. arrive.
"S 32"	. Torpedo boat leader, High Seas chief	0040	12:52 am.	070 α unable to maneuver.
"G40"	High Seas chief, Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces	0005	12:55 am.	"Lützow" can only run slowly. Navigation restricted. Location 016 ε Course S. Artillery limited to ⅓.
"Frankfurt"	High Seas chief	-	-	4 enemy armored cruisers 093α. The reported enemy forces steer SSE. (English disturbs.)
“Seydlitz”	High Seas chief	-	1:08 am.	4 enemy armored cruisers in 093 α with course S.
"König"	High Seas chief	0101	1:09 am.	"Rostock" unable to maneuver. Chief of the III. Squadron.
II. Leader of the torpedo boats	III. Flotilla	-	1:12 am.	Three boats to port on the burning ship.
"L22"	High Seas chief	2321	1:13 am.	Ascended to reconnaissance. 12:55 am. Location 122 β VII, course N by W. Nothing suspicious.
"G9"	High Seas chief, I. Leader of the Torpedo Boat	0110	1:16 am.	Enemy small cruiser in 069 α with course S.
I. Leader of the torpedo boats	III. Flotilla	-	-	A boat to "Rostock".
"G 101"	High Seas chief, I. and II. Leader of Torpedo Boat	0052	1:18 am.	Go around Skagen. II. Flotilla.
"Elbing"	III. Flotilla	optically	-	here "Elbing"; am helpless. Please come alongside.
"S 52"	High Seas chief	0180	1:31 am.	Location 016 ε, enemy interfering with F.T., destroyer in sight, course S.
"Rostock"	High Seas chief	0132	1:32 am.	Torpedo hit 055 α, F. T. main station unclear, can run 17 nautical miles. <sup>533</sup>



Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"Regensburg"	High Seas chief	0259	2:46 am.	All T. flotillas collect at the top of the First Squadron. II. Leader of the torpedo boats.
"S 32"	"Regensburg"	0245	2:52 am.	For "Lutzow". Location 089 α VII, unable to maneuver.
"L 24"	III. Entrance	0240	2:55 am.	High Seas chief. Naval Airship Dept. Bing fired at ineffective from several vehicles in 069 ε IV.
"Rostock"	II leader of the torpedo boats	-	2:57 am.	send two destroyers to "Rostock".
"S53"	"Regensburg"	0250	3:01 am.	To High Seas chief. I have almost the entire crew of "Elbing" on board. 3:00 am 086 α. III. Flotilla.
II leader of the torpedo boats	"V71", "V 73"	-	-	Go to "Rostock".
"L 17"	High Seas chief	0300	3:09 am.	Location 62 ε; steer NW by N.
"Deutschland"	High Seas chief	0321	3:20 am.	"Pomerania" destroyed by explosion in 103 α. Chief of the II. Squadron.
II leader of the torpedo boats	VI, V. flotilla	-	-	Boats with clear torpedoes line up to attack when a new battle begins. Boats without torpedoes to "Regensburg".
High Seas chief	All	0331	-	Location of main body 4:30 am. 101 α center right. SE by S, drive 16 miles.
"L 24"	III. Entrance	-	3:47 am.	An High Seas chief, Naval Airship Department. More light enemy forces in 115 ε IV I - - - steer - - - ordered.
Torpedo boat	fleet	-	3:50 am.	"V4" destroyed by explosion forecastle. According to the commander by ramming a submarine. Most of the crew rescued.
"Frankfurt"	High Seas chief	0344	3:50 am.	Location "Frankfurt", "Pillau" 3.30 am. 111 α, rate SE by S, Speed 16 nautical miles. Leaders of the II. Reconnaissance Group.
"G39"	High Seas chief	0305	3:55 am.	"Derfflinger" and "von der Tann" just two big guns have clear. "Moltke" has 1,000 tons of water in the ship. "Seydlitz" is also damaged. I. Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces.
"L14"	III. Entrance	0330	3:55 am.	To High Seas chief. Landing Nordholz 4:30 am.
"G39"	High Seas chief	0350	4:02 am.	"Moltke" is 3.30 am. 117 α left. Course SE¾S, 18 nautical miles. I. Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces <sup>535</sup> .

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"Oldenburg"	All	optically	4:03 am.	Enemy submerged submarine in sight to starboard.
"Friedrich der Große"	All	optically	4:08 am.	4-line turn to starboard. (Withdrawn with reversing flags.)
"L 24"	III. Entrance	0400	4:19 am.	Fleet, Navy - Airship Department. 4 a.m. numerous enemy forces 036 δ VII, at least 12 units. Location 016 δ, course S.
"Moltke"	High Seas chief	optically	4:20 am.	"Moltke" join at the 1st Squadron. I. Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces.
High Seas chief	Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces	0424	-	1st reconnaissance group arrive.
"L11"	High Seas chief	0410	4:30 am.	In 033 β (7) 12 English ships of the line, many light enemy forces in sight, navigate NNE at high speed.
"L24"	High Seas chief	0415	4:33 am.	The reported enemy forces appear to be steering S, high speed. Get chased by two cruisers in 029 δ, course N by W.
High Seas chief	"Regensburg"	0414	4:35 am.	To "G40". Report the location of "Lützow".
High Seas chief	All	0438	-	II. Reconnaissance group aft, - IV. Reconnaissance group forward. I. Torpedo boat leader distributes torpedo boats to secure submarines II. Squadron arrive.
"Friedrich der Große"	"Moltke"	optically	4:40 am.	"Friedrich der Große" Position 4:30 am. Square 117 α right center.
"Ostfriesland"	fleet	—	4:50 am.	Commandant "Oldenburg" wounded, 1st officer in command taken over.
High Seas chief	All	0454	-	Course SE. Approach east of Amrum Bank.
"Friedrich der Große"	All	optically	5:08 am.	Run in Formation.
"G 8"	fleet	-	5:08 am.	Formed a reconnaissance line with the 5th flotilla according to orders. Not seen anything during the night. I stayed behind to provide assistance in the "V4" accident.
"S53"	"Regensburg", High Seas chief	0454	5:15 am.	Commander "Elbing" remained on board with the first officer, torpedo officer and cutter crew. Will only blow up the ship if the enemy comes in sight. Chief of the III. Flotilla. <sup>536</sup>



Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"Regensburg"	High Seas chief	-	5:24 am.	From "G 38" to Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces, Fleet. 2:45 am. "Lützow" blown up and abandoned. "G 38"
"L 11"	III. Entrance	0500	5:33 am.	028 α three enemy battlecruisers; steer W. Weather very hazy. It is difficult to keep in touch.
"L 11"	High Seas chief	0440	5:35 am.	(7) 043 β further 6 enemy capital ships, course N; pivot on west course. Get shot at, pushed aside, have contact with the enemy main body.
"Ostfriesland"	"Friedrich der Große"	—	5:40 am.	"Helgoland" received a heavy bullet hit on the side armor above the waterline yesterday in the night battle. The bullet punched out a piece of armor with a circular radius of about 1 m, which flew into the tween deck. The projectile itself did not penetrate the ship, but rather crashed outboard. No dead or wounded, the leak is plugged. I. Squadron Command.
"L 11"	III. Entrance	0510	5:47 am.	The reported enemy armed forces control N. Individual enemy armed forces in 047 α in the haze from view. Own course N. Position unsure; unseen.
"V2"	"Rostock"	0520	6:00 am.	I. Torpedo boats leader, fleet. "V4" 054 γ destroyed by explosion in the ship. 64 men, including all officers, rescued.
"S 32"	"Regensburg"	0525	6:00 am.	To the II. leader of the torpedo boats, 1st half flotilla. Location 5:30 am. 142 α VII, course SE by E <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub> E. Travel is 10 nautical miles.
"V 71"	"Regensburg"	0512	6:05 am.	To High Seas chief. When enemy forces approach from the west, "Rostock" sunk in 080α (7) top right. Crew on torpedo boats.
"Friedrich der Große"	"Hamburg"	optically	6:15 am.	To leaders of the submarines. Can you direct a submarine to "Elbing" 056 α VII? High Seas chief
"L24"	High Seas chief	0545	6:20 am.	I'm pushed aside and shot at. Very hazy at ride height. Location 110 ε, course SW.
"L 24"	High Seas chief	0600	6:20 am.	I turned around because of the freshening southerly winds and deep cloud layers. Location 098 ε (4). <sup>537</sup>



Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"S 52"	"Regensburg"	0720	7:48 am.	Torpedo boat leader, IX. Flotilla, High Seas chief, commander of the reconnaissance forces. Location 160 α VII. Horns-Reef course, 25 nautical miles.
"Westphalia"	High Seas chief, chief of the 1st squadron	0700	7:58 am.	Sunk 5 attacking destroyers tonight, apparently "Botha" class, shot sixth on fire, watched 5 boats numbers: 60, 93, 30, 78, 606.
"L 17"	High Seas chief	0600	8:16 am.	091 β. Have no contact with the enemy. Course to 080 α; nothing suspicious.
Nordholz	High Seas chief	0800	8:29 am.	All airships come in. Marine Airship Dept.
"G11"	"Friedrich der Große"	-	8:30 am.	V. Flotilla has 3 officers, 56 men from the destroyer "Nomad" on board. Including 7 seriously wounded. V. Flotilla
"Moltke"	High Seas chief	0818	8:36 am.	I would like to suggest that "Moltke", "Derfflinger", after passing east of the Amrum Bank, go Jade at maximum speed and enter the lock at high tide. "Derfflinger" cannot anchor. I. Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces.
"Moltke"	High Seas chief	0830	8:48 am.	Chief Flotilla Forstmann, station. Please 1st minesweeping division and available boats III. Send minesweeping divisions and port flotillas to the units to secure from submarines. I. Reconnaissance Force Commander.
"S 73"	fleet	-	8:50 am.	Got 8 prisoners from new destroyer "Tipperary" on board, which was set on fire in square 072 α. Nearby were two other disabled destroyers of the older type that had been destroyed. III. Flotilla.
Neumünster	High Seas chief	0755	8:55 am.	Flagship of the British main body on cruiser flagship: Falls 9:30 am. nothing in sight, turn around and search north.
Helgoland Insel	High Seas chief	0820	8:55 am.	Leaders of the submarines. "U 53" has sailed north. II. U-half flotilla.
"S53"	fleet command	-	9:00 am.	The commander "Elbing" intended to head for the cutter Horns-Riff-Feuerschiff with the rest of the crew who remained on board if the ship did not float or had to be blown up. Flotilla Chief. <sup>539</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"Regensburg"	High Seas chief	0906	10:06 am.	I, III, IX., VII. Flotilla. Report whether and which boats are missing. II. Leader of the torpedo boats.
High Seas chief	Commander in Chief of the Baltic Sea Forces	-	-	Beyond Neumünster. Second T. Flotilla march back around Skagen.
"L 13"	High Seas chief	0800	9:25 am.	Location 7037 γ; nothing suspicious. Visibility of 20 nautical miles, wind SW by W, strength 7 doms, strongly refreshing in 500 m. Go 017γ (7).
"S 24"	"Stettin"	0916	9:26 am.	II. Leader of the torpedo boats. Complete. VII. Flotilla.
"V 45"	"Regensburg"	0800	9:35 am.	II. Leader of the torpedo boats. "G40" towed by "G37" due to damage in a battle with destroyers. Location 8 a.m. 130 α VII, journey 10 nautical miles, head for List, "Lützow" - crew on board.
"Kaiser"	"Friedrich der Große"	optically	9:35 am.	Commander to chief. After the first U-turn, "Kaiser" received a hit of heavy caliber against armor, starboard casemate. Grenade got stuck. Head mechanic wounds life-threateningly. Outer skin over water and net rigging damaged by hits.
"S16"	fleet	-	9:45 am.	Yesterday evening "S 16" fished 2 people out of a large pile of rubble who claim to be the only survivors of "Indefatigable". VII. Flotilla.
"Hamburg"	High Seas chief	0820	9:45 am.	Please send the following signal to Bruges and Nauen with the next traffic time: As return of damaged ships from the Skagerrak is expected, the east coast is located on the east coast, if one day is possible, extend a day. "U 24", "U 32" also go in front of the Tyne River. Leaders of the submarines.
"S 32"	"Regensburg"	0945	10:03 am.	1st half flotilla, 1st leader of the torpedo boats (through "Regensburg"). I am finally unable to maneuver. Anchored at Lyngvig lighthouse, 2 nautical miles away.
Neumünster	High Seas chief	0930	10:15 am.	Wrecked English ship 8:15 am. about 027 β VII with course SW by W.
Neumünster	High Seas chief	1010	10:16 am.	9:45 am. Enemy main body in 100 α, steers N, runs 20 nautical miles. <sup>540</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"L 11"	High Seas chief	0810	10:19 am.	From "G 38" to Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces, I. Leader of the torpedo boats. 7 am. "G40", "V 45" with rescued persons from "Lützow" - crew left behind in 109 α. "G40" can only run 10 nautical miles. Request protection. Send location to "G 37", "V45". "G38".
"Regensburg"	High Seas chief	0909	10:26 am.	Commander of the reconnaissance forces on 0945 from High Seas chief: 1st Flotilla. I propose to have "S32" towed by a fish trawler. II. Leader of the torpedo boats.
Helgoland Insel	High Seas chief	0930	10:32 am.	Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces, Chief 1st Group of III. Minesweeping Division. All available boats go towards the formation east of Amrum Bank. I. Mine search Division, Harbor flotilla Helgoland, "S 127" are on their way. Chief Flotilla Forstmann.
Helgoland Insel	High Seas chief	0900	10:34 am.	All, leaders of the submarines. "U 53" goes to 056 α (7). 2nd U-half flotilla.
"Thuringia"	High Seas Command, 1st Squadron	-	10:35 am.	"Thuringia" has 1 o'clock am. Burned and incapacitated an enemy large cruiser with 4 funnels. At 1:50 am. a burning enemy small cruiser was fired at to put it out of action, which was achieved.
"Regensburg"	High Seas chief	1025	10:36 am.	On "G 38", "V45". Location of 10:30 am. Report. "Regensburg" runs counter to it. II. Leader of the torpedo boats.
"G 39"	"Regensburg"	1024	10:40 am.	"Regensburg" for "V 40", "S 32", I and II leaders of the torpedo boats. Suggestions for 0800 and 0915: 1. "V40" is towed to Elbe, from there by tug to Kiel. 2. Do I intend to go to "S 32" and take it in tow. Request second boat. 1st half flotilla.
High Seas chief	3rd U-Half Flotilla	1043	-	To Neumünster 0930: Damaged English ship 8:15 am. Send about 027 β VII on course SW by W. send submarine.
"Prinzregent Luitpold"	high seas command	optically	10:50 am.	No battle damage. "Kaiserin".
"Prinzregent Luitpold"	high seas command	optical	11:00 am.	"Prinzregent Luitpold" no battle damage.
"S53"	"Regensburg"	0921	11:07 am.	II. Leader of the torpedo boats, 5th and 6th half-flotilla. To 0906: I haven't had any news about "V 48" since yesterday at 8 pm, or about "S 54" and "G 88" since today 2 am. III. Flotilla. <sup>541</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
High Seas chief	All	1114	-	Union commandos. All ships that have to call in because of a serious accident must be reported to the high seas command. All other ships Wilhelmshaven-Roadstead, II Squadron Elbe. A flotilla Schillig-Reede, a flotilla Helgoland. From the Helgoland Flotilla, a half-flotilla is supposed to advance in the dark to the scene of the accident "Elbing" to rescue the remains of the crew. The rest of the flotillas come in.
"Poznan"	fleet	—	11:15 am.	"Elbing" broke through formation tonight and caused a collision with "Posen". "Posen" destroyed one destroyer in the daytime battle yesterday and three destroyers tonight. Destroyer "30" and two others came up from astern, the eighth turned away amid heavy smoke. The other two were shot down. "78" came from the front, had been shot and was destroyed by "Posen". 2nd Admiral I. Squadron.
High Seas chief	II. Leader of the Torpedo boats	1116	-	To F.T. 0945 of "S 32": Half-flotilla, which sent to "Elbing" tonight, is at the same time entrusted with salvage "S32".
"Friedrich der Große"	III. Squadron command	optically	11:27 am.	"Friedrich der Große" suffered no damage.
High Seas chief	Fleet	1101	11:33 am.	I award all wounded who have fought bravely and who do not yet have the Iron Cross, II. class, the Iron Cross, II. class.
List	"Friedrich der Große"	-	12:02 pm.	F T.-Airplane 541 at 7:40 am. von List rose to the WNW course. Landed in Heligoland. Clarified at 8 o'clock 160 β. Nothing suspicious. Visibility 2 to 3 nautical miles.
List	"Friedrich der Große"	—	12:03 pm.	Plane "291" and "507" at 8:35 am. on risen after 159 β landing 9:20 am. Cunning. Clarified about 7:45 pm. 144 α two destroyers of their own. Result of the investigation: Nothing suspicious. Visibility 8 nautical miles. Vice versa because of heavy rain and on the fresh sea.
List	"Friedrich der Große"	—	12:03 pm.	F. T. airplane "569" 8:40 pm. Ascended List. Course WNW. Landing 8:30 pm. Cunning. Clarified about 7:30 pm. 149 α, 7:55 pm. 167 α. Result of the investigation: Nothing suspicious. Visibility 5 nautical miles. Aborted due to engine failure. <sup>542</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
List	High Seas chief	1045	12:05 pm.	High Seas chief, Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces. Planes "508", "291" landed. About 158 β and 152 β and back. Nothing suspicious. Visibility 1 nautical mile.
List	"Friedrich der Große"	1130	12:08 pm.	Aircraft "502" 11:30 pm. ascended from List. Course WNW. Landing 1:05 pm. enlightened about: 12 pm 156 β, 12:25 pm. 124β, 12:30 pm. 148 β. Result of the reconnaissance: 156β own forces, course WNW, 148β own forces. Nothing suspicious. Visibility 2-4 nautical miles.
Nordholz	High Seas chief	1157	12:09 pm.	Run in "L11". Refreshing south winds. report location. Naval Airship Department.
"L11"	High Seas chief	1045	12:12 pm.	Landing Nordholz 1 pm.
"L11"	High Seas chief	1210	12:20 pm.	Naval Airship Department. On 1157: Location 7167 β.
"Regensburg"	"S 32"	1038	12:20 pm.	To I. Flotilla. I sent "V73" to tow in "S 32" through Nordmands-Tief. I. Leader of the torpedo boats.
"Moltke"	High Seas Command	—	12:20 pm.	Participated in the first part of the battle:
	<p>3 "Lions", 1 "Tiger" type, 2 "Indomitables", later correctly identified 5 battleships. In the first part of the battle 2 battlecruisers were knocked out by I. Scouting Group, one very likely sunk. A torpedo boat in passing asked today whether it was already known here that the sunken armored cruiser was "Queen Mary"; Unfortunately the number of the torpedo boat was not determined. Nothing is known here about the name of the sunken armored cruiser either. In the second part of the battle, an old armored cruiser of the "Sutley" type was clearly identified, probably sunk by a ship torpedo from "Lützow". In addition, a light cruiser badly damaged, "von der Tann" caused a destroyer to sink.</p> <p>Observed sinking of own torpedo boat, serious damage to two other boats. Fate of "Wiesbaden" not known here. Several heavy hits on "Lützow", broadside, headquarters, artillery connection point full of water. F.T. Station and Tower "B" out of action.</p> <p>Addition: VII. Flotilla reports: Yesterday evening "S68" fished two people out of a large heap of rubble who said they were the only survivors from "Indefatigable".</p> <p>I. Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces.</p>			
"König"	fleet	-	12:45 pm.	Damage report from "König": 8 heavy hits, two 15 cm. Damage: Forward ammunition chamber group flooded, one oil boiler, both capstans failed. Protective nets damaged. About 1000 tons of water in the ship. One doctor, 29 dead, 16 wounded. III Squadron Command.
"König"	High Seas chief	1226	12:45 pm.	Regarding 1114: "König", "Großer Kurfürst" and "Margraf" must arrive. "König" and "Großer Kurfürst" cannot anchor. chief of the III. squadron. <sup>543</sup>



Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"Moltke"	High Seas chief	1025	12:50 pm.	Imperial shipyard Wilhelmshaven, port captain. Both locks today 1.15 pm. have ready for "Moltke" and "Derfflinger". In addition, he asked dry dock for "Moltke" and floating dock for "Seydlitz" in the first place. I. Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces.
Helgoland Island	High Seas chief	1247	12:57 pm.	F. T. aircraft message: 145 β enemy submarine.
Neumünster	High Seas chief	1030	1 pm.	Re 0930: Damaged ship is towed; trip is 7 nautical miles. Concerns wrecked English ship in 027 β VII.
"Moltke"	"Friedrich der Große"	-	1 pm.	"V28" reports: Have on board 2 prisoners from "Queen Mary" which has sunk. Also fished items from the destroyer "Laurel" at the extermination site. I. Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces.
"Ostfriesland"	High Seas chief	1249	1:05 pm.	I Squadron, 2nd Admiral I Squadron. Regarding 1114: "Ostfriesland" enter the shipyard, "Nassau", "Oldenburg" Wilhelmshaven Reede. Remainder of I Squadron Schillig-Reede. Outpost duty until tomorrow. I Squadron.
"Markgraf"	"Friedrich der Große"	-	1:10 pm.	Most important damage: Port engine failed. Leak in the stern. Can run 13 nautical miles; also several other damages.
"Markgraf"	fleet	-	1:10 pm.	A light cruiser with four funnels sank due to fire from "Markgraf". Hits on an armored cruiser, which turned on it, were observed.
"Oldenburg"	High Seas chief	0855	1:10 pm.	Chief of the I Squadron. Sunk an already shot destroyer yesterday afternoon, two tonight including G30.
"Posen"	fleet	-	1:15 pm.	"Rheinland" and "Helgoland" from six ships of the 1st squadron located here have to come in for capstan repairs because anchoring is in question. However, "Helgoland" will try to anchor at Schillig-Reede in order to remain on the outpost until tomorrow. 2nd Admiral of I Squadron.
"V71"	"Regensburg"	0047	1:20 pm.	Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces, V Flotilla. V. Flotilla outpost service Schillig-Reede. 1. Torpedo Boat Commander.
"V28"	High Seas chief	0918	1:33 pm.	II. Leader of the torpedo boats. On 0906: "V 27" (lead boat of the 17th half-flotilla), "V 29", "S 35" sunk. IX. Flotilla.
Heligoland Island	Fleet	1335	-	11 a.m. am. 043 γ and 12:37 middle heavy detonation. <sup>544</sup>







Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
"Ostfriesland"	High Seas chief	—	8:18 pm.	The cruiser destroyed by 1st meeting this morning is either a Shannon or Devonshire class armored cruiser. The first assumption is more likely based on the silhouette. A large ship was most likely among the other burning vehicles. Evidence: Heavy hits on "Helgoland" and further heavy hits on 1st Squadron and capital ship silhouette of the burning ship. "Nassau" has defected to an enemy destroyer. I. Squadron.
"Stettin"	"Kaiser"	1937	8:43 pm.	To Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces. "Frauenlob" came from view in 012 ε IV. Leader of the IV Reconnaissance Group.
-	-	-	9 pm.	"Seydlitz" 165 ε VII top center, drives over the stern.
"Arcona"	"Kaiser"	1659	10:22 pm.	Commander of the submarines, 1st, 3rd U-Half flotilla. Besides destroyers, the enemy has large (?) mine ships. Lively trade between English and neutral ships from the Humber. I attacked on the evening of May 31st a large English destroyer with 4 funnels; very heavy detonation, sink observed. Location (?) 125 γ IV. Approaching Ameland Island. "UB 21".
2nd of June.				
"Westphalia"	"Kaiser"	2320	12:50 am.	High Seas chief, Chief I Squadron. The first destroyer "60" destroyed yesterday was probably a torpedo boat escort cruiser, since the bow gun, stern gun and 2 or 3 broadside guns were flawlessly observed, all with armored shields.
News department	"Kaiser"	—	8:32 am.	To High Seas chief. Rotersand reports 8:20 am: towed train "Seydlitz" at Außenjade.
"Regensburg"	fleet	—	9:31 am.	From our boats got lost: "V 27", "V 29", "S 35", "V4", "V 48". Nothing known of II. Flotilla. Had 10 boats left when released for night push. Admiral Staff Officer to the Second Commander of the Torpedo Boats.
3rd of June.				
-	-	0230	-	To High Seas chief. Shot down a cruiser with 4 funnels. Overrun a destroyer. Am attached to 11th Squadron. Maximum speed 15 nautical miles. "Nasau" <sup>548</sup> .

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
News department	"Kaiser"	-	8:30 a.m.	SS. Berlin Adm. 3rd/6th 7:35 am. - For High Seas Chief - Kz 9004 telegram from Amsterdam: Official report from London: In the great naval battle we lost "Queen Mary", "Indefatigable", "Invincible", "Defence", "Black Prince", "Turbulent", "Tipperary", Fortune, Sparrowhawk, and Ardent. Other ships are still missing. Admiral' Staff A 16308 four.
High Seas chief	Chief II Squadron	-	-	Today's discussion of the course of the battle with local unit chiefs and commanders has shown that the described holding out of the II Squadron in enemy fire has freed our armored cruisers from a serious situation. The II. Squadron thereby made a significant contribution to the overall success. I would like to express my full appreciation and special thanks to you and the ship commands reporting to you for this mission and for all other achievements. High Seas chief
"Stettin"	High Seas chief	-	4:30 pm.	SS Schillig – 2:25 Pm. To the Chief of Staff of the High Seas Force. Referring to the today by Captain z. Sea Hartog Relief of the armored cruisers touched on, it is not improbable that the IV Scouting Group, which attacked 5 armored cruisers, apparently "Devonshire" class, at this time, comes into question. IV. Reconnaissance Group was at that time in front of II. Squadron, whose firing was not noticed from here. Further investigations are being made. Leader of the IV Reconnaissance Group.
High Seas chief	Fleet	1731	6:07 pm.	Expect certain annihilation of the following enemy forces: "Queen Mary" and "Indefatigable" – from both have taken prisoners. Also two older armored cruisers, two light cruisers and at least 10 destroyers.
Admiralty's staff	High Seas chief	K.B. 1005	6:46 pm.	Kz 9096 – newspaper telegram: "Frauenlob" hit by a torpedo in the engine room at 12 o'clock at night, ship sank immediately, five-man crew until 9 am. in the boat, then taken by the Dutch steamer "Texel". Near "Terel" the English torpedo boat 625 demanded the surrender of the "Frauenlob" survivors, against which the captain of the steamer "Texel" successfully protested. Later, shipwrecked people were handed over to the tugboat "Thames". According to the steamer, encountered many empty rafts. <sup>549</sup>

Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
Admiralty's staff	High Seas chief	-	7:59 pm.	Top secret! Kz 9122. News and assumptions about the loss of "Lützow" and "Rostock" are already circulating here. Inquiries in the Reichstag and from representatives of the press are to be expected. Please come to an agreement with the State Secretary there on how parliamentary groups and representatives of the press are to be informed confidentially, and submit a proposal for the wording here without delay.
High Seas chief	Admiralty's staff	1013	-	Top secret! To number 9122.
	If disclosure cannot be avoided, the following will be used for strictly confidential information Factual account is proposed: "Lützow" and "Rostock" were blown up by their commanders on the morning of June 1, after the end of the fighting and after the entire crews, including the wounded, had been rescued by our torpedo boats on the return march Bringing in the ships was impossible. Announcement is out of the question for military reasons, since the enemy cannot know anything about the losses. Also, the enemy casualties published by us include only the total casualties observed with certainty in the battle. Secretary of State hasn't heard from here, has a copy.			
News department	"Kaiser"	-	11:30 a.m.	SS Berlin Adm. 3rd/6th 10.55 Nm. High Seas chief - Kz 9159 - Aarhus message. Sweden steamer "Para" brought in two non-commissioned officers and a stoker from German torpedo boat "V48", which were rescued 8 hours after sinking. Suppose single survivor.
June 4th.				
Bruges	High Seas chief	0121		1:35 a.m. U-Flottille Flanders took part in the operation with all boats as planned. All boats entered; only coast guard encountered. Marine Corps C 2960.
June 5th.				
High Seas chief	Admiralty's staff	-	8:05 a.m.	For press use: After notification III. Immediately after his rescue, a seaman of the "Turbulent" wrote down in his own hand in the flotilla that he had seen the following ships sink: "Warspite", "Princess Royal", "Turbulent", "Nestor", "Acasta", and passed on this information certifies his signature. Two other prisoners have confirmed this information, although they were separated immediately after rescue.
High Seas chief	Admiralty's staff	-	5 o'clock pm.	KB 1122. V flotilla reports that, according to prisoners' statements, the "Princess Royal" had already had a severe list when the "Queen Mary" sank and the light cruiser "Birmingham" sank. All 5 "Queen Elizabeths" were involved in the battle <sup>550</sup> .



Radio message		Time group	Out going	Contents
from	to			
Admiral's staff	High Seas chief	—	10:37 pm.	Kz 9263. Attaché Haag reports: English doctor Burton from the destroyer "Tipperary", rescued by Madlung, stated that the English cruiser "Euryalus" was completely burned out next to his sinking destroyer.
Admiral's staff	High Seas chief	K. B. 1005	4:35 pm.	Kz 9321. Attaché Stockholm reports: Sailor Hugo Zenne from Jena, presumably the only survivor SM "Wiesbaden", rescued by the Norwegian steamer "Willy" and landed in Drammen. "Wiesbaden" sunk by torpedo.
High Seas chief	naval airship	-	-	B K 1045. Can give "L 11" more details on types of capital ships of the line unit and battlecruisers sighted early on June 1st. Information would be very valuable.
6th of June.				
News department	"Kaiser"	-	7:39 pm.	SS Nordholz L. 6./6. 6.40 pm.
	High Seas Command Wilhelmshaven. - Secret! On KB 1045 from today: Commander "L11" wired: The 6 final ships of the first sighted - battleship group - had 2 tripod masts, 2 funnels, and were addressed as "Bellerophon", "Neptune" or "Collingwood" class. The class of the above 6 ships of the line could not be made out in the smoke and haze. The 6 battleships of the second group (to the east of the first) also each had two tripod masts and funnels. The three NE battlecruisers had two tripod masts and three funnels and were mistaken for "Australias" and "Invincibles". According to my estimate, the ships of the line drove at no more than 5 hm (rather less) closed at 16 to 18 nautical miles. The battle cruisers ran in keel line with about 8 to 9 hm ship distance and very high speed. Signed Shooter. Naval Airship Division, 5990.			
High Seas Command	Admiral's staff	-	-	KB 1050. One of the English prisoners are brought: From "Queen Mary" 1 ensign, 1 man; "Indefatigable" 2 men; "Tipperary" 7 men, 2 of them wounded; "Nestor" 3 officers, 2 deck officers, 75 men, 6 of them wounded; "Nomad" 4 officers, 68 men, including 1 officer and 10 men wounded; from "Turbulent" 14 men, all wounded; a total of 177 Englishmen captured. <sup>551</sup>

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
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The War at Sea 1914-1918\_The North Sea Book 5

Note:

No Maps were enclosed with this volume. Please see Volumes 5's Map Box, which I will try to digitize if some means to do so come to hand.

Thank you